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An Equilibrium Theorem of Strategies in Non-Linear Population Matrix Models
Version 1
: Received: 31 March 2017 / Approved: 31 March 2017 / Online: 31 March 2017 (11:29:09 CEST)
Version 2 : Received: 18 May 2017 / Approved: 18 May 2017 / Online: 18 May 2017 (03:34:39 CEST)
Version 3 : Received: 22 June 2021 / Approved: 24 June 2021 / Online: 24 June 2021 (08:38:13 CEST)
Version 2 : Received: 18 May 2017 / Approved: 18 May 2017 / Online: 18 May 2017 (03:34:39 CEST)
Version 3 : Received: 22 June 2021 / Approved: 24 June 2021 / Online: 24 June 2021 (08:38:13 CEST)
How to cite: Burgess, M. An Equilibrium Theorem of Strategies in Non-Linear Population Matrix Models. Preprints 2017, 2017030234 Burgess, M. An Equilibrium Theorem of Strategies in Non-Linear Population Matrix Models. Preprints 2017, 2017030234
Abstract
An evolutionary game is introduced which considers game-theoretic strategies in the context of non-linear population matrix models. This game considers the states and actions of the organisms of the evolving population, and a notion of dynamic equilibrium between strategies is described. The game’s formalism is expounded and a proof about equilibrium is given; specifically that any stable equilibrium can be described by proportions of pure strategies; particularly when population matrices are not defective.
Keywords
evolutionary stable strategies (ESS); Markov decision evolutionary games (MDEG); Hawk-Dove game; evolutionary dynamics; evolutionary game theory
Subject
Computer Science and Mathematics, Algebra and Number Theory
Copyright: This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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