Version 1
: Received: 20 March 2017 / Approved: 20 March 2017 / Online: 20 March 2017 (17:33:38 CET)
How to cite:
Yang, Y.; Shen, M. Decentralization and Transboundary Pollution: Evidence from the Change of Water Pollution Levels in China. Preprints2017, 2017030164. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints201703.0164.v1
Yang, Y.; Shen, M. Decentralization and Transboundary Pollution: Evidence from the Change of Water Pollution Levels in China. Preprints 2017, 2017030164. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints201703.0164.v1
Yang, Y.; Shen, M. Decentralization and Transboundary Pollution: Evidence from the Change of Water Pollution Levels in China. Preprints2017, 2017030164. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints201703.0164.v1
APA Style
Yang, Y., & Shen, M. (2017). Decentralization and Transboundary Pollution: Evidence from the Change of Water Pollution Levels in China. Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints201703.0164.v1
Chicago/Turabian Style
Yang, Y. and Manhong Shen. 2017 "Decentralization and Transboundary Pollution: Evidence from the Change of Water Pollution Levels in China" Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints201703.0164.v1
Abstract
Pollution spillover is an important issue to improve the water environment of transboundary rivers, which has been aggravated by the decentralization of China's pollution control and promotion system.This paper analyzes the evolution of the pollution reduction mandates and the possible change of water environment in China which are tested with the water quality data of state key monitoring sections in 2004-2014 .In terms of research methods, this paper mainly uses Propensity Score Matching reference with group difference test and OLS. Empirical findings support the association between decentralization and pollution levels. The pollution levels of the monitoring points located at the boundary are significantly higher than that of interior counties. The pollution of tributary is more serious than trunk stream,which quickly reversed after the system changed. Water pollution levels rapidly changes when we compare the monitoring site in front of jurisdictional boundaries with that after the jurisdictional boundaries. We draw the following conclusions that local goverments may manipulate pollution within their jurisdictions and total pollutant control system will exacerbate border pollution, while water quality inspection can reduce marginal pollution.
Copyright:
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.