Online: 15 September 2021 (15:58:51 CEST)
The relevance of bacteria to subjective experiences or qualia is under-appreciated. Here, I make four proposals. Firstly, living systems traverse sequences of active states that determine their behaviour; these states result from competitive coherence, which depends on a connectivity-based competition between a Next process and a Now process whereby elements in the active state at time n+1 are chosen between the elements in the active state at time n and those elements in the developing n+1 state. Secondly, bacteria should help us link the mental to the physical world given that bacteria were here first, are highly complex, influence animal behaviour and dominate the Earth. Thirdly, the operation of competitive coherence to generate active states in bacteria, brains and other living systems is inseparable from qualia. Fourthly, these qualia become particularly important to the generation of active states in the highest levels of living systems, namely, the ecosystem and planetary levels.
ARTICLE | doi:10.20944/preprints201905.0352.v5
Subject: Keywords: Coherence; Compression; Computation; Consciousness; Entanglement; Free-energy principle; Generative model; Information; Qualia; Quantum; Representation
Online: 14 October 2019 (09:53:26 CEST)
The QBIT theory is an attempt toward solving the problem of consciousness based on empirical evidence provided by various scientific disciplines including quantum mechanics, biology, information theory, and thermodynamics. This theory formulates the problem of consciousness in the following four questions: (1) What is the nature of qualia? (2) How are qualia generated? (3) Why are qualia subjective? (4) Why does a quale have a particular quality or meaning?In sum, the QBIT theory proposes that (1) when a pack of quantum information is compressed beyond a certain threshold, a quale is generated; (2) a quale is a superdense pack of maximally entangled qubits in a pure state; (3) when information-theoretic certainty of a system about an external stimulus exceeds a particular level, the system becomes conscious of that stimulus; (4) subjectivity of consciousness is due to the fact that maximally entangled pure states are private and unshareable.
HYPOTHESIS | doi:10.20944/preprints202003.0459.v1
Subject: Life Sciences, Biophysics Keywords: topological quantum brain; quantum computing; Majorana Zero modes; qualia; consciousness
Online: 31 March 2020 (10:41:35 CEST)
Controversial hypotheses to explain consciousness exist in many fields of science, psychology and philosophy. Recent experimental findings in quantum cognition and magnetic resonance imaging have added new controversies to the field, suggesting that the mind may be based on quantum computing. Quantum computers process information in quantum bits (qubits) using quantum gates. At a first glance, it seems unrealistic or impossible that the brain can meet the challenges to provide either of these. Nevertheless, we show here why the brain has the incredible ability to perform quantum computing and how that may be realized.
ARTICLE | doi:10.20944/preprints201907.0301.v1
Subject: Keywords: consciousness; information compression; internal representation; QBIT theory; qualia; subjective experience
Online: 26 July 2019 (12:59:02 CEST)
The QBIT theory is an attempt toward solving the problem of consciousness in the light of Quantum mechanics, Biology, Information theory, and Thermodynamics. “Internal representation” is a key concept in the QBIT theory of consciousness. An internal representation is defined as a pack of information (within a cognitive system) that represents an external stimulus.The QBIT theory suggests that when robustness of an internal representation exceeds a certain threshold, a conscious experience (or a quale) is generated. In this paper, the concept of internal representation and its relation with consciousness is explored.
ARTICLE | doi:10.20944/preprints201806.0084.v1
Subject: Behavioral Sciences, Cognitive & Experimental Psychology Keywords: qualia; consciousness; emission theories; perception; event-related brain potentials; P600 or late posterior positivity; N400
Online: 6 June 2018 (10:51:03 CEST)
We take what we see, hear, smell and feel for the reality. However, as neuroscientists, we know that this reality, that is, our perceptual world, is in fact made up by the brain from the processing of the nerve impulses coming from receptors. Ancient Greeks used to think that this perceptual world, sometimes called our 3D movie (Chalmers), is emitted and has its own physical nature. Given how real the 3D movie looks to us, it is still difficult today to consider that all we would be dealing with would be patterns of brain activity The present study thus aimed at testing whether the perceptual world could have some physical existence in addition to that of the neural patterns responsible for it. To achieve that goal, we tried to see whether brains could be sensitive to the 3D movie of others. This, admittedly unusual, operational hypothesis was based on two assumptions. First, brains are sensitive to the 3D movie, as our experience includes reactions to our perceptual world. Second, the physicality at stake does not differ across individuals. We recorded the event-related brain potentials (ERPs) evoked by stimuli of the international affective picture system in pairs of closely-related participants. Most importantly, they could neither see the stimuli simultaneously presented to their partners nor their reactions to them. As in Bouten et al. (2015), around 400 ms after the onset of the stimuli, ERPs started being more positive in inconsistent conditions. Namely, when the two subjects of each pair were presented with the same stimulus whereas they were told it would be a different one and vice-versa (i.e., different-stimuli expected to be same). ERPs were less positive when the two subjects of a pair were presented with the same stimuli and were told they were the same and conversely (i.e., different-stimuli expected to be different). The same experiment was then run in pairs of strangers. No significant effect of consistency on ERPs was observed even though participants could, this time, see, in the very periphery of their visual field, the reactions of their partner to the stimuli. We thus use the results of both studies to support a new version of the emission theory of consciousness and to suggest that the sensitivity to the perceptual world of others may depend on their prior familiarity with it.