If the development of machine learning and artificial intelligence plays a role in many fields of research and technology today, it has a special relationship with neurosciences. Indeed, historically inspired by our knowledge of the brain, deep learning shares some vocabularies with neurosciences and can sometimes be considered a brain’s model. Taking the particular example of epileptic seizure, which can develop in any biological neural tissue, we raise the question if and how the models used for deep learning can capture or model these pathological events. This particular example is a starting point to discuss the nature, limits, and functions of these models, and what we expect from a model of the brain. Finally, we argue that a pluralistic approach leading to the integrated coexistence of different models is necessary to study the brain in all its complexity.

Computational neuroscience combines mathematics, computer science models, and neurosciences for theorizing, investigating, and simulating neural systems involved in the development, structure, physiology, and cognitive abilities of the brain. Computational models constitute a major stake in translational neuroscience: the analytical understanding of these models seems fundamental to consider a translation towards clinical applications. Method: We propose a minimal typology of computational models, which allows distinguishing between more realistic models (e.g., mechanistic models) and pragmatic models (e.g., phenomenological models). Result: Understanding the translational aspects of computational models goes far beyond the intrinsic characteristics of models. First, we assume that a computational model is rarely uniquely mechanistic or phenomenological. Idealization seems necessary because of i) the researcher’s perspectives on the phenomena and the purposes of the study (i.e., by the relativity of the model); ii) The complexity of reality across different levels and therefore the nature and number of dimensions required to consider a phenomenon. Especially, the use of models goes far beyond their function, and requires considering external characteristics rooted in path dependence, interdisciplinarity, and pluralism in neurosciences. Conclusion: The unreasonable use of computational models, which are highly complex and subject to a shift in their initial function, could be limited by bringing to light such factors.