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Assessing the Risk for Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak and Health System Response Capacity in Conflict-Affected Sudan

Submitted:

17 October 2026

Posted:

20 October 2026

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Abstract
Background: Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) is a severe viral hemorrhagic fever with high case fatality rates. Ongoing regional outbreaks in Uganda and the DRC, combined with protracted armed conflict in Sudan since April 2023, increase vulnerability to importation and spread, putting Sudan at risk. Conflict has caused widespread health infrastructure destruction, healthcare worker displacement, and disruption of surveillance and laboratory systems. This study assesses Sudan’s risk of an EVD outbreak and national response capacity in the context of conflict. Methods: We reviewed peer-reviewed and grey literature using PubMed, Medline, Google Scholar, WHO, CDC, UNICEF, and UN OCHA reports. No time restrictions were applied. We applied a SWOT analysis framework to classify factors influencing EVD prevention, detection, preparedness, and response in conflict-affected Sudan. The analysis focused on health system functionality, surveillance, laboratory capacity, workforce, and population vulnerabilities. Results: Our study found existing strengths, including availability of national EVD preparedness plans, prior experience responding to cholera, dengue, measles, and COVID-19, functional coordination through the Health Cluster, and ongoing disease surveillance systems including EWARS and Event-Based Surveillance. Weaknesses identified include severe disruption of health services (48% of facilities fully functional), health workforce shortages and burnout, disruption of laboratory capacity, and surveillance and access constraints in conflict-affected areas of Darfur and Kordofan. The ongoing health security frameworks, including the National Health Policy, National Health Sector Recovery Plan, and regional cross-border initiatives, expansion of digital surveillance, laboratory decentralization efforts, and recent international investments in health system recovery, provide significant opportunities for optimal preparedness and response. Threats identified include continued armed conflict and insecurity, large-scale internal displacement and cross-border mobility, humanitarian access constraints, and funding instability. Geographic risk synthesis indicates Darfur is at the highest risk for delayed detection and silent transmission, Kordofan serves as a transmission corridor, and Khartoum faces the highest risk of urban amplification. Conclusion: Sudan faces a moderate to high EVD outbreak risk due to potential virus importation, a conflict-weakened health system, and mass displacement. Key priorities: strengthen EWARS in conflict zones, decentralize laboratory capacity, restore health facilities with strong IPC, build workforce capacity, and adopt mobility-informed preparedness. Peace and international support remain essential for effective EVD response.
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1. Background

Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) is a severe, often fatal illness caused by the Ebola virus. Outbreaks usually begin with one zoonotic case, then spread between people through direct contact with an infected person, their body fluids, or contaminated surfaces. The genus Ebolavirus comprises Bundibugyo virus (BDV), Zaire ebolavirus (ZEBV), Reston virus (RV), Sudan virus (SDV), and Tai Forest virus (TFV), with only three (BDV, SDV, and ZEBV) known to cause large outbreaks. [1,2] The history of Ebola disease has demonstrated significant case fatality, ranging from 39.5% in the 2013 – 2016 outbreak to 100% in 2022. Table 1 describes the global outbreaks of Ebola disease by year and the responsible species. The largest outbreaks in history (2013 - 2016) have been caused by ZEBV (Table 1) in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia, with about 28,610 cases and a Case Fatality Rate (CFR) of 39%(CDC, 2026; Jacob et al., 2020). The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has a long history of Ebola outbreaks, with 16 outbreaks in the past 50 years. The outbreak declared by the DRC Ministry of Public Health, Hygiene and Social Welfare makes it the 17th outbreak. [1,4] As of October 6, 2026, about 8728 confirmed cases and 4205 confirmed deaths have been reported from 64 health zones across seven provinces, corresponding to a crude case fatality ratio (CFR) of 48.2% [5]. Most Ebola outbreaks originated in Africa, except for the isolated infections from Laboratories (in Russia and the Philippines) [2].
Pre-2011, Sudan had its own history with Ebola disease outbreaks. The first Ebola outbreaks in 1976 happened in DRC and Sudan, with SDV causing an outbreak in the Southern part of Sudan (now South Sudan). [6,7]. There were 284 cases in total: 67 in Nzara, 213 in Maridi, 3 in Tembura, and 1 in Juba, with epidemiological evidence suggesting that the Nzara outbreak originated among employees of a local cotton factory. CFR was about 53%. [6,7]. While there has been no case of Ebola disease in Sudan in recent years, Sudan has been strengthening its preparedness for Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers, especially since the SDV disease outbreak in Uganda in 2025 and the Marburg virus disease in Ethiopia [8,9].
The WHO categorized the risk of a Viral Haemorrhagic Fever (Ebola, Marburg) outbreak in Sudan as moderate level, meaning that the likelihood of occurrence is relatively low, and could make a minor contribution to excess mortality/morbidity in Sudan in 2026 [8]. While Sudan may not directly border DRC, the country may be at significant risk of an Ebola outbreak due to the ongoing outbreaks in DRC. Sudan shares a direct border with South Sudan, which borders DRC where the outbreak is currently raging, and Kenya, where three cases have recently been reported with one death [5,10]. South Sudan itself is facing a significant health crisis due to the convergence of years of armed conflict, climate-induced flooding, displacements, and a drastic reduction in international aid funding. Any case of Ebola in South Sudan increases the risk of an outbreak in Sudan due to significant border movement, in addition to international travel from other countries. Furthermore, Sudan’s health system has suffered significant collapse due to protracted armed conflict, evidenced by damage and looting of medical infrastructure, severe shortages of health personnel, difficulties in obtaining essential medical supplies, and the disruption of healthcare access and surveillance activities since April 2023 [8,9,11]
Like DRC, the ongoing conflict in Sudan potentially increases the vulnerability of Sudan to an EVD outbreak. Conflict severely undermines Ebola outbreak response. Community engagement, surveillance, contact tracing, isolation, and safe burials are key to controlling the outbreaks, but violence, mistrust, and misinformation in insecure areas make these measures much harder to implement.[8,12] In addition, it leads to mass displacement and population movement (including the displacement of health care workers), overcrowding, disrupts health system functionality, and constitutes a security threat to frontline health care workers.[12,13,14] This necessitates the need for a targeted risk assessment for Sudan. The purpose of this narrative review article is to evaluate the risk of an EVD outbreak in Sudan and its health system response capacity in the context of the ongoing conflict, using the SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) analysis framework to identify the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats that can impact outbreak prevention, preparedness, detection, and response capacity.

2. Methods

The SWOT analysis framework is applied to describe and classify obstacles and facilitators of Ebola disease outbreaks and to highlight current gaps for improvement. SWOT analysis evaluates strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats affecting a topic. It gives a clear, structured view of the situation to identify helpful and harmful factors, address current problems, recognize challenges, and guide strategic, evidence-based decisions. Although several tools, including the WHO Strategic Tool for Assessing Risks (STAR), are often used for structured national preparedness and public health risk assessment, this paper uses the SWOT analysis framework to examine broader health system and contextual factors influencing EVD occurrence and response capacity in Sudan.
Additionally, previous studies have used SWOT analysis to evaluate communicable disease surveillance systems, outbreak response strategies, pandemic risk management, and national health security capacity. In Sudan, Khogali et al. applied SWOT analysis to assess communicable disease surveillance, while similar approaches have been used for mpox surveillance in Uganda, COVID-19 epidemic response, and IHR-related global health security capacity.
We conducted a comprehensive literature search of. PubMed, Medline, Google Scholar, the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), and Semantic Scholar. We combined MeSH terms and free terms “Ebola disease,” “Risk,” “Sudan,” and “conflict-affected settings” using the necessary Boolean operators, including AND, OR, and NOT. We searched for peer-reviewed studies reporting on Ebola in Sudan and in conflict-affected settings. The articles consulted are mostly from Africa, as most Ebola outbreaks are in or originate from Africa. Other articles from outside Africa were also sought where available. All indicated databases were searched for relevant articles with no specific time restrictions. Articles not written in English were excluded. We also searched for relevant gray literature from the WHO, the Centers for Disease Control, Médecins Sans Frontières, UNICEF, and other organizations.
No formal systematic review methodology was applied in this study. Article selection was guided by its relevance to the objectives of this narrative review. All articles were uploaded in CSV (Comma Separated Values) or BibTeX format, imported into Rayyan software, duplicates were removed, and further screening was done. A hand search was also conducted through the reference lists of relevant articles.
A total of 73 peer-reviewed articles and grey sources were reviewed (31 peer-reviewed, 42 grey literature). The literature search yielded 210 peer-reviewed articles; 62 duplicates were removed. After screening (title/abstract and full text), 29 peer-reviewed articles were selected: peer-reviewed articles that consider Ebola in Sudan and other conflict-affected settings, and articles that discuss he broader Sudan context vis-à-vis disease outbreak risk and health system response capacity. 40 grey sources on EVD outbreaks were also included from the WHO, Centers for Disease Control (CDC), United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Bank, and ACAPS.

3. Current Epidemiological and Health System Context in Sudan

3.1. Ebola Epidemiology: Historical Risk and Cross-Border Transmission Dynamics

Sudan has a historical association with EVD, particularly the Sudan virus species (SUDV), first identified in Nzara village, southern Sudan, in 1976. Since then, multiple outbreaks have occurred in East and Central Africa, with case fatality rates ranging from 41% to 70%. After 1976, Sudan also experienced EVD outbreaks in 1979 (34 cases, 65% CFR) and 2004 (17 cases, 41% CFR). Although Sudan has not reported any cases since 2004, its historical linkage and ecological suitability continue to place it within the broader Ebola risk zone ([1,2,14,15]
Cross-border transmission dynamics primarily drive the risk of Ebola importation into Sudan. Sudan shares borders with South Sudan, which in turn shares borders with countries such as Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), both of which have experienced Ebola outbreaks in the past decade and are currently going through another. Population mobility, including refugees, returnees, traders, and nomadic groups (Ombararo, Folan, Falata), facilitates the potential spread of infectious diseases across borders [8,16,17]
The 2025 Sudan virus disease outbreak in Uganda, which was successfully contained, demonstrated the persistent regional threat and highlighted the importance of preparedness in neighbouring countries. Additionally, recurrent Ebola outbreaks in eastern DRC often occur in complex humanitarian settings—underscoring the ongoing risk of regional transmission. Given Sudan’s fragile health system and humanitarian context, even a single imported case could have significant public health implications [1,18].

3.2. Health System Status in Conflict-Affected Sudan States

The ongoing conflict in Sudan has severely weakened the health system, particularly in conflict-affected regions such as Darfur, Kordofan, and Khartoum. A significant proportion of health facilities are either partially functional or completely non-functional due to insecurity, damage, looting, or occupation by armed groups [8]. Healthcare worker (HCW) availability is critically limited. Many skilled professionals have been displaced, injured, or have fled the country, leading to severe staffing shortages. Remaining staff often work under extreme conditions with limited resources, irregular salaries, and high occupational risk [8,19,20].
Medical supply chains have been heavily disrupted. Insecurity along transport routes, fuel shortages, and damaged infrastructure have hindered the delivery of essential medicines, vaccines, and medical consumables. Cold chain systems are particularly affected, compromising immunization programs and outbreak response capacity [8,9,19].

3.2.1. Surveillance Capacity

Sudan implements the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) strategy; however, its effectiveness has been significantly compromised by the ongoing conflict. Surveillance systems suffer from underreporting, delays in data transmission, and limited geographic coverage, particularly in hard-to-reach and insecure areas [8] Currently, the Early Warning Alert and Response System (EWARS) mobile implemented by the WHO is being used in all five Darfur states to track 13 diseases from 400 facilities and respond to alerts; Sudan’s electronic EWARS covers about 26 diseases in nine states, though significant improvement is still required to ensure tracking accuracy of outbreaks and a timely response. However, the electronic/mobile EWARS is not yet being used for surveillance in all Sudan states. Paper-based indicator-based surveillance and event-based surveillance systems are still used to monitor about 15 diseases [9,21]
Laboratory capacity remains centralized, with advanced diagnostic services concentrated in Khartoum. In regions such as Darfur and Kordofan, laboratory infrastructure is limited, and diagnostic capacity for epidemic-prone diseases, including viral haemorrhagic fevers, is inadequate. Specimen referral systems are often delayed due to logistical constraints and insecurity [8,9]. Access to rapid diagnostic tools is inconsistent, and there is limited capacity for molecular testing (e.g., PCR) outside major urban centers. These gaps significantly reduce the ability to detect and respond promptly to potential Ebola cases or other outbreaks [1,19].

3.2.2. Population Vulnerabilities

Sudan’s population faces multiple, overlapping vulnerabilities that increase the risk of disease transmission and poor health outcomes. The country hosts millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, many of whom live in overcrowded camps or informal settlements with limited access to healthcare services [18,19]. In areas like Khartoum state, millions of people are returning to damaged residential structures and cities that do not support healthy living [8]. Population mobility patterns, including seasonal migration, cross-border movement, and displacement due to conflict, create additional challenges for disease surveillance and outbreak control. These dynamics increase the risk of rapid disease spread, including the potential introduction and transmission of Ebola [8,19].
High levels of acute malnutrition, particularly among children under five and pregnant and lactating women, further exacerbate susceptibility to infections and increase mortality risks. Food insecurity remains widespread due to conflict, economic instability, and disrupted livelihoods [18]. Water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) conditions are severely compromised in many areas. Limited access to safe drinking water, inadequate sanitation facilities, and poor hygiene practices contribute to the spread of communicable diseases, including cholera and other diarrheal illnesses [8,19].

4. SWOT Analysis of Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak Risk and Health System Capacity in Conflict-Affected Sudan

4.1. Strengths

Despite severe health system disruption secondary to the conflict, residual capacities remain that could support both EVD preparedness and outbreak response. Since the onset of the conflict, health services across many parts of the country have been affected by health infrastructure destruction, healthcare workers displacement, interruptions in medical supply chains, and reduced access to essential health services. Nevertheless, previous investments in epidemic preparedness and disease control have preserved certain public health functions that may provide a foundation for EVD preparedness efforts [8,9].
These strengths include the existence of national EVD preparedness plans and protocols developed in response to previous regional outbreaks, experience gained through responding to epidemic-prone diseases and public health emergencies, the continued presence of international partners with technical and operational expertise, and community awareness and engagement mechanisms established through earlier outbreak responses. While these capacities have been weakened by the current humanitarian crisis, they remain important assets that can be leveraged to strengthen preparedness, surveillance, risk communication, and response activities. Importantly, these strengths should not be interpreted as evidence that Sudan is adequately prepared for an EVD outbreak. Rather, they represent existing foundations upon which national authorities and humanitarian actors can build to improve readiness and mitigate the impact of a potential outbreak in a highly fragile and resource-constrained context.

4.1.1. Existing Disease Surveillance and Early Warning Systems (EWS)

Sudan retains disease surveillance and EWS that provide a foundation for the detection and reporting of epidemic-prone diseases. Such existing structures have been identified as key strengths of Sudan’s communicable disease surveillance system. In addition, the EWARS and routine surveillance activities continue to support the monitoring and reporting of priority diseases in accessible areas of the country [22,23]. Evidence of continued surveillance functionality is reflected in the detection and reporting of outbreaks and public health events, including cholera, dengue fever, measles, malaria, and acute watery diarrhea. Although surveillance coverage has been affected by insecurity, population displacement, and health system disruptions, existing reporting structures continue to generate epidemiological information used by national authorities and humanitarian partners to monitor disease trends and investigate alerts [8,9].
Existing surveillance and EWS represent an important strength because they provide existing mechanisms for the early identification, reporting, and investigation of suspected cases. While significant gaps remain, the continued operation of surveillance systems offers a foundation upon which EVD-specific surveillance and response activities could be strengthened in case of an outbreak.

4.1.2. Experience Responding to Epidemic-Prone Diseases and Public Health Emergencies

Published reports document Sudan’s response to multiple epidemic-prone diseases and public health emergencies, including yellow fever, cholera, dengue fever, measles, and COVID-19. These responses have involved surveillance, laboratory confirmation, outbreak investigation, vaccination campaigns, rapid response teams, treatment centres, infection prevention and control (IPC) measures, and risk communication activities [22,24,25,26,27].
Evidence from previous outbreaks demonstrates the implementation of several public health functions relevant to outbreak detection and control. During the 2012 yellow fever outbreak in Darfur, outbreak investigations, laboratory confirmation, disease surveillance, and a mass vaccination campaign targeting affected populations were conducted [22]. The response to the 2023 cholera outbreak in Gadarif State included surveillance activities, deployment of rapid response teams, establishment of cholera treatment centres, laboratory testing using rapid diagnostic tests and PCR, and coordination through a cholera task force [26]. Similarly, the response to the 2019 dengue outbreak in Kassala State involved surveillance, laboratory testing, health promotion, vector control, and outbreak management activities [12,25]. Sudan has also implemented measles outbreak response vaccination campaigns and public health interventions to contain disease transmission [28].
Although these outbreaks differ from EVD in their epidemiology and transmission dynamics, the documented responses demonstrate prior experience implementing core outbreak response functions. This accumulated operational experience represents a relative strength that could support future EVD preparedness and response efforts in Sudan.

4.1.3. Existing Coordination and Health-Cluster Mechanisms

Sudan maintains coordination mechanisms that support the planning and implementation of humanitarian health responses despite the ongoing conflict. Since the escalation of the conflict in 2023, health-sector coordination has continued through the Sudan Health Cluster, which brings together the Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH), United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations, and other health actors to coordinate response activities, share information, identify priorities, and support emergency health interventions [29,30].
Evidence from recent humanitarian responses demonstrates the continued functionality of these coordination structures. Health Cluster bulletins describe regular coordination activities, partner engagement, response planning, and information sharing across affected states. In addition, collaborative initiatives involving the FMoH, WHO, and Health Cluster partners have supported the implementation of surveillance innovations such as the EWARS Mobile in conflict-affected areas of Darfur, aimed at strengthening disease reporting and outbreak detection. Similar coordination mechanisms have also supported cholera response activities, where health and WASH actors worked together to strengthen surveillance, case management, and outbreak control interventions [30,31,32].
For EVD, these existing coordination platforms are a relative strength because they provide established mechanisms for information sharing, resource mobilization, partner coordination, and response planning. Although insecurity, funding limitations, and access challenges constrain their effectiveness, their continued operation provides a foundation that could facilitate a more coordinated response should an EVD outbreak occur in Sudan.

4.2. Weaknesses

4.2.1. Health System Disruption and Reduced Service Functionality

Sudan’s health system has been substantially weakened by the conflict, reducing the functionality of health services across much of the country. Peer-reviewed studies have documented widespread disruption of healthcare delivery, including damage to health infrastructure, closure and occupation of health facilities, shortages of medicines and medical supplies, displacement of healthcare workers, and interruptions to public health programmes and disease surveillance activities [20,33,34]. These findings are consistent with reports from international agencies indicating that, as of October 2025, only about 48% of facilities are fully functional, while 37% are classified as non-functional in Sudan, with between 70% and 80% of health facilities in conflict-affected areas being either non-functional or operating at severely reduced capacity [8,9,35].
The deterioration of health service functionality has reduced access to both routine and emergency healthcare services, particularly in heavily affected states such as Khartoum, Darfur, Al Jazirah, and Kordofan [13,35] The disruption of health facilities, workforce availability, medical supply chains, and public health programs has also limited the capacity of the health system to respond effectively to infectious disease threats [13,20,34].
For EVD, effective outbreak detection and response depend on functioning healthcare facilities that can support surveillance, case identification, isolation, clinical management, infection prevention and control, and referral services. The documented disruption to health infrastructure and service delivery, therefore, represents a significant weakness that could constrain Sudan’s ability to rapidly detect, isolate, and manage suspected EVD cases in the event of an outbreak.

4.2.2. Health Workforce Shortages and Limited Trained Response Capacity

Sudan’s health workforce faced substantial challenges before the current conflict, including shortages of skilled personnel, inequitable distribution of health workers, and limited human resource capacity within the health sector [36]. Since the onset of the conflict in April 2023, these challenges have intensified due to violence against healthcare personnel, displacement of health workers, and deterioration of working conditions across the country [13,37].
Multiple sources document significant losses within the healthcare workforce during the conflict. Ahmed et al. reported that more than 200 violations against healthcare workers had been documented, including killings, kidnapping, assault, and intimidation, resulting in many healthcare workers fleeing affected areas or refusing to work because of security concerns [38]. The same study reported high levels of burnout among Sudanese healthcare workers, including high depersonalization among 56.5% of participants and high emotional exhaustion among 13.7%. It also linked conflict exposure and insufficient access to necessities with higher burnout scores among health workers [38].
These workforce pressures are relevant to EVD response because effective EVD control requires trained staff for surveillance, triage, case identification, infection prevention and control, clinical management, referral, and laboratory coordination. The documented loss of healthcare workers, violence against staff, and burnout among remaining personnel therefore represent significant weaknesses that could limit Sudan’s ability to rapidly scale up and sustain an effective EVD response.

4.2.3. Laboratory and Diagnostic Capacity Limitations

Sudan’s laboratory and diagnostic capacity have been significantly affected by the ongoing conflict. The National Public Health Laboratory in Khartoum has not been providing its vital functions since April 2023 because military occupation has prevented access to the facility. In response, WHO and health authorities supported the upgrading of the Public Health Laboratory in Port Sudan to provide national public health laboratory functions, including the provision of RT-PCR kits, rapid diagnostic test kits, transport media, freezers, and operational support for power supply [8,20,27]
Although this upgrade strengthened diagnostic capacity in Port Sudan, it also highlights the disruption and centralization of laboratory services under conflict conditions. WHO reported that the Port Sudan laboratory was being used to confirm suspected measles and rubella samples transported from different states, while additional equipment and staff training were still planned for Port Sudan and Gezira laboratories [27]. UNICEF also reported that health facilities responding to cholera often lacked necessary resources, equipment, and trained personnel, while cholera response supplies included diagnostic kits and other outbreak response commodities [8,39].
For EVD, rapid laboratory confirmation is critical for case identification, isolation, clinical management, and outbreak response decision-making. Evidence from the Uganda outbreak showed that deployment of a mobile laboratory close to the Ebola Treatment Unit reduced diagnostic turnaround time and supported rapid outbreak decision-making [40]. However, in Sudan, the disruption of the national reference laboratory, dependence on upgraded laboratories in safer locations, and continued gaps in equipment and trained personnel represent important weaknesses that could delay confirmation and response if a suspected EVD case were detected.

4.2.4. Surveillance, Access, and Response Constraints in Conflict-Affected Areas

The ongoing conflict has created significant challenges for disease surveillance, outbreak investigation, and emergency response activities in several parts of Sudan. Humanitarian assessments indicate that insecurity, active hostilities, administrative restrictions, and logistical barriers continue to limit access to populations in conflict-affected regions, particularly in Darfur and Kordofan [41]. These constraints affect the ability of health authorities and humanitarian organizations to conduct assessments, investigate alerts, deliver health services, and implement timely outbreak response interventions [42].
Conflict-related access limitations have also contributed to information gaps in some areas of the country. Analyses of the Sudan crisis information landscape have highlighted challenges in obtaining reliable and timely information from conflict-affected regions, reducing situational awareness and complicating humanitarian decision-making [29,42]. In addition, Rahamtalla et al. reported that the conflict disrupted public health programmes and disease surveillance activities, while large-scale population displacement has further complicated monitoring and response efforts [13].
For EVD, effective preparedness and response depend on the timely detection, verification, investigation, and reporting of suspected cases, followed by rapid deployment of response teams and implementation of control measures. Surveillance and access constraints in conflict-affected areas therefore represent an important weakness because they may delay case detection, hinder outbreak investigation, limit community engagement activities, and reduce the effectiveness of response operations should an EVD outbreak occur.

4.3. Opportunities

4.3.1. Existing Health Security Planning Frameworks and Recovery Investments

Despite the challenges posed by the ongoing conflict, Sudan has an existing National Health Policy (2017-2030), which includes, as part of its key actions, to “strengthen health system resilience to adapt, absorb, and transform during emergencies, including support for a comprehensive emergency information system.” Such a document provides opportunities to strengthen EVD preparedness and response.
Sudan is one of the WHO member states that are signatories to the Khartoum Declaration on Sudan and Bordering Countries, cross-border health security alongside Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, and South Sudan. They committed themselves to enhancing cross-border preparedness and response to public health threats, formalized and signed on 22 November 2018 in Khartoum [43]. In addition, the World Health Organization (WHO) Strategic Partnership for Health Security platform documents Sudan’s participation in key global health security processes, including the Joint External Evaluation (JEE), State Party Self-Assessment Annual Reporting (SPAR), and National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) activities, indicating that mechanisms for assessing and planning health emergency preparedness have previously been established within the country [44].
In addition, Sudan’s National Health Sector Recovery and Reform Strategic Plan 2022–2024 outlines several priorities directly relevant to epidemic preparedness and response. These include strengthening Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), developing multi-hazard preparedness and response plans, improving disease surveillance through DHIS2, strengthening public health laboratory capacity, supporting rapid response teams, enhancing risk communication and community engagement activities, and improving the availability of emergency supplies and logistics systems [45].
Ongoing investments from international partners further present opportunities to strengthen preparedness capacities. In 2025, the African Development Bank and WHO implemented the Sudan Health Emergency and Infrastructure Project, a US$55 million initiative aimed at restoring essential health services, strengthening health system resilience, and supporting emergency preparedness and response activities [46]. Although these initiatives were not specifically designed for EVD preparedness, they provide existing platforms through which surveillance, laboratory systems, workforce capacity, coordination mechanisms, and emergency response capabilities could be further strengthened to improve Sudan’s readiness for future EVD threats.

4.3.2. Expansion of Digital and Community-Based Early Warning Systems

The ongoing expansion of community-based and digital surveillance systems presents an opportunity to strengthen outbreak detection and response capacity in Sudan. Event-Based Surveillance (EBS) was established in Sudan in 2016 and expanded through a network of more than 6,000 community volunteers trained to identify and report public health signals. The system has been integrated with indicator-based surveillance and Emergency Operations Centre decision-making processes, while an electronic EWARS platform was developed to manage and monitor surveillance signals and alerts [47].
In response to surveillance challenges created by the ongoing conflict, the Federal Ministry of Health and the WHO introduced the Early Warning, Alert and Response System (EWARS) Mobile in Darfur in 2024. Following a pilot in Central and East Darfur, the system was expanded to all five Darfur states in 2025 and included 453 reporting sites operated by 19 partners. EWARS monitors 12 epidemic-prone diseases and conditions, including suspected viral haemorrhagic fever, generates alerts based on predefined thresholds, and produces weekly surveillance bulletins to support public health decision-making. By March 2025, the system had recorded more than 537,000 consultations and identified multiple public health events requiring follow-up, while helping to address surveillance gaps in conflict-affected areas through a network of participating partners [32,47].
These developments align with broader national surveillance strengthening efforts. Sudan’s National Health Sector Recovery and Reform Strategic Plan identifies expansion of DHIS2 and strengthening of disease surveillance systems as strategic priorities, while Sudan continues to participate in global health security assessment and planning processes through the Joint External Evaluation (JEE), State Party Self-Assessment Annual Reporting (SPAR), and National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) frameworks [44,45].
For EVD, the continued expansion of EBS, EWARS, and other surveillance platforms provides an opportunity to strengthen early alert generation, reporting from hard-to-reach areas, information sharing, and outbreak detection. These systems could support more timely identification and investigation of suspected EVD events, particularly in areas where routine surveillance systems have been affected by conflict.

4.3.3. Regional and Cross-Border Collaboration for Epidemic Preparedness

Regional initiatives aimed at strengthening cross-border surveillance and epidemic preparedness provide an important opportunity to enhance EVD preparedness in Sudan. Several countries in East and Central Africa continue to invest in collaborative approaches to disease surveillance, information sharing, and outbreak response because infectious disease threats frequently cross-national borders. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has supported regional efforts to strengthen cross-border surveillance and coordination among countries in East Africa, with a focus on improving information sharing, joint preparedness activities, and coordinated responses to public health threats [43,48].
Recent Ebola preparedness and response activities in the region further demonstrate the value of cross-border collaboration. During the Ebola outbreak in Uganda, WHO supported intensified cross-border coordination, surveillance, screening, and preparedness activities involving neighbouring countries to reduce the risk of international spread. These efforts highlighted the importance of coordinated surveillance systems, rapid information exchange, and harmonized preparedness measures in managing high-consequence infectious disease threats [49].
Additional opportunities are provided through broader regional health security initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Health Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience Programme aims to strengthen health security, surveillance, emergency preparedness, and response capacities across countries in Eastern, Central, and Southern Africa. Such regional platforms provide opportunities for technical collaboration, capacity building, and sharing of best practices relevant to epidemic preparedness and response [50].
For EVD, these regional initiatives create opportunities to strengthen cross-border surveillance, information sharing, preparedness planning, workforce development, and coordinated outbreak response. Given Sudan’s proximity to countries with previous Ebola outbreaks and its population movement corridors across multiple borders, engagement with regional preparedness and surveillance initiatives could contribute to improved readiness for future EVD threats.

4.3.4. Expansion of Public Health Laboratory and Outbreak Detection Capacity

Recent investments in public health laboratory infrastructure provide an opportunity to strengthen outbreak detection and response capacity in Sudan. Before the current conflict, Sudan invested in the development of the National Public Health Laboratory (NPHL), which became an important component of the country’s public health system and supported disease surveillance, outbreak investigation, and laboratory confirmation of priority diseases. The establishment and gradual expansion of public health laboratory services demonstrated the country’s commitment to strengthening diagnostic and outbreak detection capacity despite longstanding operational challenges [51].
Although the conflict significantly disrupted national laboratory services, efforts to restore and decentralize laboratory capacity have continued. Following the loss of access to the National Public Health Laboratory in Khartoum after April 2023, WHO and Sudanese health authorities upgraded the Public Health Laboratory in Port Sudan to support national public health laboratory functions. The upgrade included provision of RT-PCR kits, rapid diagnostic test kits, transport media, freezers, and operational support, while additional equipment and workforce training were planned for laboratories in Port Sudan and Gezira [27]. The Port Sudan laboratory has subsequently supported testing and confirmation of suspected measles and rubella samples received from multiple states, demonstrating its role in maintaining laboratory services during the conflict.
Laboratory decentralization efforts were also initiated before the conflict through the WHO-supported establishment of public health laboratory services in Nyala, South Darfur. These investments improved access to diagnostic services for populations in Darfur and reduced dependence on laboratory testing in Khartoum. The experience demonstrated the feasibility of expanding laboratory capacity beyond the capital and highlighted the potential benefits of geographically distributed diagnostic services during public health emergencies [52].
For EVD, existing laboratory decentralization efforts provide an opportunity for continued investment in laboratory infrastructure, diagnostic equipment, workforce development, and decentralized testing networks presents an opportunity to strengthen outbreak detection and response capacity. Regional experience from the Sudan virus disease outbreak in Uganda has demonstrated the importance of laboratory workforce strengthening and rapid diagnostic capacity for outbreak control. Building on existing laboratory investments and ongoing recovery efforts could therefore contribute to improved preparedness for future EVD threats in Sudan [40].

4.4. Threats

4.4.1. Ongoing Armed Conflict and Insecurity

The continued armed conflict in Sudan represents a major threat to EVD preparedness and response. More than three years after the outbreak of hostilities, the conflict remains active and continues to generate significant humanitarian and public health consequences across the country. The Sudan crisis has been characterized by ongoing insecurity, large-scale humanitarian needs, disease outbreaks, and disruption of essential services [8,20]. Continued insecurity poses operational challenges for public health preparedness and emergency response activities. Active conflict and insecurity continue to affect humanitarian operations and access to populations in several areas of the country, highlighting the persistence of widespread humanitarian needs and pressure on essential services resulting from the conflict [8,11]. These conditions create a challenging environment for maintaining preparedness activities and implementing outbreak response interventions.
The persistence of conflict also contributes to broader regional instability. Analysis from the Policy Center for the New South notes that the ongoing war has implications beyond Sudan’s borders, affecting security and stability across the Horn of Africa and neighbouring regions [53]. Such instability may complicate regional coordination and preparedness efforts that are important for managing transboundary public health threats.
For EVD preparedness and response, continued insecurity remains a significant threat because effective outbreak control depends on timely surveillance, rapid deployment of response teams, laboratory support, community engagement, and access to affected populations. The continuation of armed conflict could therefore hinder the implementation of preparedness measures and reduce the effectiveness of response operations should an EVD outbreak occur.

4.4.2. Population Displacement, Mobility, and Cross-Border Disease Transmission

Large-scale population displacement and mobility represent an important threat to EVD preparedness and response in Sudan. Sudan has experienced one of the world’s largest displacement crises, with millions of people displaced internally and across international borders [8]. Population movements associated with conflict remain dynamic and continue to evolve. IOM mobility monitoring reports document ongoing displacement, return movements, and cross-border population flows, while migration data indicate that Sudan remains an important source, destination, and transit country for regional migration. These movements occur across multiple national borders and involve populations moving between areas with varying levels of access to health services, disease surveillance, and outbreak response capacity [54].
Evidence from humanitarian and infectious disease literature suggests that large-scale population displacement and mobility can complicate disease surveillance, outbreak detection, contact tracing, and implementation of public health control measures. Population movements may also increase the difficulty of monitoring disease transmission patterns and maintaining continuity of surveillance systems during public health emergencies [33,55].
For EVD preparedness and response, continued displacement and population mobility present a significant threat because effective outbreak control relies on timely case detection, contact tracing, monitoring of exposed individuals, and coordinated surveillance across affected areas. The scale and fluidity of population movements within Sudan and across its borders could therefore complicate efforts to rapidly identify, investigate, and contain potential EVD cases should an outbreak occur [54,55].

4.4.3. Humanitarian Access Constraints

Humanitarian access constraints remain a significant threat to EVD preparedness and response in Sudan. Despite ongoing humanitarian operations, access to affected populations continues to be limited by insecurity, active hostilities, administrative restrictions, bureaucratic impediments, and logistical challenges. Humanitarian access assessments conducted by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and ACAPS indicate that these barriers continue to affect the delivery of humanitarian assistance and public health interventions across several conflict-affected regions of the country [41,56].
The impact of access constraints is particularly evident in Darfur and Kordofan, where ongoing insecurity and movement restrictions have created hard-to-reach areas and complicated humanitarian operations. ACAPS reports that humanitarian actors continue to face challenges reaching populations in some conflict-affected locations, while access conditions vary considerably across regions depending on the security situation and operational environment [41]. These constraints may also contribute to information gaps and reduce situational awareness in areas where humanitarian presence and routine monitoring activities are limited.
Humanitarian access challenges can directly affect public health preparedness and outbreak response activities. Analysis from the Humanitarian Practice Network highlights the operational difficulties humanitarian organizations face in negotiating access and maintaining assistance in complex conflict settings, emphasizing the importance of sustained access for effective response operations [57]. For EVD preparedness and response, access limitations may delay outbreak investigations, hinder deployment of rapid response teams, disrupt laboratory sample transportation, restrict community engagement activities, and reduce the effectiveness of surveillance and contact-tracing efforts.
Should access constraints persist or worsen, they may significantly impede the timely implementation of outbreak control measures and limit the ability of health authorities and humanitarian partners to respond effectively to a potential EVD outbreak in affected areas of Sudan.

4.4.4. Funding Instability and Dependence on External Support

Funding instability represents a significant threat to EVD preparedness and response in Sudan. The country’s ongoing humanitarian crisis has generated substantial needs across the health, nutrition, food security, and protection sectors, while available financial resources remain insufficient to meet these demands. As a result, many humanitarian and public health interventions continue to rely heavily on external donor funding and international partner support [35].
Recent reports indicate that humanitarian needs in Sudan continue to increase despite declining levels of available funding. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) notes that shrinking financial resources are affecting humanitarian and recovery efforts, while humanitarian agencies have warned that funding cuts threaten the continuity of critical interventions supporting vulnerable populations [35,58]. These funding pressures create uncertainty regarding the sustainability of essential preparedness and response capacities.
For EVD preparedness and response, sustained financing is required to support surveillance systems, laboratory services, workforce development, emergency preparedness activities, outbreak response mechanisms, and community engagement efforts. Continued funding constraints could limit the ability of health authorities and humanitarian partners to maintain preparedness investments and rapidly mobilize resources in the event of an EVD outbreak, thereby reducing overall response effectiveness [59].

5. Summary Risk Synthesis, Implications, and Recommendations

5.1. Geographic Risk Assessment

The ongoing outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV) in the DRC provides an important contemporary framework for assessing the risk of EVD in Sudan. Unlike outbreaks caused by “Zaire ebolavirus”, the current epidemic involves a viral species for which no licensed vaccine or specific therapeutic intervention is currently available, increasing reliance on surveillance, infection prevention and control (IPC), contact tracing, community engagement, and supportive clinical management for outbreak containment [4,60]. The outbreak has occurred in a setting characterized by insecurity, population displacement, weak health infrastructure, and substantial population mobility, conditions that closely resemble those currently affecting large areas of Sudan [59,61].
Risk assessment for EVD in Sudan should not be limited to the probability of virus importation. Rather, risk emerges from the interaction between pathogen introduction, delayed detection, and subsequent amplification within a severely disrupted health system. Factors like widespread health infrastructure destruction, disruption of surveillance systems, reduced laboratory functionality, shortages of trained healthcare personnel, and restricted humanitarian access. collectively increase the likelihood that an imported case could remain undetected and initiate sustained transmission before response measures are activated

5.1.1. Darfur: Highest Risk for Delayed Detection and Silent Transmission

Among Sudan’s regions, Darfur represents the area at greatest risk for delayed detection of Ebola introduction and prolonged undetected transmission. Similar to eastern DRC, where insecurity and limited access complicated outbreak detection and response, Darfur continues to experience active conflict, population displacement, restricted humanitarian access, and fragmentation of public health services [4,58].
The principal concern in Darfur is not only the high likelihood of importation but the increased probability that transmission could remain undetected for extended periods. Large internally displaced populations reside in overcrowded camps where surveillance coverage is limited, and healthcare access remains constrained. Furthermore, laboratory diagnostic capacity across much of Darfur has been severely compromised [32,41]
Operational evidence from Sudan’s national preparedness activities illustrates these challenges. Multiple outbreak investigations have experienced substantial delays in laboratory confirmation due to difficulties in obtaining and transporting specimens from conflict-affected areas [21]. These recurring challenges demonstrate systemic weaknesses that would likely impede timely Ebola detection and confirmation if the virus were introduced into the region.
The experience of the ongoing Bundibugyo outbreak demonstrates that delayed recognition in insecure settings can allow transmission chains to expand before outbreak response measures are initiated [4]. Consequently, Darfur should be considered Sudan’s most vulnerable region for silent transmission and delayed outbreak recognition.

5.1.2. Kordofan: Epidemiological Corridor and Transmission Bridge

Kordofan occupies a strategic epidemiological position linking western Sudan to the central regions of the country. While the region may not represent the most likely point of pathogen introduction, it could serve as a critical transmission corridor facilitating geographic dissemination of EVD [62].
The current Bundibugyo outbreak has demonstrated the role of human mobility in facilitating disease spread across health zones and international borders [4]. Similar mechanisms operate within Sudan, where Kordofan functions as a major transit route for displaced populations, commercial activities, livestock movement, and population exchanges between Darfur, Khartoum, and neighboring countries [62].
The region’s significance is further heightened by persistent challenges in surveillance and laboratory confirmation. Ongoing conflict has disrupted disease surveillance systems, laboratory services, and specimen transport pathways across Sudan, particularly in conflict-affected areas of Kordofan and Darfur, where insecurity and restricted access may delay outbreak detection, laboratory confirmation, and response activities [29,30,58].
From a risk assessment perspective, Kordofan should therefore be viewed as an epidemiological bridge capable of connecting localized outbreaks in western Sudan with densely populated urban centers in central Sudan. Strengthening event-based surveillance, rapid alert systems, and specimen referral mechanisms along major transportation and displacement corridors should be considered a preparedness priority.

5.1.3. Khartoum: Highest Risk of Urban Amplification

Although Darfur presents the greatest risk of delayed detection and Kordofan serves as a strategic transmission corridor, Khartoum poses the greatest risk for large-scale epidemic amplification. Historical Ebola outbreaks have consistently demonstrated that densely populated urban environments can accelerate disease transmission once cases are introduced [63,64]. Khartoum contains the largest concentration of population, healthcare facilities, transportation networks, and internally displaced communities in Sudan. Population mixing, high mobility, overcrowded settlements, and healthcare-associated transmission risks collectively increase the potential for rapid epidemic expansion [8,54,65].
Healthcare-associated transmission remains an additional concern. The Bundibugyo outbreak has reinforced the importance of IPC preparedness, particularly in settings where healthcare workers may be exposed before Ebola is considered in the differential diagnosis [4]. Introduction of Ebola into Khartoum could therefore rapidly transform a localized event into a national public health emergency.

5.2. Health System Vulnerabilities and Preparedness Gaps

The ongoing Bundibugyo outbreak has highlighted the central importance of laboratory readiness in Ebola preparedness. Sudan’s capacity for rapid EVD confirmation remains constrained, particularly in the context of ongoing conflict and disruptions to health services. Delays in diagnostic confirmation may impede timely case isolation, contact tracing, and implementation of infection prevention and control measures. These challenges are likely to be amplified in conflict-affected and hard-to-reach regions, where specimen transport and laboratory referral pathways may be disrupted. Strengthening diagnostic preparedness and ensuring access to timely confirmatory testing, therefore, remain critical components of EVD preparedness in Sudan [20,63,64].
A further challenge is the substantial burden imposed by concurrent public health emergencies. Sudan continues to face outbreaks of cholera, measles, meningitis, dengue fever, malaria, acute jaundice syndrome, and other epidemic-prone diseases. These competing priorities place considerable strain on surveillance systems, laboratory networks, healthcare facilities, and outbreak response personnel. Similar conditions have been identified as contributing factors in delayed outbreak recognition during previous Ebola epidemics in fragile settings [33,66].

5.3. Recommendations

The findings from this assessment suggest that preparedness efforts should prioritize four strategic areas:
Strengthening disease surveillance remains essential for Sudan, especially in conflict-affected regions like Darfur and Kordofan, where delayed detection is most likely to occur. Effective EBS and early warning systems are particularly important for early detection and linking communities to rapid response. A comprehensive integration of surveillance and response is crucial for containing outbreaks quickly [23].
Laboratory preparedness requires urgent investment. The return of relative peace to Khartoum state, with the consequent return of the administrative seat, provides an opportunity to expand in-country laboratory capacity and decentralize specimen referral systems by revitalizing the National Public Health Laboratory in Khartoum, thereby aiding timely testing and confirmation. The deployment of a mobile laboratory has also proven to increase early detection of EVD, as seen in the ongoing outbreak in Uganda. Development of contingency plans for inaccessible areas due to active conflict is also critical for reducing diagnostic delays [27,40,51].
According to the WHO, about 40% of health service delivery units are not functioning due to infrastructure destruction and looting. Revitalization of healthcare facilities, including rebuilding or rehabilitating health centers and hospitals in conflict zones, is also a key response strategy. Infection prevention and control (IPC) measures should be strengthened in health facilities’ preparedness. Prepositioning of resources, including funds and supplies, has been identified as part of anticipatory actions for outbreak preparedness. EVD preparedness planning should incorporate mobility-informed approaches, including mobility mapping, the use of mobile clinics, and the strengthening of cross-border surveillance and coordination. Surveillance and risk assessment activities should focus not only on international borders but also on displacement routes, transportation corridors, and major population movement networks connecting Darfur, Kordofan, and Khartoum [40,67,68,69]
Furthermore, capacity building for frontline healthcare workers remains an essential preparedness step in case of a possible EVD outbreak. The Ministry of Health at all levels, in collaboration with WHO and other partners, should ensure training access/delivery. Areas of capacity building should include case management and infection prevention and control (IPC), amongst others. Healthcare facilities frequently represent the first point of contact for Ebola patients and may become amplification points when appropriate IPC precautions are not implemented. Sustained investment in IPC and healthcare worker protection [67].
Health promotion and community engagement remain central to the overall preparedness. Since Sudan is at risk of multiple infectious disease outbreaks in addition to EVD, disease-specific and broader infectious disease awareness programs for conflict-affected populations, including IDPs, are necessary to empower the community for necessary preventive actions, and stronger political commitment with intersectoral collaboration between governments and international partners. HPCE activities will strengthen community actions and enable the development of personal skills for disease prevention. This overall helps to develop community ownership by owning the process and taking responsibility for the prevention and control, in collaboration with the Ministry of Health [67,70]
Lastly, peace remains the right environment for disease control and development. Active conflicts remain a major contributor to disease transmission, preventing early detection through surveillance, hampering meaningful community engagements, and blocking healthcare access for the affected population. Conflict in DRC is significantly shaping the current Ebola outbreak. , including attacks on health facilities. Exploring the humanitarian-development-peace nexus remains essential for EVD preparedness. Sustained engagement by the United Nations and other international organizations to broker peace between the conflicting parties remains a crucial determinant in preventing or reducing the potentially uncontrolled transmission of Ebola virus in Sudan. [12,33,71,72]

5.4. Conclusion

The ongoing Bundibugyo virus disease outbreak in the DRC and Uganda demonstrates how insecurity, population displacement, weak surveillance systems, and limited laboratory capacity can contribute to delayed outbreak recognition and facilitate geographic spread. These conditions closely resemble several of the challenges currently affecting Sudan. Within the Sudanese context, Darfur may be particularly vulnerable to silent transmission and delayed detection, Kordofan may serve as an important corridor for geographic dissemination, and Khartoum presents substantial potential for urban amplification should transmission become established. Available evidence further suggests that laboratory constraints, specimen transport challenges, population mobility, and competing public health priorities continue to undermine outbreak readiness. Consequently, the greatest Ebola threat to Sudan is not merely pathogen importation but also delayed detection within a fragmented health system and subsequently spread through highly mobile and vulnerable populations. Strengthening surveillance, laboratory preparedness, infection prevention and control capacity, and mobility-informed preparedness planning should therefore constitute central priorities for Sudan’s Ebola preparedness strategy.

5.5. Limitations

This review explores the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of the Ebola outbreak in Sudan using available evidence. To our knowledge, it is the first study from Sudan assessing Sudan’s vulnerabilities, preparedness, and response capacity for an Ebola virus disease outbreak in the midst of an ongoing conflict. However, significant limitations exist, which necessitate caution in interpretation. The conflict confers significant limitations, including the scarcity of data on Ebola risks due to access restrictions. There is substantial reliance on grey literature from international organizations, including United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations, with the potential to introduce publication bias. The conflict has severely hindered original research, and restricted access to opposition-controlled areas may compromise the completeness of data available in grey literature [33]. This study also utilizes peer-reviewed studies that have been published in English. As Arabic is the official language of Sudan and a publishing language, we acknowledge the possibility of missing out on relevant studies that could have provided some more information to strengthen the findings.

Clinical Trial number

Not Applicable.

Ethics approval

Not Applicable.

Author Contributions

DMA and DM worked on the conceptualization; DMA, DM, MI, and MNYMI conducted literature search, screening, and writing of the original draft, and reviewed and edited. MAL reviewed for important intellectual content that shaped the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

Funding

The authors received no funding for this research.

Data Availability Statement

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.

Acknowledgments

Not Applicable.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

Abbreviations

EVD – Ebola Virus Disease
WHO – World Health Organization
CDC – Centers for Disease Control
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo
BDV - Bundibugyo virus
ZEBV – Zaire ebolavirus
RV - Reston virus
TFV - Tai Forest virus
SDV - Sudan Virus
UN OCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
IPC – Infection Prevention and Control
FMOH – Federal Ministry of Health
SWOT – Strength, Weakness, Opportunities, and Threats
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund

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Table 1. History of Ebola Outbreaks between 1976 and 2026 [2,3,13,14].
Table 1. History of Ebola Outbreaks between 1976 and 2026 [2,3,13,14].
Year Country (year) Number of cases Case fatality Rate (%) Viral strain Responsible
1976 Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) 318 88.1 Orthoebolavirus zairense
1976 Sudan 284 53% Orthoebolavirus sudanense
1976 United Kingdom 1 0 Orthoebolavirus zairense
1977 Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) 1 100 Orthoebolavirus zairense
1979 Sudan 34 65% Orthoebolavirus sudanense
1989 The Philippines 3 0 Orthoebolavirus restonense
1989 United State 4 0% Orthoebolavirus restonense
1994 Cote d'Ivoire 1 0`% Orthoebolavirus taiense
1994 - 1995 Gabon 51 61.50% Orthoebolavirus zairense
1995 Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) 315 81% Orthoebolavirus zairense
1996 Russia 1 100 Orthoebolavirus zairense
1996 Gabon 31 67.7 Orthoebolavirus zairense
1996 - 1997 Gabon; also exported to South Africa 62 74.2 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2000 Uganda 425 53% Orthoebolavirus sudanense
2001 - 2002 Gabon, Republic of the Congo 124 78.2 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2002 Republic of the Congo; also exported to Gabon 11 90.9 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2003 Republic of the Congo 143 89.5 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2003 Republic of the Congo 35 82.9 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2004 Russia 1 100 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2004 Sudan 17 41% Orthoebolavirus sudanense
2005 Republic of the Congo 12 83% Orthoebolavirus zairense
2007 Democratic Republic of the Congo 264 71 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2007 Uganda 131 32 Orthoebolavirus bundibugyoense
2008 Democratic Republic of the Congo 32 46.9 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2008 The Philippines 6 0 Orthoebolavirus restonense
2011 Uganda 1 100` Orthoebolavirus sudanense
2012 Uganda 17 41.2 Orthoebolavirus sudanense
2012 Democratic Republic of the Congo(Zaire) 62 55 Orthoebolavirus bundibugyoense
2014 - 2016 Guinea, also exported to Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone and USA; from Liberia, cases were exported to France, Germany, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Spain and USA and, from Sierra Leone, to Italy, UK, Switzerland and USA 28,652 39.5 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2014 Democratic Republic of the Congo (2014) 69 71 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2017 Democratic Republic of the Congo (2017) 8 50 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2018 Democratic Republic of the Congo 54 61.1 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2018 Democratic Republic of the Congo, also exported to Uganda (2018 to present) 3,470 66.3 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2020 Democratic Republic of the Congo 130 42.3 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2021 Democratic Republic of the Congo 23 65.2 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2021 Guinea 23 52.2 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2022 Uganda 164 34 Orthoebolavirus sudanense
2022 Democratic Republic of the Congo 6 100 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2025 Democratic Republic of the Congo 64 70 Orthoebolavirus zairense
2025 Uganda 14 30 Orthoebolavirus sudanense
2026 (As of July 8 2026) Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda 1812 34.5 Orthoebolavirus bundibugyoense
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