Submitted:
21 September 2026
Posted:
22 September 2026
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Abstract
Mixed-use redevelopment of obsolete urban land is widely prescribed across Europe, yet delivery frequently stalls under fragmented planning systems. This paper investigates the governance mechanism, rather than the design quality, that distinguishes successful delivery from stall. Four mixed-use districts built on former rail and port land in Barcelona, London, Hamburg and Paris are compared against a stalled contrast case in Madrid, drawing on transaction cost economics, institutional collective action theory and network-governance theory to argue that a single-purpose delivery vehicle resolves coordination problems that a fragmented, multi-actor planning process cannot. This claim is tested using a twenty-three-indicator multi-criteria rubric, within which a four-part governance sub-index captures timeline certainty, use flexibility, structured collaboration and legal security. Every delivered district is governed through a dedicated vehicle that holds land and accountability together, applies planning rules with bounded flexibility, and reinvests land-value uplift in the public realm. On the governance sub-index, the four delivered cases score between 7.0 and 8.6 out of 10, compared with 2.25 for the stalled case; governance-related indicators, though only a quarter of the full rubric, account for nearly half (47.9%) of the total performance gap between delivery and stall, a result that holds across 125 sensitivity tests on the model’s weighting. Governance design, not market context, is concluded to be the decisive variable in mixed-use delivery, translated here into a transferable specification for public administrators; the concern that such vehicles can concentrate value is also addressed, with a delivery vehicle judged necessary for successful delivery but not, on its own, sufficient to ensure a fair distribution of its benefits.
Keywords:
urban governance
; mixed-use development
; delivery vehicle
; collaborative governance
; transaction cost economics
; land-value capture
; multi-criteria decision analysis
; public–private partnership
Copyright: This open access article is published under a Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 license, which permit the free download, distribution, and reuse, provided that the author and preprint are cited in any reuse.