Cultivating Governance: An Exploratory Analysis of Urban Garden Management Models for Long-Term Sustainability

1. Introduction

In recent decades, the transformation of the food system has gained global significance [1,2]. The dominant system, based on industrialised production that is intensive in non-renewable resources, has considerable impacts on health and the environment; consequently, the transition towards sustainable food systems requires profound transformations in production, consumption, supply chains and access to food [3]. This transition is key to several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), such as food and nutrition security (SDG 2), health and well-being (SDG 3), ecosystems (SDGs 14 and 15), climate (SDG 13), social justice (SDG 16) and responsible consumption (SDG 12) [4,5]. Among the strategies aimed at healthy urban food systems, urban agriculture stands out, as it increases the availability of fresh, healthy food [1,6], strengthens local production and urban resilience [7,8,9] and promotes social cohesion and learning [10,11].

Urban agriculture is associated with environmental, health and wellbeing benefits [1,12], although some authors question its contribution to food security due to a lack of space and limited productive capacity [13]. Community gardens form part of this and usually consist of small shared plots where food is grown seasonally [14]; they integrate environmental, social and urban dimensions and constitute urban green infrastructure that generates ecosystem services [15]. Despite the sustained growth in research on their benefits [16], little is yet known about how governance—understood as the structures, relationships and participatory processes through which stakeholders share decision-making—influences these outcomes [17,18]. The literature identifies different models situated on a continuum between ‘top-down’ hierarchical structures and ‘bottom-up’ self-managed approaches, with hybrid configurations and even bottom-up models supported by political or administrative bodies [19]. In this vein, a case study in Austin (Texas) found that higher levels of social and ecological performance were associated with bottom-up models, in which the community directly takes charge of decision-making and management [20].

Similarly, the literature on urban gardens does not describe a single way of governing them, but rather a continuum between community autonomy and institutional control [19,21]. In this initial review, five models emerge most clearly: 1. community self-management or bottom-up; 2. external support without a loss of local leadership; 3. hybrid arrangements; 4. institutional management mediated by NGOs or associations; and 5. municipal or top-down management [20,22,23,24].

The bottom-up, or grassroots, self-managed model places the gardeners themselves at the centre of decision-making. Drake [23] identifies this as one of the three main ways of managing community gardens, alongside those organised externally and those actively managed by NGOs. Its distinctive feature is that the community not only participates but also defines priorities, rules of use, the division of labour and conflict resolution mechanisms. In Austin, Ponstingel [20] observed that the best social and ecological outcomes were associated with bottom-up structures, in which community members made the decisions and managed the allotment. According to the author, this form of governance tends to maximise ownership, a sense of belonging and the capacity for local adaptation, but it depends to a large extent on the time available, social capital and the internal stability of the group. When clear rules or mediation mechanisms are lacking, the very autonomy that gives the model its strength can also make it fragile, particularly in settings with high participant turnover or where there are conflicts over access to resources.

The bottom-up model with political or administrative support retains community leadership but incorporates assistance from a local council, a university, an NGO or a public agency. Drawing on a study of community gardens in Toronto, Jacob and Rocha [25] describe this as a scheme in which the community plans, implements and manages the garden with the support of the government or non-governmental organisations, and they note that such support is associated with the longevity of the projects, particularly in low-income neighbourhoods, as it helps to address specific needs such as access to land, funding, staff or training opportunities. Its distinctive feature is that it does not treat external support as a substitute for the community, but rather as a supporting infrastructure, where its advantage lies in resilience and its risk in the support leading to paternalism and reducing the scope for local decision-making. This tension becomes apparent when administrative support expands without a clear definition of responsibilities, as the allotment remains ‘community-based’ in theory whilst the practical agenda shifts towards whoever controls the resources.

The hybrid model seeks to sustain both institutional leadership and local autonomy. Drawing on a qualitative study in Cape Town, based on semi-structured interviews, Kanosvamhira [21] explicitly formulates this framework as ‘hybrid governance (neither top-down nor bottom-up)’, the value of which lies in avoiding the false dichotomy between a fully community-run allotment and a fully administered one. In the same study, the author emphasises that support from public agencies and non-profit organisations can be important for sustainability, but, if poorly managed, it can erode local ownership. The distinctive feature of the hybrid model is this ambivalence, which combines access to resources, public legitimacy and organisational capacity, but requires a finely tuned governance structure to ensure that cooperation does not turn into capture. In the best cases, it divides responsibilities so that the community retains control over the garden’s internal affairs whilst the institution provides land, funding, mediation, legal certainty or links to broader urban policies.

The institutional model, or third-party-mediated management model, emerges when an external entity (a cultural institution, an NGO or a development association) becomes the central actor in the allotment. This model takes different forms depending on the type of entity involved. Maćkiewicz and Jeziorek [24], drawing on case studies in Warsaw and Poznań, examine the variant in which the central actor is a cultural institution, and identify the factors that facilitate and hinder the garden’s operation within that partnership, including the risk that institutional involvement may shift power away from the community towards more hierarchical arrangements. Tecco et al. [26], in the case of two community gardens in Turin, examine another variant—management by the local government and by promoting associations—and point out that this, together with the regulatory frameworks within which it operates, poses challenges of adaptability in the face of a changing phenomenon, meaning that the management of the garden is neither a simple nor a static matter. This model tends to emerge when the allotment needs an intermediary to survive, as the external body secures permits, ensures administrative continuity or provides resources. Its strength lies in its capacity to provide support; its weakness is that it can turn the allotment into a project ‘for’ the community rather than ‘by’ the community. Consequently, in practice, many of these approaches oscillate between support and substitution.

The municipal or top-down model shifts the centre of gravity, as regulatory and strategic power lies with the public administration. In Warsaw and Poznań, Maćkiewicz and Jeziorek [24] describe a shift towards top-down configurations in which community members no longer influence strategic decisions. Willman [27] finds something similar in Tampere, where the ‘operational space’ of the allotment is defined by administrative policies and practices that enable or restrict urban gardening within a cautious, ambiguous and sometimes contradictory institutional culture. This model tends to provide order, regulatory continuity and land protection, but it can also limit participation to instrumental tasks, such as day-to-day maintenance, without sharing in the definition of the project. Ernwein [28] highlights a revealing variant in Geneva, where heavily regulated municipal allotments aim to curb the privatisation of space and the commodification of nature, yet may simultaneously reinforce more individualised subjectivities.

If these typologies are considered in relation to one another, the fundamental question ceases to be ‘which model is best?’ and becomes ‘what combination of power, resources and autonomy does this community garden need in this context?’. The literature reviewed above suggests that allotments function best when external support does not replace community self-management but rather enables it, and that they fail when institutional support turns into control or when community autonomy lacks minimum rules of coordination.

The aim of this article is to analyse and compare the different governance models of urban allotments in Valencia, taking into account the various ways in which these spaces are organised, managed and regulated (see Table 1). In addition, it seeks to explore the social dimensions associated with these models, in particular the dynamics of participation, community cohesion and social inclusion, as well as the processes of learning, knowledge transfer and education that take place in these spaces. Based on the literature reviewed, the starting point is the idea that urban allotments do not follow a single model, but rather fall along a continuum ranging from community self-management to municipal or institutional management, including hybrid approaches and models involving external support.

The analysis will identify how responsibilities are distributed amongst public authorities, associations, intermediary organisations and gardeners, as well as assess the degree of autonomy, participation and institutional support that characterises each case. In this way, the aim is to understand not only the organisational differences between urban allotments in Valencia, but also their social, environmental and political implications.

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. Spatial Context

The study was carried out in the Functional Urban Area (FUA) of Valencia. It is the third-largest FUA in Spain, with a population of 1.78 million in 2022 [29]. The area maintains close historical links with l’Horta de València, a peri-urban irrigated agricultural system of high environmental, cultural, landscape and productive value, whose legacy remains visible in the network of irrigation channels, traditional practices and the land protected by the Territorial Action Plan for the Management and Revitalisation of the Huerta de València [30]. At the same time, urban expansion, population growth and changes in land use are creating tensions regarding the preservation of agricultural spaces and the integration of green infrastructure.

Urban gardens have proliferated in recent decades in the Valencia metropolitan area as spaces for urban agriculture and green infrastructure, the benefits of which (social cohesion, community learning, physical and mental health, urban resilience and the provision of ecosystem services [8,10,15,16]) depend to a large extent on the specific forms of organisation, management and regulation adopted in each territorial context.

The empirical research focused on a selection of urban allotments in the Valencia metropolitan area that represent different positions along the continuum between bottom-up, hybrid and top-down models of urban governance [19,20,21,31], and incorporated the perspectives of institutional, political, technical and community stakeholders.

2.2. Participants and Procedure

Case selection followed a purposive sampling approach, aimed at capturing the maximum variability of governance models within a single territorial context and at selecting cases that were rich in information and analytically relevant, rather than seeking statistical representativeness [32,33]. The final sample comprised 33 participants across two complementary methods: 10 semi-structured individual interviews, coded E1 to E10, and 5 focus groups, coded GF1 to GF5, involving a total of 23 people. This combination made it possible to contrast the individual perspectives of institutional, political, technical, academic and associative informants with the group dynamics of community actors and service users.

For recruitment, the research team contacted, by email and telephone, the various stakeholders involved in the field of urban and community gardens: policy-makers and technical staff from local and supra-municipal authorities, staff from public innovation bodies, university lecturers specialising in urban planning and urban gardens, and representatives of the associations managing the gardens under study and of third-sector organisations.

The inclusion criteria were: (a) to hold an institutional, political, technical, academic, associative or user role with direct responsibility or documented experience in the management, regulation, use or study of the urban gardens within the FUA in Valencia; (b) to demonstrate at least six months of continuous involvement in that role or activity; and (c) to be able to express opinions and experiences verbally without restrictions. Individuals with only a one-off or circumstantial connection were excluded, as were those unable to respond independently to the interview guide.

All sessions, both individual and group, were conducted between November 2025 and June 2026 by the principal investigators following the thematic script detailed in Section 2.3; they lasted approximately between 60 and 90 minutes and were audio-recorded, with prior authorisation, for subsequent verbatim transcription and analysis. Basic data were also collected to characterise the sample (position or role, type of institution or organisation, field of activity, mode of participation and gender).

Individual interviews

The individual interviews were conducted in person, either at the institutional headquarters or at each informant’s place of work. The sample encompasses the various levels of governance involved: the supra-municipal level, the municipal level (in its technical and political aspects), public innovation, the academic sphere and the third sector (see Table 2).

Focus groups

The sample includes the views of university lecturers specialising in urban planning and urban gardens, associations and groups managing community gardens, garden users and management committees, executive committees of managing associations, and users of a garden provided by an association. The composition of each focus group is detailed in Table 3.

Data collection continued until thematic saturation was reached, defined as the point at which the themes and categories derived from the interview guide began to recur in successive sessions without providing substantially new information on the governance models analysed [34,35].

2.3. Guide to Interview Topics

The aim was to analyse and compare the governance models of urban allotments in Valencia and to explore the social dimensions associated with participation, inclusion and learning. To this end, a flexible thematic interview guide was drawn up, based on the specialist literature, containing the minimum necessary content to ensure these dimensions were covered without influencing the respondents’ answers. The guide was structured into ten thematic blocks, each opening with a broad, non-leading question, the order and depth of which could be adapted according to the interviewee’s profile and the flow of the conversation. A preliminary coding framework informed by the interview guide and the specialist literature was refined inductively through iterative review of the transcripts, resulting in a final system of 10 categories and 39 subcategories.

Following the continuum of governance models described in the specialist literature, the first sections seek to situate each allotment between grassroots community self-management (bottom-up, in which the community decides and manages [20]) and top-down municipal management (in which the administration defines and controls [27]), including hybrid configurations in which both poles collaborate [21], models of external support in which actors from outside the community assume leadership or funding roles [36], systems for allocating plots within a public framework for individual use [37], and models mediated by third parties, such as cultural or community organisations that act as a link between the administration and the users [24].

The remaining sections address day-to-day operations, participation and social inclusion, conflicts and their resolution mechanisms, knowledge and learning, environmental and urban impact, and the long-term sustainability of the model. Each of these ten sections is broken down into subsections that first present a comparative analysis of the allotments studied and then the direct quotations that support it.

2.4. Data Analysis and Ethical Considerations

The empirical material was analysed using qualitative thematic analysis. All interviews and focus groups were transcribed verbatim, and the set of transcripts constituted the corpus for analysis. Based on the system of categories and subcategories described in Section 2.3, each relevant discourse fragment was assigned to the corresponding subcategory and labelled with the informant’s code (E1 to E10) or the focus group’s code (FG1 to FG5), enabling a cross-cutting analysis that compares cases within each subcategory. The combination of individual interviews and focus groups enabled intra-method triangulation, by contrasting the individual perspectives of institutional, technical and academic informants with the collective dynamics of community actors and service users. The process continued until thematic saturation was reached, and the complete set of coded quotations is presented, organised by category, subcategory and coder, in Table S1 (supplementary material). Some quotations illustrate more than one dimension and were coded into two subcategories; they are identified by sharing the same code and, in Table S1, are transcribed only once under their main subcategory, with a cross-reference from the second.

From an ethical standpoint, all participants were informed of the study’s objectives, the voluntary nature of their participation, the academic use of the data and the option to withdraw at any time; prior to each session, their informed consent and authorisation for recording were obtained. The data were treated confidentially and anonymised using alphanumeric codes (E1–E10 for individual interviews and GF1–GF5 for focus groups), ensuring that no data enabling the identification of participants were included, in accordance with the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Furthermore, the study was conducted in accordance with the applicable European and national ethical guidelines for research involving human subjects and received a statement of approval from the Ethics Committee for Research Involving Human Subjects at the University of Valencia, reference number 2024-SOCTUR-3769066, issued on 13 October 2025.

3. Results: Comparative Analysis of Focus Groups and Interviews

The presentation of the following results proceeds from the general to the specific, from the characterisation of the governance model to the conditions for sustainability and future prospects. The complete set of verbatim quotations underpinning the analysis, organised by category, subcategory and coder, is set out in Table S1 (supplementary material).

3.1. Governance and the Institution–Community Relationship

3.1.1. Type of Governance Model

The community gardens studied are categorised into three governance models, viewed more as points on a continuum than as distinct types: (1) top-down (E8_1), with the administration setting the framework and associations providing limited, secondary support (E8_2), sometimes through ad hoc associations (E8_3, E3_4); (2) bottom-up with support, where a community or association leads the management and the local authority provides land, funding or guidance without taking on day-to-day operations (GF2_E1_5, E10_6); and (3) hybrid arrangements, which combine neighbourhood initiative with a municipal framework and oversight (GF4_E4_7). These three models are hereafter referred to as institutional (top-down or municipal), self-managed with support (bottom-up or associative) and hybrid, depending on their position on the continuum or the actor leading the management. Fundamentally, the allotments are conceived as urban facilities for social interaction, not merely as spaces for cultivation (GF1_E1_8).

Four cases are top-down. In one, which is centrally managed, a municipal agricultural body manages the garden on behalf of the local council (E8_1), and its manager prefers this format to self-management, which they associate with problems when those who cultivate also make decisions (E8_9), relying on the separation between manager and user (E8_10); associations are involved only through agreements (E8_2), some with an organisation set up specifically for that purpose within the allotment itself (E8_3). In a second municipal allotment, public management is deemed essential and self-management unfeasible with more than one hundred users (E4_11): the users’ committee advises and issues warnings, but neither makes decisions nor imposes sanctions (GF3_E4_12, GF3_E4_13), and the project originated as a political initiative to protect agricultural land (E4_14). In a third garden, despite the proposal’s citizen-led origins (E5_15), the role of the public administration is emphasised (E5_16), supported by an advisory committee (E5_17). And in a fourth scenario, a municipal by-law sets out the framework within which the managing association is established on an ad hoc basis (E3_4), with compulsory membership (E3_18) and an academic background (E3_19).

Two allotments operate on a bottom-up basis with support. In one, which is self-managed, management was handed over to a federation of neighbourhood associations (GF2_E1_5), with compulsory membership required for access (GF2_E2_20) and unified representation before the administration (GF2_E1_21); it emerged from a public innovation project designed to act as a catalyst for citizen participation (E9_22), from which the local authority withdrew to the point of no longer supervising it (E9_23). The other, a therapeutic centre run by a third-sector organisation, operates on municipal land and in a municipal building provided for this purpose (E10_6), combining a high degree of operational autonomy with a dependence on public assets (E10_24), and features an informal internal organisation centred around key figures (GF5_E6_25).

A final allotment occupies the central strip: a neighbourhood initiative has set up an association so that the allotment holders themselves can manage it, rather than an external body (GF4_E4_7, GF4_E5_26), in the belief that this fosters greater involvement (GF4_E3_27), although it is on land provided by the council and under municipal supervision, which sets its boundaries (GF4_E4_28). Thus, no case occupies the extremes: top-down models rely on day-to-day support from the association, whilst bottom-up models depend on the provision of land and institutional support. The hybridisation between the institutional framework and community self-organisation is the cross-cutting feature of the sample.

3.1.2. Distribution of Responsibilities and the Role of Key Actors

In top-down and hybrid models, the administration sets the framework (by-laws, land allocation and supervision) and delegates day-to-day management to an operational arm: a committee, a board or a contracting body. This mixed governance is also valued as a more mature form of shared responsibility, in which a designated manager coordinates and reports to the local council, thereby relieving the administration of the need for direct oversight (GF1_E1_29).

The operational arm takes various forms. In a centrally managed allotment, a municipal agricultural body centralises applications and allocates plots through agreements (E8_30), reserving for associations a limited role to which it provides ad hoc material support when needed (E8_31). In a municipal allotment garden with a volunteer management committee, the separation of functions is explicit: the users’ committee advises, reports and inspects, but formal action and decision-making rest with civil servants (GF3_E4_32); the committee was set up specifically to manage a large number of plots (E4_33), on the premise that the administration’s role is to ensure the system functions (E4_34), whilst volunteer members carry out periodic inspections (GF3_E2_35) and a municipal technician draws up the status reports (GF3_E4_36). In a community-run allotment, technical support from the local authority underpins its operation (E5_37), to the extent that it is considered a prerequisite for viability (E5_38). And in a garden governed by regulations, the local authority allocates and withdraws plots (E3_39) and intervenes when the association fails to resolve issues (E3_40), whilst the association ensures that users comply with the rules on a day-to-day basis (E3_41).

In supported bottom-up models, the focus shifts to the associative structure. A committee acts as the driving force: it maintains the infrastructure, formalises the documentation and brings in new associations (GF2_E1_42), although effective responsibility tends to be concentrated in one or two people, which reveals its fragility (GF2_E7_43); a management committee with representation from each group structures the decision-making process (E9_44), whilst the public promoting body, which operates according to the ‘four-helix’ model (E9_45), confines itself to providing discreet support (E9_46). In the therapeutic garden, the third-sector association takes charge of resources and management on municipal land provided on loan, with occasional institutional support that is administratively slow (E10_47), and distributes tasks through volunteers with agricultural expertise (GF5_E3_48, GF5_E5_49).

In the hybrid arrangement, the community itself took over management by setting up a board of directors following the handover from the previous management body (GF4_E1_50), which transferred tasks previously carried out by municipal services to the gardeners (GF4_E1_51), although communication with the local council is channelled through an independent body (GF4_E3_52). Alongside the core actors (the administration, the operational arm and the users), a network of supporting actors re-emerges: social groups with plots reserved for vulnerable populations (E5_53), educational centres benefiting from land transfers (E4_54) and traditional irrigation water management bodies (E4_55). The result is a tiered structure: the administration keeps the framework and the final say, a community-based operational arm runs day-to-day management, and a wider network of stakeholders extends the allotment’s social function.

3.1.3. Degree of Formalisation

The degree of formalisation is generally high, although the regulatory instrument varies. In institutional allotments, the framework is a current municipal by-law that regulates access, plot sizes, irrigation and penalties (E4_56, E4_57; E5_58), and which in one case even specifies the layout and the allocation of plots (E5_59). In those regulated by an agreement with the local community, there is no by-law, but rather a set of rules governing allocation and use (E3_60).

The formalisation is underpinned by monitoring tools: minutes of the management committee (GF3_E4_61) and a photographic record of plots in poor condition (GF3_E2_62). In the centrally managed allotment, however, formalisation is contentious: the manager operates according to his own rules and criticises the fact that the municipal by-law was drafted without consulting him (E8_63) and that it presupposes a form of self-management which he considers unworkable (E8_64).

In the self-managed allotments, the formalisation is internal but robust. One has established its own internal rules with a graduated system of offences that may result in the loss of the right to use the plot (GF4_E1_65), and points out that registration in the register of associations was a requirement for the allocation (GF4_E5_66). The other has its own internal regulations (GF2_E2_67) and a set of statutes that provide for the plot to be reclaimed in the event of inactivity (GF2_E1_68).

In the allotment regulated by rules, formalisation combines the rules of use with technical requirements such as mandatory agroecological cultivation (E3_69) and decisions such as the abolition of the public price to strengthen the association’s economic self-organisation (E3_70). The therapeutic garden is the exception, with a low level of formalisation: it began as an informal proposal by the association over a municipal space that had no defined use (E10_71).). Formalisation is high where the framework is institutional and shifts to self-regulation where management is community-based. In neither case does an allotment operate without rules.

3.1.4. User Autonomy and Institutional Support

User autonomy varies inversely with the degree of centralisation in management. In the most centralised model, the managing body retains overall control but allows the associations a degree of autonomy in their internal affairs, from which it acknowledges it remains aloof (E8_72). Where management is municipal, users gain real influence when dialogue with the administration is fluid and their requests are addressed (E3_73).

Institutional support is crucial to the viability of the allotments. The provision of technical support from the local council underpins day-to-day operations (E5_37), and without a body to guide the process, a community initiative may become a victim of its own success (E9_74). In municipalities with fewer resources, support from higher levels of government compensates for this shortfall (E1_75), and the local authority responds promptly to the allotment’s material needs when these are brought to its attention (GF3_E1_76).

The flip side of autonomy is fragility when support fails. In a self-managed allotment, the community takes on tasks that prove burdensome precisely because of the lack of municipal support (GF4_E4_77), and the loss of a key point of contact leaves it without a link to the administration (GF4_E4_78). The focus of this section is therefore not autonomy versus dependence, but rather an autonomy that is only sustainable when accompanied by stable institutional support.

3.1.5. Dependence on the Local Council and the Quality of Collaboration

All the allotments are ultimately dependent on the local council, which provides the land and sets the framework, but the extent and nature of this dependence vary. In self-managed gardens, the dependence is existential: the project’s continuity was called into question when a change in management led the local council to threaten closure (GF4_E4_79), and the provision of land is conditional upon a minimum level of use that reflects the council’s interest in preventing the site’s deterioration rather than in promoting the garden (GF2_E6_80). In the therapeutic allotment, the dependency is financial: the association’s investment only makes sense if the land lease is secured in the medium term (E10_24).

The quality of collaboration varies. At the positive end of the spectrum, the users’ committee describes itself as the ‘eyes’ of the local council (GF3_E2_81) and dialogue with the administration is fluid and responsive (E3_73).At the other end of the spectrum, collaboration is perceived as non-existent or merely formal: one group states that it has received no financial support (GF2_E6_82) and another describes an administration that only reacts to the pressure of a crisis, not to routine requests (GF4_E1_83). Elsewhere, collaboration is seen as non-existent or purely formal: one group reports receiving no financial support (GF2_E6_82), and another describes an administration that responds only to a crisis, never to routine requests (GF4_E1_83). Even in the most well-established institutional case, the administration drafted the regulation without consulting the managing body (E8_63).

Collaboration tends to be reactive and poorly planned. From an expert perspective, the absence of a systematic municipal strategy is highlighted: support appears to be linked to political expediency rather than to a sustained public policy (E7_84). The governance section thus concludes with an underlying tension: the allotments depend on the City Council for their very existence, but the quality of this collaboration rests more on individual will and circumstances than on a stable framework of shared responsibility.

3.2. Day-to-Day Operations and Practices

3.2.1. Organisation of Day-to-Day Work

Day-to-day work combines individual effort with collective tasks, and its coordination depends on the irrigation system: for canal irrigation, it is concentrated on the day of irrigation, whilst for drip irrigation it takes place on specific days, as illustrated by the weekly shifts in Mislata (105 plots) (GF3_85), the ‘pozo de secà’ in Godella (E3_86), gravity irrigation in Sociópolis (E8_87) or the wells using natural slurry in Alaquàs (E5_88). In Malilla (GF4_89) and the Espai Verd in Benicalap (E7_90; GF2_91), collective participation is reinforced through the registration of activities or a mandatory community-based approach, in contrast to the model of allotments open to the public in Valencia (E6_92).

3.2.2. Decision-Making

Decisions combine an operational (day-to-day) level and a strategic level (by-laws, irrigation, conflicts), distributed across a tiered structure of assemblies, meetings, committees, technical officers and councillors (GF1_E2_93): Mislata raises issues through its management committee and reaches consensus on the by-laws with the technical officer and the councillor (GF3_E2_125); Malilla combines a monthly meeting with an assembly (GF4_94); Godella distinguishes between a daily meeting and an annual assembly under non-intervening municipal oversight (E3_95); and in Alaquàs, the non-binding advisory committee effectively influences the Town Council’s decision (E5_96). In Sociópolis, everything is centralised within the Consell Agrari (E8_31), whilst in the Valencia model, matters are resolved by the Parks and Gardens Department (E6_97).

3.2.3. Resource Management

The funding of basic resources (plot, water, tools, fencing, infrastructure, maintenance) ranges from almost full municipal funding to users covering the majority of the costs themselves: Mislata receives land, weekly water supplies, fencing and the shredding of prunings in exchange for a deposit (GF3_98); Alaquàs has its own municipal wells and a sustainable drainage system (E5_99); Godella leases private land and combines an annual grant of 3,000 euros with user fees (E3_100); Malilla supplements municipal contributions with fees to cover additional costs (GF4_101); the Espai Verd in Benicalap, following an initial grant of 12,000 euros for fencing, is sustained using recycled materials (GF2_102) and support from Las Naves (the public foundation of Valencia City Council which led the European GrowGreen project and spearheaded the Espai Verd Benicalap); and Sociópolis relies on water bottles as watering is limited to alternate Tuesdays (E8_103). In the Valencia model, the City Council provides land, mains water, lockers and toilets (E6_104), whilst the Provincial Council highlights the routine use of drinking water (E1_105) and the UPV points to the ban on selling surpluses as a structural handicap (GF1_E1_106).

3.2.4. Discrepancies Between Regulations and Practice

Discrepancies between regulations and practice are grouped into five categories: individual opportunism, tacit personal exceptions, difficulty in imposing sanctions without a waiting list, structural problems with the regulations, and clashes between by-laws and reality. In Mislata, plots are accumulated through family connections, and a merit-based system was rejected on the grounds that it introduced subjectivity compared to a lottery (GF3_107); in Malilla, there are instances of symbolic appropriation and covert subletting, penalised by the loss of the allotment (GF4_108); the Espai Verd replaces revocation for inactivity — which is inapplicable without a waiting list — with a temporary transfer (GF2_109); in Godella, the biannual lottery has never been held, with plots occupied since 2013 (E3_110); Alaquàs tolerates abandonment due to illness but expels tenants immediately if chemicals are used (E5_111); and in Sociópolis, the Valencia model and the area surrounding the Espai Verd Benicalap give rise to additional tensions due to the impracticability of self-management (E8_112), uses not covered by the regulations (such as school vegetable gardens) (E6_113) and perimeter issues such as informal parking (E9_114).

3.3. Regulatory Framework and Tensions

3.3.1. Legislation and Regulation

The regulatory framework combines municipal by-laws, tender specifications and internal regulations, forming a functional structure that is nonetheless fraught with friction. In institutional allotments, the framework consists of an ordinance designed as a facilitating instrument, which must ensure that essential requirements are met without hindering use (GF3_E3_115), based on a deliberately simple set of rules for coexistence, although these require periodic reminders (GF3_E2_116). In the garden regulated by by-laws, the instrument is not a municipal ordinance but a set of by-laws governing allocation and use, which stipulates compulsory membership of an association and the exclusive practice of agroecological cultivation, and which the municipal technical staff enforce in constant consultation with the association and the users (E3_117).

From an expert perspective, it is emphasised that these spaces cannot develop organically without guidelines or a certain degree of control, lest they degrade the urban landscape (GF1_E1_118). One regularity stands out: the deeper the institutional roots, the denser the formal regulation; the greater the self-management, the heavier the internal self-regulation. No case, however, sits entirely outside a body of rules.

3.3.2. Access and Allocation of Plots

Access is the aspect where the models differ most, and in almost all of them, demand exceeds supply. In the municipal allotment scheme with a management committee, plots are allocated by lottery amongst registered residents who have been on the register for at least five years, as a guarantee of equality in relation to a public asset (GF3_E4_119), whilst membership of the committee does not confer any privilege in the lottery itself (GF3_E2_120); alongside the standard procedure, the by-law provides for direct allocations in the public interest to educational establishments and community groups (GF3_E4_121).

In the self-managed neighbourhood allotment garden, a public tender for management—subject to the submission of a project meeting all formal requirements (GF4_E3_122)—coexists with an internal waiting list that far exceeds the number of plots; indeed, the allocation process itself required the association to be formally established beforehand in order to be eligible to apply (GF4_E3_123). In the allotment garden governed by regulations, standard access is also by lottery, with an annual fee and a deposit, whilst social plots are managed through social services and are exempt from payment. Access thus functions as the primary mechanism for equity, but also as the point where unmet demand exerts the greatest pressure on the model.

3.3.3. Regulatory Rigidity Versus Flexibility

A good framework combines rigidity in essential matters with flexibility in operational matters, avoiding both a disconnect from practice and arbitrariness. In the municipal allotment scheme with a management committee, the rules are rigid regarding the lottery but flexible in the face of justified absences, addressing appeals without turning management into punitive surveillance (GF3_E4_124); the by-law itself is continuously updated to incorporate what is necessary and remove what is obsolete (GF3_E2_125). An attempt to replace the lottery with a merit-based system was rejected on the grounds that it would introduce subjectivity as opposed to the objectivity of chance (GF3_E2_126).

Self-managed models share a flexible mechanism for revocation due to inactivity, with timeframes of two to four months set out in each set of rules (E7_127), which is not actually applied in the association-based self-managed allotment due to the lack of a waiting list for replacements, thereby necessitating a permissive approach (GF2_E1_128). Flexibility, in short, is the means by which everyday practice adapts a rule which, if applied literally, would prove dysfunctional.

3.3.4. Tensions

The analysis identifies five types of recurring regulatory tensions: property-related, political, multi-level, economic and procedural. Those relating to property stem from the precarious nature of tenure: in the self-managed community-based allotment, the land is zoned for future public facilities, meaning the local authority can reclaim it—a risk mitigated only by the symbolic backing of European funding for the project (GF2_E2_129). Political tensions manifest themselves in dependence on the electoral cycle and the stance of the local government, whose dialogue with the associations may cool following a change of administration (GF4_E1_130).

Multilevel challenges stem from the division of powers and the difficulty of controlling land use on land owned by others, particularly private land (E7_131). Economic challenges centre on the ban on selling surplus produce, which confines the allotment to self-consumption and limits the associations’ financial autonomy (GF1_E1_132). Procedural vulnerabilities manifest as an administrative burden and rotation rules which, by forcing a change of users after just a few years, reopen the waiting list and jeopardise the continuity of users’ participation (E6_133). The fragility of the allotments does not stem from their community dynamics—which are generally robust—but from a legal and administrative framework that does not fully recognise their unique nature and keeps them in a subordinate position within the management of public land.

3.4. Participation and Community

3.4.1. Level of Active Participation

Most allotments have a waiting list, a sign of unmet social demand, although the level of participation varies once people are on the list. In the self-managed allotment of neighbourhood origin, more than 25 per cent of registered members take part in each communal activity – a high level for a group of around eighty users (GF4_E4_134); this dynamism stems from a group that took over management and decided to continue the project out of their own interest (GF4_E2_135). In the municipal allotment scheme initiated by local residents, the demand predated the project itself, sustained by neighbours with an agricultural background and by people from other regions who were accustomed to growing their own food (E5_136). The common pattern is high levels of participation centred on a stable core group, predominantly comprising retired people.

3.4.2. Sense of Belonging

The sense of belonging is underpinned by inherited rural traditions, by the routine and sense of purpose that the allotment offers older people, and by intergenerational transmission. In the municipal allotment with a management committee, losing one’s plot would mean losing a daily source of joy (GF3_E1_137), and the bond is described as a devotion to the countryside rather than as a productive activity (GF3_E2_138). In the therapeutic allotment, belonging to the group is considered the very foundation of the project, a prerequisite for its effects to be sustained beyond the site (E10_139). In the centrally managed allotment, a sense of belonging verges on quasi-ownership, something the manager corrects by reminding participants that it is an administrative concession. The supra-municipal administration highlights the garden’s role as a means of breaking out of isolation, even amongst neighbours who have their own gardens (E1_140).

3.4.3. Community Dynamics

Community dynamics include daily greetings, mutual assistance, the exchange of produce and shared celebrations, and often constitute the true value of the allotment, reinforced by socio-cultural diversity. In the municipal allotment with a management committee, watering is organised amongst neighbours via a messaging group when the plot holder cannot attend (GF3_E3_141), and the allotment fosters bonds that extend beyond its boundaries (GF3_E1_142).

In the allotment governed by regulations, communal work days are extended into shared lunches that foster integration (E3_143), and people of various nationalities coexist with mutual language support (E3_144). In the citizen-initiated municipal allotment, intercultural coexistence takes the form of users introducing crops from their countries of origin (E5_145), whilst in the neighbourhood-run, self-managed allotment, the community network ensures that everyone knows one another and participates, even when not everyone works equally (GF4_E4_146). In the centrally managed allotment, reciprocity operates on a time-bank basis and is linked to a neighbouring school through a third-sector organisation, creating an informal institutional framework that underpins day-to-day operations.

3.4.4. Inequality in Involvement

Even in the most cohesive allotments, involvement is not uniform: an active core group sustains day-to-day operations, an intermediate group fulfils their duties without getting involved in the collective effort, and a minority takes no part. In the municipal allotment with a management committee, there are users who systematically ask others to water their plot (GF3_E2_147), whilst the management core itself is small and ageing, revealing its fragility (GF3_E2_148). In the therapeutic allotment, involvement is tailored to each person’s physical capacity, with tasks divided between the greenhouse and the vegetable patch (E10_149). The supra-municipal administration links this divide to differing life expectations across generations and the gradual abandonment of inherited land (E1_150).

3.5. Conflicts and Regulatory Mechanisms

3.5.1. Types of Conflicts

Conflicts are classified as internal, external and structural, with one type predominating depending on the model. In the community garden with a management committee, the predominant issues are the abandonment of plots and the underhand practices of hoarding and petty theft amongst users (GF3_E1_151). In the self-managed allotment run by an association, external conflicts—such as theft and damage to equipment and infrastructure—are more prevalent (GF2_E1_152). From an expert perspective, it is observed that, in squatted allotments, coexistence is sustained by informal balances amongst the users themselves (E7_153). In institutional models, conflict tends to be channelled through administrative channels, whilst in self-managed gardens it is resolved through collective deliberation.

3.5.2. Causes of Conflict

The causes recur regularly across models and can be grouped into five categories. The first is an overestimation of commitment: many people sign up without realising the level of dedication required for cultivation (GF3_E1_154). The second is the symbolic appropriation of the plot by long-standing users, who perceive temporary tenancy as de facto ownership (GF4_E1_155).

The third is the overburdening of volunteers, with a small core group taking on unsustainable tasks (GF2_E1_156), exacerbated by poor communication between the driving force behind the project and the associations it represents (E7_157). The fourth issue concerns external management bodies that are not aligned with the allotment project, whose appointment leads to secondary management that ultimately results in the plots being abandoned (GF4_E4_158). The fifth issue is regulatory non-compliance with external effects on neighbouring plots (chemicals, pests, weeds). Conflicts are rarely strictly relational: they arise from the friction between the individual logic of the contract holder and the collective logic of the allotment.

3.5.3. Resolution Mechanisms

The mechanisms follow a tiered approach, which is more formalised in institutional models and more deliberative in self-managed ones, but with the same basic pattern: a verbal warning, formal notification, a deadline to rectify the situation, and a penalty as a last resort. In the municipal allotment with a management committee, a procedure guaranteeing due process is applied, involving a formal notice, a ten-day deadline and a hearing before revocation (GF3_E4_159). In the citizen-initiated municipal allotment, the model is entirely institutional: a preliminary report, the opportunity to submit representations and, if non-compliance persists, publication in the regional official gazette for expulsion (E5_160).

In the self-managed allotment of neighbourhood origin, the assembly acts as an internal tribunal, operating in the format of a residents’ association without an external administrator (GF4_E3_161), and cases not covered by the regulations are resolved by a vote at a general meeting (GF4_E1_162). In the delegated models, administrative intervention is reserved for serious situations.

3.5.4. Legitimacy of Rules and Authority

The legitimacy of the rules rests on shared pillars: democratic ownership, proportionality of sanctions, separation of roles and respect for users. In the municipal allotment with a management committee, the objectivity of the lottery underpins the legitimacy of the allocation, as it treats everyone equally (GF3_E4_163), and the sanctioning of serious misconduct such as theft is accepted as necessary to protect the rights of others (GF3_E2_164). In the self-managed allotment with neighbourhood origins, legitimacy is further underpinned by a minimal external framework provided by the local council, which places everyone on an equal footing under the same rules (GF4_E3_165). Technical and institutional support reinforces this legitimacy in delegated models, whilst in self-managed models it rests on the collective authorship of the rules.

3.6. Knowledge, Learning and Education

3.6.1. Learning Amongst Users and the Transfer of Agricultural Knowledge

Learning amongst users follows a horizontal and informal pattern, supported by those with more experience and shaped by a willingness to learn (GF3_E2_166). In the community garden with a management committee, the committee itself advises those with less knowledge on what to plant or how to tend the soil (GF3_E2_167). Much of this knowledge is inherited, acquired during childhood in a rural setting, which links the transfer of knowledge to a cultural heritage at risk of being lost unless its transmission is organised (GF3_E1_168). Without an organised means of passing it on, this practical knowledge may be lost within a few decades.

3.6.2. Educational Activities

Educational activities are the most institutionalised aspect of learning. In the municipal allotment with a management committee, school visits predominate (GF3_E3_169), featuring a hands-on approach in which pupils work the land directly (GF3_E2_170). In the citizen-led municipal allotment, schools visit on a regular basis to deliver practical lessons on site (E5_171).

Experts argue that school gardens should be compulsory in state schools, so as not to leave it up to the discretion of a particular teacher (GF1_E1_172), and highlight educational collaboration between gardens as an underutilised opportunity to share expertise in agroecology, pest control and composting (E7_173). In therapeutic gardens, however, the link with schools is tenuous due to the schools’ timetable constraints (E10_174).

3.6.3. Integration of New Users

The integration of new users occurs mainly through immersion, with varying degrees of support. In the community-run municipal garden, the process is informal but effective: newcomers acquire the basic knowledge within a few days thanks to the support of their peers (E5_175). In the therapeutic garden, integration occurs through a process of mimicry that blurs roles, to the extent that a distinction is not always made between participants, volunteers and professionals (E10_176). In community-based models, integration also requires formal membership of the association, which involves learning how its assembly-based decision-making works.

3.7. Social, Environmental and Urban Impact

3.7.1. Social Benefits

Social benefits form the cross-cutting core of the garden’s value and encompass the physical, psychological and relational dimensions (GF3_E3_177). The garden also serves as a resource for the integration of migrant and low-income populations (E1_178) and helps families save on food costs in a context of rising food prices (E5_179).

In therapeutic gardens, the social function takes on an explicitly clinical role: gardening helps users to focus on the here and now and to manage intrusive thoughts (E10_180). This dimension of care, together with neighbourhood cohesion and intergenerational bonds, places the social value of the garden above its productive output.

3.7.2. Environmental Benefits

Environmental benefits include organic farming, composting, soil improvement, biodiversity and the reduction of the carbon footprint. In the municipal allotment with a management committee, ongoing work has regenerated soil that was initially degraded (GF3_E1_181). In the citizen-led municipal allotment, water management is geared towards maximum efficiency through drip irrigation (E5_182) and natural preparations are used for fertilisation and pest control (E5_183); the complex is perceived as a green lung that reduces CO₂ and mitigates the heat island effect, with benefits extending to the entire community (E5_184).

3.7.3. Urban Function

The urban function of the garden varies from case to case, but converges on its role as green infrastructure. In the community-led municipal allotment, it forms part of a green corridor linking the historic market gardens with the residential fabric and cushioning the impact of major roads (E5_185); and it is proposed as a strategy to increase the density of green infrastructure where it is scarce, through small collective allotments that act as climate refuges (E5_186). From an expert’s perspective, the allotment is also valued for its connection to the neighbourhood and the wider area, which integrates it into the surrounding urban fabric (E7_187).

3.7.4. Perception of the Value of the Allotment

The perception of the value of the allotment is positive in all cases, albeit with some nuances. In the municipal allotment with a management committee, this is expressed as an almost euphoric sense of daily satisfaction at harvesting one’s own produce (GF3_E2_188). In the self-managed allotment run by the association, there is instead a sense of frustration at not being able to realise its full potential due to a lack of volunteers (GF2_E2_189). In the therapeutic garden, the value lies in the self-esteem and sense of purpose generated by bringing something to life from nothing (E10_190). The expert’s view summarises that the value of the garden is enormous, but that public policy does not make sufficient use of it.

3.8. Social Inclusion and Public Service

3.8.1. Accessibility

Accessibility depends on admission criteria and physical proximity. In the municipal allotment with a management committee, access is governed by a lottery open to registered residents; in community-based models, individual access is conditional upon membership of the association. Proximity is a key factor: in the citizen-initiated municipal allotment, most users walk there due to its proximity to the town centre (E5_191).Experts note the reverse case: private allotments, with long waiting lists and discretionary access, restrict entry in practice (E7_192). Peripheral locations or those with physical barriers disadvantage groups with reduced mobility.

3.8.2. Inclusion of Vulnerable Groups

The inclusion of vulnerable groups is underpinned by provisions in local by-laws, statutory preferences and agreements with the third sector. In the municipal allotment garden with a management committee, a plot is reserved for an occupational centre on the grounds of public interest (GF3_E4_193). In the community-led municipal allotment garden, one group donates its produce to cookery workshops for the migrant population (E5_194). In the garden governed by regulations, social plots are allocated to organisations working with people facing social exclusion, those in need of reintegration, and those with mental health conditions (E3_195).

In the centrally managed allotment, partnerships involve mental health organisations, organisations representing people with disabilities and other groups (E8_196). The therapeutic allotment represents the extreme case: it is organised entirely around the inclusion of people with mental health issues. Inclusion is thus a structural feature of the public allotment model, not a secondary addition.

3.8.3. Social Function and Equity of Access

In all allotments, the social function takes precedence over the productive one. The allotment is a space open to family and intergenerational life (GF3_E2_197) and a means of reconnecting with a horticultural culture deeply rooted in the local area (E5_198). Equitable access is guaranteed through various mechanisms (lottery, waiting list, open model or direct allocation), and experts advocate for equitable access that enables the collective use of surplus produce without unjustified restrictions (GF1_E1_199).

3.9. Territorial and Urban Planning Dimension

3.9.1. Location and Accessibility

Proximity to urban areas is key to the success of allotments. The supra-municipal administration identifies water and proximity as the two decisive factors (E1_200) and adds that a good allotment must have basic facilities, such as rest areas and shaded areas, which are essential in summer (E1_201). From an expert perspective, functional access criteria (on foot, by bicycle or by car) are also highlighted as a prerequisite for good management (GF1_E1_202). In the citizen-initiated municipal allotment, proximity to the town centre means that most people can walk there, although a car park was provided to ease congestion (E5_203).

3.9.2. Land Tenure

The type of land determines the legal stability of each allotment and its vulnerability to administrative decisions. The analysis identifies four configurations. The citizen-initiated municipal allotment is situated on land converted from a previous sporting use, prioritising the conservation of the scarce available agricultural area (E5_204). The self-managed allotment run by an association occupies land zoned for educational and cultural purposes and reserved for a future facility, a temporary status which its users accept (GF2_E1_205).

The municipal administration of the large city recognises this logic and sees scope in the ageing school network to consolidate uses such as market gardening (E6_206). Added to this are fully municipally-owned public land and private agricultural land under territorial protection, leased by the administration and subject to specific restrictions. Ownership and land-use classification do not always correspond to the actual intended use, which introduces structural fragility into several models.

3.9.3. Land-Use Conflicts

Land-use conflicts manifest themselves as either active or latent. An underlying pattern is cultural: in municipalities with a tradition of vegetable gardens, local residents find it difficult to understand the concept of urban allotments, whilst their value is better understood the larger the city (GF1_E2_207). The very origin of some allotments reveals a conflict between horticultural use and public space: the reclassification as a privatised public space made it necessary to introduce opening hours as a safeguard (E6_208).

In self-managed community-based allotments, the conflict is latent, as the town planning classification allows the land to be reclaimed at any time; and in allotments regulated by by-laws, the tension shifts to unauthorised uses on protected land, which are dealt with by the relevant regional authority in the absence of a dedicated penalty system. The supra-municipal administration points out, from a structural perspective, that inherited land tends to fall into disuse when new generations do not cultivate it (E1_209).

3.9.4. Integration into Urban Planning

Integration into urban planning reveals three patterns: consolidated, stable but vulnerable, and contingent. In the face of this variability, shared fundamental proposals emerge. Citizen-led municipal allotments and the expert perspective advocate for a mandatory land set-aside for allotments in general plans, specifying the type of green space and without reducing the existing green area (E5_210, GF1_E1_211).

The municipal administration of the large city frames this integration within a strategy for citizens to take ownership of public space (E6_212), whilst the expert perspective advocates for networking amongst allotments, although previous attempts have not yet taken root (E7_213). Other proposals point to existing tools, such as a public catalogue of available plots that highlights suitable locations for establishing a community garden.

3.10. Sustainability and the Future of the Model

3.10.1. Continuity of the Project

Continuity varies according to the governance model and the framework of institutional stability. The municipal allotment with a management committee looks forward to a future of continuity with confidence, drawing on the consolidation of the by-law (GF3_E3_214) and the internal harmony of the collective (GF3_E1_215). The self-managed neighbourhood-based allotment maintains cohesion and has a broad-based committee with monthly meetings aimed at continuous improvement, but views the pending contract renewal with concern.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, the self-managed garden run by an association shows signs of exhaustion amongst its active core, which acknowledges that it is barely surviving after years of overwork (GF2_E1_216); and the therapeutic garden illustrates a continuity conditioned by its financial dependence on a municipal land grant with a limited time frame (E10_217). Continuity favours institutional or mixed projects backed by a stable regulatory framework; self-managed projects, by contrast, live or die by the succession of their volunteers.

3.10.2. Risks

The analysis reveals five categories of risk that combine in varying ways in each case. The first is political: dependence on the electoral cycle, illustrated by the stalling of a municipal urban agriculture plan following a change of government. The second is legal and administrative: the rigidity of the tender specifications, which, in the self-managed community garden, causes concern regarding contract renewal, given the precedent of a neighbouring garden being closed due to a simple administrative delay (GF4_E1_218).

The third is property- and land-related: the risk of land being reclaimed due to its town planning classification. The fourth is volunteer-related: the exhaustion of the active core group and the lack of successors, exacerbated in the therapeutic garden by reliance on elderly volunteers with agricultural expertise (E10_219). The fifth is operational: health incidents linked to the age of users and weather conditions (E8_220), water-related risks in the event of water restrictions, and the takeover of management by organisations with no horticultural expertise. Institutional neglect in neighbouring municipalities serves as a warning of what happens without public support (GF3_E3_221).

3.10.3. Scalability and Replicability

Scalability depends on three structural factors consistently identified across cases: proximity to the town centre, the existence of prior organised demand, and the availability of a stable water supply. When all three are present, the model can be easily replicated. Those running the municipal allotment with a management committee recommend studying previous experiences before designing a new one (GF3_E3_222) and highlight water as an essential prerequisite (GF3_E2_223).

The supra-municipal administration notes a documented provincial ripple effect linked to funding schemes (E1_224), and the self-managed, association-based allotment has already inspired a replica in another neighbourhood based on its own proposal (GF2_E1_225). The therapeutic allotment demonstrates a different path to institutional scaling, having been replicated by a supra-municipal body (E10_226). Inter-municipal knowledge transfer thus emerges as the main driver of the model’s dissemination.

3.10.4. Vision for the Future and Proposals

Proposals for the future converge in five areas: urban planning provisions (land set aside in general development plans), infrastructure improvements, legal protection through local by-laws, controlled marketing of surplus produce, and networking between projects and local authorities. In the community-run municipal allotment, the priorities are operational – such as drip irrigation and shared services – subject to the available budget (GF3_E3_227).

In the citizen-led municipal allotment, the vision for the future involves strengthening water self-sufficiency by interconnecting well irrigation networks (E5_228), whilst the supra-municipal administration observes, from a forward-looking perspective, a growing interest amongst the urban population in these neo-rural practices (E1_229). The shared vision is a model characterised by regulatory stability, ongoing institutional support and adequate infrastructure, capable of sustaining the community cohesion that constitutes its main asset.

Note on coding. The format of Table S1 is followed: interviews E{n}_{order}; focus groups GF{group}_E{participant}_{order}. The participant number indicates the order in which the person spoke in the focus group, and the final number is the order in which the quotation appears in the text (a single, consecutive series throughout the document; Section 3.3, Section 3.4, Section 3.5, Section 3.6, Section 3.7, Section 3.8, Section 3.9 and Section 3.10 continue the numbering from quotation 107). The data have been anonymised: the text in square brackets replaces identifiable names or provides context without altering the meaning of the quotation; figures are retained for their analytical value.

Table 4. Comparative analysis of seven urban allotments: governance model, benefits and risks of the model, and social, urban and environmental benefits.

Allotment	Governance model	Benefits of the model	Risks of the model	Social benefits	Urban benefits	Environmental benefits
Malilla Allotment	Self-managed by the Geshuma neighbourhood association through a periodic municipal lease subject to a tender process. It has an extensive board of directors (18 members), a general assembly and its own internal regulations with a graduated system of disciplinary measures. It operates alongside five to seven partner associations.	High and sustained involvement (participation in joint activities exceeding 25 per cent), operational autonomy and a board with a rotation system. The association acts as the ‘eyes of the council’ and ensures compliance with internal regulations. A model consulted by other local authorities interested in replicating it.	Periodic contract renewal (precedent of closure in San Isidro), lack of a stable municipal contact following the retirement of the key civil servant, and dependence on the electoral cycle. No involvement in the by-law and only reactive institutional support.	An intergenerational community (aged 20 to 85) and the inclusion of vulnerable groups (mental health, children, women, multiculturalism) through partner organisations; 220 people on the waiting list. Socio-professional diversity and educational activities with schoolchildren.	Integrated into Malilla Park as a green space planned under the PAI; partially compensates for the loss of the traditional vegetable garden. Densely built-up location, accessible on foot to around 50,000 residents without a metro link.	Sector-specific composting (zero waste), biodiversity (insect hotels), agroecology and reused water. Organic farming is mandatory by by-law and makes use of shredded municipal prunings; a philosophy of a complete life cycle is demonstrated during school visits.
Sociópolis Allotment (La Torre)	Centralised institutional management: the Municipal Agricultural Council (Consell Agrari Municipal) has managed Sociópolis on behalf of the City Council since 2008 and oversees all processes. No member of the Council has a plot, which guarantees impartiality. It operates alongside six associations under an agreement and in conjunction with the Water Tribunal (Favara irrigation channel).	Consolidated institutional stability and impartial decision-making through the separation of manager and user. Extensive support (training in organic farming, pest control and composting; 3+1-year leases) and de facto flexibility, with extensions granted for well-maintained plots.	Friction between two concurrent regulatory frameworks (restrictive guidelines from the Consell and a municipal by-law geared towards self-management). Bureaucratic overload and a digital divide incompatible with an older user demographic; rigid timetables and health-related issues caused by the heat.	For vulnerable groups (people with disabilities, those with mental health issues, marginalised women), it functions as a ‘healing project’; for older people, as a structuring routine. Dynamics of reciprocity (cross-watering, time bank) and a strong sense of belonging.	Part of the Sociópolis urban development project (La Torre neighbourhood): a bridge between the city and the countryside and an element of spatial planning. Some 280 plots ranging from 65 to 90 m² on public land set aside for community use, within a framework of traditional Valencian farming practices.	Organic farming (organic fertiliser, biological pest control, composting) and food sovereignty. Heritage value of traditional gravity-fed irrigation via the Favara irrigation channel; water scarcity remains an unresolved issue.
Mislata Allotment	A municipal initiative since 2017, created to protect agricultural land and revitalise the Pou del Quint. Municipal ownership and a regulatory by-law; 105 plots, a minimum of 5 years’ registration on the municipal register and a public lottery. A voluntary Management Committee that advises and inspects whilst the Town Council makes decisions.	A formal procedure with safeguards (hearing process, regulated revocation), low cost and a partnership with the Water Tribunal (free allocation of water). A high degree of operational autonomy within the formal framework and well-established waiting lists.	An ordinance in need of comprehensive review and the exhaustion of the volunteers who sustain the Committee. Administrative overload (around 200 cases) without a specific budget allocation; underhand tactics to accumulate plots and latent pressure on land.	High demand with a reserve list, predominantly comprising older people and pensioners. Daily interaction, exchange of produce, and physical, psychological and social benefits; inclusion through plots reserved for schools and an occupational centre.	A space for relaxation in one of Europe’s most densely populated municipalities. A central, pedestrianised location on land zoned as non-building land; the local council removed a roundabout from the master plan to preserve it.	Minimisation of chemical use, prioritisation of organic farming in the lottery selection criteria, and preservation of traditional irrigation via irrigation channels. Use of shredded prunings and future installation of a composting facility; the century-old well serves as a strategic reserve.
Godella Allotment	A hybrid institutional-community model: the Town Council leases land from four private landowners and makes it available to users through the La Coscollota association, which has compulsory membership, with an assembly, a board and self-funding (membership fee of €40). Regulations dating from 2013 and compulsory agroecological farming.	High operational autonomy and very smooth communication with the Town Council. Multidimensional support (land lease, annual grant of €3,000, training, tools and legal support); well-established collaboration after twelve years.	The 2013 regulations are obsolete (the planned biennial lottery was never implemented) and there is a lack of flexibility in amending them. Dependence on private, rather than municipal, land, and pressure from ‘villa development’ in a Grade 1 protected market garden area.	High demand and a very diverse membership (various social classes, ages and nationalities). A strong sense of belonging, mutual support and communal work days; benefits for older people and vulnerable groups through agreements.	Peri-urban location next to the Moncada irrigation channel, on Grade 1 protected agricultural land, acting as a transition between the town centre and traditional farmland. Advocates for the integration of allotments into urban design as a specific amenity.	Mandatory agroecological cultivation and preservation of traditional plant material (home-grown seedlings, seeds contributed by migrants). Conversion of a former rubbish tip into a reservoir of peri-urban biodiversity.
Espai Verd Benicalap Allotment	A hybrid model of federative self-management on a municipally-leased plot: the public foundation Las Naves provides support (initial funding from the European GrowGreen project, guidance) and then withdraws, with management falling to a federation of 15 to 20 neighbourhood groups with a governing committee. Distinguishing feature: the allotments must be collective, not individual, with statutes approved by the users.	The collective design prevents individual burnout and ensures continuous activity; the federative structure provides a unified voice in dealings with the local authority. Full operational autonomy with limited logistical support and no direct cost to the local authority.	Reliance on the driving group and burnout amongst volunteers (low actual participation, 4–6 active members), recurrent vandalism and theft, lack of ongoing funding, and territorial uncertainty due to the reversible designation as an educational facility.	Intercultural and intergenerational cohesion in a low-income neighbourhood with a high mix of migrant communities; effective inclusion of vulnerable groups (an African woman has chaired the Espai). Access via open membership, with no income requirements.	Regenerative function: transforms a derelict site used as an informal car park into a place for meeting and production. It addresses the shortage of public facilities in the Ciudad Fallera and forms part of the urban greening policy; a public catalogue of sites is proposed.	Organic farming required by the statutes, a microhabitat with pollinators in fallow areas, and an edible syntropic forest with native reforestation. It forms part of nature-based solutions (GrowGreen) to tackle climate change.
Alaquàs Allotment	An institutional project stemming from a citizens’ initiative (ten years): a proposal included in the White Paper and submitted to the full council. Municipal management involving environmental and education specialists, and a de facto binding advisory committee. Two by-laws (on allocation and penalties) with provisions for different user categories.	Extensive institutional support (land, well water, fencing, car park, drip irrigation, technical expertise and training). Amendments to the by-law are proposed, for the most part, by the users; priority is given to social groups and the garden is open to the public on Saturdays.	Ban on direct sales (barter only) and immediate expulsion without notice for the use of chemicals. Private land held under a nominal lease until its transfer to the local authority; risks relating to hydrological and climatic conditions and future environmental disinvestment.	200 active users (more than half on a daily basis) and a waiting list of 60–70 people; seven or eight nationalities. An emotional refuge (“better than any medicine”), financial savings and social interaction (Saturday lunches).	Structural function in a very densely populated municipality with stunted growth: an intentional green corridor (historic market garden, urban woodland, allotments and tree-lined avenue). Public land repurposed to preserve the agricultural area, with a green space ratio well above the WHO standard.	A biodiversity reservoir providing biological pest control; 100 per cent of water sourced from municipal wells and permeable concrete that returns water to the water table. Reduction in CO₂ emissions and the urban heat island effect; natural preparations, zero plastics and zero chemicals.
Pentagrama Association’s Allotment (Llíria)	A hybrid model with a light institutional framework: municipal land and buildings provided to the Pentagrama Association, which manages the allotment, the greenhouse and the nursery. Llíria Town Council owns and funds the initial infrastructure; retired farmer volunteers pass on their technical knowledge. Distinguishing feature: there are no plots or formal regulations, and the allotment operates as a therapeutic tool within a mental health programme.	High operational autonomy with tasks tailored to each person’s abilities and regulatory flexibility allowing for incremental development. Blurring of roles between users, volunteers and professionals; 19 years of experience and proven replicability across the region.	Consumables are funded entirely by the association (structural but not recurring operational support from the local council), and administrative procedures are perceived as complicated. Dependence on older volunteers with no guaranteed succession and on a municipal land lease with an agreed time frame.	Core focus: people with chronic mental illness; physical, attentional and emotional therapeutic benefits, self-esteem and a sense of belonging (“Pentagrama experienced as a family”). Collaboration with disability, older people and children, with a normalising effect.	Regeneration of an underused municipal facility and integration into the municipal mental health policy, in which Llíria was a pioneer. Land set aside for community use at the headquarters, with a second school garden opposite; no land-use conflicts.	Environmental dimension subordinate to the therapeutic focus: low-impact practices (drip irrigation, composting, manure and natural substrate, self-defined as ‘organic’), but with no data on biodiversity or ecosystem services.

Source: own analysis based on interviews (E1–E10) and focus groups (GF1–GF5).

Table 4. Comparative analysis of seven urban allotments: governance model, benefits and risks of the model, and social, urban and environmental benefits.

Allotment	Governance model	Benefits of the model	Risks of the model	Social benefits	Urban benefits	Environmental benefits
Malilla Allotment	Self-managed by the Geshuma neighbourhood association through a periodic municipal lease subject to a tender process. It has an extensive board of directors (18 members), a general assembly and its own internal regulations with a graduated system of disciplinary measures. It operates alongside five to seven partner associations.	High and sustained involvement (participation in joint activities exceeding 25 per cent), operational autonomy and a board with a rotation system. The association acts as the ‘eyes of the council’ and ensures compliance with internal regulations. A model consulted by other local authorities interested in replicating it.	Periodic contract renewal (precedent of closure in San Isidro), lack of a stable municipal contact following the retirement of the key civil servant, and dependence on the electoral cycle. No involvement in the by-law and only reactive institutional support.	An intergenerational community (aged 20 to 85) and the inclusion of vulnerable groups (mental health, children, women, multiculturalism) through partner organisations; 220 people on the waiting list. Socio-professional diversity and educational activities with schoolchildren.	Integrated into Malilla Park as a green space planned under the PAI; partially compensates for the loss of the traditional vegetable garden. Densely built-up location, accessible on foot to around 50,000 residents without a metro link.	Sector-specific composting (zero waste), biodiversity (insect hotels), agroecology and reused water. Organic farming is mandatory by by-law and makes use of shredded municipal prunings; a philosophy of a complete life cycle is demonstrated during school visits.
Sociópolis Allotment (La Torre)	Centralised institutional management: the Municipal Agricultural Council (Consell Agrari Municipal) has managed Sociópolis on behalf of the City Council since 2008 and oversees all processes. No member of the Council has a plot, which guarantees impartiality. It operates alongside six associations under an agreement and in conjunction with the Water Tribunal (Favara irrigation channel).	Consolidated institutional stability and impartial decision-making through the separation of manager and user. Extensive support (training in organic farming, pest control and composting; 3+1-year leases) and de facto flexibility, with extensions granted for well-maintained plots.	Friction between two concurrent regulatory frameworks (restrictive guidelines from the Consell and a municipal by-law geared towards self-management). Bureaucratic overload and a digital divide incompatible with an older user demographic; rigid timetables and health-related issues caused by the heat.	For vulnerable groups (people with disabilities, those with mental health issues, marginalised women), it functions as a ‘healing project’; for older people, as a structuring routine. Dynamics of reciprocity (cross-watering, time bank) and a strong sense of belonging.	Part of the Sociópolis urban development project (La Torre neighbourhood): a bridge between the city and the countryside and an element of spatial planning. Some 280 plots ranging from 65 to 90 m² on public land set aside for community use, within a framework of traditional Valencian farming practices.	Organic farming (organic fertiliser, biological pest control, composting) and food sovereignty. Heritage value of traditional gravity-fed irrigation via the Favara irrigation channel; water scarcity remains an unresolved issue.
Mislata Allotment	A municipal initiative since 2017, created to protect agricultural land and revitalise the Pou del Quint. Municipal ownership and a regulatory by-law; 105 plots, a minimum of 5 years’ registration on the municipal register and a public lottery. A voluntary Management Committee that advises and inspects whilst the Town Council makes decisions.	A formal procedure with safeguards (hearing process, regulated revocation), low cost and a partnership with the Water Tribunal (free allocation of water). A high degree of operational autonomy within the formal framework and well-established waiting lists.	An ordinance in need of comprehensive review and the exhaustion of the volunteers who sustain the Committee. Administrative overload (around 200 cases) without a specific budget allocation; underhand tactics to accumulate plots and latent pressure on land.	High demand with a reserve list, predominantly comprising older people and pensioners. Daily interaction, exchange of produce, and physical, psychological and social benefits; inclusion through plots reserved for schools and an occupational centre.	A space for relaxation in one of Europe’s most densely populated municipalities. A central, pedestrianised location on land zoned as non-building land; the local council removed a roundabout from the master plan to preserve it.	Minimisation of chemical use, prioritisation of organic farming in the lottery selection criteria, and preservation of traditional irrigation via irrigation channels. Use of shredded prunings and future installation of a composting facility; the century-old well serves as a strategic reserve.
Godella Allotment	A hybrid institutional-community model: the Town Council leases land from four private landowners and makes it available to users through the La Coscollota association, which has compulsory membership, with an assembly, a board and self-funding (membership fee of €40). Regulations dating from 2013 and compulsory agroecological farming.	High operational autonomy and very smooth communication with the Town Council. Multidimensional support (land lease, annual grant of €3,000, training, tools and legal support); well-established collaboration after twelve years.	The 2013 regulations are obsolete (the planned biennial lottery was never implemented) and there is a lack of flexibility in amending them. Dependence on private, rather than municipal, land, and pressure from ‘villa development’ in a Grade 1 protected market garden area.	High demand and a very diverse membership (various social classes, ages and nationalities). A strong sense of belonging, mutual support and communal work days; benefits for older people and vulnerable groups through agreements.	Peri-urban location next to the Moncada irrigation channel, on Grade 1 protected agricultural land, acting as a transition between the town centre and traditional farmland. Advocates for the integration of allotments into urban design as a specific amenity.	Mandatory agroecological cultivation and preservation of traditional plant material (home-grown seedlings, seeds contributed by migrants). Conversion of a former rubbish tip into a reservoir of peri-urban biodiversity.
Espai Verd Benicalap Allotment	A hybrid model of federative self-management on a municipally-leased plot: the public foundation Las Naves provides support (initial funding from the European GrowGreen project, guidance) and then withdraws, with management falling to a federation of 15 to 20 neighbourhood groups with a governing committee. Distinguishing feature: the allotments must be collective, not individual, with statutes approved by the users.	The collective design prevents individual burnout and ensures continuous activity; the federative structure provides a unified voice in dealings with the local authority. Full operational autonomy with limited logistical support and no direct cost to the local authority.	Reliance on the driving group and burnout amongst volunteers (low actual participation, 4–6 active members), recurrent vandalism and theft, lack of ongoing funding, and territorial uncertainty due to the reversible designation as an educational facility.	Intercultural and intergenerational cohesion in a low-income neighbourhood with a high mix of migrant communities; effective inclusion of vulnerable groups (an African woman has chaired the Espai). Access via open membership, with no income requirements.	Regenerative function: transforms a derelict site used as an informal car park into a place for meeting and production. It addresses the shortage of public facilities in the Ciudad Fallera and forms part of the urban greening policy; a public catalogue of sites is proposed.	Organic farming required by the statutes, a microhabitat with pollinators in fallow areas, and an edible syntropic forest with native reforestation. It forms part of nature-based solutions (GrowGreen) to tackle climate change.
Alaquàs Allotment	An institutional project stemming from a citizens’ initiative (ten years): a proposal included in the White Paper and submitted to the full council. Municipal management involving environmental and education specialists, and a de facto binding advisory committee. Two by-laws (on allocation and penalties) with provisions for different user categories.	Extensive institutional support (land, well water, fencing, car park, drip irrigation, technical expertise and training). Amendments to the by-law are proposed, for the most part, by the users; priority is given to social groups and the garden is open to the public on Saturdays.	Ban on direct sales (barter only) and immediate expulsion without notice for the use of chemicals. Private land held under a nominal lease until its transfer to the local authority; risks relating to hydrological and climatic conditions and future environmental disinvestment.	200 active users (more than half on a daily basis) and a waiting list of 60–70 people; seven or eight nationalities. An emotional refuge (“better than any medicine”), financial savings and social interaction (Saturday lunches).	Structural function in a very densely populated municipality with stunted growth: an intentional green corridor (historic market garden, urban woodland, allotments and tree-lined avenue). Public land repurposed to preserve the agricultural area, with a green space ratio well above the WHO standard.	A biodiversity reservoir providing biological pest control; 100 per cent of water sourced from municipal wells and permeable concrete that returns water to the water table. Reduction in CO₂ emissions and the urban heat island effect; natural preparations, zero plastics and zero chemicals.
Pentagrama Association’s Allotment (Llíria)	A hybrid model with a light institutional framework: municipal land and buildings provided to the Pentagrama Association, which manages the allotment, the greenhouse and the nursery. Llíria Town Council owns and funds the initial infrastructure; retired farmer volunteers pass on their technical knowledge. Distinguishing feature: there are no plots or formal regulations, and the allotment operates as a therapeutic tool within a mental health programme.	High operational autonomy with tasks tailored to each person’s abilities and regulatory flexibility allowing for incremental development. Blurring of roles between users, volunteers and professionals; 19 years of experience and proven replicability across the region.	Consumables are funded entirely by the association (structural but not recurring operational support from the local council), and administrative procedures are perceived as complicated. Dependence on older volunteers with no guaranteed succession and on a municipal land lease with an agreed time frame.	Core focus: people with chronic mental illness; physical, attentional and emotional therapeutic benefits, self-esteem and a sense of belonging (“Pentagrama experienced as a family”). Collaboration with disability, older people and children, with a normalising effect.	Regeneration of an underused municipal facility and integration into the municipal mental health policy, in which Llíria was a pioneer. Land set aside for community use at the headquarters, with a second school garden opposite; no land-use conflicts.	Environmental dimension subordinate to the therapeutic focus: low-impact practices (drip irrigation, composting, manure and natural substrate, self-defined as ‘organic’), but with no data on biodiversity or ecosystem services.

Source: own analysis based on interviews (E1–E10) and focus groups (GF1–GF5).

4. Discussion

The aim of this study was to analyse and compare the governance models of urban allotments in the Valencia Functional Urban Area and to explore the associated social dimensions, in particular participation, community cohesion, social inclusion and learning processes. The results confirm the initial hypothesis: the allotments studied do not follow a single model, but are distributed along a continuum ranging from community self-management to municipal or institutional management, with hybrid models and those receiving external support occupying intermediate positions [19,31]. However, the analysis qualifies this hypothesis on one key point, given that rather than discrete types, what is observed are unstable balances between participation, regulation and sustainability, and the position of each allotment garden on the continuum depends less on a pre-existing design than on the day-to-day interaction between the community and the administration.

In the seven allotments, governance is organised along a continuum between community self-management and institutional management. Although each case can be classified under a formal type depending on where the regulatory framework lies, when one considers actual operation, the dominant configuration is hybrid: the local authority sets the framework and provides the land, whilst an association or committee, together with horizontal relationships amongst users, maintains day-to-day management. This de facto hybridisation is evident even in cases with institutional roots, such as the centrally managed allotment, where the municipal agricultural body coexists with an internal system of reciprocity based on a ‘time bank’ that handles irrigation, planting and maintenance, or the municipal allotment with a management committee, whose operation relies on a voluntary management committee of users. In the Valencian context, this distribution mirrors the triad of rental, associative and municipal models described by Palau-Salvador et al. [38] for the same metropolitan area, and aligns with the continuum of top-down, bottom-up and mixed approaches proposed by Fox-Kämper et al. [19]. The predominance of the hybrid model is consistent with the European trend, in which collaborative arrangements between civil society and the public sector are in the majority [31], and reinforces the idea that the dichotomy between the fully community-run allotment and the fully administered one has little analytical value [21,39].

The most consistent finding of the analysis is that institutional support is crucial for the survival of any model, but only when it complements rather than replaces the community. The Valencian cases illustrate both extremes. In the municipal allotment with a management committee, the combination of a stable municipal framework and a management committee made up of volunteer users produces the highest-rated model among those analysed. However, this balance is not without risks: members of the management committee do not enjoy any special privileges over other allotment holders and must enter the public lottery on an equal footing if they wish to continue having a plot. This requirement, consistent with the principle of equity that underpins the by-law, nevertheless introduces a structural vulnerability into the model, as the simultaneous departure of key members of the committee would jeopardise the continuity of inspections, advice to users and day-to-day monitoring of regulatory compliance; in the self-managed allotment run by an association, total autonomy does not stem from a deliberate choice, but from the local authority’s withdrawal of support once the initial grant had run out, leading to an excessive workload and burnout amongst the active core group; and in the self-managed allotment of neighbourhood origin, collaboration broke down when the key technical officer retired without a replacement. The centrally managed allotment demonstrates that even a model with institutional roots can constitute good practice when it provides users with resources (land, water, infrastructure and agreements with the third sector) whilst, at the same time, allows them to organise themselves, avoiding paternalism, as the centralised management by the municipal agricultural body coexists with an internal system of reciprocity—organised as a time bank—which handles gravity-fed irrigation, planting and maintenance in the owner’s absence without compromising regulatory compliance. This balance between the provision of resources and operational autonomy is precisely what Kanosvamhira [21] associates with the most resilient hybrid model—one capable of combining informal flexibility with formal accountability—and what van der Jagt et al. [31] advocate when calling on public authorities to move beyond rigid top-down control and be responsive to local dynamics. This evidence also aligns with the conclusion reached by Ponstingel [20], who argues that the best socio-ecological outcomes are associated with bottom-up structures supported by informal professional guidance, and with that of Jacob and Rocha [25], who link administrative support to the longevity of projects. In the words of Pino Cabeza [39], the most recommended model relies on the creation of synergies between local government and organised users.

Consistent with this idea, governance models for urban allotments are neither fixed nor permanent configurations, but living structures that evolve over time. The international literature has clearly documented this capacity for change. Governance structures tend to take on different forms at each stage of the project—planning, implementation and day-to-day management—and the allocation of responsibilities amongst public authorities, associations and users is frequently readjusted as the allotment matures [19]. Furthermore, a common shift towards more top-down configurations has been observed, in which the administration regains a leading role and the gardening community loses strategic influence over the decisions that affect it [24,26]. Conversely, the opposite trajectory has also been documented. An initially institutional model, with the community playing a supporting role, which evolves over time towards a grassroots model, sustained by the community but politically backed by the local council [39]. Both trajectories—bottom-up and top-down—demonstrate that the position of each model within the institutional–self-managed continuum is not a structural feature, but a situational one subject to review. The Valencian case clearly confirms this dynamism and provides concrete examples of how such shifts occur. The recent deterioration in the relationship between the municipal administration of the large city and the association managing the neighbourhood-based self-managed allotment illustrates how a stable hybrid model can be weakened by seemingly minor causes, such as the retirement of the key municipal officer without a replacement being appointed. The trajectory of the association-based, self-managed allotment shows a different shift; having started as a project supported institutionally by the public innovation body and through European funding, it evolved towards a form of self-management that was not deliberately chosen, but rather assumed due to the sudden absence of ongoing public support. And the case of the major city in the area—examined through the institutional perspective of its city council rather than as one of the seven allotments analysed—reveals the model’s sensitivity to the electoral cycle; the suspension of the municipal urban agriculture plan and the uncertainty surrounding the future of the municipal food council following the change of government in 2023 demonstrate that public policies on urban allotments, when not safeguarded by regulatory instruments of sufficient legal weight, are vulnerable to discontinuity. These three examples show that a model’s position on the continuum is renegotiated continually. Its trajectory hinges on very specific factors: whether there is a stable technical lead, whether funding continues, how politically sensitive the government of the day is, and how robust the regulatory framework behind the project proves to be.

A distinctive contribution of this study is that the vulnerability of community gardens does not stem from their community dynamics – which are generally robust – but from the legal and administrative framework that keeps them in a subordinate position within the management of public land. The five tensions identified (property-related, political, multi-level, economic, and procedural) are rooted in the precarious nature of tenure and in the land’s town planning classification, which rarely corresponds to its actual use as an allotment. This finding ties in with the administrative barriers described by Willman [27] in Tampere, with the ambivalence—both protective and disciplinary—surrounding Geneva’s municipal allotments [28], and with the short-term social policy nature, rather than long-term sustainable planning, that Anthopoulou et al. [40] attribute to the Greek community gardens that emerged during the crisis. Palau-Salvador et al. [38] emphasise, in the same vein, that public policies are the decisive factor in consolidating these processes and that public support is particularly necessary where land tenure or water supply is insecure. The territorial protection of the Valencian horta through the Territorial Action Plan for the Horta [30], described by stakeholders as an umbrella regulation lacking its own system of penalties, exemplifies this insufficient legal framework.

The analysis also warns of the risks of institutional mediation. When an external body with no connection to market gardening takes over management—as illustrated by the self-managed community garden whose concession was awarded to an organisation unrelated to the market gardening project—the garden can become a project for the community rather than of the community, in line with the observations of Maćkiewicz and Jeziorek [24], who warn that, without an explicit effort to build community, the allotment degenerates into a mere educational space. Drake [23] offers a complementary interpretative framework in which the promoters’ intentions regarding the community do not automatically translate into the expected outcomes, but rather depend on how users’ expectations are recognised and integrated. This mismatch between design and practice runs through several of the Valencian cases, ranging from the rejection of the merit-based allocation system in the municipal allotment with a management committee to the failure to implement the biannual lottery in the allotment governed by regulations, and points to the need to address the power dynamics that Zerbian et al. [41] identify as key determinants in the city of Valencia’s food governance instruments.

As regards the social dimensions, the results confirm that the social function takes precedence over the productive one. The allotments operate as spaces for neighbourhood cohesion, intergenerational bonding, the integration of vulnerable groups and a vital daily routine for older people – sociocultural benefits that are widely documented in the literature [10,11,16]. The contrast drawn by Hasson [42] between allotments and community gardens—with the former having greater productive capacity and autonomy, and the latter yielding better results in terms of inclusion and environmental education—is particularly relevant for interpreting the Valencian case, where the prevalence of the individual allotment model coexists with a strong community dimension. One novel aspect is the informal institutional framework observed in the centrally managed allotment, as previously noted, where reciprocity amongst users and intergenerational support (through an agreement with a state school) sustain the day-to-day viability of the project where the formal framework falls short. This capacity for self-organisation, together with the experience of the therapeutic allotment—managed by a third-sector organisation for people with mental health issues [14]—illustrates the value of the allotment as an infrastructure for care and social capital, beyond its agricultural yield.

Viewed within a broader context, these findings reinforce the argument that urban agriculture should not be assessed solely on the basis of its quantitative contribution to food security—which is limited by the scarcity of urban land [13]—but rather on the basis of its multifunctional nature. The allotments studied contribute to urban resilience, understood as the capacity to resist, adapt, recover and transform in the face of crises and stresses [7,43]; they provide ecosystem services relating to thermal regulation and water management that are relevant to climate adaptation [44,45], and they strengthen social cohesion and a sense of belonging [8,9]. Their strategic value lies in bringing together health, educational, social and environmental benefits [1,6,12], in line with the transformation of urban food systems [2,3] and with several Sustainable Development Goals [4,5]. The Mediterranean specificity of this case, characterised by the tradition of peri-urban vegetable gardens and the expansion of community gardens following the financial crisis [38], helps to explain the relative importance of municipal and plot-level configurations, in which land-use planning and heritage protection act as structuring factors.

From a public policy perspective, the results suggest that urban food strategies in the Valencia Functional Urban Area, and in comparable Mediterranean contexts, would benefit from a portfolio approach that recognises the complementarity of municipal, community-led and hybrid models, rather than favouring a single template [31,38]. Such an approach should guarantee security of tenure and equitable access, protect self-managed spaces that generate the richest social and educational outcomes, and strengthen hybrid models capable of combining institutional support with community autonomy. The proposals emerging from the stakeholders themselves point in this direction: setting aside specific land in general development plans without taking it away from existing green spaces; providing legal safeguards for local by-laws against changes in government; opening up short supply chains currently blocked by land-use classifications; and creating a network of urban farming initiatives to share knowledge and exchange resources between municipalities. In this regard, the role of the ‘gardeniser’ described by Pino Cabeza [39]—a professional figure straddling the roles of agricultural technician and community facilitator, combining horticultural knowledge with skills in mediation, organisational management and liaison with the administration—and the role of municipal food councils analysed by Zerbian et al. [41] offer concrete tools for organising this collaboration. The former would provide operational continuity and relieve volunteers of tasks that currently jeopardise their sustainability, whilst the latter would provide a stable framework for cross-sectoral deliberation between the administration, civil society and the productive sector. Governance, in sum, operates as the central mediating factor: how rules are set and how decisions are shared decide whether an allotment becomes a space for inclusive participation or stays a merely instrumental resource [17,18].

This study has several limitations. Its qualitative and contextual nature limits the statistical generalisation of the findings, although it allows for an in-depth interpretative understanding of governance practices [32,46]. The focus on the Valencia Functional Urban Area, whilst useful for comparative analysis, calls for caution when extrapolating the results to other urban contexts with different institutional and cultural trajectories. A second specific limitation stemmed from the practical impossibility of incorporating into the analysis certain urban allotments initially envisaged in the research design. The most significant case is that of a community allotment in the metropolitan area, managed by an association and dedicated to organic farming, agro-environmental education and the revival of traditional market gardening; the study of this site could not be completed because the facilities were destroyed during the severe floods (DANA) that affected Valencia in October 2024. Furthermore, the research primarily reflects the perspective of the actors directly involved; therefore, future studies should incorporate the voices of non-participating residents, public authorities at different levels and private landowners. It would also be valuable to adopt longitudinal designs capable of tracking how governance arrangements evolve over time and across the different phases of the garden’s development [19,24,41], as well as combining the qualitative approach with quantitative indicators of ecological, health and equity outcomes, including the measurement of ecosystem services such as carbon sequestration [10,45]. These approaches would help to consolidate the empirical basis needed to guide fairer, more resilient and sustainable urban allotment policies.

5. Conclusions

The results confirm, with some nuances, the initial hypothesis. Urban allotments in the Valencia Functional Urban Area do not follow a single model, but are distributed along a continuum between community self-management and institutional management. However, rather than discrete and stable types, what is observed are unstable balances between participation, regulation and sustainability. The position of each allotment on this continuum depends less on a pre-determined design than on the day-to-day interaction between the community and the administration, and is continually renegotiated according to factors such as the presence of a technical point of contact, the continuity of funding, political sensitivity and the robustness of the regulatory framework. The hybrid model, in which the administration sets the framework (by-laws, land allocation and supervision) whilst an association manages day-to-day operations, is the most widespread; this undermines the analytical value of the dichotomy between the fully community-run allotment and the fully administration-run one.

The most consistent finding is that institutional support – in the form of land, water, funding and training – is crucial to the survival of any model, but only when it complements rather than replaces the community. The most highly rated cases combine the provision of resources with scope for self-organisation, thereby avoiding paternalism; conversely, when an external body with no gardening background takes over management, the allotment runs the risk of becoming a project for the community rather than one by the community. This leads to the study’s most distinctive contribution: the fragility of these spaces does not stem from their community dynamics—which are generally robust—but from a legal and administrative framework that does not fully recognise their uniqueness and keeps them in a subordinate position within the management of public land.

In all the cases analysed, the social function takes precedence over the productive one: the allotments operate as infrastructure for care and social capital (neighbourhood cohesion, intergenerational links, inclusion of vulnerable people and informal learning), beyond their agricultural yield. Therefore, urban agriculture should not be assessed solely on the basis of its contribution to food security, but rather on the basis of its multifunctional nature. In terms of public policy, the findings suggest a portfolio approach that recognises the complementarity of municipal, associative and hybrid models rather than favouring a single model; guarantees security of tenure and equitable access; protects spaces for self-management; and reinforces hybrid models, drawing on instruments such as the role of the ‘gardeniser’ and municipal food councils.

The qualitative and geographically limited nature of the study restricts the statistical generalisation of its findings and calls for caution when extrapolating them to other contexts. Future research could incorporate the voices of non-participating residents and authorities at different levels, adopt longitudinal designs that track the evolution of governance arrangements, and combine qualitative analysis with quantitative ecological, health and equity indicators. The thread running through all of this is governance: who defines the rules and who takes part in the decisions is what turns an allotment into a space for shared participation or leaves it as a merely instrumental resource.