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Whole-Genome Sequencing and Metagenomic Surveillance for Antimicrobial Resistance in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A Narrative Review

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23 August 2026

Posted:

26 August 2026

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Abstract
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a major public-health threat, with low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) facing a disproportionate burden because high infectious-disease incidence often coexists with limited diagnostic capacity, inconsistent antimicrobial stewardship, inadequate water and sanitation, and fragmented surveillance. Conventional culture and antimicrobial-susceptibility testing remain essential for patient care and national AMR monitoring, but they provide limited resolution for identifying resistance mechanisms, reconstructing transmission, and characterizing environmental reservoirs. Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) and metagenomic approaches can address several of these gaps when they are integrated with, rather than substituted for, high-quality phenotypic surveillance. WGS can identify resistance determinants, virulence factors, mobile genetic elements, and closely related lineages, supporting outbreak investigation and molecular epidemiology. Metagenomic sequencing can characterize microbial communities and resistomes directly from complex samples such as wastewater, enabling culture-independent surveillance across human, animal, and environmental compartments. Evidence from Nigeria, Peru, and Pakistan illustrates how genomic methods can reveal mobile-element-associated resistance, community-level sewage resistomes, and clonal dissemination of extensively drug-resistant pathogens. However, benefits are constrained by sequencing and reagent costs, supply-chain instability, laboratory infrastructure, bioinformatics capacity, data governance, standardization, and long-term financing. We argue that genomic AMR surveillance in LMICs is most feasible when implemented as a tiered system: strengthened routine microbiology and isolate archiving at sentinel sites, targeted WGS for priority organisms and outbreaks, regional sequencing and bioinformatics hubs, and strategically selected metagenomic surveillance for environmental and One Health questions. Sustainable implementation requires local workforce development, interoperable data systems, quality assurance, and explicit links between genomic findings and public-health decisions.
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1. Introduction

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) threatens the effective treatment of bacterial infections and places increasing pressure on health systems. The 2019 global burden analysis estimated that bacterial AMR was directly attributable to approximately 1.27 million deaths and associated with substantially more deaths worldwide, with particularly high burdens in several low-resource regions (Murray et al., 2022). More recent modelling has emphasized that a large share of the preventable burden occurs in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where access to effective antibiotics, diagnostics, infection prevention, and reliable surveillance can be uneven (Lewnard et al., 2024; Sulis et al., 2022).
AMR in LMICs is shaped by interacting clinical, socioeconomic, agricultural, and environmental pressures. Inappropriate antimicrobial use, limited access to microbiological diagnosis, weak infection-prevention infrastructure, inadequate water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), suboptimal governance, and antimicrobial contamination of the environment can all facilitate the selection and spread of resistant organisms (Collignon et al., 2018; Holmes et al., 2016; Iskandar et al., 2021; Nashwan et al., 2024; Otaigbe & Elikwu, 2023). These drivers vary substantially across and within countries, so LMICs should not be treated as a single homogeneous surveillance setting.
Routine culture and antimicrobial-susceptibility testing (AST) remain the foundation of clinically actionable AMR surveillance. They show whether an isolate is susceptible or resistant under standardized laboratory conditions and are indispensable for guiding treatment. Their limitations are different: routine phenotypic systems often provide less information about the genetic basis of resistance, the relatedness of isolates, horizontal gene transfer, and reservoirs outside clinical culture collections. Genomic tools can add this missing resolution, but they should complement rather than replace phenotypic surveillance (Lim et al., 2021; WHO, 2020).
This narrative review focuses on how whole-genome sequencing (WGS) and metagenomic surveillance can strengthen AMR monitoring in LMICs. It examines their distinct roles, selected applications in clinical and environmental surveillance, implementation barriers, and a practical framework for integrating genomic methods into resource-constrained surveillance systems. The review is intentionally narrative and uses illustrative studies from multiple LMIC settings rather than claiming exhaustive systematic coverage.

2. AMR Surveillance Gaps in LMICs

Surveillance quality depends on more than the availability of a sequencing platform. Many LMIC surveillance systems continue to face gaps in access to routine microbiology, standardized AST, representative sampling, laboratory quality assurance, electronic reporting, and linkage of laboratory data to clinical and epidemiological information (Iskandar et al., 2021; Sharma et al., 2022; Do et al., 2023). Consequently, surveillance datasets may over-represent tertiary hospitals or urban populations while under-representing community infections, rural settings, animal production systems, and environmental reservoirs.
The same structural conditions that increase infectious-disease transmission can also amplify AMR. Inadequate WASH and wastewater management facilitate the movement of organisms and resistance determinants between households, healthcare facilities, agriculture, and the wider environment. Governance, healthcare spending, private-sector regulation, and sanitation have all been associated with national variation in AMR (Collignon et al., 2018). Environmental studies likewise show that pharmaceutical residues, sewage, and resistant organisms can enter surface waters where wastewater treatment is insufficient (Kairigo et al., 2020; Nashwan et al., 2024).
A genomic surveillance strategy therefore has to solve two problems at once: it must generate higher-resolution biological information, and it must be embedded in a system capable of collecting representative samples, preserving isolates or nucleic acid, capturing metadata, analyzing results, and acting on them. Sequencing without these supporting functions risks producing technically sophisticated data with limited public-health value.

3. Whole-Genome Sequencing for AMR Surveillance

WGS determines the nucleotide sequence of nearly the entire genome of a cultured isolate. In bacterial surveillance, the usual workflow includes isolate selection, DNA extraction, library preparation, sequencing, quality control, genome assembly or read mapping, organism confirmation, and analysis of resistance determinants, virulence factors, mobile genetic elements, and genomic relatedness. The specific pipeline depends on the organism, platform, surveillance question, and available computational resources (WHO, 2020; Okeke et al., 2020; Purushothaman et al., 2022).
For AMR surveillance, one major advantage of WGS is that multiple questions can be addressed from a single sequence dataset. Known acquired resistance genes and resistance-associated mutations can be identified, while phylogenetic or genomic-distance analyses can determine whether isolates are closely related. This is especially useful in outbreak investigation, where phenotypically similar isolates may belong to unrelated lineages, or genetically related isolates may reveal transmission that routine epidemiology alone did not resolve (Gwinn et al., 2019; Hendriksen et al., 2019).
WGS also supports molecular surveillance over longer time scales. Genotyping frameworks such as GenoTyphi demonstrate how genomic data can be used to monitor the emergence and geographic spread of Salmonella Typhi lineages and resistance-associated clones (Dyson & Holt, 2021). In LMIC settings, WGS has similarly revealed resistance-associated mutations in Mycobacterium tuberculosis and characterized multidrug-resistant Enterobacterales and other priority pathogens (Mboowa et al., 2021; Medugu et al., 2025).
Genotypic prediction is not identical to phenotypic susceptibility testing. The performance of sequence-based resistance prediction varies by organism, antimicrobial agent, mechanism, database completeness, and analytical pipeline. Resistance genes may be present without corresponding phenotypic expression, while resistance can also arise through mechanisms that are poorly represented in reference databases. Reports of genotype-phenotype discordance illustrate why genomic results should be interpreted alongside validated phenotypic methods, particularly when decisions affect individual patient management (Urmi et al., 2020; Solanki et al., 2022).

4. Metagenomic Surveillance and the Environmental Resistome

Metagenomics analyzes genetic material directly from complex samples without requiring each organism to be cultured separately. Shotgun metagenomic sequencing can profile the taxonomic composition and functional gene content of a microbial community, including antimicrobial-resistance genes (ARGs) and, depending on sequencing depth and analysis, mobile genetic elements or genomic context (Nam et al., 2023; Purushothaman et al., 2022). Targeted amplicon approaches answer narrower taxonomic questions and should not be treated as equivalent to shotgun resistome profiling.
For AMR surveillance, metagenomics is particularly relevant to wastewater, sewage, animal, and environmental sampling. These matrices contain DNA from diverse microbial populations and may provide a community-level signal that is difficult to obtain from clinical cultures alone. Population-level faecal metagenomic profiling in Cambodia and Kenya, alongside the United Kingdom, showed associations between population resistome patterns and resistance in invasive Enterobacterales, illustrating the potential of metagenomics as a complementary population-surveillance tool (Auguet et al., 2021).
Wastewater studies are attractive because a single sample can integrate signals from many individuals, including people who do not seek healthcare. The global sewage analysis by Munk et al. (2022) demonstrated marked geographic variation in the abundance and composition of resistance genes across 101 countries. In Peru, Poterico et al. (2023) used metagenomic analysis of sewage samples to characterize the resistome of an urban setting, providing a locally specific example of how environmental surveillance can identify resistance patterns outside routine clinical laboratories.
Metagenomics also has important limitations. Detection of an ARG does not automatically identify the bacterial host, demonstrate expression, or establish phenotypic resistance. Low-abundance organisms or genes may be missed, and results are sensitive to sampling design, DNA extraction, sequencing depth, contamination control, reference databases, and bioinformatic methods. These constraints are particularly important when surveillance programs compare data across laboratories or countries.

5. WGS and Metagenomics Are Complementary, Not Interchangeable

WGS and metagenomics answer related but different surveillance questions. Isolate WGS is strongest when a laboratory needs high-resolution information about a specific cultured pathogen, including lineage, resistance mechanisms, and transmission. Metagenomics is strongest when the surveillance question concerns a microbial community or reservoir that cannot be represented adequately by selected cultured isolates. A resilient AMR surveillance system therefore uses each method selectively rather than assuming that one platform can replace routine culture, AST, and epidemiological investigation.
Feature Isolate WGS Shotgun metagenomics
Primary sample Cultured isolate Complex clinical, animal or environmental sample
Main surveillance strength Strain-level characterization, resistance determinants, outbreak relatedness Community composition and resistome profiling without culture
Phenotype linkage Can be linked directly to AST from the same isolate Usually indirect; ARG detection does not prove phenotypic resistance
Transmission analysis Strong for clonal/lineage transmission when sampling is appropriate Useful for reservoir trends; host attribution may be difficult
Environmental surveillance Possible after culture of selected organisms Particularly useful for wastewater and mixed microbial reservoirs
Bioinformatic complexity High but increasingly standardized for priority pathogens Very high; strongly affected by depth, databases and host/ARG assignment
Best LMIC use case Targeted sequencing of priority pathogens, unusual phenotypes and outbreaks Strategic wastewater/One Health surveillance at selected sites

6. Illustrative Evidence from LMICs

6.1. Nigeria: WGS of Multidrug-Resistant Escherichia coli

A recent Nigerian study provides a useful example of targeted isolate WGS in a hospital setting. Medugu et al. (2025) sequenced 107 multidrug-resistant E. coli isolates from a tertiary hospital and analyzed virulence genes, mobile genetic elements, phylogroups, sequence types, and AMR determinants. The study reported extensive linkage between virulence-associated genes and mobile genetic elements and demonstrated the genomic diversity of multidrug-resistant E. coli circulating in the clinical setting. The surveillance value of this approach lies not simply in confirming that isolates are resistant, but in showing how resistance and virulence determinants are distributed across lineages and potentially mobile genetic contexts.
Nigeria has also developed national experience with WGS-based AMR reference-laboratory capacity. Okeke et al. (2022) described establishment of a national reference laboratory using a WGS framework, highlighting that successful genomic surveillance requires quality systems, bioinformatics, data management, and networks that connect sequencing to routine microbiology rather than a stand-alone instrument.

6.2. Peru: Sewage Metagenomics and the Urban Resistome

Poterico et al. (2023) used metagenomic sequencing of sewage samples to characterize the resistome of a Peruvian city. This case illustrates a different surveillance objective from hospital isolate WGS: the aim is to observe resistance determinants circulating at the community-environment interface. Such surveillance can reveal ARG distributions that would be difficult to reconstruct from a collection of clinical isolates alone. The study should be interpreted as a local environmental resistome analysis, while Munk et al. (2022) provides a separate global comparison across sewage samples from many countries; the two sources should not be presented as the same dataset.

6.3. Pakistan: WGS of Extensively Drug-Resistant Salmonella Typhi

Extensively drug-resistant (XDR) Salmonella Typhi is a major genomic-surveillance priority in Pakistan. Mumtaz et al. (2024) reported WGS of XDR S. Typhi isolates from the Peshawar region and described resistance-associated genomic features and low genetic diversity consistent with continued circulation of closely related strains. This type of analysis complements phenotypic confirmation by placing resistant isolates into a transmission and evolutionary context. Earlier regional clinical reports, including Khan et al. (2022), provide epidemiological background but should not substitute for the genomic study when making WGS-specific claims.
Setting Approach Primary value Interpretive caution
Nigeria - hospital MDR E. coli WGS of 107 cultured isolates Links resistance/virulence determinants with lineages and mobile elements Hospital sample; findings should not be generalized to all Nigerian E. coli
Peru - urban sewage Shotgun metagenomic resistome analysis Community/environmental view of ARG diversity ARG detection does not identify clinical burden or prove phenotype
Pakistan - XDR S. Typhi WGS of selected clinical isolates Characterizes resistance features and genomic relatedness Small sequenced subset; requires linkage to broader epidemiology

7. Implementation Barriers in Resource-Constrained Settings

The practical barriers to genomic surveillance are well recognized. Sequencing instruments represent only part of the cost. Programs also require recurrent reagents and consumables, maintenance, quality-control materials, stable power, cold-chain and storage capacity, reliable internet or local computing, secure data storage, and staff who can interpret results. Supply-chain interruptions may be more disruptive than the capital cost of a sequencer because a platform that cannot obtain kits or replacement parts produces no surveillance data (Iskandar et al., 2021; Sulis et al., 2022; Do et al., 2023).
Bioinformatics is a recurring bottleneck. Raw genomic data have little value until they are quality-controlled, analyzed with appropriate reference databases and pipelines, interpreted, and communicated in a form that microbiologists, clinicians, epidemiologists, veterinarians, and public-health decision makers can use. Capacity-building efforts in Africa and other LMIC regions show that open and web-based tools can lower some barriers, but sustainable programs still require local expertise, protected staff time, mentorship, and career pathways that reduce dependence on short-term external projects (Founou et al., 2025).
Standardization and data governance are equally important. Differences in sampling, sequencing, assembly, nomenclature, resistance databases, and metadata can make cross-site comparisons unreliable. National programs need agreed minimum metadata, quality thresholds, secure data-sharing procedures, and clear policies regarding ownership, access, and international sharing. WHO guidance on WGS for AMR surveillance provides a useful framework, but local implementation should be adapted to national laboratory networks and priority organisms (WHO, 2020).
Long-term financing remains the central sustainability question. Economic evaluations suggest that WGS can be cost-effective in some pathogen-surveillance contexts, but evidence is heterogeneous and should not be generalized automatically to all countries, organisms, or to metagenomic surveillance (Price et al., 2023). Programs therefore need explicit use cases: which organisms will be sequenced, how frequently, what decision will be changed by the result, and whether the same public-health objective could be achieved more efficiently by strengthening culture and AST.

8. A Tiered Framework for Genomic AMR Surveillance in LMICs

A realistic approach is to build genomic surveillance on top of progressively stronger microbiology systems. This avoids an all-or-nothing model in which countries are expected to move directly from limited culture capacity to universal sequencing.
Tier 1 - Strengthen sentinel microbiology. Core investments should include specimen quality, organism identification, standardized AST, laboratory quality assurance, isolate archiving, and standardized epidemiological metadata. These functions create the denominator and context that genomic data need.
Tier 2 - Introduce targeted WGS for priority questions. Sequencing should initially focus on high-consequence organisms, unusual or emerging resistance phenotypes, suspected outbreaks, treatment failures, and representative sentinel collections. Centralized or regional sequencing can be more sustainable than placing low-throughput instruments in every hospital.
Tier 3 - Develop regional sequencing and bioinformatics hubs. Hubs can provide library preparation, sequencing, quality assurance, analysis, training, and surge capacity for multiple hospitals or neighboring countries. The aim should be rapid return of interpretable results rather than accumulation of sequence files.
Tier 4 - Add strategic metagenomic surveillance. Wastewater or environmental metagenomics should be used where it answers a defined One Health or population-surveillance question and where sampling, sequencing depth, and analytical standards can be maintained. It is best viewed as a complement to clinical surveillance, not a proxy for clinical resistance prevalence.
Tier 5 - Integrate One Health genomic information into decision making. Mature systems can link human, animal, food, and environmental surveillance through interoperable metadata and shared analytic standards. Cross-sectoral capability frameworks are useful because One Health integration depends on governance and communication as much as sequencing technology (Ferdinand et al., 2024; Vallejo-Espin et al., 2025).
Tier Core activity Minimum requirement Decision supported
1 Sentinel culture + AST Quality microbiology, isolate archive, metadata Reliable local/national resistance trends
2 Targeted WGS Sequencing access + validated analysis Outbreaks, unusual resistance, lineage monitoring
3 Regional genomic hubs Workforce, QA, computing, referral network Scalable national/regional genomic surveillance
4 Strategic metagenomics Standardized sampling + deep bioinformatics Wastewater/One Health resistome trends
5 Integrated One Health system Governance + interoperable data sharing Cross-sector risk assessment and policy

9. Priorities for Research and Policy

First, surveillance programs need stronger evidence linking genomic information to decisions and outcomes. Studies should report not only what resistance genes or lineages were detected, but whether sequencing changed outbreak control, antimicrobial policy, laboratory practice, or resource allocation.
Second, comparative studies are needed to determine which surveillance designs provide the greatest value under realistic LMIC budgets. Questions include the optimal number of sentinel sites, sampling frequency, central versus decentralized sequencing, thresholds for sequencing unusual phenotypes, and when metagenomic wastewater surveillance adds information beyond clinical systems.
Third, locally representative reference data are essential. Global databases are valuable, but resistance mechanisms and circulating lineages differ across regions. LMIC laboratories should be positioned as data producers and analytical partners, with equitable authorship, governance, and access to resulting datasets.
Finally, genomic surveillance should be evaluated as part of a health-system package. Investments in sequencing will have limited effect if specimen referral, AST, infection prevention, antimicrobial stewardship, WASH, and access to effective treatment remain weak. The goal is not genomic surveillance for its own sake; it is earlier recognition of meaningful AMR threats and faster, better-targeted public-health action.

10. Limitations of This Narrative Review

This article is a narrative review and does not present a systematic review or meta-analysis. The studies discussed are illustrative rather than exhaustive, and the evidence base is heterogeneous in organism, setting, sample type, sequencing platform, and outcome. Several implementation claims are therefore context dependent. In particular, cost-effectiveness evidence for isolate WGS should not be generalized to metagenomic surveillance without direct economic evaluation, and environmental ARG abundance should not be interpreted as equivalent to clinical resistance burden.

11. Conclusion

WGS and metagenomics can substantially improve the resolution of AMR surveillance in LMICs, but their value depends on how they are positioned within broader microbiology and public-health systems. Isolate WGS is especially useful for identifying resistance mechanisms, characterizing lineages, and resolving transmission among priority pathogens. Metagenomics extends surveillance to complex microbial communities and environmental reservoirs, particularly wastewater, but presents greater challenges in interpretation and standardization. Neither approach removes the need for high-quality culture, AST, epidemiology, and infection-prevention infrastructure.
The most sustainable pathway is a tiered model that begins with reliable sentinel microbiology, introduces targeted WGS for defined public-health questions, develops regional sequencing and bioinformatics capacity, and adds metagenomic surveillance where it provides clear additional information. Nigeria, Peru, and Pakistan demonstrate different but complementary uses of genomic methods. The next phase of AMR genomics in LMICs should therefore focus less on demonstrating that sequencing is technically possible and more on building systems in which genomic evidence is representative, interpretable, sustainable, and directly connected to action.

Author Contributions

Iqra Fatima: Conceptualization, investigation, methodology, project administration, visualization, and writing - original draft. Md. Saddam Hossain: Investigation, project administration, resources, and writing - original draft. Christian Chibuike Aguoru: Data curation, project administration, resources, supervision, and visualization. All authors reviewed and approved the final manuscript and take responsibility for its content.

Funding

This work received no external funding.

Ethics statement

This narrative review synthesizes published literature and does not report new research involving human participants, animals, or identifiable private data; therefore, institutional ethics approval was not required.

Data availability statement

No new primary dataset was generated for this narrative review. All information discussed is derived from the cited literature.

Declaration of generative AI and AI-assisted technologies

A generative AI tool (ChatGPT, OpenAI) was used during manuscript revision to assist with language editing, organization, restructuring, and consistency checks. AI tools were not listed as authors. The human authors retain responsibility for the scientific content, interpretation, citation accuracy, and final text.

Acknowledgments

None.

Conflicts of interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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