Submitted:
22 June 2026
Posted:
23 June 2026
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Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
2. Preliminaries and Notation
2.1. STL layout
- , sign / high-exponent byte;
- , low-exponent / high-mantissa byte;
- , mantissa mid byte;
- , mantissa low byte.
2.2. Validity Constraint
2.3. The Valid-STL (VSTL) Reference Distribution
- (A1)
- The encryption transformation is a bijection on the set of valid STL files [12]: every plaintext is a valid STL file, and so is its ciphertext. For a random key, its differential properties are strong enough that the ciphertext distribution closely approximates the uniform distribution over this space [13,14,15].
- (A2)
- Bytes drawn from different floats are mutually independent. The only coupling is internal to a single float: its leading pair is dependent, because these two bytes form the exponent which is directly affected by the aforementioned validity constraint; the trailing bytes and are free uniform bytes, independent of each other and of .
- Class U (unconstrained, 26 positions per triangle): of every float, plus the two attribute bytes;
- Class B1 (low-exponent / high-mantissa, 12 positions per triangle): of every float;
- Class B0 (sign / high-exponent, 12 positions per triangle): of every float.
3. Byte-Level Marginals and Joint Laws
3.1. Class U (Unconstrained Bytes)
3.2. Class B1 ()
- If , then and the forbidden pattern cannot occur regardless of . Therefore, the byte is unconstrained and all patterns are admissible.
- If , then . The forbidden pattern can now occur, and it does so for exactly two bytes: and . These values are ruled out, leaving admissible patterns.
3.3. Class B0 ()
- If , then and the forbidden pattern cannot occur regardless of . Therefore, the byte is unconstrained and all patterns are admissible.
- If , then . The forbidden pattern can now occur whenever , which rules out half of the byte space, leaving admissible patterns.
3.4. Per-Float Joint Law
3.5. Macroscopic Departure from Uniformity
4. NPCR Reference Under the VSTL Distribution
4.1. Per-Class Collision Probability
4.2. Per-Triangle and Per-File NPCR Expectation
4.3. Deviation from Uniformity
4.4. Variance and Hypothesis Test
5. UACI Reference Under the VSTL Distribution
5.1. Per-Class Expected Absolute Difference
5.2. Per-Triangle and Per-File UACI Expectation
5.3. Deviation from Uniformity
5.4. Variance and Acceptance Interval
6. Numerical Results
6.1. Practical Significance
7. Conclusions
References
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| Range of v | Deviation |
|---|---|
| 0 | |
| k | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | |||
| 1 | |||
| 2 |
| Statistic | Unit | Uniform | VSTL | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reference mean | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T | N | Uniform | VSTL | Uniform | VSTL | ||
| 100 | 5000 | ||||||
| 1000 | 50000 | ||||||
| 5000 | 250000 | ||||||
| 10000 | 500000 | ||||||
| 20000 | 1000000 | ||||||
| 50000 | 2500000 | ||||||
| 100000 | 5000000 | ||||||
| Reference mean | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T | N | Uniform | VSTL | Uniform | VSTL | Uniform | VSTL | |||
| 100 | 5000 | |||||||||
| 1000 | 50000 | |||||||||
| 5000 | 250000 | |||||||||
| 10000 | 500000 | |||||||||
| 20000 | 1000000 | |||||||||
| 50000 | 2500000 | |||||||||
| 100000 | 5000000 | |||||||||
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