3.1. Amazon, Territorial Fluidity and Commodity Logistics
Soybean production stands out as a primary global commodity in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. Markets in China, Southeast Asia, the European Union, and Mexico drive demand. A select group of major producers—including Brazil, the United States, Argentina, China, India, and Paraguay—participates in this multiscalar and globalized economy. This dynamic reshapes emerging production regions and impacts territorial cohesion[
20]. Geographic fragmentation emerges as a hallmark of globalization, rendering agricultural regions more susceptible to external flows and exogenous political mandates [
6,
8,
21].
In Brazil, favorable climates, topography, and technological advancements drove the expansion of soybean production. Mechanization and increased productivity gains complemented this growth [
22], beginning with the opening of agricultural areas in the South during the 1970s. By the 1980s, expansion reached the Center-West, increasing its share of national production from 2% to 20%. This process gradually shifted from the South to Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Goiás, concentrating national production within the country’s Center-South [
14].
By 2024, production was concentrated primarily in Mato Grosso (27%), Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul (13%), Goiás (12%), Mato Grosso do Sul (8%), and Minas Gerais and Bahia (5%). Together, these states represent 82% of national output [
14]. Brazil has led the global ranking as the largest soybean producer since 2019, surpassing the United States and accounting for approximately 40% of world production. However, agricultural and mineral commodity production requires engineering systems to ensure territorial fluidity, which modifies the territory’s organic composition through technical densities [
5,
9,
23].
To facilitate commodity flows, the State expands infrastructure and logistics investments, which alter the territory’s composition, increasing fluidity and specialization[
8]. This trend, seen in globalized agribusiness regions [
24], enhances national trade participation and adds value to regional chains. Regional and global logistics systems reduce costs, boost service efficiency, and maximize profits, serving as key competitive advantages for economic agents.
Large agribusiness trading and agricultural firms increasingly control monoculture production in Northern and Northeastern Brazil. These entities open new fronts for globalized agribusiness, epitomized by the formation of the Matopiba region. In the Amazon, soybean production continues to grow in Pará, Rondônia, and Roraima, and to a lesser extent in eastern Acre and southern Amazonas. Expansion originating in Mato Grosso directly impacts these states [
4,
25]. This dynamic suggests the formation of peripheral agricultural regions within the globalized economy or, in Miltonian terms, the creation of “globalization spaces” [
21,
26].
Regarding Amazonian logistics, the primary routes for exporting soy and its derivatives include the Northern export corridor, which utilizes highways such as BR-163, BR-158, BR-135, BR-364, and BR-242. Other vital routes include the North-South Railway, the Carajás Railway, and the Madeira, Amazonas, and Tapajós waterways [
27]. Pressure for new engineering systems (fixed assets and flows) originates in Mato Grosso (northwest, north, and mid-north regions). This pressure creates openings in western Pará (Santarém), Rondônia (Porto Velho), southern Amazonas (Humaitá) [
28], and other riverside municipalities along the Madeira axis in Amazonas (
Figure 1).
In grain transport operations, a partial loss of competitiveness prompted measures to create routes leading to port centers in the Amazon and the Northeast. For example, the Maggi Group utilizes its subsidiary Hermasa S.A. and a river terminal in Porto Velho to transport soybeans via the Madeira and Amazonas rivers to Itacoatiara (Amazonas). Conversely, Cargill invested in terminals in Porto Velho (Rondônia) and Santarém (Pará). Santarém stands out for its strategic location at the convergence of the highway (BR-163) and waterway axes. This positioning facilitates the flow of production from the Nova Mutum-Sorriso region in the state of Mato Grosso [
21,
29].
The arrangement formed by these flows reveals three primary routes for grains traveling from Mato Grosso to the Amazon: I) transport between the production area and grain ports in Porto Velho (Amaggi, Bertolini, Cargill) and Humaitá (Masutti), with distances exceeding 800 kilometers; II) a railway route via the North-South Railway, with displacements exceeding 1,600 kilometers toward the ports of Itaqui/MA or Santos/SP; and III) the path connecting the production area along the Cuiabá-Itaituba axis (BR-163), involving highway displacements ranging from 760 to 1,200 kilometers.
All these projects aim to consolidate logistics within the Northern region[
30]. Consequently, public and private actors implement measures to enhance strategies within export corridors. These efforts include established routes, such as the Madeira Waterway from Porto Velho (Rondônia), and emerging opportunities, particularly the Tapajós Waterway accessible via BR-163 toward Santarém (Pará). New logistics systems based on intermodality are gradually incorporating ports such as Vila do Conde in Barcarena (Pará) and Santana (Amapá). This integration stems from the new engineering systems constructed at these strategic points within global flows [
31,
32].
Amazonian grain ports are part of the logistics complex known as the Northern Arc (Arco Norte)[
33]. This geographic area encompasses ports in the Northeast (Ilhéus and Itaqui) and the Northern region (Barcarena, Santana, Santarém, Itacoatiara, Novo Remanso, Manaus, Humaitá, and Porto Velho). The Northern Arc represents an extensive network focused on cargo transport, primarily commodities such as grains and ores. Currently, the emergence of new export routes is converting Amazonian roads and rivers into corridors for the export of grains and other products linked to global production chains [
27].
The Amazon Northern Arc Project (Projeto Arco Norte Amazônia—PANA), which covers part of the Northern Arc, serves as a representative expression of multimodal logistics corridors[
34]. Essentially, these initiatives expand territorial fluidity to facilitate the export of raw materials. Various agents at global and federal scales conceive of these projects. The World Bank acts as one such global agent, while the Federal Government plays a fundamental role by allocating resources for public works related to circulation and transport. Across these groups, particularly at national and regional scales, the Northern Arc aims to maximize competitive advantages. These efforts reduce the cost of transporting bulk cargo within Brazilian territory and to the external market[
30,
33,
34] .
3.2. Territorial Dynamics and the “Matogrossization” of Rondônia
Territorial dynamics are understood as a “geographical notion that corresponds to the movement of society registered in the territory as an element that brings significant and also structural changes, presenting a genetic-structural content”[
3,
12]. Based on this conceptualization, Costa Silva[
3] identifies two structural moments in Rondônia’s geography between 1970 and 2010. These moments modeled territorial use through distinct yet interchangeable processes, allowing for a reading of past eras within contemporary socio-spatial formation.
From 1970 to 1995, i) the State acted as the predominant public agent in territorial organization, agricultural colonization, and urban expansion through the interiorization of settlement, agro-pastoral growth, and environmental policies. These processes defined the axes of the new spatial organization, distancing it from the ancient river-based settlement axis (1900 to 1970). That previous era centered on the Guaporé, Mamoré, and Madeira rivers and was a byproduct of the legendary construction of the Madeira-Mamoré Railway and the exploitation of rubber[
7].
In the subsequent period (1995–2010), ii) economic geography shifted toward the BR-364 highway axis, particularly in the Central region—marked by the rise of Ji-Paraná—and further south in the cities of Cacoal and Vilhena. This period featured the territorial insertion of agribusiness (soy, corn, and meat for export), distinguishing it from other agricultural economies. Consequently, agro-export capital emerged as a regional and global economic agent, leading to the productive specialization of the territory [
8]. This formed the first agricultural regionalization characterized by the spatialization of soybeans in the southern cone of Rondônia[
3,
23].
In the early twenty-first century, territorial configurations have changed significantly through the spatialization of agribusiness, regulated by globalized agricultural expansion and anchored by three products: soybeans, corn, and beef. Additionally, a land market has emerged within a “rush” for new rural areas, currently observed in northern and northwestern Rondônia and shifting toward southern Amazonas and eastern Acre[
2,
35].
I term this emerging framework of structural changes “matogrossization.” This process manifests in the territorial reconfiguration of Rondônia’s agrarian space, centered on agribusiness expansion (soy and corn), the formation of peripheral agricultural regions within the national economy, alterations to the Amazonian landscape, the escalation of agrarian and territorial conflicts, and a declining rural population alongside urban demographic growth. These socio-geographic transformations tend to link Rondônia as a “capture area” for agribusiness originating in Mato Grosso. For this text, I will analyze the spatiality of agribusiness and its territorial impacts.
I begin with agricultural data representing this regional shift. Since 1997, soybeans, in association with corn, have emerged as the first monoculture to modify Rondônia’s agrarian space, serving as the empirical expression of agribusiness [
21]. Regarding planted area (hectares) between 2000 and 2024, the agrarian landscape recorded a general decline in daily food staples such as rice, coffee, and beans, with decreases of 57%, 76%, and 97%, respectively. Conversely, corn and soybeans grew by 169% and 5,355% during the same period. A similar trend occurred in production quantity (tons), as rice (-5%), coffee (-18%), and beans (-97%) showed reductions. Beans have virtually vanished from Rondônia’s agricultural framework, dropping from 49,751 tons in 2000 to just 1,356 tons in 2024 [
14]. Generally, rural settlements—some organized by the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) produce the state’s bean crop.
The situation is inverted for corn and soybeans—associated monocultures—whose yields increased by 743% and 6,033%, respectively, reaching 1,721,713 and 2,221,610 tons. To grasp the scale of commodity production in this period, compared to coffee, the latter totaled 48,267 hectares and 170,232 tons produced in 2024[
14]. This growth means that, in terms of planted area alone, soybeans grew thirteen times more than the primary product of family farming. An overwhelming occupation of soybeans occurs in areas available for purchase or lease by large economic groups[
36], constituting a new and selective race for land.
Average production yield (kg/ha) reflects technological advances driven by government and corporate investments, leading to productivity growth across all crops: 122% for rice, 239% for coffee, 25% for beans, 214% for corn, and 14% for soybeans during this period. As soybeans dominate the agricultural economy and grow due to new engineering systems enhancing territorial fluidity[
9], more land is likely added to production. This expands the agricultural frontier into northern and northwestern Rondônia and southern Amazonas, increasing deforestation and invasions of public forests.
The corporate use of territory[
8] emerges as a process of economic and land concentration within regional geography, serving as a structural fact in agrarian geography by revealing the territorial logic of large companies. In the 2012/2013 harvest, the framework covered 694 properties across 157,000 hectares of soy. By the 2021/2025 harvest, 2,104 properties were responsible for 460,000 hectares of soy[
37]. According to Idaron[
38], approximately 4,600 properties exist, with an estimated planted area of 687,157.91 hectares. Compared to coffee, the primary product of family farming, there were 23,483 rural establishments producing coffee in 2017, with a harvested area of 55,120 hectares [
14,
18]. A 12-fold difference in area favors the soybean agribusiness. It is common for a soybean owner to hold other properties or leases, as an individual or through an associated business, which highlights land concentration and a reduction in the number of economic agents. During field research in the Vilhena region, intersubjective dialogues frequently revealed that rural producers held their own, leased, or associated agricultural areas in other municipalities, such as Cerejeiras and Corumbiara (South), or the Ariquemes and Porto Velho regions (North)[
39].
In comparison, coffee is an agricultural crop produced by the peasantry with strong insertion into the regional economy, primarily due to technological changes in production systems encouraged by processing companies that market it nationally; this highlights peasant territoriality involving thousands of families in the productive and social process[
40]. Grain agribusiness (soy and corn) presents itself as a concentrated industry with exclusionary practices across regional geography. The analyses by Fernandes et al. [
37] correctly link soybean expansion with environmental and territorial impacts in Rondônia:
i) “the average area of soybean cultivation exceeds the average area of the properties comprising the state’s land structure”;
ii) “soybean expansion eventually occupies spaces previously dedicated to cattle ranching, which results in the displacement of cattle to new areas formerly covered by forests”;
iii) “expansion occurs through the aggregation of properties that often belong to different owners”;
iv) “to compensate for this substitution, new pastures are established on recently deforested lands”;
v) “this advancement puts pressure on protected areas, resulting in the overlapping of rural properties onto Indigenous lands and other conservation areas.”
The spatialization of soybeans creates territorial fragmentations in peripheral agricultural regions that generate demand for new areas, pressuring protected territories and public forests. Hegemonic agribusiness agents see protected areas as “space-stock” [
41] to expand their operations. Capital expands mainly through land incorporation due to limited productivity, increasing demand for new soybean areas[
36]. Another impact is land concentration in peripheral regions, which expels rural populations[
37].
Therefore, in the regional panorama, the heritage of agricultural colonization in Rondônia (1970–1990)—when the land structure featured significant participation by the peasantry or small properties—is partially modified. Soybean expansion and rising land prices are factors in the decline of Rondônia’s rural population. Furthermore, the formation of peripheral agricultural regions of the national economy indicates a movement of regionalized land concentration, peasant expropriation, and the weakening of family farming.
One can understand the process of “matogrossization” in Rondônia through the sharp decline in the rural population, which serves as a robust indicator of agrarian territorial transformations. The results of the 2022 Demographic Census indicated that Rondônia was one of the Brazilian states showing stabilization during the intercensal period (2010–2022); that is, the population barely grew. However, the decrease in the rural population impacted the overall result. While Rondônia’s population grew by 1% over 12 years, a significant difference emerged between the urban population, which grew by 8%, and the rural population, which decreased by 18%[
13].
Numerous issues can be analyzed in demographic dynamics, including the composition of municipalities, the distribution of urban and rural populations, intra-state and intra-regional migration, fertility rates, the age pyramid, and the dynamics of the agricultural frontier in Rondônia itself. However, the partial results for the rural population deserve highlighting. Of the fifty-two municipalities in the state of Rondônia, the population failed to grow in 38 (73%). When differentiated by territorial level, the urban population grew in 30 municipalities (58%), while the rural population declined in 46 municipalities (88%). The range of rural population data varied from -1% to -52%, revealing expropriation, rural-to-urban migration, migration to new agricultural frontiers, and rural emptying in some regions of Rondônia[
10]. The phenomenon of abandoned houses and the numerous closures of rural schools serve as indicators of this process.
When analyzing the agrarian space in Rondônia in this first quarter of the twenty-first century—related primarily to the globalized economy driven productively and territorially by the soybean agribusiness—one concludes that the formation of peripheral agricultural regions of national agribusiness, the expropriation of the rural population, and monocultures institute new logics of territorial appropriation. These logics distance themselves from previous processes of agricultural colonization. If in the past Rondônia received thousands of migrant families, primarily for rural areas, today it expels the rural population. It is now demarcated by the geometry of grains, monocultures, a depopulated countryside, and agrarian conflicts—veritable landscapes foreign to the Amazon.
3.3. Agrarian Conflicts and Territorial Rights in Question
Agrarian conflicts result from the mechanisms of primitive accumulation and peasant expropriation in the Amazon. For large corporations—the hegemonic agents—spoliation is a necessary condition for expanded reproduction[
42]. Both deforestation and the grabbing of public lands (grilagem) exemplify these mechanisms. They serve the expansion of the agricultural frontier, which, under globalization, manifests as neo-extractivism and deterritorialization. Agrarian conflicts crystallize class struggles and social group tensions, intensifying as capital expands territorial and environmental spoliation[
43].
In the current Amazonian context, specific factors characterize agrarian conflicts: the geographical scale of these relations, the “stock” of public lands (whether designated or not) available for agro-pastoral appropriation, and the deterritorialization of the peasantry and traditional communities. This last process directly undermines their territorial and human rights[
44,
45].
Geographical scale, as an analytical resource, represents the political relationship (actions) that society or agents maintain with a disputed space—an object of appropriation or domination[
46]. This framework allows one to observe the levels and dimensions through which agents objectify their projects within the disputed geographic space (territory). Scale is “social time”[
47]. Differentiating between the scale of operating forces—the scale of the agents—and the scale of the phenomenon (the geographic area of its manifestation) reveals the multidimensionality of social conflicts in the Amazonian countryside[
3].
Human rights generally relate to the defense of human dignity and the material and immaterial aspects of social life that enable a dignified existence[
48]. Land, territory, and nature constitute the material conditions for the dignity of human life. When men and women fight for land, territory, and nature, they affirm the inextricable link between human beings and these material and immaterial elements as a condition for human dignity[
45,
49].
The cartography of Brazilian agrarian conflicts reveals a country marked by violations and the struggles of peasants and traditional communities against an agricultural model that presents itself as unique, oppressive, and destructive to lives and territories. Analyzing data from the Conflitos no Campo Brasil report, produced by the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), requires distinguishing between agrarian and territorial conflicts[
42]. The former expresses conflicts over land possession, typically in areas that have been grabbed or are unproductive, currently occupied by social movements or through spontaneous occupation (unrelated to formal land-struggle organizations), as is occurring in Rondônia. The latter refers to the “defense of protected territories, where Indigenous peoples, Quilombola communities, and traditional communities express territoriality.”
According to the author:
In the first case, the situation involves the defense/struggle for land possession and access to family property; in the second, it involves federal or state public property for collective use and social reproduction. Thus, both the struggle of squatters and that of indigenous peoples and traditional communities are struggles for territories, as they express a whole collectivity founded on family work, the defense of nature, and the recognition of social and territorial rights. The collective, familial, sociocultural, and public character of peasant, Indigenous, and traditional territories contrasts with the privatist, exclusionary, deterritorializing, and monopolistic nature of capital sustained by neo-extractive economies[
42].
To better analyze the social dimensions of these disputes, the CPT outlines the general category of “rural conflicts” through the following operational concepts: land conflicts, water conflicts, labor conflicts, resistance, and violence against individuals. Numerous variables provide quantitative and qualitative coherence to each concept. In 2024, Brazil recorded 2,185 rural conflicts, of which 1,768 involved land (78%). Amazon accounted for 56% of these cases. The dispute over land in the region, especially public lands, establishes it as a space for the expansion and reproduction of agro-financial capital. This expansion strikes at the territories of the peasantry, Indigenous peoples, and traditional communities[
50]. Generally, between 1985 and 2023, the Amazon accounted for 44.2% of all rural conflicts, while the Center-South and Northeast accounted for 30.8% and 25%, respectively. Since 2009, the Amazonian region has led these indicators[
51], becoming a region of intense disputes over land, territory, and nature.
The victims of violence and deterritorialization are social subjects who have struggled for decades for the right to land, territory, and collective life, a life not governed by the geometry of monocultures and the social logic of capital. Indigenous peoples, the landless, squatters, settlers, smallholders, and Quilombolas form a broad social group exercising multiple forms of “r-existence” in their territories, demonstrating the social diversity of the Brazilian countryside[
52].
These social subjects oppose the violent hegemony of neo-extractive capital. This capital currently unifies large-scale landownership with the financial sector, bolstered by broad government support and strong alliances with media conglomerates. Agribusiness serves as the politico-territorial front for the privatization of natural resources, land concentration, and environmental pillage in the Amazon, Cerrado, and Caatinga biomes. The agribusiness economy exacerbates environmental degradation across all biomes. This reality contrasts with the advertised technological packages that highlight production, productivity, and geoeconomic scale while increasingly causing socio-environmental impacts and the deterritorialization of rural life[
53]—impacts that corporate media, not associated with agribusiness, ignores.
Conflicts possess local inscriptions. They disrupt the lived territory—home, dwelling, labor, community exchanges, and the culture of social subjects for whom land and territory represent the space for life and social reproduction. The meanings of expropriation, spoliation, and what Marx called primitive accumulation position Amazon as one of the last spatial reserves for neo-extractive economies. Thus, as Monteiro[
41] criticized, the region serves as a “space-stock” for capital, and as Loureiro[
54] analyzed and denounced, it functions as a colony of Brazil. The situation becomes even more affronting given that, for over ten years, the Amazon has consistently ranked as the region with the most rural conflicts and the highest lethality[
51].
In the geography of agrarian conflicts, the state of Rondônia has long been among the most violent and lethal for social movement leaders fighting for land and territory. Despite its small rural population and significant family farm production, this process is changing in the twenty-first century. Agribusiness growth exerts economic and territorial coercion on small properties and family farming, primarily through leasing, land purchases, and expulsion via pesticide contamination and other expropriation mechanisms.
In 2024, Rondônia recorded 132 rural conflicts affecting 54,276 people (16% of the rural population). This placed the state fourth in total conflicts in Brazil and third in the Legal Amazon. These conflicts primarily affect Indigenous peoples, the landless, and squatters. Records include 119 instances of violence against land occupation and possession, seven water conflicts, four cases of slave labor, three occupations, and one encampment. Within the “land conflict” category, 119 occurrences affected 9,472 families; 3,632 families suffered invasions, and 1,067 families faced expulsion threats or attempts. Furthermore, 624 families were victims of gun violence (pistolagem), 157 families had their homes destroyed, and 134 families saw their belongings destroyed[
50].
The central question is: “Why has Rondônia become so violent against squatters, the landless, and Indigenous peoples—against the rural communities who live off the land?” As a hypothesis, I argue that the political and economic logic of territorial use has shifted. It has adopted the logic of neo-extractive economies, in which agribusiness represents the most concrete expression of expropriation, deterritorialization, and, consequently, violence.
In the twenty-first century, agribusiness operations establish territorial fragmentation. The formation of agricultural regions oriented toward external flows produces agrarian conflicts with social groups pressured by the new enclosures of agro-financial capital under the logic of global neo-extractivism. Thus, land concentration creates an “empty countryside” (campo vazio). Expropriation and migration result from the contradictions of capitalist development in the countryside. This produces a concentrated and highly publicized wealth that simultaneously expels families and deterritorializes traditional communities and Amazonian peoples.
In the past, particularly in the 1990s, the Government of Rondônia maintained a perspective on sustainable development. Concrete public policy results included the institutionalization of Socioeconomic-Ecological Zoning (ZSEE/RO)[
55], the creation of dozens of Conservation Units, socio-environmental investments, and social participation in deliberative councils regarding environmental, productive, and territorial management policies.
At the turn of the twenty-first century, agribusiness—acting as both a “productive sector” and a political agent—changed the territorial agenda. This new agenda centers on monocultures, the weakening of environmental policies, gun violence, and powerful national propaganda promoting itself as the only viable agricultural model. Sustainable, productive experiences in Rondônia were displaced and stripped of public policy support, labeled as obsolete. The ideology of agribusiness as “progress and work,” as the “productive sector” that “carries” Brazil, served as a geographic ideology to expand the grabbing of public lands, environmental crimes, and invasions of protected territories.
In various speeches by state deputies during debates on environmental issues and changes to territorial zoning, pseudo-arguments such as “Rondônia is Cerrado” were common. These arguments were used to justify adjusting the ZSEE to the land demands of soybean agribusiness. Similarly, recent critiques of the soybean moratorium served to mask deforestation and the environmental crimes associated with soybean expansion. Along this path, the agribusiness agenda sought to expand monoculture from southern to northern Rondônia, reaching the banks of the Madeira River. Since 1997, the Madeira-Amazonas Waterway’s operation has boosted soybean production, gradually transforming Rondônia into a commodity frontier.
One instrument of agricultural colonization policy (1970–1980) was the use of Public Land Alienation Contracts (CATPs), which primarily benefited medium and large landowners. Through CATPs, these owners committed to investing in and developing agro-pastoral activities on properties allocated by Incra. They were required to comply with contract clauses and pay for the rural properties in reasonable installments. Evidently, many failed to comply and abandoned the lands gifted by Incra.
In the Vilhena region of southern Rondônia, squatters and the landless occupied many properties administered by CATPS. In 2017, the CPT estimated that approximately 160 rural properties in Rondônia were in this situation[
56]. As land prices rose amid agribusiness growth (soy, corn, and meat), these areas became sites of agrarian conflict. The southern region, known as the cone-sul, transformed into a soybean agribusiness hub and a site of intense agrarian disputes.
In the Southern Cone, the struggle for land is one of the greatest tragedies against the peasantry—a conflict known as the “Corumbiara Massacre”[
57]. Approximately six hundred families challenged the latifundia by occupying a plot on the Santa farm, an area spanning 20,000 hectares[
58]. On August 9, 1995, in a botched operation and a gross violation of human rights, the Military Police spearheaded the massacre with a “task force” of three hundred men, including military officers and gunmen. “By the end of the conflict, eleven people had officially died, including a child, two police officers, and eight peasants. The results of eight autopsies on the landless workers identified gunshot wounds to the head, neck, or back at close range and from a top-down trajectory”[
59]. This evidence clearly indicates execution. Consequently, because of the peasants’ struggle, Incra established the rural settlements of Zé Bentão, Alberico Carvalho, Alzira Augusto Monteiro, Renato Natan, Maranatá, and Maranatá II (
Figure 2). The Corumbiara Peasant Movement (MCC) and, subsequently, the Poor Peasants’ League (LCP) were born from the aftermath of Corumbiara.
In this context, peasants and social movements fighting for land and agrarian reform faced a new political actor: globalized agribusiness. Supported by the State, corporate media, the judiciary, and sectors of society, the liturgy of “agro” established itself through violence against social movement leaders and human rights defenders. This process—characterized as “agribanditry” (agrobandidagem)—involved the appropriation of public lands through land-grabbing (grilagem) and environmental crimes to expand commodity frontiers[
60].
Twenty-seven years after the Corumbiara Massacre, another multiscalar historical event gained national and international relevance in southern Rondônia. In August 2022, Funai reported the death by natural causes of the “Índio do Buraco”[
61]. This news concerned the passing of the last indigenous individual of an unknown ethnicity, who inhabited the Tanaru Indigenous Territory—an 8,101.04-hectare area situated between the municipalities of Corumbiara, Chupinguaia, Parecis, and Pimenteiras do Oeste.
Official Funai records since 1973 document the presence of uncontacted or isolated indigenous peoples in southern Rondônia. Incra’s colonization projects in the Corumbiara river valley and surrounding region triggered territorial conflicts with indigenous groups, often fueled by state action[
62,
63]. In 1986, denunciations by the Indigenous Missionary Council (Cimi), published in local newspapers, revealed massacres and the displacement of indigenous peoples caused by road construction and the creation of large estates. These reports accused both Funai and the Federal Police of failing to act in response to violence stemming from colonization policies[
64].
The Funai Ethno-Environmental Protection Front of Guaporé (FPE Guaporé) identified the “Índio do Buraco” in 1996. Funai bestowed this name based on the indigenous man’s specific practices:
The team verified that he left deep ditches (holes) in the forest, likely used for hunting animals, with sharpened stakes at the bottom. However, the most notable feature was the holes he constructed in his dwellings [...], which FUNAI believed held spiritual and religious significance[
17].
A survivor of past massacres, the indigenous man lived in the Tanaru Indigenous Territory (TI), which holds the legal status of “Restricted Use.” This classification designates a demarcated and protected area inaccessible to third parties due to specific legal requirements, such as the presence of isolated people. Regarding territorial management, Funai secured this restriction only through Ordinance 1392/PRES/2012 (valid until 2015), which was renewed for an additional 10 years via Ordinance 1,040 on October 16, 2015[
17].
His death signaled the “last of his ethnicity.” We thus witnessed the extermination of a people on Rondônia’s lands in the mid-twenty-first century. Yet this historical fact—the extermination of a people—did not awaken “humanitarian sentiments” within agribusiness, despite its potential to prompt reflection on historical memory and Brazil’s original peoples. Modern agro-spoliation detaches land from its territory, concentrates it, and destroys nature. Agribusiness dismisses environmental protection, viewing nature as an obstacle; this drives violence, racism, and land-based racism.
Human rights violations continued after the death of the “Índio do Buraco,” starting with delays in analyzing the body and cause of death. The “Bolsonarista” Funai obstructed burial procedures in the territory he inhabited for nearly sixty years. The body was finally buried in the Indigenous Territory after nearly two months, following a Federal Court decision in Rondônia prompted by the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office. This highlights the ongoing land dispute, with regional farmers claiming legal ownership since 1970 and arguing that the “Restriction of Use” designation prevented them from accessing the area. They asserted that with the last inhabitant’s death, the legal purpose of the indigenous area had ended.
Legal hermeneutics inherently carries the dispute over the meaning of territory. Various indigenous organizations and public institutions—including APIB, COIAB, ISA, and the AGU—defended the maintenance of the indigenous land as a cultural territory and a memory of a massacred people. They acted through an Allegation of Non-Compliance with a Fundamental Precept (ADPF). In December 2022, the MPF appealed to the courts against the Union and Funai to have the indigenous land designated as a socio-environmental protection area[
65].
Capital, represented by agribusiness economic forces, sought a legal review of the area, asserting the right to titled property. Essentially, it aimed to convert the indigenous area into a commodity space. Legal filings included: cattle ranchers holding Ibama embargoes for unauthorized deforestation and who serve as interested parties in thwarting the demarcation of the Tanaru Indigenous Territory, known as the refuge of the ‘Índio do Buraco’ [
66]. This legal maneuvering aimed to formalize land-grabbing already recorded in the area, involving property overlaps and deforestation. For agribusiness, historical reparation toward indigenous peoples does not exist.
On September 11, 2025, the Supreme Federal Court (STF) approved the work plan for the creation of the Tanaru National Park: “The full protection conservation unit will be dedicated to the recognition and preservation of the material and immaterial memory of the Tanaru people”[
19]. This represents an act of the State providing historical reparation to the indigenous peoples of Brazil.