Submitted:
02 July 2025
Posted:
03 July 2025
You are already at the latest version
Abstract
A Cut-/Reflexivity-free version LK-C/R of the propositional fragment of Gentzen calculus LK for the classical propositional logic PC endowed with propositional rules inverse to its logical ones as well as rules of constant elimination is proved to be equivalent to the bounded version of the ``logic of paradox''/``Kleene three-valued logic''\/} LP01/K301 under the standard interpretation of propositional sequents by propositional clauses and inverse interpretation of propositional formulas by premise-less single-conclusion sequents, ``with same theorems as PC, implying that LK has same derivable sequents as LK^-C, and so yielding a new semantic insight into Cut Elimination in LK''/. As a by-product of the discovered equivalence and absence of proper consistent extensions of LP01/K301 other than PC ``and that relatively axiomatized by the Ex Contradictione Quodlibet rule''/, proved here upon the basis of the universal algebraic technique elaborated in an earlier work of ours, we prove that LK-C/R has no proper consistent extension other than LK ``and the one relatively axiomatized by the context-free restriction of Cut''/.
Keywords:
equent calculus
; logical matrix
; logic of paradox
; disjunctive logic
; Kleene algebra
; extension
; cut
; structural rule
; logical rule
MSC: 03B50; 03B53; 03F05; 06D30; 8C15
1. Introduction
According to [14], the constant-free propositional empty-sequent-less fragment of [4] endowed with rules inverse to logical ones is equivalent (in the sense of [11]) to the logic of paradox [9], having the same theorems as the classical propositional logic , in view of [13], that has yielded both a novel semantic insight into Cut Elimination in and the fact that the only proper consistent extension of the sequent calculus involved distinct from is the one relatively axiomatized by Cut with minimal non-empty context (viz., having just a single formula either on the right or on the left but not on both sides). The primary objective of this work is to expand [14] to the full propositional fragment of upon proper expanding underlying works [10,13].
2. General background
2.1. Set-theoretical background
Non-negative integers are identified with sets/ ordinals of lesser ones, their set/ordinal being denoted by . Unless any confusion is possible, one-element/-component sets/sequences are identified with their elements/components. As usual, functions are treated as binary relations.
Given any sets A, B and an infix , let be the set of all (finite) subsets of A [including B], the equality relation on A, and , while A-tuples 〈viz., functions with domain are written in the sequence form with , where , stands for , as well as, in case [where ] written also in the standard finite tuple/sequence form [and identified with ] under identification of with whereas the concatenation binary operation.
An is said to be meet-irreducible in Y, if , their set being denoted by . A is said to be upward-directed, if , subsets of closed under unions of upward directed subsets being called inductive. A [finitary] closure operator over A is any unary operation on such that . A closure system over A is any {〈inductive〉} containing A and closed under intersections of subsets containing A, any {such that being called a (closure) basis of and} determining the {〈finitary〉} closure operator over A such that . Conversely, is a[n inductive] closure system over A such that , C and being called dual to one another.
Remark 1.
Due to Zorn Lemma, according to which any non-empty inductive set has a maximal element, is a basis of any inductive closure system . □
A [dual] Galois connection/retraction between/of a poset and/onto a poset is any such that:
for all and , [dual] Galois retractions of onto being exactly [dual] Galois connections between and with either injective left or surjective right component.
2.2. Algebraic background
Unless otherwise specified, we deal with a fixed but arbitrary finitary algebraic (viz., functional) signature L, viewed as a propositional language consisting of (propositional) connectives, L-algebras/“their carriers|class” being denoted by “/respective capital Fraktur/Italic letters [with /same indices], unless otherwise specified”. Then, {where (unless L has a constant)|} is the set of L-terms, viewed as 〈propositional〉L-formulas, with ⌈propositional⌉ variables in , where , viz., the carrier of the absolutely-free L-algebra , freely-generated by |{whose endomorphisms are viewed as ⌊propositional⌋L-substitutions, their set being denoted by , where }. Any m-ary connective , where , is identified with . As usual, the class of all “isomorphic copies”/subalgebras/“[ultra-]products of tuples” of members of a is denoted by .
2.3. Logical background
Here, we mainly follow [11] but allow infinitary logics and calculi as well as adopt more conventional terminology and notations.
Let be a [first-order] language (viz., finitary signature), where is a relational one, any being extended to the equally-denoted unary operation on the set of F-formulas/-axioms (viz., first-order atomic formulas of the signature F with variables in Var) via setting , for all . Then, any is called a (non-axiomatic∥proper) [finitary] F-rule with “elements of ”/ called its premises/conclusion, written as (either or and identified with 〈the universal closure of〉 (iff ), those of the form , where , being said to be inverse to , while any ⌊where is a language⌋ is extended to the equally-denoted via setting under proper identifying singletons with their elements in the non--optional case covering L-substitutions, whereas sets of {non-proper} [finitary] F-rules are called {axiomatic} “[finitary] F-calculi”[/“deductive bases over F”] [/[11].
A closure operator C [with non-one-element range-image] over is said to be structural, if, for all and , , i.e., is closed under inverse substitutions in the sense that, for all and , , in which case it is called a [consistent] F-logic(al system) {satisfying an F-rule , if }, elements of being called its theorems, while any F-logic such that is said to be an [axiomatic] {proper} extension of C, F-logics forming a complete lattice poset under extension partial ordering ≦, intersection of dual closure systems as join and point-wise intersection of F-logics as meet, whereas C is an extension of the theorem-less F-logic dual to the closure system over , called the theorem-less version of C. Then, the least F-logic [being an extension of C and] satisfying all rules in a (finitary) F-calculus is said to be axiomatized by [relatively toC] ( being finitary), in which case C is axiomatized by the set of all {finitary} F-rules satisfied in it {if it is finitary}, and so C is finitary iff it is axiomatized by a finitary F-calculus, while axiomatic extensions of C are exactly its extensions relatively axiomatized by axiomatic F-calculi, whereas any F-rule is satisfied in iff it is derivable in in the sense that there is a -derivation of Φ from , i.e., a mapping from a (finite) ordinal , called its length, to such that and, for each , either or there is some such that , as well as:
where . Given a sublanguage of F, where and , the -fragment ofC is the -logic .
2.3.1. Basic kinds of languages
Sentential languages
Let D be a unary truth predicate relation symbol, the sentential L-language and “identified with under identification of any with ”|, -formulas/-rules/-axioms/-calculi/-logics being called [sentential] L-formulas/-rules/-axioms/-calculi/-logics.
First-order -structures (viz., algebraic systems of the signature ; cf. [7]) [with truth predicate distinct from its carrier] are called [consistent] (logical) L-matrices (cf. [6]), identified with {the left components of} the couples constituted by their underlying algebras (viz., L-reducts) and truth predicates {whenever these are are empty, L-algebras being thus viewed as L-matrices with empty truth predicates} as well as denoted by capital Calligraphic letters 〈with indices〉, their underlying algebras being denoted by respective capital Gothic letters 〈with same indices〉. Any class of L-matrices defines its L-logic dual to the closure system over with closure basis , satisfying any L-rule iff this is satisfied in in the usual-model-theoretic sense, as well as being finitary, whenever both and all its members are finite (cf. [6]), but, otherwise, not necessarily being so,1 such that
where is any one-element L-algebra. Then, L-matrices defining extensions of an L-logic C are called its models, their class being denoted by .
Given L-matrices and , a[n] [injective] /surjective |strict homomorphism from to/onto is any [injective] such that and (their set being denoted by ) |[also called an embedding/isomorphism of/from into/onto, being said to be embedable/isomorphic into/to underh as well as, in case , called a∥the submatrix∥restriction of ∥“onA with setting ”], in which case
and so:
for all .
Equational languages
Let ≈ be an infix binary equality relation symbol, the equational L-language and the set of L-equations/-identities identified with under identification of any with , -rules/-axioms/-calculi/-logics being called equational L-rules/-axioms/-calculi/-logics. Then, given a class of L-algebras, we have the equational L-logic dual to the closure system over with closure basis , called the equational logic of , equal to that of
satisfying any equational L-rule iff this is satisfied in in the usual model-theoretic sense, as well as being finitary, whenever (in view of the Compactness Theorem; cf. [7]) {in particular, both and all its members are finite; cf. [3]}, but, otherwise, not necessarily being so,2 in which case L-algebras defining extensions of an equational logic C are called its models, their class being denoted by , and so the mappings and form a Galois retraction of the poset of pre-varieties (in the sense of [15]; viz., classes closed under , and , being the least one including and said to be generated by ) of L-algebras onto the one of the equational logics of classes of L-algebras. Clearly, the latter poset is closed under axiomatic extensions, the reservation “axiomatic” appearing redundant, in view of the following observation:
Remark 2.
Given any class of L-algebras and any , there are some set I, some and some such that , in which case is a [surjective] homomorphism from [on]to such that , and so, by the right alternative of (8), every equational L-rule , such that each one in is true in under h, is true in , any extension C of being then the equational logic of . □
Sequential languages
Let , where , be an -ary sequent relation symbol, the [ℓ-]sequent(ial) relation signature, the [ℓ-]sequent(ial) L-language and the set of L-sequents [of rank ℓ], any one being written in the standard form . Then, -rules/-axioms/-calculi/-logics are called [ℓ-]sequent(ial) L-rules/-axioms/-calculi/-logics.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Disjunctive sentential logics
Fix any . Given any , set . Then, an L-logic C is said to be weakly/〈strongly〉 [finitely] Δ-disjunctive, if, for all , /“in which case:
Likewise, it is said to be Δ-multiplicative, if, for all , . Finally, an L-matrix is said to be Δ-disjunctive, if, for all , .
Theorem 1.
A (finitary) L-logic C is Δ-disjunctive if(f) it is both weakly Δ-disjunctive and Δ-multiplicative, while both (11) and (12) hold {whereas:
for all } if(f) C is defined by a class of [consistent] Δ-disjunctive L-matrices.
Proof.
{The second “if” part is immediate.} Now, assume C is both weakly -disjunctive and -multiplicative, while both (11) and (12) hold. Consider any and any , in which case , and so C, being weakly -disjunctive, is -disjunctive. (Finally, assume C is -disjunctive. Then, by Remark 1, it, being finitary and structural, is defined by . Consider any and any such that , in which case , and so either or , members of being thus both consistent and -disjunctive, by the weak -disjunctivity of C.) □
3.1.1. Multiplicative sentential calculi
Given any and , put , elements of being called Δ-multiplications of. Then, an L-calculus is said to be Δ-multiplicative, if each multiplication of every rule of it is derivable in it, in which case, by induction on the length of -derivations, is -multiplicative, and so, by the structurality of L-logics and Theorem 1, we get:
3.2. Extensions versus interpretations
Here, we entirely follow the conventions adopted in Chapter 2 but allowing not necessarily finitary logics as well as finitary translations (viz., those with finite values). Fix any propositional language L, first-order ones , translations from to over L and an -logic . Then, is said to be compatible with, if the condition (ii) of Definition 2.1 of [11] holds, that is (in view of the structurality of ), , for all and all [one-element] (cf. Proposition 2.2 therein), i.e., for all and all , , in which case is compatible with any extension of . In that case, is called an interpretation of C in , if the condition (i) of Definition 2.1 of [11] holds too, that is, (cf. Proposition 2.4 therein). We start from presenting the following almost immediate observation:
Lemma 1.
Let be an -logic (and an F-logic as well as an F-calculus). Suppose τ is compatible with (resp., with [in particular, τ is an interpretation of C in {more specifically, C and are equivalent with 〈respect to〉τ and ρ}]). Then, is a closure system over closed under inverse substitutions, in which case τ is an interpretation of the F-logic dual to in ([while {whereas , and so and are equivalent with 〈respect to〉τ and ρ}]). (Conversely, is a closure system over closed under inverse substitutions, in which case the -logic dual to is an extension of , while [and , τ being an interpretation of in {whereas , and being equivalent with 〈respect to〉τ and ρ}]).
This, first, immediately yields the following infinitary extension of [11]:
Theorem 2.
Suppose C and are equivalent with (respect to) τ and ρ. Then, and form inverse to one another isomorphisms between the complete lattices of [axiomatic] extensions of C and , corresponding ones being equivalent with (respect to) τ and ρ.
And what is more, as an equally immediate consequence of Lemma 1, we have the following important result, being formally beyond the scopes of [11] but implicitly contained, though not explicitly presented, therein:
Theorem 3.
Suppose τ is an interpretation of C in . Then, and form a dual Galois retraction of the poset of extensions of onto that of C, τ being an interpretation of any extension of C (relatively axiomatized by an F-calculus ) in the extension of (relatively axiomatized by ).
This, in its turn, by Remark 2, yields a more canonical insight into the main universal result of [13] in the spirit of the outstanding work [11] plagiarized (like [13]) more and more by such crooks as Font, Pigozzi, et al.:
Corollary 2 (cf. [13]) Let ∇ be a translation from to over L, C an L-logic, a class of L-algebras, and . Suppose ∇ is an interpretation of C in , i.e., C is defined by , viz., by . Then, the mappings and form a Galois retraction of the poset of sub-pre-varieties of onto the one of extensions of C such that, for any L-calculus , , while, for any , .
4. Main issues
Here, we deal with the propositional languages , where ∧ and ∨ are binary [while ⊥ and ⊤ are nullary] (whereas ¬ is unary) with [bounded] lattices {cf. [1]} viewed as -algebras, standing for . Then, a [bounded] (De)/ Morgan/Kleene lattice [traditionally called a (De)/ Morgan/Kleene algebra; cf., e.g., [1] is any -algebra with [bounded] distributive lattice -reduct, satisfying:
their variety being denoted by . Let be the chain [bounded] lattice over , while the [bounded] Kleene lattice with [bounded] lattice reduct and , whereas the [bounded] Morgan lattice with [bounded] lattice reduct and , the following standard notations of elements of being used in this connection and , as well as the logic of , being [the bounded (version of the)] “{relevance} first-degree entailment”/(“logic of paradox”|“Kleene three-valued logic”)/ “classical logic” [2]/ ([9]|[5])/[8], in which case the truth predicate of is equationally definable by the translation from to over in the sense that:
and so the universal elaboration of [13] is equally applicable to the bounded versions of both the logic of paradox and Kleene three-valued logic. Then, for any -algebras and any -rule :
so, for any :
4.1. An axiomatization of the bounded version of FDE
Let be the -calculus, constituted the -rules given by [10]:
[and the following additional -rules and -axioms:
Let be the Excluded Middle axiom, the Resolution rule, , where , and , where .
Lemma 2.
is ∨-multiplicative.
Proof.
According to [10], is axiomatized by . Then, since its defining matrix is ∨-disjunctive, by Theorem 1, it is ∨-multiplicative, while (13) holds for it, in which case both the rule inverse to and the ∨-multiplication of any rule of , being satisfied in , are derivable in , and so in . Moreover, by , the ∨-multiplication of any axiom in is derivable in . [Finally, due to the following demonstration:
- — Hypothesis;
- — ;
- — ;
the ∨-multiplication of , being derivable in , is so in .] {Likewise, due to the following one:
- — Hypothesis;
- — Hypothesis;
- — ;
- — ;
- — ;
the ∨-multiplication of , being derivable in , is so in .} □
An -matrix is said to be (∧-)conjunctive, if is ∧-disjunctive.
Theorem 4.
.
Proof.
Clearly, since , , being both conjunctive and ∨-disjunctive, is a model of , i.e., . Conversely, by Theorem 1, Corollary 1, Lemma 2 and the inclusion , C, being both finitary and ∨-disjunctive, is defined by a class of consistent ∨-disjunctive -matrices. Consider any and take any , in which case, by the truth of , and in , this is conjunctive [while, by that of , , whereas by that of under , ]. Then, [by the truth of in , , while, by that of under , , whereas] by that of , , and under assignments containing , is both conjunctive and ∨-disjunctive, for is so. Finally, consider any , in which case, by the truth of and in under , (while, by that of in under , ) {whereas, by that of in under , }, and so , being in , as required, in view of (9). □
This, by (9) and the fact that is an isomorphism from onto , immediately yields:
Corollary 3. is axiomatized by . In particular, is the extension of , relatively axiomatized by , while is the axiomatic extension of relatively axiomatized by .
This subsumes [10].
4.2. Extensions of the bounded logic of paradox and Kleene’s three-valued logic versus pre-varieties of Kleene algebras
Key observations enabling one to expand [13] onto the bounded case almost immediately are as follows:
Lemma 3.
Let and be bounded lattices and . Suppose (in particular, ). Then, .
Proof.
Take any such that , in which case , so . □
Lemma 4.
For any {2-element} [bounded] Morgan lattice and any (distinct) , .
Since has no non-one-element subalgebra not retaining bounds, by (10), Lemma 3 and [12], we, first, have the following well-known fact (cf., e.g., [1]):
Corollary 4.
.
Let be the extension of relatively axiomatized by the Ex Contradictione Quodlibet rule , viz., the least non-paraconsistent extension of . Then, a [bounded] Kleene lattice is said to be non-paraconsis-tent, if it satisfies , i.e., satisfies [13]:
in which it satisfies , and so, by the right alternative of (16), satisfies [12]:
i.e., it is non-idempotent in the sense of [12]. Conversely, any [bounded] Kleene lattice, satisfying (23), satisfies , in which case it is non-paraconsistent, and so non-paraconsistent [bounded] Kleene lattices are exactly non-idempotent ones, their quasi-variety being denoted by .
Let and . Then, since the only non-one-element subalgebra of not retaining bounds is that with two-element carrier , by (10), Lemmas 3, 4 and [12]/[13], we immediately have:
Corollary 5.
.
Let be the extension of relatively axiomatized by the Modus Ponens rule for material implication (in view of the ∨-disjunctivity of and Theorem 1). Then, a [bounded] Kleene lattice is said to be regular/classical (cf. Definition 4.6/4.11 of [12]/[13]), if it satisfies , i.e., satisfies (10/14) of [12]/[13]:
their quasi-variety being denoted by . Since the only non-one-element subalgebra of not retaining bounds is that with two-element carrier , by (10), Lemmas 3, 4 and [12], we immediately get:
Corollary 6.
.
From now on, we use (17), (18), (19), (20), (21) and Corollary 2 tacitly. Then, by Corollaries 4 and 5, we, first, have:
Theorem 5.(An arbitrary exrension C of) is defined by .
Theorem 6..
Proof.
Theorem 7.
Proper consistent extensions of form the two-element chain .
Proof.
First, , while , whereas . Then, by Theorems 5 and 6, and are proper consistent extensions of forming the chain involved. Finally, consider any consistent extension C of , in which case, by Theorem 5, there is a non-one-element such that , and so, by (9) and Lemma 4, . In particular, , whenever . Otherwise, consider the following complementary cases:
-
,in which case, by Theorem 5, there is some such that , and so . Then, by the case 4/3 of the proof of Theorem 4.8/4.11 of [12]/[13], there is an . Consider the following complementary subcases:Thus, anyway, , in which case, by Theorem 5, , and so .
-
,in which case, by Theorem 5, there is some such that , and so there is some such that . Then, , in which case, by (9), , and so . □
□
Theorem 8.
is the only proper consistent extension of .
Proof.
Consider a consistent extension C of distinct from , in which case, by Theorem 7, , and so, by Corollaries 3 and 4, there is some such that . Then, there is some such that . Consider the following complementary cases:
Thus, in any case, , i.e., , C being equal to , as required, in view of Corollary 3, for . □
If, for any , was true in , then it would be true in , in which case, since , would be true in , and so would be in . Nevertheless, though the universal algebraic approach developed in [13] is thus not applicable to , Theorem 8 is still so as follows.
Lemma 5.
Any extension C of with(out) theorems is (the theorem-less version of) the -fragment of an extension of .
Proof.
Let be the inconsistent -logic.
Corollary 7.
Proper extensions of form the diamond lattice, isomorphic to under , where is injective.
4.3. Cut-free versions of Gentzen calculus
Let be the -sequent -calculus constituted by the following strucural rules (except for Reflexivity/“〈both Reflexivity and〉 Cut {with non--ary sequent predicate in conclusion}”):
where and , together with the following logical rules [and axioms]:
where (as well as [both] the rules inverse to logical ones [and the following constant elimination rules:
where ]) its rules being derivable in .
Let
and be parameter-less translations from to and vice versa over in the sense of the fundamental work [11] we follow here tacitly.
Lemma 6.
and are equivalent with (respect to) and ρ.
Proof.
First, for any and any with range-image , is true in , so is true in , for is a filter of . Likewise, is true in , so both and are true in . Conversely, for any , is derivable in . Finally, for all , both and , where , are derivable in . Then, Theorems 2.24 of [11] and 4 complete the argument. □
Theorem 9.
and are equivalent with (respect to) and ρ.
Proof.
Clearly, is true in , while is derivable in , Corollaries 2.27 of [11], 3 and Lemma 6 ending the proof. □
Corollary 8 (cf. [13] for the non-[]-optional case) Proper consistent extensions of form the two-element chain , the lesser/greater being equivalent to with (respect to) and ρ.
Proof.
Corollary 9.
is the only proper consistent extension of .
Proof.
Clearly, is true in . Conversely, is derivable in . Then, Theorems 2, 8, 9 and [11] complete the argument. □
Likewise, by Theorems 2 and 9 as well as Corollaries [11] and 7, we eventually get:
Corollary 10.
Proper extensions of form the diamond lattice, isomorphic to the one of those of under , any and being equivalent with [respect to] τ and ρ.
References
- R. Balbes and P. Dwinger, Distributive Lattices, University of Missouri Press, Columbia (Missouri), 1974.
- N. D. Belnap, Jr, A useful four-valued logic, Modern uses of multiple-valued logic (J. M. Dunn and G. Epstein, eds.), D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1977, pp. 8–37.
- T. Frayne, A.C. Morel, and D.S. Scott, Reduced direct products, Fundamenta Mathematicae 51 (1962), 195–228.
- G. Gentzen, Untersuchungen über das logische Schliessen, Mathematische Zeitschrift 39 (1934), 176–210, 405–431.
- S. C. Kleene, Introduction to metamathematics, D. Van Nostrand Company, New York, 1952.
- J. oś and R. Suszko, Remarks on sentential logics, Indagationes Mathematicae 20 (1958), 177–183.
- A. I. Mal’cev, Algebraic systems, Springer Verlag, New York, 1965.
- E. Mendelson, Introduction to mathematical logic, 2nd ed., D. Van Nostrand Company, New York, 1979.
- G. Priest, The logic of paradox, Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979), 219–241.
- A. P. Pynko, Characterizing Belnap’s logic via De Morgan’s laws, Mathematical Logic Quarterly 41 (1995), no. 4, 442–454.
- ——, Definitional equivalence and algebraizability of generalized logical systems, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 98 (1999), 1–68.
- ——, Implicational classes of De Morgan lattices, Discrete mathematics 205 (1999), 171–181.
- ——, Subprevarieties versus extensions. Application to the logic of paradox, Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (2000), no. 2, 756–766.
- ——, Gentzen’s cut-free calculus versus the logic of paradox, Bulletin of the Section of Logic 39 (2010), no. 1/2, 35–42.
- L. A. Skornyakov (ed.), General algebra, vol. 2, Nauka, Moscow, 1991, In Russian.
| 1 | This is mainly why we have extended here the finitary framework of [11]. |
| 2 | This is one more reason of our going beyond the finitary framework of [11]. |
| 3 | Though [13] is expandable onto the bounded case, we have presented here more immediate and transparent model-theoretic proofs of both it and the axiomatizability of the [bounded] classical logic relatively to the [bounded] logic of paradox by Modus Ponens for material implication. |
| 4 | It is this subcase that justifies the reservation “almost” in the first sentence of this subsection. |
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content. |
© 2025 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Copyright: This open access article is published under a Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 license, which permit the free download, distribution, and reuse, provided that the author and preprint are cited in any reuse.