3. Research Methodology and Case Study Selection
Based on the findings from the previous literature review and considering the aims and research questions already outlined in the introduction of this article, we decided to adopt a qualitative research methodology based on the analysis of five recent case studies (occurring after the year 2000). These case studies focused on large companies (i.e., with sales revenues exceeding 1 billion euros) where significant occupational fraud (greater than 1 million euros) had been confirmed and had received substantial media attention, ensuring the availability of articles, interviews, reports, or other public documents.
We are aware of the limitations inherent in this research methodology, which relies on purposeful sampling, particularly regarding the difficulties in generalizing and extending the results and observations to different contexts, even with a sample that is appropriately diversified in terms of countries, sectors of activity, and fraud schemes considered. However, given the exploratory nature of this research and the topic under study, we deemed this approach acceptable as an initial step, reserving the possibility for further exploration using alternative methods in the future. It is important to note that, in the context of corporate fraud, it is particularly challenging to conduct interviews or obtain responses to questionnaires due to the confidentiality of the data provided (often disclosed only after market closures and with specific notifications to the competent authorities) and the natural reluctance of companies to admit weaknesses in their internal control systems, as the literature on the topic has already highlighted (ACFE, 2018).
With this premise, the five selected cases, which operate in different sectors and involve distinct fraud schemes, were: Société Générale, Enron, Wirecard, Parmalat, and Theranos.
3.1. The First Case Study: Société Générale and the Unauthorized Subscriptions
The first case study considered is that of Société Générale and the fraud perpetrated by Jerome Kerviel, one of its employees, in 2008. Société Générale, based on the size of its managed assets, was the second-largest bank in France, with assets under management amounting to €473 billion. The fraud occurred through the unauthorized and covert subscription of forward transactions on stocks and futures, totaling nearly €50 billion, resulting in an established loss of approximately €4.9 billion (Allegrini et al., 2003).
Based on Cressey’s pioneering work on the topic, the occurrence of corporate fraud is typically attributed to the simultaneous presence of three elements: opportunity, pressure, and rationalization. As discussed in the literature review, more recent research has added two additional factors: the fraudster's capability and arrogance (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004; Marks, 2012). Let us now examine each of these elements in detail.
Regarding opportunity, Jerome Kerviel exploited numerous weaknesses in Société Générale’s internal control system, as revealed post facto by both PwC, the consulting firm commissioned by the Paris Tribunal, and the Commission Bancaire, the supervisory authority of the French banking system until 2010 (Di Gennaro, 2013). These weaknesses included insufficient supervision of traders’ activities and the inability of information systems to promptly flag anomalies (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004).
In terms of pressure, Jerome Kerviel’s criminal behavior originated from his desire to distinguish himself from colleagues who came from more privileged social backgrounds and had attended more prestigious educational institutions. In contrast, immediate personal enrichment does not appear to have been his primary motivation (Jannone, 2016).
With respect to rationalization (Kassem & Higson, 2012), Jerome Kerviel consistently claimed that his actions were aimed at generating profits in the interest of Société Générale. He also asserted that his direct supervisors tacitly supported his activities as long as the results were favorable (Der Spiegel, 2010).
Concerning capability (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004), Jerome Kerviel had prior experience in back-office operations, enabling him to manipulate information systems to conceal unauthorized exposures, falsify documentation, and generate fake email messages. Moreover, his interpersonal skills allowed him to be convincing when providing explanations and to secure the collaboration of colleagues when necessary (Tutino & Merlo, 2019).
As for arrogance (Marks, 2012), Jerome Kerviel exhibited an evidently excessive confidence in his ability to control situations and a sense of superiority over others and the rules. In official statements, he claimed to have been "sure of winning" and that "if he had won, nothing would have happened to him" (Di Gennaro, 2013). The very notion that he was acting in the bank’s interest reflects his conviction that he alone knew what the bank needed, regardless of the instructions received or even the law (Dorminey et al., 2012).
In relation to collusion (Vousinas, 2019), the sixth factor of the fraud hexagon, played a role in the Société Générale fraud. While Kerviel acted as an individual, the lack of intervention from supervisors, coupled with the tacit acceptance of his actions while results remained favorable, suggests a degree of implicit collusion within the organization. The failure of risk management and compliance teams to detect and address the fraud sooner indicates that systemic negligence or willful ignorance, where multiple parties overlook red flags due to financial incentives or institutional complacency (Sihombing & Panggulu, 2022), facilitated the perpetuation of fraudulent activities.
Additionally, in interviews he revealed that he spent days and days in front of his terminal from dawn to dusk, often without sleeping or eating, with the only interest in trading and interacting just with colleagues in the trading room (Der Spiegel, 2010), behaviors that are comparable to gambling addiction, when individuals are dominated by an overwhelming need to gamble.
Considering the foregoing analysis, it can be concluded that all six conditions outlined in the fraud hexagon were simultaneously present in the Société Générale fraud case in 2008. However, it can be observed that an additional personality trait of the fraudster can be found: the thrill and dependence from risk-taking in committing fraud, which will be further discussed in the dedicated section.
3.2. The Second Case Study: Enron and the Special Purposes Vehicles
The second case study analyzed is that of Enron Corporation, one of the most infamous corporate fraud cases in history, an American energy company that collapsed in 2001 due to widespread accounting fraud. Before its downfall, Enron was one of the largest energy traders in the world, with reported revenues exceeding $100 billion. However, behind its apparent success, the company engaged in systematic financial manipulation to inflate its earnings and conceal massive debt. The fraud led to the company's bankruptcy, wiping out $74 billion in shareholder value, causing the loss of thousands of jobs, and leading to the dissolution of Arthur Andersen, one of the world's largest auditing firms (McLean & Elkind, 2003; Healy & Palepu, 2003).
As analysed in fraud theory, fraudulent schemes often arise from a combination of opportunity, pressure, rationalization, capability, arrogance, and collusion—all six elements of the fraud hexagon were clearly present in the Enron scandal (Dorminey et al., 2012).
Regarding opportunity, Enron’s executives exploited weak regulatory oversight and loopholes in accounting rules to engage in fraudulent activities (Benston, 2003). The company's complex financial structure, which included off-balance-sheet special purpose entities (SPEs), allowed Enron to hide debt and inflate profits. The absence of effective internal controls, combined with Arthur Andersen’s failure to act as an independent auditor, provided the perfect conditions for fraud ((Healy & Palepu, 2003).
Considering Pressure, the company faced intense pressure to meet Wall Street’s expectations for continuous profit growth. Enron’s corporate culture was highly aggressive, rewarding short-term success over long-term stability (Sridharan et al., 2002). Executives were driven by stock price performance, as their personal wealth was tied to stock options. This pressure to deliver ever-increasing profits incentivized fraudulent reporting (McLean & Elkind, 2003).
Rationalization was present as executives, including CEO Jeffrey Skilling and CFO Andrew Fastow, justified their actions by arguing that they were using "creative accounting" rather than outright fraud. They believed they were protecting shareholder value and maintaining Enron’s market position. Many employees were also misled into thinking that financial manipulation was merely part of the company’s innovative strategy (Healy & Palepu, 2003).
The fraud at Enron required highly skilled financial engineering, therefore capability of the fraudster was fundamental. CFO Andrew Fastow was instrumental in designing the network of SPEs, which were used to hide debt and create the illusion of profitability (Benston, 2003). His deep understanding of accounting and financial instruments allowed him to manipulate financial statements without immediate detection. Furthermore, Skilling’s charismatic leadership and ability to manipulate stakeholders helped sustain the deception for years (Sridharan et al., 2002; Fraud Magazine, 2016).
Regarding arrogance, Enron’s top executives displayed extreme overconfidence in their ability to deceive regulators and the market. Jeffrey Skilling openly mocked analysts who questioned the company’s financials, while Ken Lay, the chairman, maintained that Enron was financially sound even as it was collapsing (McLean & Elkind, 2003). Their belief in their invincibility led them to continue fraudulent activities despite growing scrutiny.
Lastly, collusion too was present as unlike many fraud cases perpetrated by a single individual, Enron’s fraud was enabled by a network of insiders, including executives, board members, auditors (Arthur Andersen), and even some financial institutions (Healy & Palepu, 2003). Arthur Andersen not only failed to detect the fraud but also actively destroyed documents to cover up evidence (Benston, 2003). Major banks also facilitated Enron’s deceptive practices by funding its SPEs despite clear risks.
In addition, regarding the pleasure and thrill of taking risks and challenges through fraud, Andrew Fastow, in an interview, candidly stated: 'I think my ability to do structured financing, to finance things off-balance sheet and to find ways to manipulate financial statements — there's no nice way to say it. I was good at finding loopholes... I'm not proud of it now, but I was very proud of it at that time.'. Also in this case study, it is possible to observe the presence of an additional personality trait of the fraudster not included in the other six: the thrill in risk-taking when committing fraud.
3.3. The Third Case Study: Wirecard and the Non-Existing Liquidity
The third case study considered is that of Wirecard, a company in the electronic payments sector listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. In 2020, Wirecard collapsed, destroying a market capitalization of over €13 billion and rendering an additional €1.6 billion in bank loans irrecoverable. The cause of the collapse was a fraud involving the accounting of non-existent cash reserves amounting to €1.9 billion. The responsibility for this fraud has been attributed to Markus Braun, CEO, and Jan Marsalek, COO. Both are currently facing criminal charges for accounting fraud, false corporate disclosures, embezzlement, and criminal conspiracy. Specifically, Jan Marsalek is also under investigation for additional charges related to the disclosure of sensitive national security information. Currently, Markus Braun is in custody, while Jan Marsalek remains a fugitive.
The case provides an opportunity to analyse how the five elements of fraud interact.
Regarding opportunity, Wirecard’s fraudulent management exploited the lack of transparency in certain Southeast Asian jurisdictions to generate fake business transactions through complicit third parties (Financial Times, 2020). Furthermore, they took advantage of an inadequate internal control system (KPMG, 2020) and negligent audits by external auditors (Financial Times, 2023). Finally, they leveraged Wirecard’s image as an innovative start-up to secure protection from regulatory authorities and even gain the support of certain political figures (Frankfurter Allgemeine, 2020).
In terms of pressure, both Markus Braun and Jan Marsalek pursued personal enrichment and accumulated significant wealth. However, for both individuals, the priority seemed to be building a fantastical narrative around their personas. Through Wirecard, Markus Braun aimed to embody the visionary high-tech entrepreneur (the “German Steve Jobs”), while Jan Marsalek lived out an adventure-film fantasy filled with femme fatales and dangerous alliances (Der Spiegel, 2024).
As for rationalization, both Markus Braun and Jan Marsalek deny any responsibility, leaving their justification for their misconduct unclear. However, Markus Braun strongly identified with Wirecard, and his desire to protect his “creation” could explain certain ethical compromises (Handelsblatt, 2023). Jan Marsalek, on the other hand, maintained long-standing relationships with dubious individuals, suggesting that, in his value system, these connections outweighed his obligations to employers, investors, and the law.
Concerning capability, both Markus Braun and Jan Marsalek were charismatic figures capable of earning the trust of their interlocutors. Markus Braun presented investors with futuristic visions within a framework of apparent technological and financial solidity, while Jan Marsalek promoted implausible projects that the organization nonetheless perceived as game changing (Handelsblatt, 2018).
In relation to aggressiveness, Markus Braun and Jan Marsalek did not hesitate to communicate unrealistic growth prospects, provided vague answers to questions on sensitive issues, and reacted aggressively when their actions were questioned. These behaviors demonstrated a lack of regard for shareholders, the press, and institutional counterparts.
Furthermore, collusion played a significant role in enabling the Wirecard fraud. The company’s executives were aided by a network of auditors, regulators, and financial institutions that either ignored or actively facilitated fraudulent activities (Götz, 2021). Ernst & Young (EY), Wirecard’s external auditor, failed to detect clear red flags over several years, while BaFin (Germany’s financial regulator) was accused of protecting Wirecard rather than investigating it properly (Köhler & Stehle, 2021). The fraudulent activities were further facilitated by banks and business partners who knowingly participated in suspicious transactions, allowing Wirecard to sustain its deception for years. The fraud hexagon model suggests that collusion between internal and external actors significantly amplifies the scale and impact of fraud (Vousinas, 2019).
As in the other cases, all six conditions outlined in the "fraud hexagon" are simultaneously present in the Wirecard scandal. We have the hedonistic sense of gratification from committing fraud and a strong sense of pleasure or thrill from risk-taking, to the point that in November 2020, Markus Braun had hired McKinsey & Co to help prepare his most audacious idea yet—a plan to take over Deutsche Bank, the crowning achievement for a company that, within a few years, had become one of the most valuable in the country, earning the label of 'Germany’s PayPal' (Financial Times, 2020).
3.4. The Fourth Case Study: Parmalat and the Non-Existing Liquidity
The fourth case study is the Parmalat scandal, revealed in 2003, that is one of the most significant corporate frauds in European history. Once considered a global leader in the dairy industry, Parmalat collapsed after it was discovered that the company had engaged in massive accounting fraud to conceal financial losses and fabricate fictitious liquidity. The fraud, which resulted in €14 billion in missing funds, led to one of the largest bankruptcies in Europe (Allegrini et al., 2003).
At the center of the fraud was Calisto Tanzi, Parmalat’s founder and CEO, alongside Fausto Tonna, the company’s CFO, who was instrumental in orchestrating fraudulent financial transactions. The company used a complex network of offshore subsidiaries, including the so-called "Buco Nero", a fictitious financial entity designed to absorb company losses and create the illusion of solvency (Di Gennaro, 2013).
Additionally, auditors failed to conduct proper verification procedures, which allowed fraud to persist for over a decade. One of the most striking failures was the acceptance of a fax as proof of liquidity, a document that falsely claimed that a Parmalat subsidiary in the Cayman Islands held €3.95 billion in cash reserves (Healy & Palepu, 2003). Parmalat fraud offers a clear opportunity to analyze the six elements of the fraud hexagon (Vousinas, 2019).
Regarding opportunity, Parmalat executives exploited weak regulatory oversight and inadequate auditing practices to manipulate financial statements. The creation of the "Buco Nero" served as an off-the-books entity to absorb financial losses while maintaining the appearance of profitability (Di Gennaro, 2013). Furthermore, external auditors overlooked glaring inconsistencies, such as the acceptance of the fraudulent fax as proof of liquidity, demonstrating serious weaknesses in financial oversight (Healy & Palepu, 2003).
In the two decades preceding the outbreak of the crisis the company faced significant financial pressure due to high debt levels and an aggressive expansion strategy. To maintain investor confidence and secure additional financing, Parmalat manipulated financial reports to reflect fictitious profits and liquidity (Murphy & Dacin, 2011). Tanzi and Tonna were under intense pressure to sustain Parmalat’s market position and avoid the repercussions of a financial collapse.
Like many corporate fraudsters, Tanzi and Tonna rationalized their actions, claiming they were acting in Parmalat’s best interest. Tanzi argued that temporary financial manipulation would allow the company to recover and eventually generate real profits (Kassem & Higson, 2012). This aligns with psychological research indicating that fraudsters often justify unethical actions as necessary for the survival of the company (Heath, 2008).
Regarding capability, fraud involved a sophisticated financial structure, requiring advanced accounting expertise to create falsified financial statements, offshore accounts, and forged documents. Fausto Tonna played a pivotal role in designing and executing these fraudulent schemes. His financial knowledge and ability to manipulate reporting procedures were essential in sustaining the deception (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004).
Calisto Tanzi and Fausto Tonna displayed an extreme sense of invincibility, believing that their financial manipulations would never be discovered. Despite growing skepticism from analysts, they dismissed concerns and continued to deceive investors and regulators (Marks, 2012). This reflects findings in fraud research, where executives who perceive themselves as untouchable are more likely to engage in fraudulent activities (Dorminey et al., 2012).
Unlike cases of individual fraud, the Parmalat scandal involved an extensive network of collusions. Banks, auditors, and financial institutions played a role in facilitating or ignoring fraudulent activities. Notably, external auditors failed to perform basic verification checks, including blindly accepting a fax as proof of cash reserves, a fundamental oversight that enabled the fraud to continue (Sihombing & Panggulu, 2022). Additionally, financial institutions approved questionable transactions, further sustaining the deception (Vousinas, 2019).
The Parmalat case also exhibited a conscious pleasure for thrill in committing fraud, which is strongly tied to the earlier decision to cancel the sale of certain assets to the Kraft Group—partly due to alarming levels of debt—and instead pursue a stock market listing, with all the ensuing consequences in terms of required profitability, financial position, and periodic shareholder returns.
3.5. The Fifth Case Study: Theranos and the Non-Existing Testing Machine
The fifth case study is Theranos fraud, exposed in 2015, that is one of the most notorious cases of corporate fraud in the healthcare industry. Theranos, a Silicon Valley startup founded by Elizabeth Holmes in 2003, claimed to have revolutionized blood testing with its proprietary Edison device, which supposedly required only a few drops of blood to conduct a wide range of tests. However, investigations later revealed that Theranos' technology did not work, and the company had deceived investors, regulators, and patients by fabricating test results and using conventional laboratory equipment while falsely claiming they were using its own technology (Cohen et al., 2022; Carreyrou, 2018).
At its peak, Theranos was valued at $9 billion, with high-profile investors including Rupert Murdoch, the Walton family, and former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. However, when the fraud was uncovered, the company collapsed, investors lost billions, and Holmes was charged with multiple counts of fraud. In 2022, Holmes was sentenced to 11 years in prison, while Ramesh "Sunny" Balwani, the company’s COO and Holmes' business partner, received nearly 13 years (U.S. Department of Justice, 2022). The Theranos case presents an ideal opportunity to analyze the six elements of the fraud hexagon (Vousinas, 2019).
Considering the opportunity element, Holmes and Balwani exploited weak regulatory oversight in the medical startup sector, where disruptive innovation is often prioritized over rigorous scientific validation. Theranos operated without proper peer-reviewed studies, evaded regulatory scrutiny, and misled investors by restricting access to independent verification of its technology (Carreyrou, 2018). Additionally, Walgreens and Safeway failed to conduct proper due diligence before partnering with Theranos, allowing fraud to continue (Healy & Palepu, 2003).
Theranos faced immense financial and market pressure to meet investors’ high expectations. Holmes, who styled herself as "the next Steve Jobs," was determined to live up to Silicon Valley’s culture of "fake it until you make it." She needed to demonstrate rapid technological breakthroughs and secure partnerships with major healthcare providers to keep the company afloat (McLean & Elkind, 2003). Research indicates that executives in high-pressure environments are more likely to engage in fraudulent activities to meet unrealistic targets (Murphy & Dacin, 2011).
Holmes justified her actions by claiming she was protecting the future of Theranos, believing that minor fabrications were necessary to achieve an eventual breakthrough. She argued that the company was on the brink of success and that temporary deception was a means to secure long-term benefits (Kassem & Higson, 2012). This aligns with research showing that fraudsters often convince themselves that short-term dishonesty serves a greater good (Heath, 2008).
Holmes and Balwani had the technical and strategic knowledge to mislead investors, regulators, and the media. Holmes’ charismatic leadership helped her secure deals with Walgreens, Safeway, and the U.S. Department of Defense, while Balwani controlled the internal operations, enforcing a strict culture of secrecy and intimidation (Carreyrou, 2018). The fraud diamond model suggests that a high degree of intelligence and confidence is necessary to execute large-scale fraud successfully (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004).
Holmes displayed extreme arrogance, believing she was above scrutiny and that her vision justified bending the rules. She ignored warnings from employees, dismissed whistleblowers, and threatened lawsuits against journalists investigating Theranos (Marks, 2012). Her sense of invincibility and entitlement aligns with studies suggesting that fraudsters with high levels of arrogance feel immune to consequences (Dorminey et al., 2012).
Unlike lone-wolf fraudsters, the Theranos case involved collusion between executives, board members, and business partners. Holmes and Balwani worked together to manipulate test results, mislead investors, and pressure employees into silence. Furthermore, board members and investors failed to conduct proper due diligence, enabling the fraud to persist (Sihombing & Panggulu, 2022). Research suggests that collusion amplifies the impact of fraud, making detection more difficult and extending its duration (Vousinas, 2019).
The Theranos case study includes a specific trait of the personality of Holmes and Balwani who fundamentally derived gratification from the risk-taking thrill in committing fraud. They bet on being able to invent a technology that did not exist and continued to do so until the very end, likely knowing they would never be able to achieve it. “They chose to be dishonest. That choice was not only callous; it was criminal” (Cohen et al., 2022).