4.2. Hypotheses Development
In this section, we present a theoretical model to study the four PPP structural elements from a common perspective of ‘embedded financial risk’ to better understand whether these elements are related and how much equity private investors are willing to put into PPP projects. We present hypotheses linking the three independent risk-related variables. They include Subsidies (S) provided by the public sector partner, Risk Assumed (RA) by the private sector partner, and the Bid Criteria (BC) applied by the public sector to the dependent variable - the level of Private Investment (PI) in a PPP project. Also, we propose a fourth risk variable, i.e., financial leverage (FL), which would serve as a moderating factor in these relationships. We then test our hypotheses using data from an extensive World Bank database and present the results.
4.2.1. Moderating Role of Leverage in PPPs
The relationships among subsidies, assumed risk, bid criteria, and the extent of private investment are affected by the amount of leverage in the capital structure of the SPV (Hu & Hooy, 2022). It may be noted that PPP project financing normally consists of a mix of equity provided by private investors, loans provided by banks or other financial institutions, and issuance of debt such as bonds. Equity providers refer to private investors and shareholders in SPV; they receive their returns only after payment of operating costs, capping of required financial reserves, and servicing costs associated with debt. Furthermore, they absorb the first loss when there is a shortfall in the contract payments and/or increased operational costs. Like most capital financing, equity investors take a higher risk than debt providers, owing to which they expect higher returns.
In PPPs, leverage is determined by a number of risk factors such as country and political risk, the risk of technology reliability that would be employed for the project, and credit ratings of equity providers, among others (Wang et al., 2019).
Project financing in PPP is often considered ‘limited-recourse financing because lender security is normally limited solely to the project's cash flows. On the other hand, the sponsor’s equity invested in SPV is effectively ring-fenced from the rest of the sponsor's business interests. Therefore, there is a clear management focus on the full transparency of cash flows throughout the life of the project. Notably, sponsors do not guarantee the project as a whole; lenders, on the other hand, rely primarily on the cash flow of the project for debt service. Because the sole recourse of debt providers is linked to the assets of the SPV and because the physical assets in a PPP (e.g., a road or an airport) have little value if they are not used in the context of the project, the main assets that lenders tend to rely on, as security, are the contract between the public authority and the private sector project entity, including the cash flows derived from this contract. As a result, SPV may also be subject to several restrictive and affirmative covenants, such as restrictions on sale of assets, restrictions on incurring additional debt backed by SPV assets, interest rate hedges, and requirements to provide periodic compliance reports. Thus, in a typical PPP project, the greater the financial leverage in the capital structure, the greater the expected level of private investment. Thus, there is a need to study the unique moderating role of leverage in the risk relationships among Indian PPPs.
4.2.2. Subsidies and Private Investments (PI)
There are many implicit ways to financially help a PPP project, usually in terms of providing subsidies, concessional loans, guarantees, or paying for project preparation; however, ‘subsidies’ is most common way. In theory, subsidies to PPPs serve a single purpose: to make sure projects that will produce a net economic or social gain can be commercially financed" (World Bank Institute Report, 2019). One reason why Subsidies are popular because they can be structured in several ways, depending on the cash flows of the project. At times, governments provide subsidies by making upfront cash contributions to pay the capital costs. This is the case when partners agree that the project might not be financially viable but is required for the delivery of social goods. On the other hand, governments can make regular subsidy payments to private companies based on both the availability and quality of the service, albeit as a function of the expected revenue stream over project life (pppinindia.gov.in, 2020). Another reason for offering subsidies is to invite broader private participation in the project bid. Generally, when subsidies are offered, other private investors (those with no other contractual relationship with the project) are incentivized to align with the primary private partner to ensure that the PPP project is viable and succeeds. The literature on the relationship between government support subsidies focuses primarily on the elements of government policies that support PPP project performance, the level of private investment (Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2017; Silaghi & Sarkar, 2021), and/or whether both loans and subsidies influence the structure of PPP projects (Vecchi et al., 2022).
Based on the above findings, one would assume that there would be a positive relationship between the subsidy provided and total private investment; the greater the subsidy, the more private investors (s) would be incentivized to invest in the PPP project. Conversely, one can argue that if the subsidy is relatively high, it probably means that the public partner has predetermined the cash flows from the project and is suspected of the economic viability of the PPP. In such cases, the primary private investor would not need to invest as much, would be less accountable, and may be willing to walk away if the project does not generate adequate returns. For example, a recent study used principal-agent theory to show that while government subsidies are related to expected revenue and costs, governments' altruism in terms of providing subsidies can undermine investors' enthusiasm in terms of cooperation and risk-sharing propensity (Wang et al., 2020). For the private partner, the investment made comes from its own balance sheet, combined with funding from ‘other investors’ (e.g., private equity, investment banks) who help capitalize on the transaction. Based on this understanding, subsidies should ideally be structured in light of the projected cash flows from the PPP but should be kept under consideration of both the scope and leverage of private investment (Farquharson et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2019). A detailed study of subsidies (provided through ‘Viability gap fund’ VGF) in India reveals that private players benefit greatly from subsidies and contribute a very low percentage of equity funding (World Bank report, 2014).
The VGF program may not be ideal, and certainly has some drawbacks or questionable criteria. However, given the enthusiasm for and sheer number of private sector participants in PPP projects in India, our position is that the provision of subsidies to PPPs in India has generally been successful. Interestingly, the Kelkar Committee Report of 2015 held a similar stance. However, they made multiple recommendations to rectify the issues associated with the provisioning of subsidies in Indian PPPs.
From a financial perspective, the certainty of government support programs such as the VGF could decrease risk in the private sector, incentivizing it to make more investments (Urpelainen & Yang, 2017).
Table 1a and
1b outline the distribution of the percentage of subsidies received across 136 PPP projects in India and the nature of risk associated with each PPP model (i.e., risk assumed).
The distribution is evenly spread, although many projects received subsidies in the range of 31-40%. We also noticed that within this range, almost all the projects received the maximum subsidy–40%–as capped under the Indian government policies for VGF. From these observations, it can be concluded that the public sector probably engages in some sort of revenue projection (even though these are not made publicly available) to decide on the amount of subsidy to be awarded to a PPP project. Moreover, this also leads us to believe that a significant number of PPP projects in India would probably not be economically viable on their own. Thus, subsidies in the form of VGF are essential for substantial Private Investment (PI) to take place in Indian PPPs. Furthermore, it may be noted that the provision of subsidies shows commitment from the public sector; in addition, it incentivizes private sector players to bid on the project and to have more skin in the game. Notably, the amount of external support (or leverage in the project) influences the relationship between subsidies and the PI. Subsidies, PI, and funding from third-party providers (which impact leverage) shall, taken together, determine the final capital structure of the project. Therefore, we propose that the amount of private investment in Indian PPP projects is positively related to the overall subsidies provided. Additionally, this relationship is moderated by leverage in transactions. This leads us to propose our first set of hypotheses.
H1(a): Subsidies and Private Investment (PI), in Indian PPPs will be positively related.
H1(b): Leverage would moderate the relationship between Subsidies and Private Investment (PI).
4.2.3. Risk Assumed (RA) and Private Investment
Risk Assumed (RA) is inherently difficult to deal with, and risk allocation within PPP projects is particularly complicated. Governments floating tenders for a PPP project typically state their preferences upfront as to how project risks are shared. Private investors then assess their capacity to take risks and bid accordingly (Warsen et al., 2018). Theoretically, ‘risk’ should be allocated to the party that can best manage it at minimum cost (Leo-olagbaye and Odeyinka, 2020). Notably, in a PPP contract, the optimal risk allocation strategy is not to pass all risks to the private sector but to do so in a manner that there is a fine balance between efficient management and total costs to both the public and private sectors. However, in practical terms, extant research shows that the private sector usually ends up taking the most risks at the project level (Mazhar et al., 2020).
At one end of the risk assumption spectrum, where the PPP project may be in the form of a ‘service contract’ or ‘delegated management contract’, the private sector partner assumes minimal risk. In a service contract, the private sector provides support, but the public sector is responsible for operations. In fact, the private sector does not influence how services are distributed, although to a certain extent, it is dependent on the public sector for generating profits. Delegated management contracts, on the other hand, are similar in that the public sector retains the overall ownership of assets, but delegates operational responsibility to private investors. However, the most wide-ranging form of PPP contract requires the private operator to be involved in the design and construction phases of the new infrastructure. In these cases, the risk to private players is relatively high and varies because of the various types of involvement. In India, the four most common forms of PPP contracts are – built-operate-transfer (BOT), build-own-operate (BOO), build-rehabilitate-operate-transfer (BROT), and rehabilitate-operate-transfer (ROT). Brief descriptions of these four types of arrangements in terms of project design and construction elements and the associated degree of risk assumed by the private sector partner are shown in
Table 2.
In almost all cases, private investments in Indian PPPs come from (a) private developers and concession operators (the ‘private sector partner’s partner) and (b) supporting partners that provide funding, such as banks, other financial institutions looking to invest, and indirect investors. Therefore, one would expect that the higher the risk assumed by the private sector partner, the lower the level of financial support that third-party lenders (banks, financial institutions, and other investors) would be willing to contribute to the capital structure to minimize their risk exposure in the project. In addition, high investment by the private sector partner should incentivize the private player to do everything to make the project successful.
Because Indian PPPs involve varying amounts of assumed risk wherein the exact nature of inherent risks is significantly unknown at the time of initiation of the project, public partners and the Indian Government have often struggled to forge new, successful partnerships with private players. The Kelkar Committee report pointed out: "attempts to improve well-defined expected service outcomes and equitable sharing of risks has met with limited success." Since project offerings are not explicitly tied to assumed risk, they compete more on the basis of governmental policies and standard contracts across sectors, and under conditions of expected but unknown cash flows, as well as associated subsidies, the amount of which is decided primarily by the public partner. We posit that the risk assumed by private investors would be closely analyzed, and cash flows would be projected across multiple scenarios, with investments made accordingly. Furthermore, it may be noted that when the broad private investor group (lead investors and supporting investors) reaches a consensus regarding the amount of investment that needs to be made by the private sector partner, as well as the amount of leverage required in the project, which will be acceptable to all participants in the private consortium. This discussion leads to our second set of hypotheses.
H2(a): Risk Assumed (RA) and Private Investment (PI), in the context of Indian PPPs, will be positively related.
H2(b): Leverage will moderate the relationship between Risk Assumed (RA) and Private Investment (PI).
4.2.4. Bid Criteria and PI
In PPPs, there are several types of procurement options, viz., bid criteria to choose a winning bid, and they are made known by the public sector party before inviting the bids. Bids can be invited using an open procedure, wherein everyone is allowed to bid, and they can also be made via selective or restrictive procedures that involve an additional pre-qualification step. However, in some cases, the invitation to bid might be offered only to a select group of bidders, an option known as ‘limited procedure’. Other procurement options could be through a ‘negotiated procedure’ that allows bidders to propose different solutions, which are then negotiated to reach a best-and-final-offer ("BAFO") for evaluation purposes.
Importantly, when only one bid criterion is involved, such as the lowest average tariff, royalty, subsidy, or net present value (NPV), the evaluation process for bids is quite straightforward. However, when there is more than one bid criterion, this issue becomes more complex. This may call for a multi-criteria decision analysis to select the winning bid. World Bank data show that PPPs in India essentially use one of the four types of bid criteria (given in
Table 3); the four types of bid criteria contain varying degrees of risk.
Importantly, when the bid criterion is the ‘lowest cost of construction or operation,’ the private partner asserts that it can deliver the project at the lowest cost from construction to the end of the operation. In other words, it promises to provide the most value for money (VFM). However, risk-sharing plays a fundamental role in determining whether a PPP would yield VFM. This is a key mechanism to ensure that a private partner performs as efficiently as possible. A good measure for the VFM criteria is to compare the net present value (NPV) of various bids (Tallaki and Bracci, 2021), which private players more commonly use. For the public partner, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) or cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is more appropriate. In the CBA approach, both benefits and costs are quantified to a large extent in monetary value, whereas the CEA approach is primarily a cost-minimization technique. Importantly, both CBA and CEA consider a broader socio-economic assessment and the net contribution of an activity or project to overall benefits. They are relatively more complicated in PPP projects, in which most benefits cannot be readily monetized (Sdoukopoulus et al., 2019). Under this ‘lowest cost of construction or operation’ bid criterion, the public sector partner carries minimal risk, whereas the level of risk carried by the private sector partner is high; but it could vary, depending on its knowledge-base and experience, ability to take advantages of economies of scale, and managerial skills over the entire life-cycle of the project from design stages to end of the concession period.
Specifically, when the bid criterion is ‘lowest government payments’ into the PPP project, the primary risk for the private party alludes to a political risk. Thus, the bid is made under the assumption that the public partner would deliver on its commitments in terms of issues such as timely acquisition and deliverance of land, shifting of utilities, and right-of-way issues and that the project would proceed fluidly without any major interruptions, project-related scandals, or other delays that might add uncertainty to the expected cash flows from the project. Importantly, the risk to private partners is fairly high because there are multiple ways in which a PPP project might be delayed. On the other hand, the risk to the public partner is relatively low because the key criterion is the lowest payment commitment. If the bid criterion is ‘lowest subsidy required’ by the private partner from the public partner, the risks to the private party are primarily in the construction phase and in the form of financing risk. An inadequate upfront subsidy can result in a higher financing risk or total cost to the private party, and if the subsidy is delayed, the cost of capital can be much higher. Therefore, under these bid criteria, the risk to the private partner is relatively high, and the risk to the public partner is relatively low. On the other hand, when the bid criterion is the ‘lowest average tariff’ charged by the concessionaire, the primary risk includes demand risk. In the context of Indian PPPs, in the absence of substantiated cash flow projections, the public sector has historically often underestimated tariff revenues to the private sector from PPPs, resulting in a substantial loss of ‘potential revenues’ to the public sector. This is evident from several case studies of Indian PPPs, such as those on the now-defunct Delhi Gurgaon Tollway (Delhi and Mahalingam, 2020; Kudtarkar, 2020). In other words, demand risk is usually low for private partners, whereas the risk of losing out on project upside benefits, such as potential revenue, is high for public partners.
We posit that the greater the amount of risk related to the bid criteria, the higher the private investment required by private players, and leverage moderates this relationship. Therefore, we hypothesize as follows:
H3(a): In India-based PPPs, there is a significant and positive relationship between Bid Criteria (BC) and Private Investment (PI).
H3(b): Leverage will moderate the relationship between Bid Criteria (BC) and Private Investment (PI).
4.2.5. Conceptual Model
Our model tests the relationship among subsidy, assumed risk, bid criteria, and private investment (PI), which is a dependent variable. PI is a key component of PPPs and is especially significant in emerging markets. Without the support of private players, governments often find it difficult to develop infrastructure projects. Governments in emerging markets such as India are, therefore, highly incentivized to provide all kinds of direct and indirect support to private investors. A high PI can be used as a surrogate measure of project attractiveness. It also represents a commitment to and confidence in the success of a PPP from the private partner's perspective. We controlled for the sector in which these projects were operational, as well as for primary revenue sources (Wang et al., 2019), to enhance the internal validity of the study (Becker, 2005).
We considered leverage as the moderating variable, and our empirical model proposes that leverage in the transaction would affect the relationship between assumed risk, bid criteria, subsidy, and PI. The empirical model tested is shown in
Figure 1.