preprints.org > arts & humanities > philosophy > doi: 10.20944/preprints202302.0366.v1

Preprint Article Version 1 Preserved in Portico This version is not peer-reviewed

Version 1 : Received: 19 February 2023 / Approved: 22 February 2023 / Online: 22 February 2023 (02:04:39 CET)
Version 2 : Received: 25 February 2023 / Approved: 1 March 2023 / Online: 1 March 2023 (01:19:08 CET)

This paper presents four key results. Firstly, it distinguishes between partial and consistent assertion of a sentence, and introduces the concept of an equivocal sentence, which is both partially asserted and partially denied. Secondly, it proposes a novel definition of truth, stating that a true sentence is one that is consistently asserted. This definition is immune from the Liar paradox, does not restrict classical logic, and can be applied to declarative sentences in the language used by any particular person. Thirdly, the paper introduces an epistemic model of language, known as assertional language, which is used to formalize the definition of truth. Finally, it provides an argument for the falsity of so-called Liar sentences. The paper also discusses Tarski's solution to the Liar paradox and argues for the abandonment of the Tarski Scheme: 'p' is true if and only if p, in the context of everyday language. The proposed definition of truth can be viewed as a formal account of the correspondence theory. The epistemic model is a powerful concept on its own that allows for combining different languages in a meaningful way. This model is uniquely capable of reflecting on epistemic inconsistencies, such as logical paradoxes, in a consistent manner.

Ajdukiewicz; assertion; correspondence theory; epistemic model; Liar paradox; natural language; Tarski; theories of truth

ARTS & HUMANITIES, Philosophy