Preprint Article Version 1 Preserved in Portico This version is not peer-reviewed

A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3

These authors contributed equally to this work
Version 1 : Received: 26 September 2018 / Approved: 27 September 2018 / Online: 27 September 2018 (03:19:22 CEST)

A peer-reviewed article of this Preprint also exists.

Kohlios, C.P.; Hayajneh, T. A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3. Electronics 2018, 7, 284. Kohlios, C.P.; Hayajneh, T. A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3. Electronics 2018, 7, 284.

Abstract

The presence of wireless communication grows undeniably more prevalent each year. Since the introduction of the IEEE 802.11 standard for Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) in 1997, technologies have progressed to provide wireless accessibility to industries and consumers with growing ease and convenience. As the usage of personal devices, such as phones and watches, that connect to the Internet through Wi-Fi increases, wireless attacks on users are becoming more critical. This paper provides a novel attack model to offer an organized and comprehensive view of the possible attacks on WiFi latest security standards. All exiting attacks will be investigated, with emphasis on more recent attacks, such as the KRACK and PMKID Dictionary attacks. This paper will then analyze the technology offered in the new Wi-Fi Protected Access III (WPA3) security scheme and provide a comprehensive security analysis and discussion to determine whether it has addressed the vulnerabilities of its predecessor. An interesting finding of this paper is that WPA3 still lacks to address all the issues existed in WPA2 and explore other mitigations for future research.

Keywords

WPA3; WiFi; attack flow; security analysis; WLAN

Subject

Computer Science and Mathematics, Security Systems

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