Preprint Article Version 1 This version is not peer-reviewed

Coordination and Private Information Revelation: Failure of Information Unraveling

Version 1 : Received: 18 July 2018 / Approved: 20 July 2018 / Online: 20 July 2018 (04:51:20 CEST)

A peer-reviewed article of this Preprint also exists.

Saha, D.; Roy Chowdhury, P. Coordination and Private Information Revelation. Games 2018, 9, 64. Saha, D.; Roy Chowdhury, P. Coordination and Private Information Revelation. Games 2018, 9, 64.

Journal reference: Games 2018, 9, 64
DOI: 10.3390/g9030064

Abstract

This paper examines a persuasion game between two agents with one-sided asymmetric information, where the informed agent can reveal her private information prior to playing a Battle-of-the-Sexes coordination game. We find that in the presence of strategic uncertainty in coordination there exists an equilibrium where there is no 'unraveling' of information. We provide a purification argument for this mixed strategy equilibrium to strengthen the central result, which is robust to several extensions, including both-sided asymmetric information and imprecise information revelation.

Subject Areas

private information revelation; coordination; strategic uncertainty

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