Article Version 1 Preserved in Portico This version is not peer-reviewed
Induction and Epistemological Naturalism
Version 1 : Received: 8 June 2018 / Approved: 8 June 2018 / Online: 8 June 2018 (16:24:17 CEST)
How to cite: Johansson, L. Induction and Epistemological Naturalism. Preprints 2018, 2018060143. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints201806.0143.v1. Johansson, L. Induction and Epistemological Naturalism. Preprints 2018, 2018060143. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints201806.0143.v1.
Epistemological naturalism dismisses the notion that epistemology is a basis for the empirical sciences. In particular, it rejects the demand for a general justification of induction. Making inductive generalisations is a basic habit among humans. There is no such thing as a logic of inductive inference. The role of induction in science is heuristic; it is our way of inventing new theoretical predicates and developing theories. We discover new laws by applying inductive thinking; but this is not any kind of inference which can be evaluated as more or less rational.
induction; naturalism; evidence and justification; epistemic norms; induction and concept formation; induction and discovery of laws
Arts and Humanities, Philosophy
Copyright: This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
We encourage comments and feedback from a broad range of readers. See criteria for comments and our Diversity statement.Leave a public comment
Send a private comment to the author(s)