Induction and Epistemological Naturalism
How to cite: Johansson, L. Induction and Epistemological Naturalism. Preprints 2018, 2018060143 (doi: 10.20944/preprints201806.0143.v1). Johansson, L. Induction and Epistemological Naturalism. Preprints 2018, 2018060143 (doi: 10.20944/preprints201806.0143.v1).
empirical sciences. In particular, it rejects the demand for a general justification of induction. Making
inductive generalisations is a basic habit among humans. There is no such thing as a logic of inductive
inference. The role of induction in science is heuristic; it is our way of inventing new theoretical
predicates and developing theories. We discover new laws by applying inductive thinking; but this is
not any kind of inference which can be evaluated as more or less rational.
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