Preprint Article Version 1 This version is not peer-reviewed

Induction and Epistemological Naturalism

Version 1 : Received: 8 June 2018 / Approved: 8 June 2018 / Online: 8 June 2018 (16:24:17 CEST)

How to cite: Johansson, L. Induction and Epistemological Naturalism. Preprints 2018, 2018060143 (doi: 10.20944/preprints201806.0143.v1). Johansson, L. Induction and Epistemological Naturalism. Preprints 2018, 2018060143 (doi: 10.20944/preprints201806.0143.v1).

Abstract

Epistemological naturalism dismisses the notion that epistemology is a basis for the empirical sciences. In particular, it rejects the demand for a general justification of induction. Making inductive generalisations is a basic habit among humans. There is no such thing as a logic of inductive inference. The role of induction in science is heuristic; it is our way of inventing new theoretical predicates and developing theories. We discover new laws by applying inductive thinking; but this is not any kind of inference which can be evaluated as more or less rational.

Subject Areas

induction; naturalism; evidence and justification; epistemic norms; induction and concept formation; induction and discovery of laws

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