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ESG Disclosure Quality, Cost of Capital and Financial Performance: Evidence from Indian Listed Firms

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12 November 2026

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13 November 2026

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Abstract
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) disclosure has become a vital segment of corporate transparency, sustainable finance and investment decision-making. The recent advent of Business Responsibility and Sustainability Reporting (BRSR) by Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has enabled the institutional structure of sustainability reporting to be strengthened for listed firms. However, the economic implications of ESG disclosure quality have been noted as an area of research interest, especially in terms of firms’ financing costs and financial performance. The present research proposes to empirically analyse the relationship between ESG disclosure quality, cost of capital and financial performance for Indian listed firms through secondary data. Drawing on stakeholder, legitimacy, signalling and information-asymmetry theories, the study puts forth a framework where quality ESG disclosure can help enhance transparency, diminish risk and enhance stakeholder confidence. The present research intends to use a firm-year panel data set (2018-19 to 2024-25) (subject to data availability), along with structured content analysis index based on BRSR indicators for measuring ESG disclosure quality, and measures like cost of debt, estimated cost of equity and weighted average cost of capital for measurement of costs of financing, and return on assets, return on equity, Tobin’s Q for financial performance. Panel regression, fixed-effects estimation, robustness tests and diagnostics for endogeneity are expected to be used to analyse data. This research is expected to show whether the advantages of a superior corporate performance and financing in the form of a higher cost of capital are not merely the result of disclosure volume, but the quality of sustainability disclosure.
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1. Introduction

The embracing of environment, social and governance factors by companies to guide their strategic decision-making has transformed the way investors, lenders and other stakeholders think about the risk and sustainability of companies over time. Financial statements usually tell us about profitability, liquidity, solvency and operating performance, but don’t always reveal environmental liabilities, employee risks, supply chain issues, board responsibilities or how sustainable a company’s business model may be. ESG disclosure can play a role in helping close this information gap.
The quality of ESG disclosure is especially relevant given that sustainability reporting does not necessarily ensure transparency. Firms might make many qualitative statements but lack goals, comparable historical information, quantify results or independent verification. As such, the quality of disclosure should be separated from the quantity of disclosure and the factual level of each company’s ESG performance. A company might have a large number of sustainability efforts but little evidence of implementation.
India has experienced significant development in regulation of sustainability disclosure. In May 2021, SEBI launched the mandatory reporting guidelines for the top 1,000 listed entities by market capitalisation based on financial year 2022-23 in the BRSR framework (SEBI, 2021). The framework is designed to strengthen the comparability and consistency of disclosures on sustainability information of listed entities (SEBI, 2021). Further regulation innovation on the BRSR framework came later: the BRSR Core and the staged assurance framework, intensifying focus on specific ESG indicators and reliability of disclosure (SEBI, 2023). These developments form a solid institutional basis to test the financial impact of disclosure quality.
The link between ESG disclosures and the firm’s financial results may be uneven. Superior disclosures can alleviate information asymmetries, strengthen the confidence of investors and can serve as an indicator of risk management. These factors can contribute to the decrease of firm financing costs and firm value enhancement. On the other hand, measuring sustainability, developing reporting systems, assurance and operational measures can generate extra costs.
Indian evidence gives weight to this question. Malik and Kashiramka (2024) studied 272 Indian companies for 2015-2021 and found a link between ESG disclosure scores and financial performance, market value and financing results, although these links differed by industry and the pandemic period. Other Indian studies have also reported positive links between ESG reporting and firm performance (Veeravel et al., 2024). However, there is scope for more research into disclosure quality, other proxies for the cost of capital, and whether financial performance impacts ESG disclosures in turn.
Based on this context, this study constructs an empirical model for the relationship among ESG disclosure quality, cost of capital, and financial performance of Indian listed firms. It provides an insight as to when high quality and decision useful disclosure might lead to higher financial performance, instead of presuming so.

2. Review of Literature and Theoretical Framework

2.1. Theoretical Foundations

Stakeholder theory Freeman (1984) states that organisations have a range of power and interests from investors, employees, customers, suppliers, regulators to communities. Good ESG disclosure can enhance stakeholder accountability by informing them of their costs and duties. This can aid the retention of employees, increased consumer confidence and smooth running of the business which may affect a firm’s financial performance.
Signaling theory. Spence (1973) suggested that organisations can convey attributes that are otherwise not easy to observe using credible signals. ESG disclosure can act as a signal about the quality of management and long term focus as well as effective risk management and oversight. Its ability to do so is, however, ultimately a matter of credibility.
Information asymmetry theory. Varying amounts of information available to corporate insiders and outsider equity investors can lead to uncertainty about future cash flows and overall corporate risk. Healy and Palepu (2001) highlight the role of corporate disclosure in mitigating information problems in capital markets. ESG-related information disclosures can make corporate risk more transparent and consequently reduce risks associated with environmental liabilities, governance failures and operational failures.
Legitimacy theory. Organisations aim to preserve social approval by providing positive assurances that their actions are in line with institutional expectations. ESG reporting may provide legitimacy by articulating the linkages between corporate behaviour and environmental and social concerns. However, legitimacy-based reporting may be symbolic, when disclosures are not accompanied by tangible results.
These hypotheses collectively imply that disclosure quality might affect financing costs and financial performance via transparency, credibility, relations with interest groups and perceived risk.

2.2. ESG Disclosure and Cost of Capital

Cost of capital means, the minimum return to capital providers. From an information-risk point of view, reliable information reduces the uncertainties of the cash flows and the corporate governance. This may cause demand for higher interest rate by debt providers or expected return of equity providers.
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) explored the association of CSR disclosure and cost of equity capital and thus provided the evidence that is applicable to the hypothesis that voluntary nonfinancial disclosure could potentially have financing implications. Nevertheless, such a relationship is context specific: ESG reporting might be of little benefit in financing if disclosures are not credible, financially material or comparable.
In India, Malik and Kashiramka (2024) examined ESG disclosure, financial performance and cost of debt and found evidence that these relationships are pertinent in the Indian capital-market context. However, understanding that the difference between ESG performance and disclosure quality is still crucial. A firm might have good sustainability result but might not communicate the result accordingly, and vice versa.
As such, this study will also postulate that the higher the disclosure quality, the lower will be the cost of capital, with respect to both debt and equity financing costs.

2.3. ESG Disclosure and Financial Performance

To assess financial performance, one can use accounting-based performance indicators or market-based ratios. Return on assets (ROA) measures the ability of the firm to earn a return based on its assets. Return on equity (ROE) reveals the return on the stockholders’ funds. Tobin’s Q defines as the ratio between the market value and the replacement value of assets.
There are several possible routes fromESG disclosure to financial performance: improved environmental information can be used to identify inefficiencies and to control costs; improved social disclosure can be used as a measure of excellence in the management of employees, customers and supply chains; and improved governance can be used as a measure of quality of management and lack of agency costs.
However, there are costs of disclosure and implementation, and benefits may take longer to materialise. Malik and Kashiramka (2024) found a significant positive relationship between ESG disclosure and financial performance in Indian firms, and also noted industry specific variation. Veeravel et al. (2024) found a significant positive relationship between ESG disclosure and financial performance among companies listed in NSE. This encourages researchers to explore more but does not imply the strong causality.

2.4. Research Gap

Based on what we read, it’s clear that there is a correlation between ESG reporting and company financial performance but some issues are still valid.
First, aggregate ESG scores may embed disclosures, ratings and performance, therefore conflating quality of publicly available information. Second, cost of debt, cost of equity and weighted average cost of capital are three variables that measure different types of financing decisions and should not be used interchangeably. Third, the Indian transition from previous business-responsibility reporting to BRSR will allow us to revisit disclosures in the context of changing regulation. Finally, reverse causality cannot be ruled out, given that the former may have resources to build reporting systems and acquire external assurance.
The present study tries to resolve these issues by employing a BRSR-oriented disclosure-quality index, several financial performance variables, and a panel-data research design that accounts for the effects of firms and years.

3. Research Objectives and Hypotheses

The main objective is to examine the association between ESG disclosure quality, cost of capital and financial performance among Indian listed firms.
The specific objectives are:
  • To evaluate the impact of quality of ESG disclosure on the cost of debt, cost of equity and weighted average cost of capital.
  • To test the association between ESG disclosure quality and accounting-based financial performance.
  • To test the association between ESG disclosure quality and market-based valuation of firms.
  • To assess the comparative explanatory strength of environmental, social and governance disclosure dimensions.
  • To test if the association differs across industries and disclosure regimes.
The study proposes the following hypotheses:
H1: ESG disclosure quality is negatively associated with the cost of capital of Indian listed firms.
H1a: ESG disclosure quality is negatively associated with the cost of debt.
H1b: ESG disclosure quality is negatively associated with the estimated cost of equity.
H2: ESG disclosure quality is positively associated with accounting-based financial performance, measured by ROA and ROE.
H3: ESG disclosure quality is positively associated with market-based financial performance, measured by Tobin’s Q.
H4: The associations between ESG disclosure quality, financing costs and financial performance differ across industries and ESG disclosure dimensions.

4. Research Methodology

4.1. Research Design

This study is quantitative and employs an explanatory research design, which uses only secondary data. A longitudinal panel methodology is suggested in order to test for the differences in the level of quality of ESG disclosures and financial results between companies and across the time. Panel data can control for unobservable firm characteristics and country/time effects.
The suggested observation period is financial years 2018-19 to 2024-25. It spans several previous years to BRSR and a few years since the mandatory BRSR regime, including the COVID-19 disruption and reprieve. Therefore, the time controls will be especially relevant. The precise sample and observation period will be specified once the annual reports, ESG disclosures, and financial information are available and comparable.

4.2. Population and Sample Selection

All the population companies on the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) and/or Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). A stratified sample of about 200-300 nonfinancial firms would be randomly drawn from the major listed-company indices, from which, there may be additional sampling depending on data availability and the final sampling plan.
The following criteria are proposed:
1. Annual reports and sustainability disclosures of the companies have to be available during the observation years.
2. Financial variables need to be determined by financial data. Financial data needs to be based on audited financial statements.
3. The company needs to have enough information to build the disclosure-quality index.
4. Financial Firms may be excluded from the main sample as financial firms have very different leverage, capital and capital formation requirements/structure than nonfinancial firms.
Where possible, balanced panels should be used, but unbalanced panels can be preserved to prevent needless loss of sample. In the final paper, the initial population, exemptions, missing observations, remaining number of firms and the total number of firm-year observations (from the data assembled) should be specified.

4.3. Sources of Secondary Data

The principal sources will include:
  • Annual reporting and integrated reporting on the corporate website, as well as in stock-exchange filing service.
  • BRSR and BRSR Core disclosures by listed companies.
  • Corporate announcements and filings BSE and NSE.
  • Audited financial statements for accounting-based measures of performance.
  • A standardised financial database, such as CMIE Prowess, to which we have institutional access for financial and market variables.
  • Share-price data publicly available and government or regulatory publications where necessary in estimating the costs of finance.
  • The study will need to keep a documented source register with identifiers, report period, the link to each document, the date of extraction and date-of-data-quality checks.
The study should maintain a documented source register containing company identifiers, reporting periods, document links, extraction dates and data-quality checks.

4.4. Measurement of Variables

Dependent variables
There are three measurements of the cost of capital which will be analysed.
Cost of debt (COD):
[COD_{it}=\frac {\text {Interest Expense} {it}}
{\text {Average Interest-Bearing Debt} {it}}]
Average interest bearing debt is calculated by averaging the beginning and ending balances of interest-bearing borrowings. Interest-bearing debt interest is an accounting-based proxy of the effective cost of borrowing and may differ from the marginal rate on debt issued. The equivalent tax adjusted measure of debt interest is (COD(1-T)), where (T) is the applicable effective tax rate.
Cost of equity (COE):
The primary estimate may use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM):
[COE_{it}=R_{ft}+\beta_{it}(R_{mt}-R_{ft})]
Where (Rf) is the risk-free rate, (\beta) is the assumed equity beta and (Rm-R_f) is the market risk premium. The beta must be estimated over a disclosed return window, benchmark index and frequency of return observations. Because CAPM estimates are sensitive to assumptions and do not incorporate all information-risk effects, the result should be tested against an implied cost-of-equity if reliable analyst forecasts and market data are available.
Weighted average cost of capital (WACC):
[WACC_{it}=w_{e,it}COE_{it}+w_{d,it}COD_{it}(1-T_{it})]
Here, (we) and (wd) are the market-value weights of equity and debt and should sum to unity. The debt-cost measure should be aligned with what was used in the empirical work. A WACC derived from CAPM is an estimate of the financing-cost and is not a market price.
Financial performance will be measured using:
[ROA=\frac {\text {Profit After Tax}}{\text {Average Total Assets}}]
[ROE=\frac {\text {Profit After Tax}}{\text {Average Shareholders’ Equity}}]
ROA and ROE will be computed uniformly across firms and years. To avoid difficulty interpreting net income against abnormal items and negative equity, alternate specifications will be given.
Market-based performance will be measured using Tobin’s Q, approximated as:
[TQ=\frac {\text {Market Value of Equity} +\text {Book Value of Debt}}{\text {Book Value of Total Assets}}]
This is a common approximation in cases where the replacement cost of assets is not reported. Different operationalisations should be presented for robustness checks.
Independent variable: ESG disclosure quality
The ESG Disclosure Quality Index (ESG-DQI) will be built by means of content analysis of Company disclosures and five key characteristics will be evaluated:
1. Coverage and availability of relevant ESG indicators.
2. Quantitative specificity (e.g., measurements and objectives).
3. Familiarity with past performance using historical figures and a steady point of reference.
4. Trade-offs between saying positive things, bad results and material risks.
5. Credibility, verification or assurance, where relevant.
A disclosure item will be scored according to a prespecified 4-point ordinal scale of 0 (none), 1 (general qualitative disclosure), 2 (specific disclosure but incomplete or non-comparable information), or 3 (specific, measurable and comparable information). Assurance and other credibility characteristics may be scored separately as appropriate to avoid double-counting.
The index will be normalised as follows:
[ESG\text {-} DQI_{it}=\frac{\sum_{j=1} ^{J}Score_{ijt}}{3J} \times100]
Where (J) is the number of applicable indicators and (Score_{ijt}) is the item (j), firm (i) and year (t) score. Items not suitable for application will be treated as per a predetermined denominator rule. Missing information will not be automatically treated as non-applicable.
Environmental, social and governance sub-indices will also be computed. The coding scheme should also be consistent with the relevant BRSR reporting needs for the respective year. Two independent coders should code a pilot sample, and disagreements may be arbitrated, reporting inter-coder reliability in any appropriate statistic (e.g., Cohen’s kappa for categorical coding).
Control variables
This analysis will control for the firm size (log total assets), leverage (total debt/total assets), sales growth, firm age, capital expenditure intensity, asset tangibility and the percentage of independent board members, if data are available. It will include the effect of industry and financial year. All the variables will be clearly defined and checked for missing data, extreme values and multicollinearity.

4.5. Econometric Models

The baseline model for financing costs is:
[COD_{it}=\alpha+\beta_1 ESGDQI_{i,t-1}+\gamma’X_{i,t1}+\mu_i+\lambda_t+\varepsilon_{it}]
The same specification will be estimated for COE and WACC separately. The application of lagged ESG disclosure quality introduces a time order but does not preclude endogeneity.
For accounting and market performance, the models are:
[Performance_{it}=\alpha+\beta_1ESGDQI_ {i, t1} +\gamma’X_ {i, t1} +\mu_i+\lambda_t+\varepsilon_{it}]
Where performance is alternatively measured by ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. In this case, ( \mu i )is firm fixed effects, ( \lambda t ) is year fixed effects, and (X) is the vector of control variables.
In order to control for time-invariant characteristics of firms, the primary specification suggested is the entire firm fixed-effects estimation. Standard errors should be clustered at the firm level. Industry-year fixed effects can be included in some robustness specifications, if the sample allows.
Possible endogeneity problems will be handled by lagged explanatory variables, alternate measures of disclosures, sensitivity analyses and, if the data warrant it, dynamic panel estimators or a quasi-experimental design. Use of instrumental-variable estimation should be limited to those cases where a convincing instrument for the endogenous variable exists with solid relevance and validity. Cannot blindly treat BRSR as an exogenous treatment for each firm, as their applicability and compliance can be contingent on size and market value.

5. Empirical Analysis and Results Reporting Framework

5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis

The stage one should report the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of ESG-DQI, COD, COE, WACC, ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q and control variables. The distribution of ESG-DQI by year and industry should be checked to test whether the quality of disclosure increases over time and sector differences.
Next, a correlation matrix can be used to evaluate the direction and magnitude of the initial relationships. Correlations are descriptive only and cannot determine causality. Variance inflation factors can be used for the regression specifications to determine multicollinearity.

5.2. Regression Analysis

The fixed-effects regressions will investigate whether high-quality disclosure of ESG information is correlated with costs of financing and financial performance after controlling for observable covariates and unobservable, time-invariant, firm-specific characteristics.
As for H1 and H1a, a negative and statistically significant estimate of the relationship between ESG-DQI and the COD also be be consistent with the expected relationship between disclosure quality and borrowing costs. Support for H1b would be found if the corresponding estimate in the COE model were negative and statistically significant. H1 should be interpreted judiciously using the various measures of financing-costs.
For H2, we expect that positive and statistically significant coefficients in the ROA and ROE regressions would indicate that the hypothesized positive effects are supported. For H3, positive and statistically significant coefficients in the Tobin’s Q regression would suggest that firms with higher quality disclosure tend to have higher market value.
Coefficient estimates, clustered standard errors, confidence intervals, p-values, number of observations, within-(R^2), and any other relevant diagnostics should be presented. Furthermore, economic significance of the coefficients should be examined by estimating the change in each outcome variable associated with a relevant change in ESG-DQI.

5.3. Robustness and Heterogeneity Analysis

The following tests should be done:
  • Use the sub-indices instead of aggregate ESG-DQI.
  • Consider different indicators of profitability, the cost of finance and market valuation where robust data are available.
  • Winsorise the continuous financial variables at the recommended cut-off points reported in the literature and compare these to their respective unadjusted distributions.
  • Estimate models with other lags and sample periods.
  • Check the robustness of your result by breaking it down into subsets for these sectors: those that are heavily regulated or environmentally intensive.
  • Examine changes in disclosure patterns pre and post mandatory BRSR submission, controlling for constraints imposed by regulation and firm characteristics.
  • Test if the results are sensitive to the inclusion of the years affected by COVID-19 and to eliminating firms with outlying financial characteristics.
Interpretation of the results should consider the direction, size, statistical uncertainty, and robustness of the estimates. A statistically nonsignificant coefficient should not be characterized as indicative of no relationship without considering statistical power and measurement issues.

6. Discussion and Expected Contributions

The following will be the discussion on the study’s implementation on how ESG disclosures are linked to disclosure quality, the cost of capital, and a firm’s performance in the Indian capital market. The discussion will on the empirical estimates and should not assume that all of the hypotheses will be supported.
Should the analysis find a negative relationship between ESG-DQI and the cost of debt, the result would be consistent with the view that companies that disclosure more information on sustainability matters make it easier for lenders to price risk. Knowledge of the company’s environmental liabilities, safety standards, compliance with regulation and governance could reduce its perceived riskiness. This must be differentiated from the effect of disclosure from the tendency for firms with better fundamental credit quality to produce more detailed reports.
Disclosed quality and estimated cost of equity will be negatively related if an information-risk story holds. Investors would accept lower expected returns where information is equally credible. However, estimated costs of equity are quite sensitive to beta, market-risk-premium assumptions and the estimator used. Consequently, the analysis must examine whether the relationship will be robust to different specifications.
The link between the ESG-DQI and financial performance may be nuanced. Efficiencies in resource use, workforce behavior and corporate governance can support sustainable profits over the long term, but installing sustainability systems could drive costs higher in the short term. Market responses to accounting and market performance may also differ. Credible disclosures about the long term can be appreciated even when their effect on accounting earnings is small.
Another contribution has been differentiating reporting quality from the real ESG quality a company is achieving. A disclosure-quality index assesses the informativeness, adequacy and accuracy of reporting; it doesn’t prove that an enterprise has low emissions, good labour conditions, or excellent governance results. Additional measures of actual performance would clarify whether markets value the reporting process or the benefits arising from sustainability.
The Indian context is especially pertinent because mandatory BRSR reporting offers a shared regulatory baseline with varying firm-sector exposures, governance structures and reporting abilities. Any relationship estimated should be considered in light of the sample’s sector-specific and institutional factors.

7. Managerial and Policy Implications

Possible implications, subject to empirical substantiation, of the study are:
For Corporate Management: Companies should incorporate ESG reporting into enterprise risk management and investor relations rather than treat it as a compliance exercise. The use of quantified targets, consistent historical indicators, discussion of both negative effects and a transparent articulation of financially material risks may enhance its usefulness to decision-makers.
For investors and lenders: Quality of ESG disclosure should supplement rather than replace traditional financial analysis. Investors should be able to differentiate between narrative commitments, performance metrics and independently verifiable data. Credit analysts should be able to determine whether the disclosure of ESG risks has an impact on cash flows from operations, collateral value, exposure to regulation and repayments.
For the regulator: Standardised requirements can improve comparability, although this can only be judged through implementation, harmonised disclosure requirements and adequate verification. The regulatory usefulness of disclosures should be assessed in terms of whether they are decision-useful and whether the cost of compliance is proportionate for lower disclosure firms.
For boards and audit committees: Oversight mechanisms must establish alignment of sustainability disclosures, financial statements, risk-management processes and internal control systems. Well-specified accountability for ESG data will mitigate the potential for unsupported assertions and reinforce the reliability of external reporting.
These implications are to be elaborated based on the actual regression outcomes and/or any indications of differences between sectors or between ESG factors.

8. Limitations and Directions for Future Research

There are a number of limitations to this paper. Disclosure-quality indices rely on researcher judgement, even if structured coding may better reflect the materiality and/or credibility of disclosed information. Cost-of-debt accounting measures are only estimates and may not reflect a firms next funding rate. CAPM-based cost-of-equity measures are based on a number of market assumptions and may contain significant measurement error.
Fourth, disclosure and finance may be endogenously determined, with more financially successful firms using more investment to report on ESG activities. This reverse causality can be alleviated to some extent by the firm and year fixed effects, although not all confounders vary over time. Fifth, the construction of the sample proposed in the paper may introduce selection bias by omitting firms that did not disclose on certain items.
Research could further explore the impact of external assurance, the credibility of climate disclosures, ownership structure and the role of institutional investors. Others could look at similarities between BRSR reporting and global standards of sustainability disclosure, or differences between mandatory and voluntary reporters.

9. Conclusions

In this paper we present a secondary-data research framework to empirically explore the impact of ESG disclosure quality on cost of capital and financial performance of Indian listed companies. We differentiate quality of sustainability information from the extent of disclosures and different aspects of ESG performance. The framework suggests an index of disclosure quality in terms of completeness, quantitative specificity, comparability, balance and verifiability and other variables for debts, equity and WACC costs, profitability and market value.
The key argument is credible ESG disclosure decreases information asymmetry, enhances risk evaluation and builds stakeholder confidence. These channels can be linked to lower cost of finance and better financial performance. Yet, reporting costs, initial adoption costs, firm and industry nature and reverse causality may generate heterogeneous effects.
While the new BRSR framework presents a relevant regulatory context in which to investigate these relationships, the presence of mandatory reporting does not imply that disclosure quality holds financial benefits. The suggested panel regressions and robustness tests aim to evaluate the magnitude and stability of the relationships through observable firm-level data.
And in the end, it will depend on the disclosure index, the financial proxies and the extent to which causality can be separated from correlation. Empirical estimates, robustness tests, and extensive details of the sample building process are essential before the paper will be able to make any defensible claims of financial impacts of ESG disclosure quality in India.

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