Submitted:
20 July 2026
Posted:
21 July 2026
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Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
2. Conceptual Foundations and Methodology
2.1. From Money to Digital Money
2.2. Digitization and Tokenization
2.3. Trust Mechanisms in Monetary Systems

2.4. Scoping–Integrative Review Approach
2.5. Research Questions
2.6. Search Strategy and Inclusion Criteria
2.7. Quality Assessment
2.8. Data Extraction and Synthesis
2.9. Limitations of the Methodology
3. The Evolution of Digital Money: Four Pillars
3.1. Cryptocurrencies: Decentralized Algorithmic Money
3.1.1. Conceptual Foundations and Design
3.1.2. Decentralized Finance (DeFi)
3.1.3. Economic Characteristics and Limitations
3.1.4. Regulatory Challenges
3.2. Stablecoins: Bridging Volatility and Transferability
3.2.1. Conceptual Foundations and Typology
3.2.2. Use Cases and Adoption
3.2.3. Risks and Regulatory Concerns
3.2.4. Regulatory Developments
3.3. Central Bank Digital Currencies: Sovereign Digital Money
3.3.1. Conceptual Foundations and Design Choices
3.3.2. Motivations and Objectives
3.3.3. Pilot Projects and Implementations
3.3.4. Risks and Challenges
3.4. Tokenized Deposits: Programmable Commercial Bank Money
3.4.1. Conceptual Foundations
3.4.2. Use Cases and Pilot Projects
3.4.3. Regulatory Considerations
4. Comparative Analysis: Trust, Governance, and Regulation
4.1. Trust Mechanisms
4.2. Governance Architectures
4.3. Regulatory Exposures
5. The Digital Money Ecosystem Taxonomy (DMET)
- No single instrument dominates across all dimensions; Each digital money instrument offers distinct advantages and disadvantages, suggesting that future monetary systems will be pluralistic rather than monolithic.
- Trade-offs are fundamental; Decentralization, privacy, scalability, regulatory compliance, and stability involve inherent trade-offs. Instruments that excel in one dimension often underperform in others.
- Complementarity: The four pillars are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Cryptocurrencies provide censorship-resistant infrastructure; stablecoins provide price stability; CBDCs provide risk-free public money; tokenized deposits provide regulated programmable money. A layered ecosystem incorporating all four may be optimal.
- Evolution and convergence; The boundaries among categories are blurring. Some stablecoins are seeking banking licenses; some banks are issuing tokenized deposits; some CBDCs are exploring DLT architectures. Convergence and hybridization are likely.
6. Governance, Economic and Global Implications
6.1. Regulatory Governance Frameworks
6.1.1. International Regulatory Coordination
6.1.2. Jurisdictional Approaches
- European Union (MiCA): The Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation, which entered into force in 2023 and became fully applicable in December 2024, establishes a comprehensive regulatory framework for crypto-assets, including cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, and crypto-asset service providers. MiCA requires authorisation, prudential safeguards, transparency, and consumer protection, with additional requirements for significant stablecoins [90].
- United States: The US regulatory approach is fragmented across multiple agencies (SEC, CFTC, OCC, Federal Reserve, FinCEN, state regulators), with ongoing debates about the appropriate regulatory classification of crypto-assets and the division of regulatory authority. Legislative proposals have sought to establish a comprehensive federal framework, but as of mid-2025, comprehensive legislation has not been enacted [91].
- United Kingdom: The UK has brought certain crypto-asset activities within the regulatory perimeter, including AML/CTF regulation of crypto-asset exchanges and wallet providers. The UK government has proposed bringing stablecoins used as payment instruments within the regulatory perimeter, subjecting them to requirements similar to those for electronic money institutions [92].
- Singapore: Singapore has established a comprehensive regulatory framework for digital payment tokens and stablecoin issuers, requiring licensing, AML/CTF compliance, and prudential safeguards. Singapore has positioned itself as a hub for digital asset innovation while maintaining robust regulatory oversight [93].
- Hong Kong: Hong Kong introduced a licensing regime for virtual asset service providers in 2023 and a licensing regime for stablecoin issuers in 2024, requiring reserve backing, redemption guarantees, and regulatory oversight by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority [94].
- China: China has banned cryptocurrency trading and mining, while simultaneously advancing the e-CNY CBDC pilot. China’s approach reflects a preference for state-controlled digital money over private cryptocurrencies [95].
- Switzerland: Switzerland has established a comprehensive legal framework for digital assets, including amendments to banking, securities, and insolvency laws to accommodate tokenized assets and DLT-based financial market infrastructures [96].
6.1.3. Regulatory Challenges and Future Directions
- Regulatory classification: The appropriate classification of crypto-assets (commodities, securities, currencies, or sui generis) remains contested, with implications for regulatory authority, investor protection, and taxation [52].
- Decentralized finance (DeFi); DeFi protocols operate without traditional intermediaries, raising questions about how to apply existing regulatory frameworks designed for intermediated finance. Potential approaches include regulating DeFi protocol developers, front-end interfaces, or DAO governance token holders, but each approach faces conceptual and practical challenges [43].
- Cross-border coordination; Effective regulation of global digital money requires cross-border coordination, but achieving consensus among jurisdictions with different legal systems, policy priorities, and risk assessments is challenging [87].
- Innovation and regulation balance; Regulators face the challenge of mitigating risks without stifling innovation. Regulatory sandboxes, innovation hubs, and principles-based regulation are potential approaches, but their effectiveness remains debated [97].
- Privacy and surveillance; Balancing privacy rights with AML/CTF compliance and law enforcement needs is a central challenge, particularly for CBDCs and account-based digital money systems [20].
- Quantum computing threats: The emergence of quantum computing poses long-term threats to current cryptographic protocols, requiring the development and deployment of quantum-resistant cryptography for digital money systems [198].

6.2. Economic and Monetary Implications
6.2.1. Monetary Policy Transmission
6.3. Financial Stability Issues
6.3.1. Payment System Efficiency
6.3.2. Credit Intermediation
6.3.3. International Monetary System
6.4. Global Digital Money Landscape
6.4.1. Regional Variations
| Region | CBDC Development Status | Stablecoin Regulatory Landscape | Cryptocurrency Adoption Pattern |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asia–Pacific | Advanced development, pilots, and large-scale experimentation (e-CNY, e-Rupee) | Emerging to advanced frameworks (Singapore Stablecoin Framework, Hong Kong licensing regime, Japan regulations) | Very high adoption (India, Pakistan, Vietnam, Indonesia) |
| Europe | Development and preparation phase (Digital Euro, e-Krona pilot) | Comprehensive regulatory framework (MiCA) | Moderate to high adoption (Germany, France, UK) |
| North America | Research and wholesale experimentation (Project Hamilton, Bank of Canada studies) | Transition toward comprehensive regulation (GENIUS Act, US stablecoin initiatives) | High adoption (United States, Canada) |
| Latin America & Caribbean | Mixed deployment and pilot activity (Sand Dollar, JAM-DEX, DREX) | Emerging regulatory approaches (Brazil, Mexico) | High adoption (Brazil, Argentina) |
| Middle East & North Africa | Active experimentation and cross-border initiatives (Digital Dirham, mBridge, Project Aber) | Emerging but increasingly sophisticated frameworks (UAE, Bahrain) | Moderate to high adoption (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain) |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | Mixed deployment and research activities (eNaira, e-Cedi, Project Khokha) | Limited but evolving frameworks (Nigeria, South Africa) | High grassroots adoption (Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia) |
6.4.2. Adoption Drivers and Barriers
6.4.3. Future Scenarios
- Pluralistic coexistence; Cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, and tokenized deposits coexist within a layered, interoperable ecosystem, each serving different use cases and user segments [83].
- CBDC dominance; CBDCs become the dominant form of digital money, with stablecoins and cryptocurrencies relegated to niche use cases or heavily regulated [23].
- Private digital money dominance; Stablecoins and tokenized deposits become the dominant forms of digital money, with CBDCs playing a limited role or not being issued [9].
- Fragmentation; The global digital money landscape fragments along geopolitical lines, with competing regional blocs (US-led, China-led, EU-led) developing incompatible digital money systems [85].
- Hybrid systems; Future monetary systems combine public money (cash, reserves, CBDCs), regulated private money (bank deposits, tokenized deposits, regulated stablecoins), and selected crypto-asset infrastructures within layered governance arrangements [83].
7. Practical Implications, Discussion and Future Research
7.1. Implications for Policymakers
7.2. Implications for Financial Institutions
7.3. Implications for Technology Providers
7.4. Implications for Users
7.5. Future Research Directions
7.5.1. Technical Research
7.5.2. Economic Research
7.5.3. Regulatory and Legal Research
7.5.4. Interdisciplinary Research
7.6. Discussion
7.7. Unresolved Questions
7.8. Limitations
8. Conclusion
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
| Abbreviation | Full Form |
| AI | Artificial Intelligence (include only if used in later sections) |
| AML | Anti-Money Laundering |
| API | Application Programming Interface (if mentioned in technical discussion) |
| BIS | Bank for International Settlements |
| BUSD | Binance USD |
| CBDC | Central Bank Digital Currency |
| CBDCs | Central Bank Digital Currencies |
| CTF | Counter-Terrorist Financing |
| DAO | Decentralized Autonomous Organization |
| DeFi | Decentralized Finance |
| DLT | Distributed Ledger Technology |
| DMET | Digital Money Ecosystem Taxonomy |
| DvP | Delivery versus Payment |
| ECB | European Central Bank |
| e-CNY | Digital Yuan (China Central Bank Digital Currency) |
| eNaira | Nigeria Central Bank Digital Currency |
| ETH | Ethereum |
| FSB | Financial Stability Board |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| ICO | Initial Coin Offering |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| JAM-DEX | Jamaica Digital Exchange |
| KYC | Know Your Customer |
| MiCA | Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation |
| PoS | Proof of Stake |
| PoW | Proof of Work |
| P2P | Peer-to-Peer |
| PSP | Payment Service Provider |
| PvP | Payment versus Payment |
| TVL | Total Value Locked |
| UST | TerraUSD |
| USDC | USD Coin |
| USDT | Tether USD |
| ZKP | Zero-Knowledge Proof |
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| Stream | Dominant Focus | Common Methods | Representative Issues | Research Gap |
| Cryptocurrencies | Decentralisation, blockchain, markets, mining, governance | Conceptual, econometric, network analysis, legal analysis | Volatility, scalability, illicit finance, energy use, market integrity | Limited integration with monetary-system theory and institutional economics |
| Stablecoins | Reserve backing, payment function, financial stability, regulation | Policy analysis, legal analysis, market studies | De-pegging, redemption risk, reserve opacity, run risk | Need for comparative analysis with CBDCs and tokenized deposits |
| CBDCs | Central-bank money, design architecture, privacy, monetary policy, financial inclusion | Conceptual, surveys, pilots, modelling, case studies | Bank disintermediation, privacy trade-offs, interoperability, adoption | Need for synthesis across design, governance, and economic domains |
| Tokenized Deposits | Commercial-bank digital money, tokenization of deposits, programmable payments, settlement efficiency, financial-market integration | Conceptual analysis, policy analysis, pilot studies, case studies, institutional reports | Interoperability with CBDCs and stablecoins, legal classification, settlement finality, operational risks, scalability, cross-border payments | Limited empirical evidence and theoretical integration; need for comparative analysis with CBDCs and stablecoins and greater understanding of implications for banking systems, monetary transmission, and financial-market infrastructures |
| Dimension | Typical Profile | Monetary and Policy Implication |
|---|---|---|
| Issuer | No central sovereign issuer: issuance rules embedded in protocol code | Monetary authority shifts from state institutions to network-embedded algorithmic rules |
| Trust mechanism | Consensus algorithms, cryptographic verification, economic incentives for validators | Trust is protocol-mediated and market-disciplined rather than institutionally guaranteed |
| Value basis | Market demand, scarcity narratives, network utility, speculative dynamics | High price volatility and speculative boom-bust cycles limit monetary usefulness |
| Governance | Core developers, miners/validators, token holders, exchanges, community forums | Decentralisation varies considerably across projects; governance disputes are common |
| Regulatory status | Fragmented: treated as commodity, security, payment token, or asset class across jurisdictions | Legal uncertainty, regulatory arbitrage, and inconsistent consumer protection regimes |
| Principal risks | Volatility, cyber theft, fraud, illicit finance facilitation, operational fragility, environmental impact | These limitations constrain use as general-purpose money but not as investment assets or network tokens |
| Dimension | Main Variants | Policy Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| Backing mechanism | Fiat-backed; commodity-backed; crypto-collateralised; algorithmic | Reserve quality, transparency, and redemption credibility vary critically across designs |
| Issuer type | Private corporation, decentralised protocol, foundation, or regulated financial institution | Requires appropriate governance, public disclosure, licensing, and accountability structures |
| Primary use cases | Crypto-asset trading, DeFi collateral, cross-border transfers, payment settlement, value storage | Creates payment efficiency gains but also systemic risk channels if reserve management fails |
| Trust mechanism | Reserve backing, independent audits, legal redemption rights, issuer reputation, regulation | Trust depends on legal enforceability of claims and operational credibility of the issuer |
| Key risks | Run risk, de-pegging, reserve opacity, illicit finance, foreign-currency dollarisation | Regulatory frameworks increasingly focus on stability guarantees and supervisory oversight |
| Relationship to CBDCs | Potential competitor, complement to existing payment systems, or bridge infrastructure | Raises fundamental policy questions about coexistence of public and private digital money |
| Dimension | CBDC Profile | Policy Implication |
|---|---|---|
| Issuer and liability | Central bank; constitutes a public liability of the monetary authority | Sovereign trust and legal tender status underpin credibility and acceptance |
| Types | Retail CBDC (general public); wholesale CBDC (financial institutions); hybrid models | Different user populations require distinct design architectures and governance arrangements |
| Distribution architecture | Single-tier (direct central bank access) or two-tier (via intermediary banks and PSPs) | Two-tier models preserve commercial bank intermediation; single-tier raises disintermediation risk |
| Infrastructure | Account-based, token-based, centralised database, DLT, or hybrid infrastructure | Design determines privacy, resilience, scalability, interoperability, and adoption dynamics |
| Policy objectives | Payment efficiency, financial inclusion, monetary sovereignty, resilience, settlement innovation | Design must justify value proposition relative to existing digital payment alternatives |
| Key risks | Bank disintermediation, privacy violations, cybersecurity, operational failure, low adoption | Governance, design safeguards, and phased implementation are essential risk mitigants |
| Cross-border relevance | Multi-CBDC platforms, payment-versus-payment interoperability, cross-border settlement | Requires international legal compatibility, technical standards, and cooperative governance |
| Instrument | Trust Mechanism | Trust Source | Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cryptocurrencies | Algorithmic consensus | Cryptographic protocols, distributed consensus, open-source code | Decentralisation, censorship resistance, transparency | Volatility, scalability limits, energy consumption (PoW), governance challenges |
| Stablecoins | Reserve backing | Fiat reserves, audits, legal redemption rights, issuer reputation | Price stability, transferability, programmability | Counterparty risk, reserve transparency, regulatory uncertainty, run risk |
| CBDCs | Sovereign authority | Central bank credibility, legal tender status, state backing | Risk-free, legal tender, monetary policy integration | Privacy concerns, bank disintermediation risk, implementation complexity |
| Tokenized deposits | Regulated intermediation | Banking regulation, deposit insurance, central bank liquidity support, DLT infrastructure | Regulatory protection, programmability, interoperability with tokenized assets | Dependence on bank solvency, regulatory complexity, interoperability challenges |
| Instrument | Governance Model | Decision-Making | Accountability | Adaptability |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cryptocurrencies | Decentralised, community-driven | Rough consensus, on-chain voting, core developer influence | Diffuse, limited formal accountability | Slow, contentious (e.g., Bitcoin block size debate, Ethereum PoS transition) |
| Stablecoins | Centralised (issuer) or decentralised (DAO) | Issuer discretion (centralised) or token-holder voting (decentralised) | Issuer accountability (centralised) or DAO governance (decentralised) | Moderate to high, depending on governance structure |
| CBDCs | Centralised (central bank) | Central bank policy committees, government oversight | High formal accountability to government and public | Moderate, constrained by legal and political processes |
| Tokenized deposits | Centralised (issuing bank) with regulatory oversight | Bank management, subject to regulatory constraints | High formal accountability to regulators and depositors | Moderate, constrained by banking regulation |
| Instrument | Primary Regulatory Concerns | Regulatory Approach | Jurisdictional Challenges |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cryptocurrencies | AML/CTF, consumer protection, market integrity, systemic risk (as adoption grows) | Fragmented; ranges from bans to comprehensive frameworks (e.g., MiCA) | High; decentralised, cross-border, pseudonymous |
| Stablecoins | Reserve adequacy, run risk, systemic risk, monetary sovereignty, AML/CTF | Evolving; increasing convergence toward banking-like regulation | Moderate to high; cross-border issuance and use |
| CBDCs | Privacy, bank disintermediation, financial stability, operational resilience, cross-border spillovers | Central bank design and oversight; intergovernmental coordination for cross-border CBDCs | Low domestically; high for cross-border arrangements |
| Tokenized deposits | Legal status, deposit insurance applicability, interoperability, AML/CTF on DLT | Existing banking regulation, with adaptations for DLT | Low to moderate; primarily domestic, though cross-border use raises questions |
| Dimension | Cryptocurrencies | Stablecoins | CBDCs | Tokenized Deposits |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Issuer Type | Decentralized protocol / network | Private entity (centralized) or DAO (decentralized) | Central bank | Commercial bank |
| Liability Structure | No liability (asset, not liability) | Liability of issuer (if redeemable) or no liability (algorithmic) | Direct liability of central bank | Liability of commercial bank |
| Governance Arrangement | Decentralized (community, developers, miners/validators) | Centralized (issuer) or decentralized (DAO) | Centralized (central bank, government oversight) | Centralized (bank management, regulatory oversight) |
| Trust Mechanism | Algorithmic consensus (cryptography, distributed ledger) | Reserve backing, audits, legal rights | Sovereign authority, central bank credibility | Regulated intermediation, deposit insurance, prudential supervision |
| Monetary Control | No central monetary control; supply determined by protocol | Limited monetary control; supply responds to demand (if redeemable) | Full monetary control by central bank | Indirect monetary control via banking regulation and monetary policy |
| Settlement Role | Final settlement on blockchain (peer-to-peer) | Final settlement on blockchain (peer-to-peer or intermediated) | Final settlement (central bank money) | Final settlement (commercial bank money, convertible to central bank money) |
| Regulatory Exposure | AML/CTF, consumer protection, market integrity, systemic risk (evolving) | Reserve requirements, redemption rights, AML/CTF, systemic risk, monetary sovereignty | Central bank regulation, privacy, financial stability, cross-border coordination | Banking regulation (capital, liquidity, deposit insurance), AML/CTF, DLT-specific issues |
| Primary Use Cases | Speculation, store of value, DeFi infrastructure, censorship-resistant payments | Cryptocurrency trading, DeFi, cross-border payments, store of value (high-inflation economies) | Domestic payments, financial inclusion, monetary policy transmission, cross-border payments | Wholesale payments, programmable payments, atomic settlement, trade finance |
| Degree of Decentralization | High (Bitcoin, Ethereum) to moderate (some PoS chains) | Low (centralized issuers) to moderate (DAOs) | Low (centralized) | Low (centralized) |
| Privacy Level | Pseudonymous (Bitcoin, Ethereum) to high (Monero, Zcash) | Pseudonymous to low (depending on issuer KYC) | Low to moderate (depending on design; privacy-enhancing technologies possible) | Low (KYC/AML requirements) |
| Programmability | High (smart contract platforms like Ethereum) | High (token-based, smart contract integration) | Moderate to high (depending on design) | High (DLT-based, smart contract integration) |
| Scalability | Low to moderate (improving with Layer-2 solutions) | Moderate to high (depending on underlying blockchain) | High (centralized architectures) to moderate (DLT architectures) | High (leveraging existing banking infrastructure and DLT) |
| Energy Efficiency | Low (PoW) to high (PoS) | Moderate to high (depending on underlying blockchain) | High (centralized architectures) | High |
| Interoperability | Low (fragmented across chains; improving with bridges and Layer-2) | Moderate (within DeFi ecosystems; cross-chain bridges) | Low (early stage; multi-CBDC platforms in development) | Moderate (requires interoperability standards across banks and DLT platforms) |
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