After engaging with literature, four frameworks of grief emerged as especially helpful for providing more understanding about ecological grief: disenfranchised grief (section 3.2.1.), chronic sorrow (section 3.2.2.), anticipatory grief and mourning (section 3.2.3.), and complicated grief (section 3.2.4.). Some of these have not yet been explicitly discussed in relation to ecological loss and grief in earlier research, and all of them are given here deeper attention than before.
3.2.1. Disenfranchised grief and its varieties
… my friend Liz loved a certain forest in New Hampshire. … She was a teenager when a fierce storm blew into that forest, wiping out a large swath of trees. Liz was heartbroken. She had lost a friend, a spiritual presence, a guide. The next time her high school English teacher assigned the class an essay, she wrote about her love and grief for the forest. The teacher read the essay aloud to the class – not to praise it but to scorn it. When he finished reading, he chastised Liz for her sentimentality and her misguided notion that it was possible to love a mere
thing like a forest. She was twice bereaved: once by the damage to her beloved forest and once by disrespect for her grief. [
155], p. 19
The concept of disenfranchised grief refers to various kinds of dynamics where grief is not “openly acknowledged”, “socially validated”, and/or “publicly mourned” [
156], p. 26. The background is that there are contextual norms in societies and communities about grief, “grieving rules” [
157]. Grief philosopher Ratcliffe condenses the core of disenfranchised grief: “others fail to acknowledge or legitimate one’s grief, in ways that affect one’s access to processes that shape grief’s trajectory” [
52], p. 211. A key developer of this framework has been grief researcher Doka e.g. [
158,
159] and the framework is commonly featured in grief research. Doka himself has briefly discussed disenfranchised grief in relation to non-death loss [
156], but most research about it has focused on classic bereavement.
Dynamics of disenfranchised grief have often been observed in ecological grief research both explicitly and implicitly. Many kinds of ecological grief have not been understood in various communities [
2,
12,
78] and sometimes ecological grief has been deliberately silenced or ridiculed, as in the quote above. As a result, ecological mourners have often felt belittled and isolated e.g. [
96,
160]. Grief research shows that social support is one key factor in engaging constructively with grief, and if that is missing or complicated, many problems can ensue for grief processes e.g. [
68].
However, the more exact dynamics of disenfranchised grief have not been discussed in ecological grief research. A deeper engagement with grief research can help to see various factors and dynamics in disenfranchised ecological grief. More broadly, this research and topic raises up the importance of paying attention to social dynamics around grief and mourning, and provides opportunities to link disenfranchised grief more deeply with the existing ethical and political critiques of dismissal of ecological grief, which are often inspired by feminist philosophy such as [
12,
161].
Doka makes several distinctions about various possible dynamics of disenfranchised grief, including: “the relationship is not recognized”, “the loss is not acknowledged”, and/or “the griever is excluded” [
156], pp. 29-30. In addition, some circumstances of losses are prone to increase disenfranchised grief for example via social stigma, and various grieving styles may affect the responses of others, including disenfranchisement (p. 31). Grief scholar Corr [
162,
163] extended the list to grief reactions and expressions of them, ways of mourning and rituals, and outcomes of grief [
164]. Sociologist Thompson [
165] observes that non-death losses are especially prone to disenfranchisement.
When the aforementioned distinctions are applied to literature about ecological grief, it becomes evident that all these dynamics of disenfranchised grief can take place in relation to ecological grief. However, some forms of these have received more attention than others, and closer engagement with the distinctions can help to discern important dynamics.
In ecological grief scholarship, the second dynamic mentioned by Doka, “the loss is not recognized”, has often been discussed. Scholars have noted that various kinds of ecological loss, including many climate change -related losses, have not been socially validated or they have been contested e.g. [
166,
167]. The reasons for not recognizing ecological losses can be very diverse. Fundamentally, anthropocentric ideas are often in the background, and sometimes these have been combined with colonial, patriarchal and/or racist leanings [
12,
161]. There may also be economic factors at play: people may not want to recognize an ecological loss if that recognition would include admitting that current economic practices should be changed [
168]. Furthermore, the general psychosocial difficulty of connecting with ecological grief impacts the situation [
169,
170,
171,
172].
The first dynamic mentioned by Doka, lack of recognition of the relationship, provokes further thinking about ecological grief. Doka writes that if there are no “recognizable kin ties”, grief can get disenfranchised: for example, if there was a secret love relationship between the deceased and another person, that another person may not be given any recognition for their grief [
156]. In the case of ecological grief, this dynamic leads again to issues of anthropocentrism and speciesism. As for example ecological grief scholar Braun [
99] has noted, anthropocentric societies deny kinship between humans and many other parts of the natural world, which many indigenous peoples have recognized. Braun calls for a renewed understanding of the fundamental importance of interspecies relations and kinship, and warns that ecological mourning may sometimes be simply adjustment to a changed environment, not including necessary ethical and relational transformations in human attitudes.
In both kinds of ecological grief – not recognizing the relationship or not recognizing the loss – there seems to be versions where part of the loss is recognized, but not its actual depth. This often happens also with general forms of grief. It is noticed that something is lost, but no real recognition is offered and thus there is “an empathic failure”, as grief scholars write [
173]. For example, when a companion animal such as a dog dies and a person feels strong grief, others may say things such as “You can always get a new dog” or “Don’t be so sad, it’s only a dog” for related dynamics, see [
98]. Or if a person feels ecological grief about a clearcutting of an old forest, people may say: “But the forest will grow there again!” [
174]. The idea that the loss could easily be replaced is often deeply insulting to mourners and may lead to disruptions in social relations and loneliness among mourners. The framework of intangible loss is highly relevant here: what are often totally disenfranchised are the intangible aspects of the loss.
By the formulation “the griever is excluded”, Doka means that sometimes “the characteristics of the bereaved in effect disenfranchise their grief”; the person “is not socially defined as capable of grief” [
156], p. 30. Examples mentioned are persons with dementia or disabilities, and very young children.
When applied to ecological grief, this reminds that sometimes people’s characteristics can be used as an excuse to exclude them from ecological grief. For example, many children and old people often mourn the destruction of nature areas in cities, including city trees, but they may be disenfranchised because of their age and social status [
174,
175]. However, Doka seems not to pay enough attention to power structures and active disenfranchisement here, which are raised up by Corr [
162,
163], Attig [
164] and Thompson [
176] (2020). Grievers are often excluded because their communities and groups are held in a subordinate position [
162]. For example, grief by indigenous peoples about ecological and cultural changes has often not been recognized by white people in power e.g. [
177]. Furthermore, there are studies of also white people who become “emotional outlaws” because of their ecological grief [
96].
Attig [
164] argues that disenfranchised grief is not only an empathic failure, but also an ethical failure and often a political failure: communities and/or societies fail to give recognition both to the loss and to the rights of mourners.
Disenfranchising messages actively discount, dismiss, disapprove, discourage, invalidate, and delegitimate the experiences and efforts of grieving. And disenfranchising behaviors interfere with the exercise of the right to grieve by withholding permission, disallowing, constraining, hindering, and even prohibiting it. [
164], p. 198
This dimension of disenfranchised grief is further elaborated by sociologist Thompson [
165,
176] and philosopher Rinofner-Kreidl [
178]. Thompson discusses social injustices related to grieving, including discrimination and oppression which can manifest in dynamics of disenfranchised grief. The losses and griefs of some people are even more probably disenfranchised than others, and long-standing justice issues such as racism, sexism, colonialism and ableism are evident here. This could be linked with the discussions in ecological grief research about philosopher Judith Butler’s ideas and her concept of what is deemed “grievable” [
50], see many articles in [
12], and to the framework of “affective injustice” [
179,
180], which has been applied to ecological grief by van den Bosch [
161].
Rinofner-Kreidl [
178] argues that grief both affects social relations and is affected by them (similarly [
52]). She points out that the existential difficulty of facing death and mortality easily strengthens a general disposition towards disenfranchising grief in Western and industrial societies: “there is a far more extensive latent readiness to disenfranchise grief, which takes effect in our society
for the sake of warding off deep existential anxieties” [178, p. 203, italics in original]. In general, social aversion to grief and mourning in the West has been discussed by many scholars e.g. [
44,
76], and several authors have linked it with denial of death for a classic discussion, see [
181]. These kind of dynamics have been discussed by several authors in relation to ecological grief and anxiety e.g. [
169,
182,
130], but usually not in conversation with theories of disenfranchised grief.
As for Doka’s distinctions about circumstances of the loss or the ways of grieving as causes for disenfranchising, more research is needed to study these in relation to ecological grief. Broadly, circumstances of losses naturally affect grief responses and social dynamics around them, but Doka and other grief researchers have focused on stigma-producing circumstances and anxiety-producing circumstances. Some classic examples of stigmatized loss are suicide and death because of substance overdose [
156], p. 31. In relation to ecological grief, a related but complex case would be a suicide where the dead person has left a note telling that the ecological crisis is a major reason for the suicide; these kind of cases have already been reported e.g. [
183]. Mourning a close one who has committed a suicide at least partly because of ecological despair is perhaps not explicitly ecological grief – it depends on how the term is used –, but it is at least closely related to the broad topic of sorrow caused by the ecological crisis.
It is an open question whether the ways of grieving and particular mourning practices around ecological grief could be more of the cause for disenfranchising than the unrecognition of the loss, relationship, or griever. One can speculate for example about cases where the ecological loss would be at least partly recognized, but a person’s very emotional grief reaction would be the cause for disenfranchising. The same uncertainty applies to outcomes of mourning: whether others may claim that a person’s outcome of ecological grief is in some ways wrong or inadequate in their minds, whether this outcome is depression or acceptance.
More broadly, it seems important to think about what kinds of ecological grief and mourning are socially supported in various societies and communities – and which are not. This issue is related to normativity of eco-emotions and climate emotions e.g. [
9,
184]. Certain “affective displays” and “grieving rules” [
156] of ecological grief can be supported and others disenfranchised.
People can also internalize societal grieving rules and thus self-initiate disenfranchised grief [
156], p. 28,165, p. 20 or strengthen the disenfranchising started by others. These kind of dynamics are discussed also below in section 3.2.4. in relation to “inhibited grief”. There can be a literally ecological, reciprocal and complex process of disenfranchising grief where individuals and collectives both do their part. Grief philosopher Ratcliffe points out that people can simply have a lack of “interpretative resources” to make sense of their grief [
52], p. 135, and this seems very evident in relation to ecological grief which is a new topic for many people.
The literally ecological character of disenfranchised grief is actually discernable in the definition of empathic failure by grief scholars Neimeyer and Jordan, which is cited also by Doka: “the failure of one part of the system to understand the meaning and experience of another” [
156,
173], p. 96. However, as discussed above, this definition needs more awareness of a) intentional use of power and b) collective dimensions.
Table 6 brings together various aspects of disenfranchised grief and when possible, links them with studies about ecological grief. Many aspects need further study and are marked with “?”.
3.2.2. Chronic sorrow
Here is a well of grief we’re going to have to drop into over and over again for all our lives, no matter if we are eighty or eight: the wrecking power of climate change. [
155], p. 13
Grief theory includes a framework which brings together many aspects which have been discussed above and which seems highly relevant for ecological grief, namely chronic sorrow. The name can be misleading: it is to be noted that this is not the same as ‘chronic grief’, which will be more discussed in section 3.2.4. The phenomenon which is targeted by chronic sorrow is ancient: a type of grief which persists for a long time but includes variations in strength. Indeed, scholars have linked the old Greek word
parapono, having a heavy heart, with chronic sorrow. This is a grief which is difficult but not pathological, because it has a very real reason [
185,
186,
66,
103].
The concept of chronic sorrow was spearheaded in the 1960s by rehabilitation counselor and leader Simon Olshansky, and it became used in nursing professions. In the 2000s, the concept and framework has been much developed by grief scholar Roos [
185]. Chronic sorrow was first observed especially in parents of children with disabilities, but later the framework has been applied to a wide variety of cases. Roos defines chronic sorrow as follows: “a normal yet profound, pervasive, continuing, and recurring set of grief responses resulting from a loss or absence of crucial aspects of oneself (self-loss) or another living person (other-loss) to whom there is a deep attachment” [
186], p. 194. A deep feature of chronic sorrow is “a painful discrepancy” between what was supposed to be and what has happened: for example the feelings of parents who realize that their child will not develop similar abilities than most other children.
As grief scholars have observed, there is significant overlap between theories of nonfinite loss, ambiguous loss, and chronic sorrow [
10,
117]. There is a difference, however: nonfinite loss and ambiguous loss focus on type of loss, while chronic sorrow focuses on type of grief. The theories complement each other, helping to see various kinds of losses and related grief dynamics. Chronic sorrow is a natural response to significant nonfinite loss, and often aspects of ambiguous loss and/or disenfranchised grief make it more difficult [
10,
117].
The term chronic may sound pathologizing, but actually one of the major emphases in the whole framework of chronic sorrow has been to oppose pathologizing. Practitioners and scholars have wanted to bring into fore that when losses are ongoing and complex, it is natural to experience grief in long-standing and variable ways [
66,
185]. This fits ecological grief, especially in its global dimension, very well, and also gives a strong message about the fundamental non-pathological character of such ecological grief.
As noted above, a special feature of the chronic sorrow framework is that it prominently includes both self-related loss and other-related loss as potential causes of such grief. In “self-loss”, some aspect of the self is felt to be lost, and in “other-loss”, this happens to somebody other. These losses are often tangible, such as a disabling injury, but they can also be intangible or include both kinds of aspects. Involuntary childlessness is one example of such a loss which can produce chronic sorrow; again the “painful discrepancy” between expectations (and hopes) and reality is very evident there [
117,
186], compare with 40. Fundamentally, both the self and the world are at play in chronic sorrow, and especially the experience of the self in the world [
185], esp. 54-59. The first realization of the loss which results in chronic sorrow can often be traumatic [
185], p. 65, and chronic sorrow prominently includes shattered assumptions and the need for meaning reconstruction (see section 3.1.4.; and [
117]). Thus, there are natural elements of an existential crisis in processes of chronic sorrow [
185], esp. chapter 6.
As is the case with its loss-related counterpart, nonfinite loss, the framework of chronic sorrow has not yet been extensively discussed in ecological loss and grief research. Kevorkian [
78], p. 222 briefly observes the fittingness of the concept for many dynamics of ecological grief, but up to the author’s knowledge, this article is the first time that chronic sorrow is discussed in more length in an ecological context.
Table 7 shows the characteristics that Roos links with chronic sorrow and connects literature about ecological grief with those, showing how the aspects of this framework resonate closely with it. These will be discussed below.
As
Table 7 shows, all these characteristics of chronic sorrow can rather easily be found in studies and literature about ecological grief. Chronic sorrow seems to serve as a helpful unifying grief framework especially for experiences of global ecological grief, such as broad climate grief, and for such local ecological griefs which have a profound and lasting impact on people. It is usually non-pathological but difficult (characteristic A in
Table 7, see also section 3.2.4.). It is often disenfranchised because it is so difficult (characteristic B, see section 3.2.1.). It can include many kinds of tangible and intangible losses, including shattered assumptions (characteristic C, see sections 3.2.1. and 3.1.4.). It often has a traumatic beginning (characteristic D, see sections 3.1.4. and 3.2.4.), and it is closely connected with nonfinite loss (characteristic E, see section 3.1.3.).
Environmental grief scholar Kevorkian observes three aspects of chronic sorrow. She writes: “the loss [producing ecological grief] is ongoing without a foreseeable end and there are constant reminders of what has been lost and the potential of what will be lost with time”[
78], p. 222. Thus, Kevorkian links chronic sorrow and its characteristics (e) – which is practically nonfinite loss – and (f), constant reminders, with ecological grief. She also discusses trauma and ecological grief, emphasizing the “insidious” and “slow” trauma possible amidst long-time ecological changes and losses. Kevorkian notes that there may not be a “single identifiable incident” of trauma behind ecological grief, but rather a more compounded experience of various losses causing trauma for further discussions of related dynamics, see [
148,
190]. This is an important observation, but it must be added that, in some cases, there can be single incidents which cause ecological trauma and grief, whether these are experiences of “natural” disasters or traumatic awakenings to the severity of the ecological crisis see [
187,
191,
192].
Research about the characteristics F-J of chronic sorrow seems to offer especially novel insights for ecological grief scholarship. While fluctuations in ecological grief have been observed by several scholars e.g. [
58,
86], chronic sorrow research offers nuanced concepts about various aspects of these kind of phenomena.
Chronic sorrow scholars have observed that there is usually a first, more intense period of crisis and grief following the realization of a significant loss. They note that this can last for several years [
185], p. 84. This correlates with attempts of ecological grief and anxiety researchers in charting an initial, intense process and then a continued process with fluctuations [
58,
187].
“Constant reminders or triggers” [
185], pp. 84-85 are closely related to nonfinite loss, but they can also simply arise out of the experience of chronic sorrow. Many kinds of things, both inner and outer, can contribute to a triggering effect [
66], p. 126. Something in the outer world may remind the person of the loss and the grief; or something internal, such as a mood or a feeling, may lead the person to the triggering of the grief. In many forms of ecological grief, the array of potential triggers is vast. For example, carbon emissions are interlinked with a nearly endless amount of things in contemporary societies, and a person sensitized to climate grief can be reminded of their grief simply by seeing a new construction site, because the construction causes carbon emissions [
193]. Grief scholar Harris writes about “unavoidable reminders of the loss” [
117], p. 294, and this wording seems very suitable for experiences of ecological grief e.g. [
87,
194].
Chronic sorrow scholars also observe “predictable and unpredictable stress points” (characteristic H), sometimes discussing “critical stress points” [
185], pp. 80-81. These are closely related to characteristic G, “unavoidable, periodic resurgence of intensity”, and the feature of “temporary adaptation” in chronic sorrow [
117], p. 292.
In classic types of chronic sorrow, many stress points have been identified. For example, a parent of a seriously disabled child may feel stronger stress and grief when the other children of the same age reach a developmental milestone that the disabled child does not. These kind of events are called “life markers” by Roos, and a person experiencing chronic sorrow may be left “marker bereft” [
185], pp. 83-84. To mention another example, a person suffering from involuntary childlessness may feel unusually bad during an annual Mother’s Day or Father’s Day. Stronger feelings of anxiety are one possible impact.
In ecological grief research, these concepts can give tools for observing similar dynamics and linking them with broader grief research. Triggers and stress points have been passingly observed in ecological grief and anxiety research, but more attention is needed to explore them. Some already known stress points include publications of new and alarming climate change reports and periods in life where big decisions should be made but the ecological crisis complicates them e.g. [
57,
84,
87]. The concepts of “life markers” and being “marker bereft” apply for example to those ecological mourners who have decided not to try to have children and who see others celebrating children’s births and development stages.
The alternation between psychic numbness and being emotionally flooded in chronic sorrow [
66], p. 126,185, p. 86 seems also to have its counterparts in people’s experiences of ecological grief and anxiety [
169,
118,
84]. Chronic sorrow research could be validating for people who experience fluctuations in their ecological grief. Furthermore, it could help them to accept that in response to significant and ongoing losses, it is normal to feel persistent sorrow.
3.2.3. Anticipatory grief and mourning
Leah wept about her children’s futures and the immensity of intensified suffering for all living beings. At times, the grief was in response to a present irretrievable loss and at other times, the mourning was about imagined future loss. [
101], p. 6
Anticipatory grief and mourning have been much discussed in grief research [
195,
196], for a review of research until mid-1990s, see [
197]. The topic has been prominent also in ecological grief research, because many dire environmental changes are predicted for the future. Cunsolo and Ellis delineate “grief associated with anticipated future losses” as a category of their threefold classification [2, p. 278]. Many scholars of ecological grief discuss the topic and mention the term ‘anticipatory’, combined with ‘grief’ or ‘grieving’ [
11], esp. chapter 2,46, [
198], p. 172, [
199], p. 242, [
200], p. 197], or with solastalgia [
201]. However, ecological grief scholarship has not yet engaged extensively with general grief research about anticipatory grief and mourning, such as Rando’s work [
90,
196,
202].
A major theme in general grief research about anticipatory grief and mourning has been its usefulness. Scholars have wondered: is anticipatory grief/mourning helpful or harmful? Or which forms, and in which circumstances? [
197], p. 1353 Many debates around anticipatory grief and mourning have roots in different understandings about what grief itself is. If grief is seen more in the vein of “grief work”, then there is a possibility to think that such work could be done in advance, with various consequences as in [
195]. But if grief is seen as a process e.g. [
52,
142], it is quite natural that such a process can start with “forewarning of loss”, a term grief researchers sometimes use [
197]. Especially in relation to ongoing losses, the temporalities of present and future are intimately connected.
Rando, a major scholar of anticipatory grief and mourning, has consistently argued that the phenomenon should be seen in a wide way. In her view anticipatory mourning is:
“the phenomenon encompassing the processes of mourning, coping, interaction, planning, and psychosocial reorganization that are stimulated and begun in part in response to the awareness of the impending loss of a loved one and the recognition of associated losses in the past, present, and future” [
196], p. 24
Rando thus includes the complexity of temporalities in her definition, and sees grief and mourning strongly as a process. Later she added the task of “balancing conflicting demands” to this characterization [
202]. Rando prefers the term anticipatory mourning, instead of grief, because of the width of the phenomenon for critical discussion, see [
203,
204]. Because various scholars use different terms and in various nuances, here the term “anticipatory grief/mourning” is used.
Worden [
68], pp. 204-208 also warns against simple interpretations related to anticipatory grief/mourning and its effects, because grief is so multi-determined. The positive possibility is that having a longer period of knowing about the loss can help people in tasks of grief by providing possibilities to work through acceptance of the loss and the many emotions which can be connected to it.
A special theme in anticipatory grief/mourning is the possibility of cutting off emotional bonds before the actual loss has happened in an effort to lessen the potential pain [
196,
197]. This theme is closely linked to the whole debate about the Freudian concept of decathexis and the grief work hypothesis. The influential framework of continuing bonds is a response to this: contemporary grief researchers usually see the aim of grief not to be the cutting of emotional bonds, but instead re-working and continuation of them [
74] (see section 1.3.).
These discussions and distinctions in grief research can provide nuance to ecological grief scholarship. The idea of decathexis has been discussed both explicitly and implicitly in environmental research, but the framework of continuing bonds and the nuances of anticipatory grief/mourning have not received attention. A classic example of implicit discussion related to decathexis is the discourse about “biophobia” as defined by Sobel [
205] in environmental education and psychology: the possibility that especially children and young people start to avoid natural environments because they reminds them of emotional distress caused by awareness of environmental crises. Scholars have wondered whether people may cut, or try to cut, emotional bonds with more-than-human world in an effort to protect themselves from pain in the future e.g. [
206,
207].
Several scholars of ecological grief have explicitly and critically discussed the concept and phenomenon of decathexis in relation to ecological grief, and argued that instead of it, the aim should be to continue relationships with the more-than-human world e.g. [
11,
55]. These scholars also point out that various temporalities become intertwined in experiences of ecological grief. For example, Barnett writes:
“Rather than liberating ourselves from the dead or disappeared, we can see grief as a way of sustaining connections with those whose loss we have survived. We can also see grief as an anticipatory stance, an orientation toward the vulnerability of the earth and our fellow travellers, that summons us to support and calls us to care.” [
11], p. 23
Explicit engagement with continuing bonds theory and anticipatory mourning theory would help to link this with the larger body of grief research.
The moral emphasis of many ecological grief writers is clearly visible in Barnett’s writing: anticipatory grief/mourning has also an ethical function. Broadly, this is linked to a classic theme in environmentalism: warning about future losses as an effort to spark preventive action now. This was evident in Rachel Carson’s
Silent Spring in the 1960s and in many classic texts of the environmental movement e.g. [
208]. However, what is new is that Barnett and certain other ecological grief scholars have explicitly linked grieving with this. They argue that grieving allows people to continue to care [
11,
198,
200]; this has been proposed also by certain environmental organizations such as branches of Extinction Rebellion e.g. [
54]. Furthermore, they argue that learning skills and practices of grieving also prepares people to encounter the even more severe ecological losses that are predicted to happen in the future, for example because of the amount of atmospheric gases loaded already in the climate system e.g. [
11,
209].
Thus, ecological grief scholars are on one hand implicitly arguing for what Rando has described anticipatory mourning to be: engaging in processes of “mourning, coping, interaction, planning, psychosocial reorganization, and balancing conflicting demands” [
196,
202]. But on the other hand, processes of ecological grief are even more about a) ongoing and multiple losses and b) processes of transformation [
58,
210] than classic cases of anticipatory mourning. Even while Rando links various temporalities together in her frame of anticipatory mourning, ecological losses and grief are more complex.
One aspect of this is what Cunsolo and colleagues call “cascading ecological grief”: “sequential, ongoing, and interrelated forms of grief triggered by a singular ecological loss” [
6], p. 52. Even a singular loss can result in complex cascades. But often people are facing multiple ecological and social losses at the same time [
100]. These can intensify each other or at least cause very potential overwhelm for the grievers for overwhelm, eco-anxiety and ecological grief, see [
30,
58]. People may realize, as the Inuits did in case studies by Cunsolo and colleagues, that the losses experienced now will grow more intense [
6,
26,
198]. Ongoing loss and anticipatory aspects combine [
199], again echoing the work of Rando and others, but this time the sorrow manifests on a cultural scale. Cunsolo and Ellis [
2] observe elements of this:
This [ecological] grief is both acute and chronic, carried psychologically and emotionally, but is not linked to any one event or break moment, and develops over time, with knowledge of what could come based both on already-experienced changes (for example, declining sea ice in the North and on-going drought conditions in Australia) and projected changes. [
2], p. 278
This produces big challenges for collective and individual coping with ecological grief, and points to the need for transformation. This has been explored in frameworks such as “transformational resilience” [
189] and “affective adaptation” [
146], for an overview of proposals, see [
58].
Randall [
47] has discussed both anticipatory loss and “transitional loss” in her exploration of climate change -related loss and grief. The latter concept, which itself is not widely used in grief research, refers to loss experienced during transitional periods in life, such as moving from one life stage to another. In relation to life stages, this is what McCoyd & Walter [
75] have studied under the frame of “maturational loss”: the ambivalent effects of transitions, often producing both feelings of sadness and feelings of achieving something. These kind of transitions are intimately related to anticipatory grief/mourning in cases when a person or a group reacts to a forthcoming transition. As Randall [
47] points out, the concept of transitional loss can be a useful tool for paying attention to these kind of dynamics in relation to many kinds of losses, including ecological ones, and this framework could complement anticipatory grief/mourning (see
Section 4.1.1. below).
In general, the future-orientation in anticipatory grief/mourning produces strong links with anxiety and worry. Rando [
202] discusses the role of traumatic stress and anxiety in processes of anticipatory mourning. Worden [
68] notes that engaging with potential serious loss can also increase people’s personal death awareness, producing existential anxiety – and potentially existential growth. In relation to this, Plant [
211] has explored the dimension of self-mourning in anticipatory grief/mourning, drawing on earlier work on the topic and concept by Attig [
212]. They both note that grief processes often include a dimension of dealing with the griever’s own mortality: the death of another reminds of one’s own inevitable death. This issue is linked with the philosophical observations of the role of changes in self as part of grief processes e.g. [
52,
178] and with existential literature in general, where the psychological dynamics of mortality are a major theme [
213]. These observations provoke the need to think about the potential role of grieving one’s own mortality as a factor affecting ecological grief: anticipated ecological loss and one’s own anticipated death can resonate with each other for reflections, see [
182,
214,
215] (see also
Section 3.2.1. above).
Furthermore, simply the need to wait for the actualization of the loss can produce anxiety. Anxiety emotions [
216] may be also engendered by the inherent uncertainty in even most precise future predictions: Will the loss happen in the way which is predicted? There are evident possibilities for grieving either too strongly or too weakly in advance, and this leads us to the final form of grief which is discussed in this chapter, complicated grief. Before that,
Table 8 shows key concepts related to this section.
3.2.4. Complicated grief
The patient reported that preoccupation with climate change was impairing his ability to perform activities of daily living, and that he had been experiencing financial difficulties as he had stopped working secondary to this stressor. [
220], p. 1
One major part of grief research has been the effort to study which kind of forms of grief would require or at least strongly benefit from clinical support for an overview, see [
73]. There are significant differences in opinion about what counts as normal and what as abnormal grief, and many scholars have pointed out that social and cultural factors strongly shape these notions e.g. [
52]. If people experience serious problems in relation to grief, many other psychological phenomena are close to that, especially depression and anxiety, and the debates about abnormality have psychiatric and insurance-related consequences e.g. [
44,
45].
Some ecological grief scholars, especially those coming from backgrounds related to medical professions and psychology, have called for more research about possible complicated forms of ecological grief e.g. [
48]. Furthermore, the emerging research about “eco-depression” and “climate depression” [
221] has close connections to this topic. In the following, insights from grief research about complicated grief are applied to explore these issues.
Many different terms have been used of those forms of grief which are considered to be in some way complicated. These include for example “prolonged grief”, “chronic grief”, “debilitating grief”, “inhibited grief”, and “unresolved grief” for an overview, see [
68], pp. 131-157. The various terms have overlap, but some of them target different kinds of complicatedness. Many terms refer to persistence and strength of grief, such as ‘prolonged’, ‘chronic’, or ‘debilitating’ grief. Other terms refer to grief which is not allowed expression and causes complications because of that, such as ‘absent’, ‘inhibited’, ‘suppressed’, or ‘repressed’ grief. “Masked grief” is a term used to describe reactions of acting-out which arise because of grief, but without the person realizing the cause of these reactions [
68], pp. 147-149. Here, the commonly used term complicated grief is utilised as the general term, also because “prolonged ecological grief” is a more complex concept to define than “complicated ecological grief”, as will be discussed below.
Grief researchers have mapped many factors and dynamics related to complicated grief e.g. [
222]. Worden’s frame about “mediators of mourning” [
68] is one relevant tool here; Parkes and Prigerson write about “determinants of grief” [
69]. Aspects which can increase the difficulty of grief include the following:
Violent losses
Losses which could have been prevented
Sudden and powerful losses
An ambivalent relationship with the subject of loss
Personal or collective lack of grief skills and practices
Lack of social support, or actual disenfranchised grief [
68,
69,
223]
These kind of frameworks can be applied to explore factors which can have impact on both particular ecological griefs and the experiences of global ecological grief see also [
48]. Contextual analysis of these kind of factors can help to explain why certain people in certain situations feel more intensive ecological grief than others. Moreover, some factors seem especially relevant for ecological grief in general, such as preventability, violence, severity of the loss, guilt dynamics, and lack of social support.
Losses which cause trauma are closely related to complicated grief e.g. [
223]: the more traumatic a loss is, the more probable are complicated grief reactions e.g. [
136]. This reminds once again of the possible connections between ecological grief and ecological trauma.
Guilt is a common feature in grief [
224], and sometimes complications of grief orient around complicated guilt. The person or group may get stuck in feeling that they should have done more to prevent the loss. While this may be the case, it is also very common that people over-exaggerate the guilt. This is why Worden recommends “reality testing” the guilt in bereavement in order to help coping [
68], pp. 21-22, 97. If people have actual culpability for the loss, a process with repentance and reparation is needed. All these kind of dynamics can affect ecological grief. Many scholars have observed the close connections between ecological guilt and ecological grief e.g. [
124,
122,
225], and closer engagement with the guilt-related research in grief theory could increase understanding about related dynamics.
Overall, defining complicated grief even in relation to the classic subject of grief research, the death of a close person, has proved to be difficult and contested. For example, there are strong debates whether there can or should be “closure” in grief, and if so, what kind of closure or “acceptance” [
52,
102]. These difficulties seem to be even greater in relation to ecological grief, where the objects of grief can be multiple and varied, and the root cause is persistent ecological damage which continues over generations. What intensity and length of grief counts as “normal” in relation to such losses? (This question is touched upon in many articles in [
12])
The question about normality is even more complex in cases where there is much disenfranchising of grief. Many people who feel long-standing ecological grief have argued that their grief is a normal response to the intensity of losses e.g. [93, while other people may have accused them of grieving in wrong ways or wrong intensity e.g. [
167]. These issues are closely related to discussions about possible medicalisation and pathologizing of ecological emotions [
56,
226].
As has been discussed above, most forms of ecological grief seem to be normal in relation to the dire ecological crisis [
28,
48]. However, certain categories of complicated ecological grief can be delineated on the basis of grief research.
Table 9 shows a proposal for these.
These four types resonate in many ways with the three categories of ecological grief characterized by Cunsolo & Ellis [
2]. Type a) is a complicated form of “Grief associated with physical ecological losses” and type c) is a complicated form of “Grief associated with anticipated future losses”. The third category of Cunsolo & Ellis, “Grief associated with disruptions to environmental knowledge systems and resulting feelings of loss of identity”, can be a factor which affects the intensity of all types a-d.
In the following, the four types are briefly discussed. Further research about them is warranted, and it is clear that there can be interconnected or overlapping psychological phenomena: variations of depression, anxiety, and adjustment disorders are close to these [
61].
a) Clearly prolonged and very intense grief reactions to a particular ecological loss. Because of the particularity of the loss, the definition of complicated grief is easier to make here than in relation to the ongoing experiences of global ecological grief. Still, defining this may be difficult, because particular ecological losses can damage significant emotional attachments and affect whole lifestyles, understandably causing persistent grief e.g. [
6,
7]. The wording used here, “clearly prolonged and very intense”, refers to cases where it is evident that tasks of mourning have not been met, even though there is already a long time since the loss. Research frameworks around prolonged grief could be critically applied to discern these [see 222,227]. A particular ecological loss may cause chronic sorrow which lasts for ages, but that is different from experiencing debilitating grief continuously.
It is not argued here that people’s experiences of difficult grief in relation to particular ecological losses should easily be diagnosed; instead, grief theory is here applied to discern a possible form of prolonged and complicated ecological grief, in the hope that this might help to notice people who need special support in their eco-grief.
b) Long-standing, very strong and debilitating grief reactions to global ecological loss. This type is intimately related to discourses of ecological distress and eco-anxiety, including climate anxiety. In general grief theory, the amount and persistence of distress is one major factor which is considered in evaluations of complicated grief [see 227]. The question of what counts as overly strong distress and grief in relation to global ecological loss is a complex one, since the problems are so immense. Psychologists have argued that if symptoms of eco-distress are severe and long-lasting, various diagnostic criteria can be used, while at the same time the fundamental cause is not related to pathology but instead to very real ecological problems [
61]. Ecological grief scholars Cunsolo & Ellis [
2], p. 279 ponder about the possibility of applying the term “frozen grief”, made famous by grief scholar Boss [
104], to describe some forms of complicated ecological grief.
Perhaps one could speak also about a dimension of complicated ecological grief in some strong and persistent forms of eco-anxiety/distress. In those cases, the alleviation of strong eco-anxiety symptoms would depend on engaging with tasks of mourning: in working with complicated ecological grief (for this kind of suggestions, without using the term complicated grief, see e.g. [
85,
86,
228].
c) Overly strong forms of anticipatory grief/mourning. Once again, defining “overly strong” may be tricky here, because the predicted ecological damages are so vast. Clear cases of this kind of complicated ecological grief include strong catastrophizing: for example believing that societies will collapse because of ecological crisis in the very near future, and grieving the loss of everything in advance. While it is difficult to estimate future events and possible collapses cannot be ruled out, there is a difference between realistic thinking about them and catastrophizing. Closely related frameworks here are anxiety and existential crisis.
Ecological grief and anxiety scholars have observed these kind of possibilities, although not by linking the concept of complicated grief with them. Mark and di Battista [
199], p. 242 write about the possibility of “perpetual anticipatory anxiety” see also [
48]. Therapist Babbott utilizes the frame of “pre-traumatic stress” (PTS), proposed by both clinician Lise van Susteren [
229] and environmental humanities scholar Kaplan [
230], and observes that: “Just as PTSD entraps people in the past, PTS can entrap people in the future. Therefore, one goal of treatment is to help clients live mostly in the present moment with fluid integration of past memories and future imaginings” [
101], p. 5. Losses related to the future may be mourned via transitional loss and grief (see
Section 4.1.1. below), avoiding overly strong anticipatory grief.
d) Cases where inhibited ecological grief can clearly be noticed. Research about ‘inhibited’, ‘delayed’, ‘suppressed’, ‘repressed’, or ‘masked’ grief has been conducted most of all in relation to the death of a close human person. It is usually presumed that deep emotional attachments, which become impacted by the death, need to be reworked via grief. If grief is very absent, researchers warn about the possible complications caused by this e.g. [
69], p. 39. However, there are also debates about the issue, and for example grief researcher Bonanno has argued that most people are resilient in their grieving, thus criticizing the notion of delayed grief [
45]. Worden argues that delayed grief is a real phenomenon, but its study needs large-enough samples and long-enough time spans [
68], pp. 143-145.
Inhibited and delayed ecological grief are tricky subjects, but they do seem to exist. A person’s or a group’s depth of attachment with ecosystems naturally affects these dynamics [
175]. Some people do not grieve the changes in local ecosystems even when they know about them, because they do not have attachments with these ecosystems, or related values. But this is complicated by several things: the global character of the ecological crisis, the intricate connections between local and global, and the many possible intangible losses involved. People with anthropocentric values may still grieve the changes for societies and their life paths caused by the ecological crisis [
99].
If people do not express any kind of ecological grief even when they feel ecological losses, one can speak of inhibited, suppressed or repressed ecological grief. Several interview studies show dynamics which can be described with these terms, such as Norgaard’s ethnographic observations in Norway [
118], Lertzman’s in-depth interviews in the US [
171], and many observations among environmental professionals e.g. [
231,
232]. In addition, many theorists of ecological grief have explored this [
169,
233,
228,
225], pp. 161-167. Lack of engagement with ecological grief which is present somewhere in people’s bodyminds can cause various kinds of impacts, which can be explored in future research via the knowledge about inhibited grief gathered in general grief research. There may also be delayed ecological grief responses.
What is here called inhibited ecological grief has been argued to be a major cultural and environmental problem. People suffer from the lack of emotional flow, and complications can hinder engagement with sustainability efforts e.g. [
171,
21,
225]. This is linked with the discussions above in
Section 3.2.1. about various kinds of disenfranchised grief, which can be enacted both by individuals themselves and by others. An important part of the dynamics around inhibited ecological grief is a cultural-level “inability to mourn”, and the impacts of such inability have been argued to be very problematic for societies e.g. [
234]. Not being in touch with emotions can reduce empathy and functioning.
Naturally, not all people who do not seem to feel ecological grief manifest inhibited grief. Some people probably do not yet realize the extent of ecological losses, some don’t care, and some may be resilient in relation to feelings of grief. As grief scholars often remind, people grieve in widely varied ways, and it is problematic to construct only one normative model of grieving, ecological or otherwise. But as a category of potential complicated ecological grief, it is important to notice the existence of inhibited ecological grief.