Version 1
: Received: 5 September 2023 / Approved: 6 September 2023 / Online: 6 September 2023 (09:54:31 CEST)
How to cite:
Boudet, S. Bipartisan/Range Voting in Two Rounds Reaches a Promising Balance between Efficiency and Strategy-Resistance. Preprints2023, 2023090388. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202309.0388.v1
Boudet, S. Bipartisan/Range Voting in Two Rounds Reaches a Promising Balance between Efficiency and Strategy-Resistance. Preprints 2023, 2023090388. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202309.0388.v1
Boudet, S. Bipartisan/Range Voting in Two Rounds Reaches a Promising Balance between Efficiency and Strategy-Resistance. Preprints2023, 2023090388. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202309.0388.v1
APA Style
Boudet, S. (2023). Bipartisan/Range Voting in Two Rounds Reaches a Promising Balance between Efficiency and Strategy-Resistance. Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202309.0388.v1
Chicago/Turabian Style
Boudet, S. 2023 "Bipartisan/Range Voting in Two Rounds Reaches a Promising Balance between Efficiency and Strategy-Resistance" Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202309.0388.v1
Abstract
In the quest to develop a more effective and representative electoral system that offers a higher global satisfaction while also resisting strategic voting, this paper introduces the Bipartisan/Range method. This electoral system operates in two separate rounds: a first round where voters rank candidates, and if no Condorcet winner emerges, a second round where voters score candidates within a small head set known as the bipartisan set. The proposed method takes inspiration from randomized Condorcet voting system, probably the most strategy-resistant Condorcet methods, but eliminates the non-determinism while improving efficiency in the case of paradoxes. By introducing an unpredictable second round spaced in time and prohibiting predictive surveys, voters face difficulties in anticipating paradoxes, and insincere votes carry inherent risks. Furthermore, the Bipartisan set's limited size mitigates the range voting problem of exaggerated votes. Thus, the method has the potential to be both efficient in reflecting voters' preferences and resistant to strategic voting, exceeding expectations from Arrow's theorem. The method's versatility allows for extensions to multiple candidates, enhancing its applicability across various electoral contexts. Additionally, we have developed BipartiVox, an online platform specifically designed to conduct elections using the Bipartisan/Range method, making it accessible to a wider audience. In conclusion, the Bipartisan/Range method represents a substantial contribution to the field of voting systems, providing a practical, strategy-resistant, and efficient alternative that aligns closely with genuine voter preferences.
Copyright:
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
