Wang, X.; Huang, X.; Zhou, H.; Zhang, N.; Sun, X. Evolution Game Analysis of Chemical Risk Supervision Based on Special Rectification and Normal Regulation Modes. Processes2023, 11, 2072.
Wang, X.; Huang, X.; Zhou, H.; Zhang, N.; Sun, X. Evolution Game Analysis of Chemical Risk Supervision Based on Special Rectification and Normal Regulation Modes. Processes 2023, 11, 2072.
Wang, X.; Huang, X.; Zhou, H.; Zhang, N.; Sun, X. Evolution Game Analysis of Chemical Risk Supervision Based on Special Rectification and Normal Regulation Modes. Processes2023, 11, 2072.
Wang, X.; Huang, X.; Zhou, H.; Zhang, N.; Sun, X. Evolution Game Analysis of Chemical Risk Supervision Based on Special Rectification and Normal Regulation Modes. Processes 2023, 11, 2072.
Abstract
Chemical safety is related to public health, safety and environmental concerns, and the dangerous chemicals safety problem is becoming the one that people commonly pay attention to. Strengthening chemical safety supervision not only involves safe production, but also is an important link to maintain social safety. Most related studies focus on chemical safety under normal regulation, this paper addresses the perspective of ‘special rectification’ and ‘normal regulation’, and establishes an evolutionary game model between chemical enterprises and government supervision departments under different supervision modes. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper studies the evolution process of the two game players' strategy choices, and compares and analyzes the evolution, stability and equilibrium between the chemical safety and the behavior strategies of government regulatory departments. The model is effectively analyzed based on numerical simulation, and the results show that: Under the ‘special rectification’ mode, the strategic choice of chemical enterprises engaging in safety without investment depends on the difference between the benefits and costs of safety without investment; In the ‘normal regulation’ mode, the choice of its safety non-investment strategy depends on the difference between the cost of engaging in safety investment and the cost of safety non-investment; Increasing the government's punishment will encourage chemical enterprises to take safety investment behavior under the two supervision modes. Increasing the punishment has a significant impact on the safety investment behavior of chemical enterprises under the ‘normal regulation’ mode, but it has no significant impact on the behavior of chemical enterprises under the ‘special rectification’ mode. At the same time, increasing the punishment will inhibit the strict supervision behavior of the government. The research conclusion provides important decision support for government departments to effectively supervise the safety production of chemical enterprises.
Keywords
chemical enterprises; safety regulation; evolutionary game; evolutionary stable strategy
Subject
Engineering, Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
Copyright:
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
