Preprint Article Version 1 Preserved in Portico This version is not peer-reviewed

Green Supply Chain Pricing and Performance: a Fairness Preferences and Green Marketing Perspective

Version 1 : Received: 13 July 2021 / Approved: 14 July 2021 / Online: 14 July 2021 (12:14:03 CEST)

How to cite: Huo, H.; Zhong, H.; Zhang, X. Green Supply Chain Pricing and Performance: a Fairness Preferences and Green Marketing Perspective. Preprints 2021, 2021070328 (doi: 10.20944/preprints202107.0328.v1). Huo, H.; Zhong, H.; Zhang, X. Green Supply Chain Pricing and Performance: a Fairness Preferences and Green Marketing Perspective. Preprints 2021, 2021070328 (doi: 10.20944/preprints202107.0328.v1).

Abstract

This study investigates optimal decisions in a green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a leading retailer considering the green marketing and fairness preferences of member firms. Four Stackelberg game decision models are constructed in which the manufacturer and the re-tailer engage in green marketing separately when the manufacturer has no and has fairness preferences. The impacts of fairness preferences and green marketing on the optimal decision in the green supply chain are comparatively analyzed. The study finds that member firms perform green marketing regardless of the presence or absence of fairness preferences and that such be-havior increases the wholesale price, retail price, and market demand of low-carbon products as well as the profits of member firms and the supply chain. A more interesting finding is that the profit growth of member firms and the supply chain due to the manufacturer’s green marketing is more pronounced than that due to the retailer’s green marketing. When the retailer and the manufacturer engage in conduct green marketing, the manufacturer's fairness preferences have different effects on the wholesale price, retail price, market demand, level of green marketing efforts, member enterprises and profits of supply chain. Therefore, firms should consider the impact of green marketing and fairness preferences to make pricing and performance decisions, so as to achieve efficient operation of the whole supply chain and avoid double marginal effects. Finally, the above conclusions are verified through numerical simulation, providing a reference for the decision-making of member firms in the green supply chain.

Subject Areas

green supply chain; manufacturer’s fairness preferences; leading retailer; Stackelberg Game

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