Preprint Article Version 1 Preserved in Portico This version is not peer-reviewed

The Interaction Between the Largest Shareholder and Firm Performance Under the Heterogeneity of Holding- Regulation and Intermediary Effect of Financing Constraints

Version 1 : Received: 7 October 2020 / Approved: 8 October 2020 / Online: 8 October 2020 (16:05:14 CEST)
Version 2 : Received: 16 October 2020 / Approved: 19 October 2020 / Online: 19 October 2020 (14:32:53 CEST)

How to cite: Zhang, L.; Yu, W.; Xia, X. The Interaction Between the Largest Shareholder and Firm Performance Under the Heterogeneity of Holding- Regulation and Intermediary Effect of Financing Constraints. Preprints 2020, 2020100182 (doi: 10.20944/preprints202010.0182.v1). Zhang, L.; Yu, W.; Xia, X. The Interaction Between the Largest Shareholder and Firm Performance Under the Heterogeneity of Holding- Regulation and Intermediary Effect of Financing Constraints. Preprints 2020, 2020100182 (doi: 10.20944/preprints202010.0182.v1).

Abstract

Real estate industry is related to the national economy and people's livelihood,characterized by a high degree of financial intensity. The enterprises in this industry need certain financial ability and large shareholder controlling ability to support their survival. However,due to the multiple adverse impacts of current state policies,banks and private capital,the credit crunch,the sudden decrease in withdrawn funds and the limitation of internal financing,the problem of capital restraint of real estate enterprises has become more and more serious. From the perspective of corporate governance,this paper studies the interaction among financial constraints,ownership concentration and corporate performance under different shareholding states by analyzing the quantitative characteristics of equity structure,and looks for the appropriate range of the largest shareholder holding ratio,which has considered the financial performance and risk. It is found that raising the ownership concentration can effectively ease the financing constraints and improve the performance of enterprises,both of which are significant under the state of high ownership concentration, while the financial constraints play a significant intermediary effect under the State of absolute holding, while in the decentralized state of ownership,there is a significant regulatory effect,and the interaction of the three will be different due to the size of the enterprise.

Subject Areas

Financial Constraints; Agency Cost; Equity Concentration; Holding Heterogeneity; Real Estate Industry

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