This document makes a comprehensive analysis of the inequality of the water market in Chile, measured by the Gini coefficient method. The situation of water rights in Chile is of particular interest because it is a completely privatized system, where rights are traded in the market and therefore water is presented as a commodity. This privatization of water in Chile occurred as part of the process of neoliberalization since the 1981 Water Code. The results of this study indicate that both the concentration and the inequality in the distribution of water rights is very high. It proposes a profound revision of applying a mercantile logic to a scarce basic resource for life such as water and exploring the importance of its role as a national good for public use.

Partially state-owned firms are common in both developed and developing countries and contribute around 10% of the world's GDP. This has led to a rich literature exploring various aspects of competition between such “mixed”-ownership firms. This paper contributes to the existing literature by studying the effects of mixed ownership on the intensity of competition in oligopoly markets. Our findings indicate that state ownership exerts an anti-competitive influence, with a higher state ownership share resulting in less aggressive behavior by firms in the product market. This result implies that industries with a higher proportion of state ownership yield lower total surplus. Further, when considering factors such as taxes, soft budget constraints, and weak property rights, the anti-competitive effects of state ownership are accentuated.