2014 marked the first emergence of avian influenza A(H5N8) in Jeonbuk Province, South Korea, which then quickly spread worldwide. In the midst of the 2020-21 H5N8 outbreak, it spread to domestic poultry and wild waterfowl shorebirds, leading to the first human infection in Astrakhan Oblast, Russia. Despite being clinically asymptomatic and without direct human-to-human transmission, the World Health Organisation stressed the need for continued risk assessment given the nature of Influenza to reassort and generate novel strains. Given its promiscuity and spread to humans, the urgency to understand the mechanisms of possible species jumping to avert disastrous pandemics is increasing. Addressing the epidemiology of H5N8 and its mechanisms of species jumping and its implications, mutational and reassortment libraries can potentially be built, allowing them to be tested on various models complemented with deep-sequencing and automation. With the knowledge on mutational patterns, cellular pathways, drug resistance mechanisms and effects of host proteins can allow better preparedness against H5N8 and other influenza A viruses.

We isolated two highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of subtype H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4b from falcated duck (Anas falcata) feces and environmental water collected at an overwintering site in Japan. Our isolates were almost genetically identical to each other and showed high genetic similarity with H5N8 HPAIVs recently isolated in South Korea, a distant part of Japan, and European countries. These results suggest the potential role of falcated ducks in the dissemination of HPAIVs.

In 2020-2021, the second massive dissemination of a highly-pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) of H5Nx subtype occurred in Europe. During this period, the virus caused numerous outbreaks in poultry, including in the Czech Republic. In the present study, we provide an insight into the genetic variability of the Czech/2021 (CZE/2021) H5N8 viruses to determine the relationships between strains from wild and domestic poultry and to infer transmission routes between the affected flocks of commercial poultry. For this purpose, whole genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of 70 H5N8 HPAI genomes representing 79.7% of the cases were performed. All CZE/2021 H5N8 viruses belonged to the 2.3.4.4b H5 lineage and circulated without reassortment, retaining the A/chicken/Iraq/1/2020 H5N8-like genotype constellation. Phylogenetic analysis suggested frequent local transmission of H5N8 HPAI from wild birds to minor poultry and extensive farm-to-farm spread among commercial poultry farms. In addition, the analysis suggested one cross-border transmission event. Indirect transmission via contaminated materials was considered the most likely source of infection. Improved biosecurity and increased collaboration between the field veterinarians and the laboratory are essential to limit the local spread of the virus and to reveal and interrupt critical routes of infection.

In contrast to previous incursions of highly pathogenic H5 viruses, H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4b caused numerous lethal infections in white-tailed sea eagles (Haliaeetus albicilla) in Germany during the winter 2016/2017. Until April 2017, 17 HPAIV H5N8-positive white-tailed sea eagles had been detected (three alive and 14 dead). Mainly young eagles died (before reaching the adult plumage at 5 years), often with severe neurological symptoms, where histopathology revealed mild to moderate, oligo- to multifocal necrotizing polioencephalitis. Lethal lead (Pb) concentrations, proven as main mortality factor of the sea eagles could be ruled out since values measured in liver or kidney tissue were all within background levels (< 1 ppm). Since the fall of 2016, the epizootic of HPAIV H5 clade 2.3.4.4b reportedly induced, for the first time, fatal disease in European white-tailed see eagles. The virus strain may become a new threat to a highly protected species across its distribution range in Eurasia. Positive cloacal swaps have proven that the eagles can spread the virus with their faeces.

In this study, we report the first outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A H5N8, clade 2.3.4.4b in Kosovo on May 19, 2021. The outbreak consisted of three temporal phases: May–June 2021, September–November 2021, and January–May 2022. In total, 32 backyard and 10 commercial holdings tested positive for the virus, affecting 179,198 poultry. Interestingly, the third and last phase of the outbreak coincided with the massive H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b epidemic in Europe. Phylogenetic analyses of 28 viral strains from Kosovo revealed that they were closely related to the H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4.b viruses that have been circulating in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, and Russia in early 2021. Whole genome sequencing of the 25 and partial sequencing of 3 H5N8 viruses from Kosovo showed high nucleotide identity, forming a distinctive cluster and suggesting a single introduction. The results of the network analysis were in accordance with the three epidemic waves and suggested that the viral diffusion could have been caused by secondary spreads among farms and/or different introductions of the same virus from wild birds. The persistent circulation of the same virus over a one-year period highlights the potential risk of the virus becoming endemic, especially in settings with non-adequate biosecurity.

During autumn/winter in 2016 – 2017 and 2020 – 2021, highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) caused severe outbreaks in Germany and Europe. Multiple clade 2.3.4.4b H5 HPAI subtypes were responsible for increased mortality in wild birds and high mortality and massive losses in the poultry sector. To clarify putative entry sources and delineate interconnections between outbreaks in poultry holdings and wild birds, we applied whole-genome sequencing and phylodynamic analyses combined with the results of epidemiological outbreak investigations. Varying outbreak dynamics of the distinct reassortants allowed for the identification of individual, putatively wild bird-mediated entries into backyard holdings, several clusters comprising poultry holdings, local virus circulation for several weeks, direct farm-to-farm transmission and potential reassortment within a turkey holding with subsequent spill-over of the novel reassorted virus into the wild bird population. Whole-genome sequencing allowed for allowed for a unique high-resolution molecular epidemiology analysis of HPAIV H5Nx outbreaks, recommended to be used as a standard tool. The presented detailed account of the genetic, temporal and geographical characteristics of the recent German HPAI H5Nx situation emphasizes the role of poultry holdings as an important source of novel genetic variants and reassortants.