Albarracin, M.; Pitliya, R.J.; St. Clere Smithe, T.; Friedman, D.A.; Friston, K.; Ramstead, M.J.D. Shared Protentions in Multi-Agent Active Inference. Entropy2024, 26, 303.
Albarracin, M.; Pitliya, R.J.; St. Clere Smithe, T.; Friedman, D.A.; Friston, K.; Ramstead, M.J.D. Shared Protentions in Multi-Agent Active Inference. Entropy 2024, 26, 303.
Albarracin, M.; Pitliya, R.J.; St. Clere Smithe, T.; Friedman, D.A.; Friston, K.; Ramstead, M.J.D. Shared Protentions in Multi-Agent Active Inference. Entropy2024, 26, 303.
Albarracin, M.; Pitliya, R.J.; St. Clere Smithe, T.; Friedman, D.A.; Friston, K.; Ramstead, M.J.D. Shared Protentions in Multi-Agent Active Inference. Entropy 2024, 26, 303.
Abstract
In this paper, we unite concepts from Husserlian phenomenology, the active inference framework in theoretical biology, and category theory in mathematics to develop a comprehensive framework for understanding social action premised on shared goals. We begin with an overview of Husserlian phenomenology, focusing on aspects of inner time consciousness, namely, retention, primal impression, and protention. We then review active inference as a formal approach to modeling agent behavior, based on variational (approximate Bayesian) inference. Expanding upon Husserl’s model of time consciousness, we consider collective goal-directed behavior, emphasizing shared protentions among agents and their connection to the shared generative models of active inference. This integrated framework aims to formalize shared goals in terms of shared protentions, and to thereby shed light on the emergence of group intentionality. Building on this foundation, we incorporate mathematical tools from category theory; particularly, sheaf and topos theory, to furnish a mathematical image of individual and group interactions within a stochastic environment. Specifically, we employ morphisms between polynomial representations of individual agent models, allowing predictions not only of their own behaviors but also those of other agents and environmental responses. Sheaf and topos theory facilitate the construction of coherent agent worldviews and provides a way of representing consensus or shared understanding. We explore the emergence of shared protentions, bridging the phenomenology of temporal structure, multi-agent active inference systems, and category theory. Shared protentions are highlighted as pivotal for coordination and achieving common objectives. We conclude by acknowledging the intricacies stemming from stochastic systems and uncertainties in realizing shared goals.
Keywords
active inference; phenomenology; multi-agent; category theory
Subject
Computer Science and Mathematics, Mathematical and Computational Biology
Copyright:
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
The commenter has declared there is no conflict of interests.
Comment:
Very interesting work, very happy to see something on temporal phenomenology especially addressing the long history of Husserlian based attemtps to grapple with the subject. Was pleased to see Andersen's and Grush's 2009 review of the area but was very surprised (even disappointed) that there were no further mentions of Grush's subsequent work. Specifically, Grush's further work develops mechanistic theories of the phenomenology, based on a Kalman Filter formalism. This work speaks to PP and active inference mechanisms and should I think be addressed in this paper. I will also be a little self promotional and mention some of my own work on this subject that is directly related:
Hohwy, J., Paton, B., & Palmer, C. (2016). Distrusting the present. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 15(3), 315–335. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9439-6
The most surprising omission is any discussion of the Specious Present, this concept and related phenomenology looms large in E Robert Kelly (writing as E R Clay), William James, C D Broad and more modern treatments like Grush's (and others eg Susan Pockett https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022960122740). It is most surprising as the Specious Present is mentioned in detail in Andersen's and Grush's review. I can see some easy/straight forward ways that active inference can be used to address issues like the disconnect between physical time and psychological time and the apparent "width/depth/breadth" of the Specious Present.
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Commenter:
The commenter has declared there is no conflict of interests.
Hohwy, J., Paton, B., & Palmer, C. (2016). Distrusting the present. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 15(3), 315–335. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9439-6
The most surprising omission is any discussion of the Specious Present, this concept and related phenomenology looms large in E Robert Kelly (writing as E R Clay), William James, C D Broad and more modern treatments like Grush's (and others eg Susan Pockett https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022960122740). It is most surprising as the Specious Present is mentioned in detail in Andersen's and Grush's review. I can see some easy/straight forward ways that active inference can be used to address issues like the disconnect between physical time and psychological time and the apparent "width/depth/breadth" of the Specious Present.
Thanks.
Commenter:
Commenter's Conflict of Interests: I am one of the author
We will most certainly look at these references and see how well they can be added to the narrative.