Following the 2001 end to negotiations on a legally binding protocol, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) states parties (SPs) developed entrenched positions about the necessity of a verification regime, hindering progress on treaty aims. This study aimed to facilitate dialogue on verification-related issues outside the context of those positions, using the term "assurance" to represent the degree of certainty that SPs are meeting their treaty obligations. From August 2020-July 2021, 36 interviews were conducted—16 SPs' delegations and 20 subject matter experts, representing 20 countries—and interview content was analyzed utilizing a mixed methods approach, including quantitative metrics on qualitative interview content. Interviewees' views on verification, compliance, and related concepts varied widely. Efforts by SPs to achieve common understanding on these topics could facilitate concrete progress in these important areas. While no single mechanism is sufficient to achieve verification or assess compliance, packages of mechanisms could increase assurance. There was general support for implementing assurance mechanisms, even in the absence of a comprehensive, legally binding protocol or verification regime, even among SPs for which that is the primary goal. Avenues to increase assurance among BWC stakeholders merit further discussion in the Intersessional Programme following the 9^th BWC Review Conference.

Biological events—including outbreaks and pandemics, biological weapons use, or accidental laboratory release—have the potential to be extremely disruptive. The ability to accurately investigate, identify origins of, and attribute these events is critical for deterring deliberate events and implementing interventions to prevent future natural or accidental events. However, historical examples of biological event attribution and origins investigations illustrate significant gaps in processes, from technical capabilities to communications, and have lacked conclusive consensus among decision makers, the public, and scientists. This study aimed to assess attitudes and expectations of a broad range of stakeholders regarding investigations and evidence generated for biological attribution. We interviewed 41 experts in disciplines related to attribution and investigations and analyzed interview content using a mixed-methods approach. Interviews generated a list of factors to consider when planning or conducting investigations, presented here. Opinions concerning the conduct and reporting of biological samples analyses and perceptions of feasibility of attribution varied among interviewees representing different fields of study. Participant opinions varied less in regard to requirements, protocols, and guidelines thought to be important to maintain confidence and trust in an investigation and evidence. Findings from this study can inform planning for future events.

In the absence of a treaty protocol or verification regime, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) instituted Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) as a mechanism to increase confidence in compliance, by enhancing transparency and mitigating ambiguities regarding states parties’ biological activities. While a promising tool to support treaty compliance, low participation, concerns regarding the completeness and accuracy of CBM submissions, a dearth of analysis, and restricted access to many submissions have limited CBMs’ value. Through interviews with 53 international experts—38 from BWC delegations and 15 independent experts—we identified concrete opportunities to increase CBMs’ value while mitigating the burden on states parties. This study supports states parties’ efforts in the BWC Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention, as part of a series of research on BWC assurance that aims to characterize challenges around BWC verification and increase certainty in BWC compliance.

Although the idea of making electric weapons has emerged since the beginning of the 20th Century, the great number of technological problems made that such technology was not developed. During the Cold War, the US strategic programme Space Defensive Initiative paid a special attention to this category of weapons, but the experiments have demonstrated that the prototypes are too big, very heavy, and involve a very high energy consumption and low reliability. Under these circumstances, the authors have noticed the trend to design new types of electric weapons starting from the hybridization of some technologies: the compressed flux weapons, the plasma electromagnetic cannon, the electromagnetic weapons as the coil-gun and rail-gun.

Over the years, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has seen a steady progress in development and evolution that can aid many sectors. Today, AI plays an essential role in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, and it is making its way into the military sector as well. Many countries are actively looking into AI military technology. Some of these innovations include image recognition, text analysis, Self-driving vehicles (SDV), gaming, robotic process automation (RPA) & Robotic and Autonomous Systems (RAS), and Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS). In this research, we discuss the advantages of each innovation mentioned and analyze the many different cybersecurity threats that awaken due to military artificial intelligence systems. We then discuss the open research areas to better improve the current state of military artificial intelligence applications in terms of ethics, system security, proper strategy plan, accepted responsibility matrix, and introduction of relevant laws.

Autonomous weapons systems (AWS), sometimes referred to as “killer robots”, are receiving evermore attention, both in public discourse as well as by scholars and policymakers. Much of this interest is connected with emerging ethical and legal problems linked to increasing autonomy in weapons systems, but there is a general underappreciation for the ways in which existing law might impact on these new technologies. In this paper, we argue that as AWS become more sophisticated and increasingly more capable than flesh-and-blood soldiers, it will increasingly be the case that such soldiers are “in the power” of those AWS which fight against them. This implies that such soldiers ought to be considered hors de combat, and not targeted. In arguing for this point, we draw out a broader conclusion regarding hors de combat status, namely that it must be viewed contextually, with close reference to the capabilities of combatants on both sides of any discreet engagement. Given this point, and the fact that AWS may come in many shapes and sizes, and can be made for many different missions, we argue that each particular AWS will likely need its own standard for when enemy soldiers are deemed hors de combat. We conclude by examining how these nuanced views of hors de combat status might impact on meaningful human control of AWS.

AGI could arise within the next decades, promising a decisive strategic advantage. This paper discusses risks, associated with the development of AGI: destabilizing effects on strategic balance, underestimating risks in the interest of victory in the race, egoistically exploiting the huge benefits by a tiny minority. Further: Developed AGI could be beyond human control. Human goals could not be implemented and an intelligence explosion to superintelligence could take place leading to a total loss of control and power. If competition for AGI is non-transparent, secret, uncontrolled and not regulated, it’s possible that risks could not be managed and would lead to catastrophic consequences. The danger corresponds to that of nuclear weapons. It is crucial that the key actors of a possible AI Race agree at an early stage on the prevention and transparent regulation of a possible AI Race - similar to measures to secure strategic stability, on arms control measures, disarmament, and prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The realization that an uncontrolled AI race can lead to the extinction of humanity - this time even independent of human will – requires analogous measures to contain, prevent, regulate and secure an AI race within the framework of AGI development.

AI is extraordinarily useful technology but it is becoming increasingly powerful with rapidly growing capabilities to disrupt and harm human society. We call on international and national organizations and individuals to join forces in banning the development of superintelligent AI and introducing regulations to prevent and mitigate AI-caused harm.