New analytical solutions of the heat conduction equation are presented in cylindrical and spherical coordinates. Then these solutions are reproduced with high accuracy by recent explicit and unconditionally stable finite difference methods. After this, real experimental data from the literature regarding a heated cylinder are reproduced by the explicit numerical methods as well as by Finite Element Methods (FEM) ANSYS workbench. Convection and nonlinear radiation are also considered on the boundary of the cylinder, and it is shown that the explicit methods are much more accurate than the commercial software.

We start with the discussion on misapplication of classical probability theory by Feynman in his analysis of the two slit experiment (by following the critical argumentation of Koopman, Ballentine, and the author of this paper). The seed of Feynman's conclusion on the impossibility to apply the classical probabilistic description for the two slit experiment is treatment of conditional probabilities corresponding to different experimental contexts as unconditional ones. Then we move to the Bell type inequalities. Bell applied classical probability theory in the same manner as Feynman and, as can be expected, he also obtained the impossibility statement. In contrast to Feynman, he formulated his no-go statement not in the probabilistic terms, but by appealing to nonlocality. This note can be considered as a part of the author's attempts for getting rid off nonlocality from quantum physics.

A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution system is introduced. The attack is based on 1) Utilizing the dc-voltage-source - which we put at Alice’s end in our mathematical modeling of the attack-that could exist due to errors, imbalances, Electromagnetic interference and etc.2) On studying the number of samples per bit in the security key that the measured Alice/Bob voltages exceeds or falls below a threshold voltage, respectively. The threshold voltage is the average between dc voltages across low and high resistors- generated by a dc-voltage source. We count the number of samples the voltage at Bob’s end (containing both the noise and dc components) exceeds the threshold voltage and how many times it falls below the threshold to judge whether the resistor can be guessed as low or high for every cycle. Also for a pre-specified key-length we count the number of high resistance estimations per bit –at Bob’s end-according to the previous criterion and the non-successful estimations per bit to judge the final guessed resistor value at Alice’s end and Bob’s end, where if we have more bits with most of its measured samples are above the threshold voltage then we will predict Bob’s resistance as high resistance, otherwise we predict Bob’s resistance to be low resistance. The Simulation was conducted and the attack proved that it is successful unless the temperature increased dramatically to ranges more than a threshold temperature ~ Kelvin that increases when the number of samples per bit increases.