The concept of a "circular economy" needs a more cogent theoretical anchor which will allow for transference of its goals and methods of attainment across cases. Tensions between ecological goals of this concept and the social implications of its implementation need to be addressed. This paper attempts to provide a theoretical framework for harnessing the strengths of a circular economy. Building on theories of social ecology which are predicated in Murray Bookchin's notion of "dialectical naturalism", the analysis presented here addresses some of the criticism of circular economic paradigms, such as their potential for stifling innovation or a neglect of human development challenges. A model for managing human "need" and "greed" within a circular economy framework is presented that also incorporates consumer choice and innovation. Planned obsolescence as a means of livelihood generation is also problematized with a view towards balancing durability of products on the one hand and ensuring throughput for manufacturing employment and innovation incentives on the other. Finally, the need for governance systems is considered to ensure that a planetary vision for a circular economy can be realized that efficiently harnesses local initiatives rather than an atomized and insular view of circularity.

The more than thirty spacetime theorems developed over the past five decades establish that the universe and its spacetime dimensions have emerged from a cause/Causal Agent beyond the cosmos. Thus, to infer that this cause/Causal Agent may have intervened in the origin and history of Earth and Earth’s life resides well within the bounds of reason. Meanwhile, proponents of each of the three prevailing naturalistic models for the origin and history of Earth’s life have marshalled arguments and evidence that effectively undermine and refute the other two models. A biblical perspective and approach to Earth’s life can help resolve this impasse. While a superficial and pervasive appeal to divine intervention thwarts scientific advance, so does a rigid adherence to naturalism. A productive way forward is to identify which models (or parts of models), whether naturalistic, theistic, or a combination, most effectively narrow, rather than widen, knowledge gaps, minimize anomalies, offer the most comprehensive and detailed explanation of the data, and prove most successful in predicting scientific discoveries.

Epistemological naturalism dismisses the notion that epistemology is a basis for the empirical sciences. In particular, it rejects the demand for a general justification of induction. Making inductive generalisations is a basic habit among humans. There is no such thing as a logic of inductive inference. The role of induction in science is heuristic; it is our way of inventing new theoretical predicates and developing theories. We discover new laws by applying inductive thinking; but this is not any kind of inference which can be evaluated as more or less rational.