Echoing the long-held JTB account of knowledge, according to which knowledge can be conceptually analyzed as justified true belief, Backes (2019) argues that our epistemic aim is to believe truly or accurately and emphasizes on that “a belief is justified iff it is highly probable”. We maintain that this line of reasoning is deficient, in terms of epistemic concerns and non-epistemic concerns of interest for both philosophy and legal theory. Specifically, in this short paper, we argue for the ineffectiveness of the aforementioned Backes’ view to meet the challenges posed by the ongoing rapid techno-scientific transformation of our contemporary societies and ways-of life.

The spread of ideas is a fundamental concern of today’s news ecology. Understanding the dynamics of the spread of information and its co-option by interested parties is of critical importance. Research on this topic has shown that individuals tend to cluster in echo-chambers and are driven by confirmation bias. In this paper, we leverage the active inference framework to provide an in silico model of confirmation bias and its effect on echo-chamber formation. We build a model based on active inference, where agents tend to sample information in order to justify their own view of reality, which eventually leads to them to have a high degree of certainty about their own beliefs. We show that, once agents have reached a certain level of certainty about their beliefs, it becomes very difficult to get them to change their views. This system of self-confirming beliefs is upheld and reinforced by the evolving relationship between agent's beliefs and its observations, which over time will continue to provide evidence for their ingrained ideas about the world. The epistemic communities that are consolidated by these shared beliefs, in turn, tend to produce perceptions of reality that reinforce those shared beliefs. We provide an active inference account of this community formation mechanism. We postulate that agents are driven by the epistemic value that they obtain from sampling or observing the behaviors of other agents. Inspired by digital social networks like Twitter, we build a generative model in which agents generate observable social claims or posts (e.g. `tweets') while reading the socially-observable claims of other agents, that lend support towards one of two mutually-exclusive abstract topics. Agents can choose which other agent they pay attention to at each timestep, and crucially who they attend to and what they choose to read influences their beliefs about the world. Agents also assess their local network’s perspective, influencing which kinds of posts they expect to see other agents making. The model was built and simulated simulated using the freely-available Python package pymdp. The proposed active inference model can reproduce the formation of echo-chambers over social networks, and gives us insight into the cognitive processes that lead to this phenomenon.

This paper is devoted to the foundational problems of dendrogramic holographic theory (DH-theory). We use the ontic-epistemic (implicate-explicate order) methodology. The epistemic counterpart is based on representation of data by dendrograms constructed with hierarchic clustering algorithms. The ontic Universe is described as the p-adic tree; it is zero dimensional, totally disconnected, disordered, and bounded (in p-adic ultrametric). Interrelation classical-quantum loses its sharpness; generally simple dendrograms are ``more quantum’’ than complex one. We use the CHSH-inequality as a measure of quantum(-likeness). We demonstrate that it can be violated by classical experimental data represented by dendrograms. The seed of this violation is neither nonlocality nor rejection of realism. This is nonergodicity of dendrogramic time series. Generally, violation of ergodicity is one of the basic features of DH-theory. We also consider DH-theory for Minkovski geometry and monitor the dependence of CHSH-violation and nonergodicity on geometry as well as a Lorentz transformation of data.

This paper presents four key results in the philosophy of language. Firstly, it distinguishes between partial and consistent assertion of a sentence, and introduces the concept of an equivocal sentence, which is both partially asserted and partially denied. Secondly, it proposes a novel definition of truth, stating that a true sentence is one that is consistently asserted. This definition avoids the Liar paradox, does not restrict classical logic, and applies to declarative sentences in the language used by any particular person. Thirdly, the paper introduces an epistemic model of language, called assertional language, which formalizes the definition of truth. Finally, it provides an argument for the falsity of so-called Liar sentences. The proposed definition of truth can be viewed as a formal account of the correspondence theory. The epistemic model is a powerful concept that allows for combining different languages in a meaningful way. This model is uniquely capable of reflecting on epistemic inconsistencies, such as logical paradoxes, in a consistent manner and without resorting to non-classical solutions.

This is a shortened and revised version of the article: A. Tyszka, Statements and open problems on decidable sets X⊆N, Pi Mu Epsilon J. 15 (2023), no. 8, 493-504. The main results were presented at the 25th Conference Applications of Logic in Philosophy and the Foundations of Mathematics, see http://applications-of-logic.uni.wroc.pl/XXV-Konferencja-Zastosowania-Logiki-w-Filozofii-i-Podstawach-Matematyki. We assume that the current mathematical knowledge is a finite set of statements which is time-dependent. In every branch of mathematics, the set of all knowable truths is the set of all theorems. This set exists independently of our current scientific knowledge. Nicolas D. Goodman observed in Synthese that epistemic notions increase the understanding of mathematics without changing its content as a formal science. This content remains also unchanged when the current mathematical knowledge leads to new conjectures. We explain the distinction between algorithms whose existence is provable in ZFC and constructively defined algorithms which are currently known. By using this distinction, we obtain non-trivial statements on decidable sets X⊆N that belong to constructive and informal mathematics and refer to the current mathematical knowledge on X. This and the next sentence justify the article title. For any empirical science, we can identify the current knowledge with that science because truths from the empirical sciences are not necessary truths but working models of truth from a particular context.

Many statistical distributions approximate well the frequent values of the maximum discharges, but have a very large spread for medium or rare probabilities of exceedance. This scattering defines a range of uncertainty of maximum discharges outside the measured values. Based on the upper (U) and lower (L) values of the uncertainty interval, a maximum discharge flood (MDF) and a maximum volume flood (MVF) are defined for each probability of exceedance. This approach is in agreement with the bivariate analysis, the contour lines for a certain probability of exceedance putting into evidence an infinity of couples (maximum discharge, flood volume). If the most critical combinations are selected, the MDF and MVF are derived. Apart from maximum discharge and flood volume, the shape of the design flood, characterized by the time to peak and the total duration, is also important. The easiest way to obtain the design flood is to use an analytical curve that passes through the characteristic points of the flood. Another possibility, which was largely developed in this paper, is to normalize the floods, then to define clusters of floods with similar shapes, and to obtain an average dimensionless flood for each class. Finally, a family of design floods with different shapes, but characterized by the same parameters for each probability of exceedance, are derived. The use of these floods in the design or operation of hydrotechnical works or in the delineation of flooded areas is presented at the end.

Epistemological naturalism dismisses the notion that epistemology is a basis for the empirical sciences. In particular, it rejects the demand for a general justification of induction. Making inductive generalisations is a basic habit among humans. There is no such thing as a logic of inductive inference. The role of induction in science is heuristic; it is our way of inventing new theoretical predicates and developing theories. We discover new laws by applying inductive thinking; but this is not any kind of inference which can be evaluated as more or less rational.

I introduce now for the first time the neutrosophic modal logic. The Neutrosophic Modal Logic includes the neutrosophic operators that express the modalities. It is an extension of neutrosophic predicate logic, and of neutrosophic propositional logic. In order for the paper to be self-contained, I also recall the etymology and definition of neutrosophy and of neutrosophic logic. Several examples are presented as well.