Human non-conscious reasoning is one of the most successful procedures developed to solve everyday problems in an efficient way. This is why the field of artificial intelligence should analyze, formalize and emulate the multiple ways of non-conscious reasoning with the purpose of applying them in knowledge based systems, neurocomputers and similar devices for aiding people in the problem-solving process. In this paper, a framework for those non-conscious ways of reasoning is presented based on object-oriented representations, fuzzy sets and multivalued logic.

Self-conscious emotions, such as shame and guilt, play a fundamental role in regulating moral behavior and in promoting the welfare of the society. Despite their relevance, the neural bases of these emotions are uncertain. In the present meta-analysis, we performed a systematic literature review in order to single out functional neuroimaging studies on healthy individuals specifically investigating the neural substrates of shame, embarrassment and guilt. Seventeen studies investigating the neural correlates of shame/embarrassment, and seventeen studies investigating guilt brain representation met our inclusion criteria. The analyses revealed that both guilt and shame/embarrassment were associated with the activation of the left anterior insula, involved in emotional awareness processing, and arousal. Guilt specific areas were located within the left temporo-parietal junction, which is thought to be involved in social cognitive processes. Moreover, specific activations for shame/embarrassment involved areas related to social pain (dorsal anterior cingulate, insula, thalamus), behavioral inhibition (premotor cortex) networks. This pattern of results might reflect distinct action tendencies associated with the two emotions.

Within the field of guilt and shame, two competing perspectives have been advanced. The first, the social-adaptive perspective, proposes that guilt is an inherently adaptive emotion and shame is an inherently maladaptive emotion; thus, those interested in moral character development and psychopathology should work to increase an individual’s guilt-proneness and decrease an individual’s shame-proneness. The functionalist perspective, in contrast, argues that both guilt and shame can serve a person adaptively or maladaptively—depending on the situational appropriateness, duration, intensity, and so forth. This paper reviews the research conducted supporting both positions, critiques some issues with the most widely used guilt- and shame-proneness measure in the social-adaptive research (the TOSCA), and discusses the differences in results found when assessing guilt and shame at the state versus trait level. The conclusion drawn is that although there is broad support for the functionalist perspective across a wide variety of state and trait guilt/shame studies, the functionalist perspective does not yet have the wealth of data supporting it that has been generated by the social-adaptive perspective using the TOSCA. Thus, before a dominant perspective can be identified, researchers need to (1) do more research assessing how the social-adaptive perspective compares to the functionalist perspective at the state level, and (2) do more trait research within the functionalist perspective to compare functionalist guilt- and shame-proneness measures with the TOSCA.

Advanced electrode designs have made single-unit neural recordings commonplace among modern neuroscience research. However, single-unit resolution remains out of reach for the intrinsic neurons of the gastrointestinal system. Single-unit recordings of the enteric (gut) nervous system have been conducted in anesthetized animal models and excised tissue, but there is a large physiological gap between awake and anesthetized animals, particularly for the enteric nervous system. Here, we describe the opportunity for advancing enteric neuroscience offered by single-unit recording capabilities in awake animals. We highlight the primary challenges to microelectrodes in the gastrointestinal system including structural, physiological, and signal quality challenges.

Abstract. Can we nowadays keep a qualitative difference between the primitive and advanced Theory-of-Mind? The old criteria have become blurry. In addition, it is clear that in ‘apes’ lifestyle’ it is not necessary to use the communicative-cognitive basic abilities which became indispensable in ‘the new lifestyle’. Thus, it is usual to conclude that apes would have to some degree such abilities. However, this article tries to reformulate and defend that qualitative difference. Thus, after underlining the contrast between two kinds of mental states (‘contents’ and ‘expectations’), I apply it to the detection of foreign mental states as well. Then, three points are proposed: First, ‘vicarious expectations’ sustain the primitive ToM; second, a subject can have no expectation of inner states which are intrinsically impossible for him; third, the state of interacting with ourselves as with a different person –e.g., the thinking what others think of us– cannot be a vicarious expectation of ours, but it requires the estimation of foreign contents. From this hypothesis, I deduce that vicarious expectations are unable to sustain self-conscious emotions or the really effective reception of pointing gestures. These abilities could appear only when ‘the estimation of foreign contents’ –i.e., the origin of the advanced ToM– arose.

The mind-body problem is the central issue in both of philosophy and life science for several centuries. To date, there is still no conclusive theory to interpret the relation between the mind and the body, even just the mind alone. Here, we promote a novel model, a derived mathematic equation called the entropic system equation, to describe the innate characters of the mind and the mechanism of the mind-body coupling phenomenon. As the semi-open thermodynamic systems far from equilibrium, the living organisms could be logically considered as an entropic system. In the living organisms or the entropic systems, there also are three essential existing elements including mass, energy and information, in which the mind and the body are hypothetically coupled by free energy and entropic force.