In 2021, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and global food insecurity, the Nigerian poultry sector was yet exposed to highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus and its economic challenges. Between 2021 and 2022, HPAI caused 467 outbreaks reported in 31 of the 37 administrative regions in Nigeria. In this study, we characterized the genome of 97 influenza A viruses of the subtypes H5N1, H5N2 and H5N8 identified in different agro-ecological zones and farms during the 2021-2022 epidemic. The phylogenetic analysis of the HA genes showed widespread distribution of the H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b and similarity with the HPAI H5Nx viruses detected in Europe since late 2020. Topology of the phylogenetic trees indicates the occurrence of several independent introductions of the virus into the country followed by a regional evolution of the virus most probably linked to its persistent circulation in West African territories. An additional evidence of the evolutionary potential of HPAI viruses circulating in this region is the identification in this study of a putative H5N1/H9N2 reassortant virus in a mixed-species commercial poultry farm. Our data confirm Nigeria as a crucial hotspot for HPAI virus introduction from the Eurasian territories and reveal a dynamic pattern of avian influenza virus evolution within the Nigerian poultry population.

H9N2 avian influenza viruses have become globally widespread in poultry over the last two decades and represent a genuine threat both to the global poultry industry but also humans through their high rates of zoonotic infection and pandemic potential. H9N2 viruses are generally hyperendemic in effected countries and have been found in poultry in many new regions in recent years. In this review we examine the current global spread of H9N2 avian influenza viruses as well as their host range, tropism, transmission routes and the risk posed by these viruses to human health.

We investigated the effect of C. psittaci and H9N2 coinfection on HD11 cells in vitro, expecting to find the potential pathogenesis of airsacculitis caused by co-infection of C. psittaci and H9N2. HD11 cells were infected with C. psittaci and/or H9N2 in a different order, and effects of the co-infection on iNOS expression and activity, NO synthesis, cell phagocytosis, and cytokines levels in HD11 cells were determined. Results showed that C. psittaci and H9N2 can significantly aggravate the mortality of HD11 cells compared to the effects of infection with one pathogen alone. In addition, infection with C. psittaci can increase the replication of H9N2 in HD11 cells, whereas decrease the iNOS level and enzyme activity as well as NO concentration of HD11 cells by H9N2 infection. We also found that C. psittaci infection alone can significantly decrease the phagocytosis of HD11 cells, compared to H9N2 infection alone. Furthermore, infection with C. psittaci can increase the mRNA expressions of type Th2 cytokines IL-6 and IL-10 of HD11 cells by H9N2 infection. All the above data indicated that primary C. psittaci infection is able to aggravate H9N2 invasion by down-regulating functions of HD11 cells

The Influenza A virus (IAV) is a highly infectious virus that poses a significant threat to global public health and food supplies. The current subtype of avian influenza virus (AIV), H5N1, is being closely monitored worldwide due to its unprecedented spread from Europe to North America and now to Central and South America. This review summarizes recent updates on the evolution of the different IAV subtypes in birds and mammals including humans, in Chile. The distribution and spread of AIV H5N1 in Chile indicated a complex interplay between ecological and human factors in that it was negatively correlated with distance to the closest urban center and precipitation and temperature seasonality. It is evident that highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 in Chile was introduced from North America via the Atlantic migratory flyways as opposed to local transmission from other countries in South America. The presence of these viruses in Chile underscores the need for increased biosecurity on poultry farms and continuous genomic surveillance approaches to understand and control AIVs in both wild and domestic bird populations in Chile.

A comparative efficacy of apathogenic genotype I (V4) and lentogenic genotype II (LaSota) strains of live Newcastle disease virus (NDV) vaccines was done following vaccination with pathogen-associated molecular pattern (PAMP) H9N2 avian influenza vaccine and challenge with velogenic NDV genotype VII.1.1 (vNDV-VII.1.1). Eight groups (Gs) of day-old chicks were used (n=25). Groups 1-4 received a single dose of PAMP-H9N2 subcutaneously, while Gs (1, 5) and (2, 6) received eye drops of V4 and LaSota respectively as twice doses. All Gs except 4 and 8 were intramuscularly challenged with vNDV-VII.1.1 at 28th days of age. No signs were detected in Gs 1, 5, 4, and 8. The mortality rates were 0% in Gs 1, 4, 5, and 8; 40% in G2; 46.66% in G6; and 100% in Gs 3 and 7. Lesions were recorded as minimal in Gs 1 and 5, but mild to moderate in Gs 2 and 6. The lowest significant viral shedding was detected in Gs 1, 2, and 5. In conclusion, two successive vaccinations of broilers with a live V4 NDV vaccine provided a higher protection against vNDV-VII.1.1 challenge than LaSota. Besides, PAMP-H9N2 with live NDV vaccines induced more protection than live vaccine alone.

Influenza A viruses (IAV) are widespread viruses affecting avian and mammalian species worldwide. Outbreaks of IAV in poultry are usually associated with substantial morbidity and mortality, significantly affecting the poultry industry and food security. IAVs from avian species can be transmitted to mammals including humans and, thus, they are of inherent pandemic concern. Most of the efforts to understand the pathogenicity and transmission of avian origin IAVs have been focused on H5 and H7 subtypes due to their highly pathogenic phenotype in poultry. However, IAV of the H9 subtype that circulate endemically in poultry flocks in some regions of the world have also been associated with cases of zoonotic infections. As a result, the World Health Organization includes avian origin H9N2 IAV among the top in the list of IAVs of pandemic concern. In this review, we discuss the interspecies transmission of H9N2 between avian and mammalian species and the molecular factors that are thought relevant for this spillover. Additionally, we discuss factors that have been associated with the ability of these viruses to transmit through the respiratory route in mammalian species.

A brief overview of the past and present trajectories made by the A(H5N1) avian influenza virus among domestic birds, avian and mammalian wildlife species and humans is presented here, thereby taking into special account the 2.3.4.4b clade of the virus recently emerged in several geographic areas of the globe.

Human infections caused by the H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) sporadically threaten public health. The susceptibility of HPAIVs to baloxavir acid (BXA), a new class of inhibitors for the influenza virus cap-dependent endonuclease, has been confirmed in vitro, but it has not yet been fully characterized. Here, the efficacy of BXA against HPAIVs, including recent H5N8 variants, was assessed in vitro. The antiviral efficacy of baloxavir marboxil (BXM) in H5N1 virus-infected mice was also investigated. BXA exhibited similar in vitro activities against H5N1, H5N6, and H5N8 variants tested in comparison with seasonal and other zoonotic strains. Compared with oseltamivir phosphate (OSP), BXM monotherapy in mice infected with the H5N1 HPAIV clinical isolate, the A/Hong Kong/483/1997 strain, also caused a significant reduction in viral titers in the lungs, brains, and kidneys, thereby preventing acute lung inflammation and reducing mortality. Furthermore, compared with BXM or OSP monotherapy, combination treatments with BXM and OSP using a 48-hour delayed treatment model showed a more potent effect on viral replication in the organs, accompanied by improved survival. In conclusion, BXM has a potent antiviral efficacy against H5 HPAIV infections.

Between October 2021 and April 2022, 317 outbreaks caused by highly pathogenic avian influen-za (HPAI) H5N1 viruses were notified in poultry farms in the northeastern Italian Regions. The complete genomes of 214 strains were used to estimate the genetic network based on the virus similarity. An exponential random graph model (ERGM) was used to assess the effect of at-risk contacts, same owners, in-bound/out-bound risk windows overlap, genetic differences, geograph-ic distances, same species and poultry company, on the probability of observing a link within the genetic network, which can be interpreted as the potential propagation of the epidemic via lateral spread or a common source of infection. The variables same poultry company (Est.=0.548, C.I.=[0.179;0.918]) and risk windows overlap (Est.=0.339, C.I.=[0.309;0.368]) were associated with a higher probability of link formation, while the genetic differences (Est.=-0.563, C.I.=[-0.640;-0.486]) and geographic distances (Est.=-0.058, C.I.=[-0.078;-0.038]) indicated a re-duced probability. The integration of epidemiological data with genomic analyses allows moni-toring the epidemic evolution and helps explain the dynamics of lateral spreads suggesting the potential diffusion routes. The 2021-2022 epidemic stresses the need to further strengthen the bi-osecurity measures, and to encourage the reorganisation of the poultry production sector to mini-mize the impact of future epidemics.

In 2021/2022, the re-emergence of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) occurred in Europe. The outbreak was seeded from two sources, resident and reintroduced viruses, which is unprecedented in the recorded history of avian influenza. The dominating subtype was H5N1, representing a reversion to the original A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996-like subtype combination. In this study, we present a whole genome sequence and a phylogenetic analysis of 57 H5N1 HPAI and two low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H5N1 strains collected in the Czech Republic during 2021/2022. Phylogenetic analysis revealed close relationships between H5N1 genomes from poultry and wild birds and secondary transmission in commercial geese. The genotyping showed considerable genetic heterogeneity among Czech H5N1 viruses with six different HPAI genotypes, three of which were apparently unique. In addition, second-order reassortment relationships were observed with the direct involvement of co-circulating H5N1 LPAI strains. The genetic distance between Czech H5N1 HPAI and the closest LPAI segments available in the database illustrates the profound gaps in our knowledge of circulating LPAI strains. The changing dynamics of HPAI in the wild may increase the likelihood of future HPAI outbreaks and present new challenges in poultry management, biosecurity, and surveillance.

Since 2007, highly pathogenic clade 2.3.2 H5N1 avian influenza A [A(H5N1)] viruses have evolved to clade 2.3.2.1a, b and c, and currently only 2.3.2.1c A(H5N1) viruses circulate in wild birds and poultry. During antigenic evolution, clade 2.3.2.1a and c A(H5N1) viruses acquired both S144N and V223I mutations around the receptor binding site of hemagglutinin (HA), with S144N generating an N-glycosylation sequon. We introduced single or combined reverse mutations, N144S and/or I223V, into the HA gene of clade 2.3.2.1c A(H5N1) virus and generated PR8-derived, 2 + 6 recombinant A(H5N1) viruses. When we compared replication efficiency in embryonated chicken eggs, mammalian cells and mice, the recombinant virus containing both N144S and I223V mutations showed increased replication efficiency in avian and mammalian hosts and pathogenicity in mice. The N144S mutation significantly decreased avian receptor affinity and egg white inhibition, but not all mutations increased mammalian receptor affinity. Interestingly, the combined reverse mutations dramatically increased the thermostability of HA. Therefore, the adaptive mutations possibly acquired to evade avian immunity may decrease viral thermostability as well as mammalian pathogenicity.

The Influenza A Virus (IAV) represents an enveloped, positive-sense and single-stranded RNA-based virus that infects mammals mainly via the respiratory system, although other bodily systems are also infected and undergo various extents of inflammatory pathogenesis. There are two well-known strains of IAV that cause life-threatening disease in mammals; H1N1 and H5N1, and the first strain caused the 1918 IAV H1N1 pandemic that claimed between 30 and 50 million human lives. Due to the significant ability of IAV to evade important immune recognition, the virus was observed to favor the onset of secondary microbial infections (i.e. bacterial or fungal), as the overall performance of the immune system became transiently weakened during the viral infection. During the IAV H1N1 pandemic, many patients died as a result of bacterial pneumonia, as pathogenic bacteria, such as Streptococcus pneumoniae and Haemophilus influenzae, gained a wider opportunity to colonize and infect vital areas of the lower respiratory tract, and such a phenomenon led to the excessive, prophylactic usage of antibiotics due to the increased levels of panic, which in turn favored the natural selection of bacteria with genes that became resistant to such antibiotics. Antibiotics might be required for usage solely when bacteria are known to be colonizing vital areas of the human body, and this aspect is tricky, as colonization is asymptomatic and screening is consequently rare. Recently, new variants of the avian IAV H5N1 strain were transmitted from live, infected birds to mammals, including humans in some isolated cases, and given that there have already been several zoonotic spillover events overall since the beginning of 2023, we are rapidly approaching the time when a zoonotic spillover into humans will mark the first epidemic outbreak of the avian flu in humans. A lethality rate of 60% was projected by the World Health Organization, as the virus was shown to favor the development of life-threatening hyper-inflammatory responses at the levels of alveolar tissues constituted by Type II pneumocytes. There are hints that novel variants of H5N1 are capable of infecting the intestinal layer, as recently, two dolphins died as a result of ingesting infected birds within the area of the British Isles. IAV is known to suppress the production and transmission of Type I Interferons by expressing various non-structural proteins (NSPs), such as NSP1, which was found to be also packaged into exosomes and transmitted to neighboring uninfected cells, thereby preventing them from responding to the virus in the first place. A more pronounced rate of innate immune evasion would probably be observed in H5N1 IAV infection than in the infection caused by recent variants of H1N1 IAV. The H5N1 strain of IAV was also found to secrete a higher concentration of NSP1 than SARS-CoV-2, indicating the existence of an association to the greater mortality rate of H5N1 IAV infection. A direct, prophylactic stimulation of the interferon system using a reduced oral or nasal dosage of recombinant anti-inflammatory and anti-viral interferon glycoproteins may represent the most viable approach to prevent an emergence of a life-threatening H5N1 IAV pandemic. A similar non-invasive approach could be developed for an Marburg Virus (MARV) and a Nipah Virus (NiV) infection of humans, as risks of the emergence of a Marburg epidemic and also of a Nipah epidemic may be substantial at this stage as well. Clinical testing of clinical approaches as such could be of critical importance at the moment. Animals could also benefit from related clinical approaches. Somatic natural and adaptive lymphocytes treated with IFN I and III could also constitute a substantial approach of immunization and heavily favor an indefinite shift in the evolutionary battle between the host organism and microbes of public health concern.