Background: People with Williams syndrome (WS) are characterized with hypersociability, fluency in languages, and advantageous face-processing skills, leading to the proposal of a social module. Previous studies on the mentalizing abilities of people with WS using two-dimensional pictures and mindreading from eyes, including normal-like, delayed, and deviant behaviors, have yielded mixed results. This study thus examined the mentalizing ability of people with WS through structured computerized animations of false belief tasks to investigate whether inferences about other people’s minds can be improved in this population. Method: Participants were shown animations with unexpected location and content changes. After viewing each animation, participants had to answer four types of questions: character identification, reality, memory, and false belief. Their responses were recorded and analyzed. Results: Comprehension of false belief was observed in 4-year-old healthy children, whereas children with WS showed unsuccessful comprehension of false belief (until they attained a mental age of 5.3 years), suggesting an improvement in theory of mind resulting from viewing structured computerized animations. This age is earlier than that reported by previous studies for using theory of mind to pass false belief tests (8.5 years old), even challenging the age at which individuals failed to pass the tests (12.10 years old). Conclusions: Structured computerized animations enhanced the mentalizing ability of people with WS to a certain extent. Compared to the typically developing controls, people with WS presented with a lower developmental level in processing false belief tasks. The educational implication of this study is to develop computerized social skills interventions for people with WS.

Background: People with Down syndrome (DS) have a trisomy of chromosome 21 and marked deficits in verbal memory but relatively preserved visuospatial perception. Verbal memories are related to semantic knowledge. Little is known about the organization of semantic knowledge in people with DS, which was the aim of this study. Aims: The extent of false memory in people with DS was examined. Possible differences in the number of false memories induced by nominal and verbal themes were examined. Methods and Procedures: In the study phase, ten word lists with semantically related associates were presented. In the recognition phase, participants made judgments on whether each word had been represented previously as semantically related lures, old words, and semantically unrelated new words. Outcomes and Results: Differences in the processing of nominal and verbal theme-related lures were observed among people with DS. When processing nominal theme-related lures, people with DS showed delayed false positives. When processing verbal theme-related lures, people with DS showed no differences compared to controls. Similar patterns have been observed in people with DS when processing nominal theme-related associates and verbal theme-related associates. People with DS have delayed recognition of associates. When processing unrelated words, they showed significantly higher false positives than controls for both nominal and verbal eliciting themes. Further analyses of the themes revealed differences in false positives across syntactic categories among groups. Conclusions and Implications: People with DS showed a delayed recognition of associates and deviance in recognizing unrelated words in the nominal and verbal theme categories. People with DS were delayed in terms of nouns, but deviated with verbs in associated and unrelated words. Additionally, people with DS showed distinct patterns in processing five nominal lures and three verbal lures, suggesting that they formed false memories differently based on distinct syntactic categories. Thus, it was concluded that people with DS develop a deviant semantic structure. Category-based interventions for people with DS should be implemented in order to improve their semantic knowledge through lexical connections.