Field experiments

**Finland**

*KELA*

Kangas et al., 2019, 2020 [63, 64]

Finland

2017-2018 Period of evaluation on employment: November 2017 - October 2018

If the conditionality is removed, does labour activation increase? Then the study of other consequences of its implementation is introduced

Distribute and recognize the subsidy system that previously existed in the country

The entire population of the rural community (minimum 1/16 Cherokee blood)

Equal amount paid to all members of the community. Estimated amount about USD 10,000 per year in two payments (25% of North Dakota GDP per capita)

Increase of days of work activity than the control group: total: 28 in the control group and 59 in the experiment

170,000 unemployed with benefits. All the population with these conditions in Finland

Increase of food security and a probability of decrease in women of 0.9 hours per week in job demand, a probability of increase of the supply in men

Improvement in health, self-confidence, in others and institutions; increase in economic security and freedom of choice; reduction of the bureaucratic trap

Improvements in physical and mental health, food security, housing stability, financial situation and relationships, reducing their living standards, as well as some of self-esteem and hope for a better future

There was a drastic decrease in juvenile delinquency and an improvement in variables related to mental and emotional health

The study was not done expressly, but the study with different objectives was used

Notes: Shows that you cannot improve your condition from unconditional to conditional one, it does not reduce the motivation to look for work, nor the poverty either, apart from increasing well-being

Foundation: Kela, Finland

Insurance: permanent, social security

Funding: 2.000

People: 15.000

**Ontario (Canada)**

Government of Ontario, Ministry of Social Services

Pardosi et al. (2020) [65]

Canada

2017 to March 2019 (planned until April 2020)

Hammond, Brantford, Brant County

Experiment with the aim of replicating it in the whole country

Online surveys and in-depth interviews

4,000 people with low incomes aged 18 to 64

Negative income tax (NIT) for 3 years

Not applicable

Increase in government spending (from USD 225 million to 266.3 million per year)

Improvement in employment, education, income, increase in demand for local products

There was a drastic decrease in juvenile delinquency and an improvement in variables related to mental and emotional health

The study was not done expressly, but the study with different objectives was used

Notes: Shows that you cannot improve your condition from unconditional to conditional one, it does not reduce the motivation to look for work, nor the poverty either, apart from increasing well-being

Foundation: Government of Ontario, Canada

Insurance: permanent, social security

Funding: 4.000

People: 15.000

**Kenya**

GisD: Directly Foundation

Innovations for Poverty Action; Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (MIT); https://www.gisdirectly.org/ki-study/


In international aid, more often than not it is driven directly to the poor as cash

Combined BCT and saturation, with a control group. Follow-up surveys: first in 2018, then ever 3 x 3 years. They analyze a large number of impacts: use of time, risk taking, economic status, gender, aspirations and life prospects

20,000 out of 197 villages, plus 100 from control

To be determined. Results of the first survey of 2019 not yet available

To be determined. Results of the first survey of 2019 not yet available

Funding: GisD: Directly Foundation

Insurance: Permanent, social security

Funding: 20.000

People: 6.500

**India**

Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA)


India

June 2011 - November 2012

Madhya Pradesh

Determine the effects of UBI implementation in the short-term, long-term and in a single payment

Analysis through BCT, with several rounds of surveys: an initial one (2013), an intermediate one, another one and last 4 years after the end (2017)

All the residents of 9 random villages

Rs 200 per month is given to each adult, 100 to children the first year, 300 and 150 respectively the second year

Increase productive work: 21% (9% in control), increase of economic activity: 19.4% (7.2% in control), increase in self-employment: 40% to 62% (control) Child labour reduced by 20% compared to 5% in the control population

Increase food sufficiency from 52% to 78% (38% to 57% in control); increase inflation from 39% to 50% (46% to 58% in control); increase food consumption; improved health; debt reduction by 73%

Notes: Shows that you cannot improve your condition from unconditional to conditional one, it does not reduce the motivation to look for work, nor the poverty either, apart from increasing well-being

Foundation: UNICEF

Insurance: permanent, social security

Funding: Approx. 6,000 people plus others from the control group

People: Approx. 1,000
| Committee formed by an alliance of 
churches, unions and civil society 
coordinated and promoted by the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Namibia  |
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<td>Namibia</td>
<td>January 2008 to December 2009</td>
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| Otjiyearo-Omitara | Committee formed by an alliance of 
churches, unions and civil society 
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Evangelical Lutheran Church of Namibia  |
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<td>Haarmann et al. (2008, 2009) [77] [78]</td>
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The basic objective of this coalition was to convince the Namibian government that the introduction of a UBI throughout the country would reduce poverty and inequality, in addition to serving as an economic catalyst. Everyone who resided in the location the previous year except those over 60 with a public pension. Cash payment to the entire population of Otjivero first and then also of Omitara: 100 Namibian dollars per month, for two years. Not applicable. Increase work activity and entrepreneurship.

- There is no difference in choice between work/leisure with or without UBI.
- The introduction of a UBI increases work offer and incentives, and, furthermore, more than a NIT (experiment 1). Secondly, although the offer rises in all of them, it rises more in people with more competitive and individualistic characters (experiment 2); and, finally, it does not necessarily follow that there is a libertarian effect for the subject groups, such as women, children or the disabled (experiment 3).
- Participation and hours worked decrease when tax neutrality and very high income tax rates are imposed, and yet they rise with more moderate tax rates [103]. Labour supply increases due to those who received a benefit that rises despite the fact that those who have increased taxes (much less in net terms) could be discouraged from employment [115].
- It shows that, despite the fact that for different groups the results are different in terms of the increase or reduction of the labour supply (different elasticity), the overall net effect is favourable [116]. The introduction of a UBI instead of the current conditional system in Germany would eliminate the unemployment trap and increase labour participation, in addition to the positive effects on well-being [117].
- The result is not significant (variation in annual average hours of work for both men (between -0.1% and -0.6%) and women (between -0.1% and -2.6%).
- Although the results in general may be ambiguous, they are favourable as a greater incentive to employment in the poorest population (1st and 2nd quintiles) [123] [124], especially those who are currently receiving some type of conditional aid due to the elimination of the effects of poverty, unemployment and bureaucratic traps, due to the uncertainty of getting back the lost benefit or undergoing an unaffordable delay [125]. Disincentives are also observed for women in a couple with part-time jobs.
- The effects on employment are very low in all cases: it falls slightly in some and rises slightly in other mechanisms and for different countries.
- The introduction of a UBI increases work incentives for the primary income earners in couples and decreases for the secondary, usually women.

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<td>Snell &amp; Marjolin (2004) [105]</td>
<td>Sommer 2016 [114], Gilroy et al. [2013] [117], Horsterer et al. [2010] [118], Colombino (2009) [119]</td>
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<td>Creedy &amp; Dawkins (2002) [115]</td>
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<td>Colombino &amp; Nazaret, 2013 [121], Colombino, 2013 [122]</td>
<td>Martinelli, (2017 a y b) [123][124], Kalliomaa-Pahkala et al. (2016) [125]</td>
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<th>European Union</th>
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- Increase work activity and entrepreneurship.
- Decrease child malnutrition from 42% to 10%, decrease poverty, decrease petty crime, increase schooling by 92%, increase medical assistance.
- There is no difference in choice between work/leisure with or without UBI.
- The introduction of a UBI increases work offer and incentives, and, furthermore, more than a NIT (experiment 1). Secondly, although the offer rises in all of them, it rises more in people with more competitive and individualistic characters (experiment 2); and, finally, it does not necessarily follow that there is a libertarian effect for the subject groups, such as women, children or the disabled (experiment 3).
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