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International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOS) and their impact on The Democratization of Developing Countries: The Case of Nigeria

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Abstract: The paper examines the impact of INGOs on the democratization of developing countries. Following the 'end of history,' the INGOs multiplied globally, and the number of aids to developing countries was given through them in billions of dollars in the past three decades. It is envisaged that with the increase in their population, the developing countries will be better off with a standard form of living that is attributable to standard democratization. However, despite the billions of dollars spent, the citizens of the developing countries are still worse in poverty, poor leadership, and corruption. On the contrary, some countries, including Nigeria, are threatening legislation that will curtail the INGOs, sighting their opacity and lack of tangible results as reasons. The research used Nigeria as a case study to analyze the methods, approaches, and the capacity of these INGOs and how they affect the democratization of their host countries. Through a review of existing records, non-participatory observations, and reviews of conference proceedings. The paper analyzed the parallel gaps that exist by arguing that, taking a broad, multi-disciplinary method from the various works of literature studied will provide essential conceptual and practical insights that can inform current debates

Keywords:1; INGOs 2; Democratization 3; Funding 4; Developing-countries 5; better-living

Introduction

The general growing notion among researchers and observers is that International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) are failing in their roles. The INGOs are set up with different goals to achieve. The standard being to extend democratization, enhance development, and alleviate suffering among the ordinary people of developing nations. The INGOs are estimated to be "the 8th largest economy in the world. They worth over \$1 trillion a year globally. They employ nearly 19 million paid workers, and they spend about \$US15 billion on development each year" (Hall-Jones, 2006, p. 1). Despite vast riches and support, critiques believe they are failing in their duties. Researches have shown that the target population they are trying to help improve is mostly worsening or are slowly moving below the expected pace over the same period the INGOs are booming. Instead of extending support where the hands of the government can not reach both locally and internationally, The INGOs members of staff, consultants, and associates are more enriched than the people they are trying to assuage. In the developing countries, the INGOs are paly a role of the liberators of hardships. The hope increases as the and lingers in the regions as these multinational organizations expand. Because of opportunities and lingering problems, these organizations offer to alleviate. The INGOs enjoyed a remarkable growth proportionately around the world. In the 1900s, there were just about 69 NGOs registered with the United Nations with the capacity to act internationally. Today there are more than 47,000 International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) registered to operate globally, with more than 2,000 acting as consultants for the United Nations. Notwithstanding the number of local Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) working

locally. In India, there are close to two million NGOs, and in Russia, more than 227,000 NGOs operate in the Soviet country. The Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), an organization established to handle company allied matters in Nigeria, listed more than 46,000 NGOs in operations in Nigeria. The proliferation of these international organizations and groups as major actors and players in the global system paved the way for a renewed hope that for the underrepresented. These organizations promised optimism to hinge on the existing NGOs. The highest point is the reliance is that it will help the countries to a better life through the establishment of democratic norms and principles. Common democratic standards like transparency, accountability, civic participation, service to the people, human rights, and better living becomes the deliverables. Deliverables that are yet to be seen nor effectively delivered in the developing countries. The principles of democratization, such as open governance, transparency, and accountability, accessibility to information that should be growing, are stagnant at best. The life hardships these norms target to ease become worse; hence, further increasing and widening the gap between the rich and poor. Showing that, despite progress made towards implementing open governance, the level of poverty still increases, this is accompanied by increased insecurity and corruption despite the expended billions of dollars over time. Furthermore, it continues to happen despite the beautiful intentions and projections, with the growth of the INGOs and the Local NGOs. The anticipated democratization and growth in better living in developing nations seem more further than nearer. Begging the question, has the INGOs failed in their role? A problem this research set out to explore.

The INGOs assured hope to the world and proposed solutions to the developing nations, in particular, to help them build the right democracy. In the words of Melena and Heinrich, (2007), they (the advocate of INGOs) "postulate a link between NGOs and crucial social and political goals, such as transparency, development, good governance, poverty reduction, and social justice" (p. 3). They postulate a direct impact and result in an ordinary person. They are linking their solutions to the growing understanding that many issues that challenge tenets of democracy are part of the whole creation and consequences of globalization rather than just national or actions within a state. These boosted their justifications to garner the might and ease to spread their activities internationally and get acceptance anywhere they go in the international communities, with exclusive reliance on bigger INGOs that have global coverage.

Several scholars opined favoring the role of INGOs in consolidating democratic development and good governance by their autonomy. The existence of INGOs brings different interest groups to have more influence and act as a 'watchdog' and create more opportunities for citizens to mount pressure on state officials. Garrison (2000) maintains that INGOs have become the most critical drivers of civic engagements, having flourished to be the 'microorganisms' of the governance process. (Clark, 2000) credited the rapid growth and 'associational revolution' in some developing countries like Indonesia, Cambodia, Philippines, and Thailand to the political role INGOs played. Commenting on the role played by INGOs in the region, Silliman and Noble stated that "NGOs enhance democracy by expanding the number and range of voices addressing the government." (Silliman and Noble, 1998 p.35). The World Bank affirms the scholars' postulations by recognizing INGOs' role in communicating citizens' aspirations, and mounting pressures on the government to respond to their ambitions. According to the Bank, INGOs' positions lead to broader, thereby counteracting excesses of undemocratic systems (World Bank, 2000). Active INGOs that inspire citizen participation across many sectors encourage decentralization in many countries, particularly developing countries with multi-ethnic local identities (World Bank, 2000).

Abortively, years into the journey of these INGOs, the anticipated results are dented and can not be directly measured to have a direct impact on the citizens. The apparent lack of results, scholars are beginning to note the limited tools for NGO monitoring (Melena, and Heinrich, 2007). The broader public perspective and interest that the advocacy approach for policy reform will quickly reform to good governance is becoming false. The assumption that the expansion of the activities of the NGOs will also automatically mean better results is still missing. Moreover, the general assumption that information is power seems to yield fewer results than expected (Badiou, 2007; Brown, 2017). The

INGOs are regularly facing criticism as principles of civil societies are not guiding their core activities. As a result, not representing the target beneficiaries, they are meant to serve and are accountable to dubious donors and governments rather than the grassroots communities. Their actions target and address needs for an emergency and do not address long term problems, unlike mainstream CSOs that encourage citizenship and state-building. Despite these problems, These doubts were supported by a history that shows decades into the triumph of liberalism and the civil liberties of INGOs; the citizens of the developing nations are still worse in poverty, poor leadership and corruption (Brown, 2011). Billions of dollars were spent as a support to different INGOs in the developing nations during these periods, especially after the Millennium Development in the year 2000.

To developing countries like Nigeria: corruption, conflicts, and poverty are not just variables or concepts but a reality. The fact that tears apart the societies and creates havoc. Understanding, measuring, and comparing approaches of INGOs over space and time will help in understanding what factors influence its 'strength' or 'weakness' on democratization. Thereby creating a room for a better appraisal of programs aimed at supporting INGOs, and assist the developing nations to establish whether or not efforts to strengthen their NGO. Furthermore, measuring INGOs and its impacts on democratization will also help to promote comparative knowledge among the actors of INGOs themselves, in different countries over time, and among citizens. Volunteers to better develop their understanding of the specific forces and faintness of their civil society. Hence, increasing the chances of learning from the experience of others to use this research result in developing an improved model that will enhance accountability to the affected people (APP) mechanism better. A term utilized globally to indicate to residents whose lives are straightforwardly influenced by the choices taken in the policies. A term used in this Paper to denote to citizens whose lives are directly pretentious by the choices made – or the 'decision failures' - by the INGOs.

Methodology

The research has adopted a qualitative research method to find out the Impact of INGOs on the democratization of developing nations. The paper adopted Nigeria as the research case study using the qualitative case study method. Qualitative methods offered us a direct and spontaneous sharing of information, local knowledge, expertise, and experiences between researchers and participants. Based on the information, local knowledge, expertise, and experiences, it helped us in overviewing and drawing conclusions from the information and reports in the paper hands (Hancke, 2009). The qualitative technique is adopted because it suites the dynamic nature of the subject of this research, that is, Human beings and the institutions they manage. Human nature changes and cannot be quantified easily. For this research, the paper used two methods: an indirect secondary source of documents and existing records review and complimentary primary sourcing through direct observations from activities and proceedings of INGOs, aid agencies, and local NGOs. The research data is on the in-depth review of the existing records and the scholarly contributions on the roles of INGOs as international actors in the democratization of developing nations. The paper reviewed reports by other actors and historical records. For control purposes, the source of information the research used a defined period. All sources were limited to documents published in the last 30 years - 1988 to 2018. The publications were also only sourced from the publications and official reports made by recognized institutions, donor agencies, Multilateral organizations, and concerns raised by citizens whom the INGO and local NGOs that are serving. Additionally, the paper sourced its augments from observations as non-participants while taking note of issues that were not captured by the reviewed documents. The observations were done passively but directly through direct listening, watching, and writing all that is seen (Hancke, 2009). Facts from conference proceedings, meetings, reactions of people to the activities of the INGOs and local NGO that relates the case study formed the sources of data for the observations.

A qualitative case study approach is applied in this research because the paper focuses on the research questions, which are more explanatory in the current nature of the case study - Nigeria (Kumar, 1999). The questions aimed to explore and identify the profound realities underlying the

construction and the focus within the institutional context of this research. Specifically, the aim is to grasp the nature of the INGOs in the democratization of developing countries: the case of Nigeria. Nigeria was selected as a case study because of its dynamism and multicultural nature (Abba, and Usman, 2000; Achebe, 1984; Hoffmann, 2014). The population and the size of the country made the country a centerpiece and a more substantial part of the developing countries. Nigeria houses more than 20% of the total population of Sub Saharan Africa population (World Population Review, 2018), the region that has more than one-third of the global developing nations (UNDP, 2018).

The Case Study: Nigeria

Nigeria was first crafted with two protectorates, the North and the South, during the colonial era in the late 20th century. The two protectorates were later amalgamated to form one, but ethnically diverse Nigeria, in 1914. The amalgamation was obviously for the ease of administration by the British. Some scholars believe this is the cause of the nation's endless woes (Maier, 2000). Nigeria is situated in the Eastern part of West Africa, with a population density of about 200 million people and a geographic mass of 923,768 square kilometers. Nigeria has three major tribes of Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba, and the Igbo, with more than 250 other minority groups. The Hausa-Fulani reside in the north, covering three geopolitical zones of North West, North East, and The North Central; The Yoruba in the South-west geopolitical zone and the Igbo in the southeast Geopolitical zones (NPC, 2014). Nigeria is an agrarian community consisting mainly of farmers and herders. Since its independence in 1960, the country came out of different crises from the civil war of 1967 – 1970 to inter and intra community and ethnic clashes (Maier, 2000) Nigeria was home to ethnically based kingdoms and tribal communities before it became a European colony. Despite European contact that began in the 16th century, these kingdoms and communities maintained their autonomy until the 19th century. The colonial-era started in earnest within the late nineteenth century, whilst Britain consolidated its rule over Nigeria. In 1914 the British merged their northern and southern protectorates into an unmarried state known as the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. Nigeria gained independence from British rule in 1960. After independence, Nigeria experienced frequent coups and long durations of autocratic army rule between 1966 and 1999 when a democratic civilian government turned into established (Stock, 2009). Nigeria is by far the maximum populated of Africa's countries, with extra than one-seventh of the continent's population. Humans belong to many unique ethnic companies. In addition, they pose sizable challenges to nation-building. Ethnic strife has plagued Nigeria since it gained independence in 1960. Nigeria strived through different regimes that fueled a series of national complex, with corrupt political and authoritarian military leaders. Corruption and crime were understood by numerous as legitimate means or advancement and people in search of resolutions were turning inwards to ethnic prejudice and religious bigotry (Maier 2000)

Nigeria has a federal form of government and is divided into 36 states and a federal capital territory. The country's official name is the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Lagos, along the coast, until 1991 was the country's capital city, and it is still the economic and cultural center. However, Abuja, a city in the interior planned and built during the 1970s and 1980s, is the present capital. The government moved from Lagos to Abuja in 1991 in the hope of creating a national capital where none of the country's ethnic groups would be dominant. (Stock, 2009).

Nigeria long had an agricultural economy but now depends almost entirely on the production of petroleum, which lies in large reserves below the Niger Delta. While oil wealth has financed major investments in the country's infrastructure, Nigeria remains among the world's poorest countries in terms of per capita income. Oil revenues led the government to ignore agriculture, and Nigeria now imports farm products to feed its people (WorldBank, Data Bank, 2018). Nigeria, as a country, has been playing a significant leadership role in the Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-region and, indeed, the African continent. Africa has remained the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence in 1960. With a population of over 200 million people, almost one-quarter of the African continent,

and being endowed with immense physical and human resources, Nigeria has been a key player in international politics (Okunnu, 2010). Successive Nigerian governments have consistently accorded special attention to the plight and conditions of her brothers and sisters in Africa, which constitute the vast number of world bank grouped developing countries.

However, with the level of scarce resources and poverty, Nigeria easily became a breathing ground of scuffle for scarce resources through violent conflicts motivated by different factors. The most common motivator being political manipulation, ethnicity, religious bigotry, or the disputes between the first settlers or local groups and “settlers” over the distribution of public resources (International Crisis Group, 2010). These factors might not have survived or triggered conflict if the frustration of the residents of the country were not heightened or challenged by poverty and hardships. While the poverty and hardship persist, every year, thousands of people were displaced and many more slain by whichever side with the advantage of the surprise attack. The level of conflict in Nigeria grew to a larger proportion with the coming back of Boko-Haram in 2012 after a failed military operation. The insurgency claimed the lives of more than 20,000 people and displaced more than 2.3 million civilians setting Nigeria to its highest humanitarian crisis only compared to the Nigerian Civil War (Emmanuelat, 2015). Scholars and writers alike linked the rise of Nigerian poor administrative crises to its lack of democracy and a long history of military leadership in the country’s polity. Dare (2007) explains that in the Forty-six years of Nigeria, after gaining political independence, the country remains unfinished business. “Not because the materials and tools needed to complete the Nigerian project are not available, but because Nigeria lacks visionary leaders and disciplined citizenry...the blame rest upon self-imposed leaders at all levels of government” (p. 177). This as well remains the picture of the country’s administration internationally.

Maier (2000) expatiated on how chaotic and insecure Nigeria democracy is. His observations explained the dilemma as emanating from the people of the country and their expectations. A minister’s family will be expecting him to do things that are impossible on a minister’s salary. They will be forcing spurious demands such as expecting them to buy a new car or take them to trips. (Maier 2000 pp 302 -303). “The Nigeria democracy of no benefit is a by-product of Aliens occupants – Colonialist design, abused by the prolonged despotism of the military regime that ruled the country for more than 30 years of its brief life span, “the Nigerian state is like bruised elephant staggering toward abyss with the ground crumbling under its feet” (Maier 2000 p. xx). Corruption and poor governance lead to the woes of the country. The recent uncovering of the misappropriation of security funds in Nigeria led an eye-opener in the understanding of the dilemma of corruption and lack of democratic principles in the country. A total amount of 15 billion dollars meant for mitigation of conflict the was diverted for election campaigns (Magu, 2016). This, scholars believe, might not have been possible if there were an instituted fiscal transparency and Social accountability in the process. A process of making open every activity from the government and the civil societies alike.

In Northern Nigeria, violent conflicts continued to surge. What started as a pocket crisis in the North-Eastern part of the region in the early eighties as “Mai Tatsine” gave space to what followed as the Sharia riots of 2000 to 2004 and the Jos religious crisis of 2008 to 2010. The level of violence escalated to engulf the whole region with the reemergence of Boko Haram in 2012 (Hassan, A. et al, 2013). While the religious crisis frequently happens in the cities, the continuous militating conflict between the herdsmen and the farmers continued in the villages claiming lives every day. By the end of 2014, casualties of the conflicts have reached more than 20,000, and the number of internally displaced refugees has risen to more than 2.5 million (Emmanuelat, 2015). Academicians and theorists have opined on the possible reason for the deterioration of the situation despite attempts to mend by activist and International Organizations, including INGOs.

Security experts, the Nigerian government, international organizations, and Civils society organizations alike have been working to find a lasting solution to the deteriorating poor service delivery and the mitigation of the hardship within the country. Billions of Dollars were spent, yet the expected result seems far. Many scholars identified the ill-preparedness of the public institutions of the states to maintain public order to contribute to a meaningful dispute settlement and to implement

post-conflict peacebuilding measures as factors militating the success (International Crisis Group, 2010). Scholars and International organizations encouraged INGOs to take up the role of democratization through its characteristics of transparency, accountability and increase citizen participation through reintegration and maintenance of public order and peace to aid the government in achieving the set goals. Funds and supports were provided by international donors and International Organizations.

According to the UNDP and the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI). The actual number of people who are living as multidimensionally poor in Nigeria increased from 86 million to 98 million between 2007 to 2017. Also vital to note from the UNDP report is that when compared to the national poverty line, which measures income/consumption, a more significant proportion of Nigerians (51%) are multidimensionally poor than those that are income poor (46%) (MPI, 2019). In Nigeria, the national average shows that around 50% of Nigerians are multidimensionally poor; some states and local governments at the sub-national levels have higher levels. There is also inequality among the poor. Findings of the 2019 global UNDP also paint a detailed picture of the many differences in how deeply people experience poverty. In Nigeria, deprivations among the poor vary enormously. The report also shows that children suffer poverty more intensely than adults. Lacking essentials such as clean water, sanitation, adequate nutrition, or primary education. Even more staggering, in Nigeria, is one in three children are multidimensionally living in poverty, in relation to one in six adults. Meaning that nearly more than almost 50% of the people living in multidimensional poverty are children, with the youngest children bearing the most considerable burden. The UNDP MPI 2019 showed a significant improvement in other countries of South Asia. However, in developing countries of Africa, there was no reduction, with numbers of multidimensionally poor rising in Nigeria, South Suda, South Africa, among other developing countries. This level of poverty created the right breeding space in the country. Within the same period reviewed by UNDP above, Nigeria saw a series of religious crises the escalation of Boko Haram of conflict. An insurgency that destroyed the lives of more than 20,000 people and displaced more than 2.3 million civilians (Emmanuelat, 2015). The outpour of the INGOs was commendable and hopeful. The hopes of them achieving the goals were raised through the roof. A reality the developing countries will hope to see actualized in the near future using the right approach.

Theoretical Approaches By INGOS

To link up, the INGOs and other development agents adopted approaches to deliver their goals. They adopted three devise means that work towards helping them achieve their different goal while adopting each of the approaches where it best fits. The conventional approaches they used in developing nations and Nigeria are Change Theory, Theory of Accountability to affected people, and the shine theory. These theories are a hypothesis of methods that has been followed by these multinational in the last three decade. The theory of change is a result-based activity that defined the expected impact, and based on it, defines specific actions that should be done to achieve the result. Rogers (2014), in her methodological brief to UNICEF, discussed a theory of change and explained that the theory shows a deliberate attempt to design activities that will produce a series of results that will build up and contribute to achieving the final intended impacts. The shine theory seeks to address the balance that accomplishments and better results are better achieved together than divided. It is a theory founded by feminist groups based on a mutual understanding of the need to invest in each other. First coined by Aminatou Sow and Ann Friedman in 2010, the shine theory was originally was created to encourage, and supper reduces gender imbalance in the society by helping each other grow. However, the theory speaks more about the gaps created when collaborations have fallen (BBC, 2016). The theory of Accountability to Affected People (AAP) assumes that the best way for INGO to intervene is to be accountable to the community it will be providing support for. AAP is an "active commitment by humanitarian actors and organizations to use power responsibly by taking account of, giving account to and being held to account by the people they seek to assist" (STAIT, 2017, p. 1).

International-Nongovernmental Organisation (INGOs)

In line with United Nations definitions, International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) are non-profit organizations operating in numerous countries that have been established privately rather than by intergovernmental agreement (United Nations, 1945; Davies, 2014). INGOs engage in different types of activities ranging from advocacy, service-delivery, conflict mediations, among others. They work in distinct fields, often overlapping sectors like Democratization, development, humanitarian, environmental to mention few, and are driven by a variety of values and principles, like religious beliefs and human rights frameworks (Grimm, 2016). Scholars of international relations and international law favor broad and open-ended definitions of INGOs as transnational non-profit based organizations (Charnovitz 1997; Willetts 2011). One widely-used definition in this tradition is the Union of International Associations (UIA), (2018), which defines INGOs as formal organizations with international aims that are operational and are intending to conduct activities involving the participation of members, and receiving budgetary contributions in at least two countries. Development studies academics have inclined to adopt narrower definitions that require INGOs to be engaged in public welfare goals across at least one country. (Clark J. , 2000, p. 6).

As it is clear from above, there may not be an agreed definition of INGO; the legitimacy problems faced by these international institutions also affect their ease of definition (Maragia, 2002; Collingwood, 2006). while local or national Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)s are set up to face specific rising or community challenges, INGOs are typically both more organisationally complex and operate across a range of institutional and political environments (Roche, 1996; Clark J. , 2000). As a result, there is a broader range of audiences that confer or challenge their legitimacy, and these diverse definitions and conceptions are more likely to come into tension with one another (UIA, 2018). This organizational complexity is linked to political challenges arising from the increasing interconnectedness of global and local civil societies that have become more tightly bound together over the last century (Doyon and Jayeram, 2012). Raising a conceptual challenge because the traditional boundaries that provide the contours for understanding the INGO sector - between state/non-state, southern INGOs and northern INGOs, human rights and development organizations - have broken down considerably, thus creating new challenges for analyzing INGO legitimacy (Mitlin, Hickey, and Bebbington, 2007; and McNeil and Malena, 2010). This is evident in two ways. Firstly, established INGOs such as Open Society Foundation (OSF), Save the Children International, and Oxfam International are increasingly delivering programs in both the global south and the north, as evidenced in the UK and other European countries. They work to tackle the same issues of poverty and social exclusion (Davies, 2014). They are contradicting the direct definition that INGOs are set up by the developing countries to provide support in the developing nations. Secondly, although they have extensive histories, influential INGOs from the Global South, like BRAC in Bangladesh or from emerging economies like Kimse Yok Mu in Turkey are gaining increasing global prominence (Lewis, and Kanji, 2009 and Tekin, 2012).

Similarly, as highlighted above, academic disciplines vary in their treatment of the concept of legitimacy. While international relations scholars have been primarily concerned with how INGO legitimacy relates to the capacity of the developing countries to influence international standards or decision-making methods, the development studies literature has engrossed more on INGOs' relations with people and states in the global South. These conceptions broadly reflect an ontological divide among normative and sociological understandings of legitimacy (Davies 2014). Normative understandings view legitimacy as derived from standards, values, and norms. They are, therefore, concerned with INGOs' capacity to comply with or sell norms by representing particular viewpoints that are sold as common. Sociological considerations, on the other hand, see legitimacy as a specific sort of relationship amongst different companies based totally on social values (Mitlin, and Bebbington 2007). The research stress that both understandings elucidate essential aspects of the legitimization process and stress the need to understand the synergies between them. The paper will attempt to relate that the normative and sociological dimensions of INGO legitimacy are inter-dependent and that achieving sociological legitimacy, at least among some key groups, is a necessary

prerequisite to successfully bring about change in the normative framework of international society. By acknowledging this synergy, the research can generate an approach that demonstrates how the international normative framework of INGO legitimacy is reliant on sociological justifications, many of which are domestically sourced and localized without discarding the normative structure of legitimacy (Mitlin, and Bebbington, 2007).

The bodies of works of literature discussed in this paper tend to focus on different types of INGOs, emphasizing different aspects of INGO legitimacy to the detriment of others and drawing different conclusions in the process (Vakil, 1997). A lack of agreement around outlines for classifying INGOs has, moreover, hindered the development of theory, further reinforcing disciplinary boundaries. Looking at the challenges in the conceptualizations and the lack of single agreement of definitions among scholars, it is essential therefore to scope this research to the objectives the paper wishes to achieve by adopting a definition that will guide the writing. There will never be enough time to explore the divide in the normative and sociological conception of meaning. Hence, as a scope and limitation, this research will focus on purposive definitions that see International Non-governmental Organizations as organizations set up to enhance the activities of communities across countries via different advocacies, projects, and operations. Importantly, how this activity affects the democratization or otherwise of developing nations.

INGOs have varied roles in development, and have varied methods based on different approaches to development practice. However, there are strong comparisons in the objectives they aim to attain, and in their overall expectations. Key objectives for INGOs typically include the decrease of poverty and inequality, the realization of rights, the promotion of gender equality and social justice, protection of the environment, and strengthening of civil society and democratic governance (Boutros-Ghali, 2018). For example, most of the INGOs across the developing have primary objectives based on poverty reduction, empowerment to demand accountability, and enhance social justice:

INGO	OBJECTIVES
CARE International	To save lives Defeat Poverty Enhance social Justice (care, 2018)
Oxfam International	Help People claim the right to a better life To Save Lives Safeguard global food (OXFAM, 2018)
Plan International	Empower the young and communities Drive Change in practice and policy Support and Respond to the crisis (Plan, 2018)
ONE International	To improve Transparency To improve growth in Agriculture To end Infectious disease (One, 2018)
Open Society Foundation	To seek and strengthen the rule of law Strengthen Civil Society Protect lives (OSF, 2018)

Table 3: Sample Table of INGOs and their Objectives

Democracy.

The focus of this paper is the democratization of developing nations. However, before the research operationalizes democratization, the paper wishes to explain what democracy means in the context of this research and what a democratic country should be. The simplest definition among the

thousand definitions that exist of democracy is the one given by Abraham Lincoln in 1863. That is the government of the people, for the people and by the people. A better concise definition is difficult to formulate because democracy is a term that has acquired many different meanings over time. With the very different levels and ways of development of societies in today's world, the meaning of democracy continues to be the subject of debate (Blackwell, 2003). Democracy and democratization are broad terms to define in one phrase of words. Blackwell (2003) gave his account of democracy to be when a person is free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives. They should enjoy equal "rights and, accordingly, equal obligations in the specification of the framework, which generates and limits the opportunities available to them, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others" (p7). Generally, democracy can be understood as a system where citizens have the right to decide on their own culture. In a democratic country, the rule of law can protect citizens or their properties, and the government has to be transparent and accountable to their citizens and work best for citizens. Citizens have the right to voice their wants, need, and fear, and equality must be present among citizens. Women and children must have equal rights, too (Epstein, 2011). Robert Alan Dahl (2003), also added that democracy as having equality. That is to say, and everyone has the right to vote according to their democratic rule and voice freely for what they are in need and when they are unjustified. Moreover, he also argued that information should flow freely for a country to be considered a democracy, as it is a key element in creating fair competition both in the electoral process and the decision-making process. In a democratic country, the government cannot stop citizens from speaking out about what is going on inside the country in reality. Besides, a free flow of information can make the government listen to what citizens want so that the government is accountable.

Democratization is therefore ascribed to the transition to a further democratic political administration, including functional political changes steered by the concepts of democracy and moving in a democratic direction. It can be the changeover from a dictatorial regime to a complete democracy, a changeover from an authoritarian political structure to a semi-democracy, or transition from a semi-authoritarian political system to a democratic political setting (Dobbins, Jones, Crane, and DeGrasse, 2007). The consequence may be what is expected and consolidated as mostly the cases in the Germany United Kingdom, and other western countries (Dobbins et al. 2007) or democratization may face frequent upheavals in the processes of implementations reversals. Democratization itself is influenced by various factors, including economic development, history, and civil society. The ideal result of democratization is to ensure that the people have the right to vote and have a voice in the affairs that concern them in the political system.

Dobbins et al. (2007) further identify what could be termed as best practices in Democratization. According to them, several general factors tend to make democratization more or less difficult. First is the type of regime sounding the country seeking to democratize. According to them, if a country is surrounded by democratic countries, it more likely to democratize than other systems surrounding it. Secondly, they asserted that Democratization inclines to occur in waves, with a series of clustered openings followed by a period of economizing. According to them, the causative factor seems to be unclear. However, democratization contagion effects may endow waves with a force of their own—opposition movements often draw inspiration or adopt strategies from recent international developments. The intervening authorities can sometimes ride the wave, propagating techniques, and political measures that facilitated successful democratization in a different post-conflict setting. The intervening authorities may also wish to bring officials and individuals who participated in a successful democratization effort in a neighboring state into the host country as advisors to institutions and politicians (Dobbins et al. 2007 p193). Thirdly, they aligned to the postulations of theories of modernization like Fukuyama (1992) as an additional drive to democratization. They held that economic development and empowerment promotes democracy by facilitating the emergence of a middle class with sufficient time and resources to push for more representative institutions. This suggests that intervening authorities involved in nation-building should view economic development as the third identity of democratization, which encompasses the main theme of this research. INGOs across the globe work with local NGOs in different aspects to create the

consciousness of Locals to do it themselves. It may be to step up to monitor the activities of the health sector or to empower the citizens to demand the right governance. Either way, they work to create a strong opposition both politically and within the system. For this paper, democratization will be hinged on citizen participation, equality, accountability, transparency. The research shall look at the success of the INGOs in this process.

Developing Nations

For this research, the literal definition of the developing nation will be the base words. The literal definition of developing means “progressing” from one point that it was to a new better position. “to grow or gradually change into a larger, stronger or more advanced stronger” (Turnbull, 2010, p. 344) Therefore developing countries can be categorized as progressing countries. It is also seen as those countries that are not categorized among the developed nations. These two descriptions, however, are less encompassing because, even among the countries that are termed as not developed and that is progressing, their capability, industrialization, and per-capita income vary. Hence the paper is mandated to look at different opinions of what makes a country a developing nation. According to the World Bank classification, developing countries can be defined as “countries with low or middle levels of Gross National Product (GNP) per capita (WorldBank, 2018). Another challenge is that some countries are classified as developing despite their high per capita income because of their economic structure or the official opinion of their governments. A good example is China (Doyon and Jayaram, 2012). Several countries with transition economies are sometimes grouped with developing countries based on their low or middle levels of per capita income, and sometimes with developed countries based on their high industrialization. An upward of 80 percent of the world's population lives in more than 100 developing countries (WorldBank, 2018). Almamari (2014) pointed out that both developing and less developed economies face common unique challenges when compared to developed countries. These include poor accountability, relatively less developed infrastructures, and inconsistencies of appropriate regulatory tools, in addition to incomplete institutional support such as opaque government policies and poor services provided. (Almamari, 2014, p. 26). This analysis has been supported by what is obtainable in the research case study (Maier, 2000).

Developing countries are also referred to as dependent countries. An argument scholars like Walter Rodney (1973) vehemently deny postulating that the developed nations only did so by successfully exploiting the developing nations. However, the reality is that developing countries largely still have limited innovative capabilities (Mastromarco, 2005). It, therefore, becomes economically more convenient for them to import foreign technologies than to produce them domestically.

There is a general agreement, therefore, that no agreed definition that will encompass and define the developing nations. The United Nations Statistics Department, otherwise known as UN data, states that there is no agreed or established convention for the designation of “developed” and “developing” countries or areas in the United Nations system. In common practice, Japan in Asia, Canada, and the United States in northern America, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania, and Europe are considered “developed” regions or areas. In international trade statistics, the Southern African Customs Union is also treated as a developed region and Israel as a developed country; countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia are treated as developing countries; and countries of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States in Europe are not included under either developed or developing regions (UNdata, 2008). Hence this paper look at the developing countries as the countries that are not at the required global acceptable level that easily becomes the target of the INGOs to advocate and attempt to improve their way of leaving. The research assessed how successful this international organization impacted developing countries.

Understanding the Challenges

Concerns about an impending crisis of INGOs legitimacy have been an issue among scholars since, at least early 1990s (Huggett, 2012). In recent years worries about the sustainability of INGO

roles and characteristics in a shifting social and geopolitical climate have reached an alarming rate (Doyon, and Jayaram, 2012; Carsten, 2017). Worries have focused on a sense of lessening support for liberal democracy and human rights, a growing mismatch between contemporary international challenges and INGO capacities and a backlash against INGOs across a variety of countries across Asia, Africa and Latin America which forms the majority of the developing countries (Buchanan-Smith et al., 2015; Ross, 2011). These challenges have arisen both from shifts in international power relations, prompting a series of changes in the national and international regulatory environment for INGOs, and from long-term changes in INGOs' roles and relations with donors and recipients, which is compounded with lack of favorable result in the normative work on global governance and democratization (Mastromarco, 2005; Melena, and Heinrich, 2007).

A series of publications and write-ups reflecting on the challenges and prospects for INGOs have continued to emerge in response to such concerns (Aall, 1996; Mastromarco, 2005; Melena, and Heinrich, 2007; McNeil, and Malena, 2010; Huggett, 2012; Tomlinson, 2013; Davies, 2014; and Transparify, 2015). These valuations draw consideration to a new set of issues facing INGOs, further fueling the doubts about the INGOs' capability to deal with these challenges, and offer other recommendations on how INGOs can uphold legitimacy in improving global context. Many prominent INGOs such as Plan International, Oxfam, Save the Children and Amnesty International have undertaken ambitious internal re-structuring programs in response to this shifting environment to ensure that the bases for their legitimacy are not eroded (HAP, 2016).

INGOs have been widely criticized around the world as irregular institutions with the sole aim of achieving their agendas. The World Bank (2000) stated that NGOs across the globe had been hit by the manifestation of bad governance within their structures, which has increased sufferings in many countries and communities despite the availability of various NGOs operating in such countries.; this has necessitated governments of many developing countries to make moves towards curbing and regulating the operation of INGOs and NGOs within their locality. Because of this, INGOs and other civil societies strategized to increase their advocacy role, ensuring transparency and accountability within the public sector. The World Bank, through its supports, emphasizes INGOs to ensure the principles of good governance such as public participation, transparency, accountability, inclusiveness, effectiveness, efficiency, and equity are being practiced in developing countries (World Bank 2000).

In another research, Odeh (2012) identified and critically examined some of the pressing challenges affecting these multinationals and their implementing partners in Nigeria. According to Odeh (2012), one of the significant factors is the non-democratic tenants and lack of transparency among the implementing NGOs themselves. The lack of democratic principles within the local NGOs has brought them many criticisms. Their deficiency in internal democracy makes it unlikely for them to learn and grow democratic values making it impossible for them to instill democratic principles to citizens (Odeh, 2012). The NGOs work to promote democratic principles, but most of them lack transparency and accountability to the people they are working to promote. Lack of proper engagements create gaps and give a less expected result. The INGO operates with a defined guideline created by the donor agency, mostly based on studies of a similar situation that, if implemented according to their hopes, will create a similar result. Unfortunately, because of lack of ownership and co-creation, the well crafted and funded initiative will end up in expensive hotels with so many funds expended, the beautiful report written but no actual change to the affected community.

The second obvious challenge, according to Odeh, is the inadequate capacity to implement the twisted technical definitions of programs that are crafted for Nigeria. Many NGOs lack in terms of skills and knowledge to effectively carry out advocacies as is required for any organization that wishes to participate in governance (Ojo, 2011). The advocacy and the zeal for a better democratic society are not homegrown nor an initiative by the local communities, but an expectation and "ideal" society created in the minds of the propagators as fashioned by liberalist scholars and sold through the INGOs to the local NGOs to implement. As much as the local NGOs like the grants and the funds from the INGOs, it is always difficult to fully comprehend what is needed. And so much of the

resources will be expended on “capacity” building rather than the impact on the affected community. Hence even though the resource is expended, the result may not be guaranteed.

Finally, in his research Odeh (2012) identified the third challenge to be funding. According to him, most pro-democracy NGOs highly depend on funds sourced from a variety of donors, mostly INGOs, and other international donors. However, the focus of such donors is gradually shifting towards strengthening institutions of democratic systems. That is shifting towards directly funding the governmental institutions. The Completed Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the ongoing Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are an excellent example of government focused funding on government intuitions. The INGOs push the governments to implement their policies and designs while the local NGOs are asked to compete for a fraction of the funds to monitor the government institutions. The model reduces the number of funds in the hands of local NGOs and Smaller INGOs hence reducing reach and delivery of better outcomes. The model also shrinks the pool from which NGOs source their funds, thereby affecting their activities and impacts in the democratization of Nigeria and, by extension, Nigeria. The competitions for funds, therefore, fueled the disunity and differences among the majority of local NGOs. Most NGOs, this acrimony, further deteriorates their effectiveness and efficiency, leaving them exposed to penetration and sabotage by government agents.

Identifying the Gaps

The scope of global institutions and INGOs has used a common tool called Democracy and created a process of democratization that has comprised of a focal component of interstate relations since the end of the two World Wars. The foundation of the United Nations – “parliament of men” typified the assurance of global leaders and INGOs to spare succeeding generations from the scourge of war and reaffirm confidence in essential human rights. The post-war period likewise observed the development of the worldwide monetary administration structures intended to help the development of organized commerce and the advancement of coordinated worldwide money related commercial centers. An idea fashioned and sold globally as democratization. Over 60 years after the facts, the guarantees of universal participation have been partly satisfied. Even though the recovery from the second world war is characterized by technological advancement, the world economy has not, in every case, easily continued along the direction of more profound financial reconciliation. The current arrangement of democratization has neglected to give answers to a significant number of the most challenging global issues. This has been particularly apparent in the disappointment of universal agreeable endeavors to counteract a portion of the genuine democracy, outstandingly global environmental degradation, poverty, inequality, and corruption. Progress towards a successful global understanding has been moderate. This has prompted great saddened expectations with INGOs activities and hindered the trust in the global institutions.

The legitimacy of INGOs is not only being undermined when they fail to provide solutions to global problems. Another line of criticism relates to the fact that decisions within these institutions are often not taken in a fair, equitable, and truly democratic manner. It is this side of the legitimacy deficit of the international institutions that is of most concern to why they are failing in helping the developing countries become more democratic and hence to the questions addressed in this paper – although the distinction between how decisions are made and the results achieved are often weak in practice. The complaint that decision-making processes within many international institutions are ‘unfair’ or ‘undemocratic’ is not only voiced by those member states that feel that they are disadvantaged in international negotiations. Similar – and often even more far-reaching – forms of criticism have also come from the quarters of civil society. Featuring the inadequacies of numerous global organizations and calling for higher guidelines of big government and responsibility has, in any case, not forestalled a large number of these INGOs from looking for discourse and closer contact with a scope of intergovernmental establishments. The establishments thus have begun connecting all the more intimately with the bourgeoisie society after some time. Opening up towards citizen-based NGOs has been one of the responses by global institutions to the criticisms directed at them. It

is presented as evidence of an organizational shift towards greater transparency, participation, and democracy.

Shin (1994), in his work on the third wave of democratization, identifies four stages that expose the cosmetic make up of the current INGOs. His work explained what each nation is expected to pass through to show their effectivity in the process. Comparing Shin's description of this research further showed a significant gap missing by the INGOs. As a result, billions of dollars are injected without evident achievements. The INGOs skipped two essential states in between the first state and the last state and tabled the final goal to the developing countries, which made achievements difficult and hardly sustainable. The four stages are firstly the decay of authoritarian rule, secondly the transitioning period, thirdly the period of consolidation, and lastly, the fourth as the maturing of democratic political order. The visible gaps from our reviews are from the second and third goals. As pointed out by the functionalist, there are alternative ways of achieving these goals, INGOs adopted the all perfection which gives a cosmetic make up to the real situation on the ground, while pushing for the perfect democratic political orders immediately there was a sign of the decay of authoritarianism. So, it ended up with a government that shows to the world we are ready for a transparent, accountable and responsive government but with civil servants (government employees) that are trained on the job through time and developed a culture and act in an authoritarian manner without democratization – at best showing a form of liberalization and a form of democracy but without democratization.

The additional gap in the case study is the missing periods, which include the transition phase of democratization, which is viewed as a period of considerable political uncertainty, one especially fraught with the risk of reversion. It is characterized by unforeseen contingencies, a period of learning, and rebuilding among the locals a period of developing a new norm and unintended outcomes. The citizens and the institutions of the past regime coexist with those of the new regime. Learning and unlearning alternative methods of doing things differently, changing thoughts from the authoritarian ways to conventional ways of power-sharing. Moreover, this might be through conflict or agreement. The Transition period is followed by the second skipped period of democratic consolidation. The transition phase features the conscripting of methods or rules for deciding political conflicts amicably. Unlike in liberalization where its transition is expected to have ended when a new democracy has accepted the drafted new constitution and held welcomed elections for political leaders with little barrier to mass participation. In democratization, such a successful transition to procedural democracy does not guarantee sustainability and result that will improve the human index preached by liberalist. Hence a necessary form of consolidation that will establish a substantial arrangement amongst elites and the citizens concerning the rules of the democratic political game and the worth of democratic institutions is at the heart of democratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation as concepts is often associated with that of permanency or institutionalization. It should be noted, however, that the mere retention of a liberalist regime does not necessarily consolidate it. What consolidates democratization is the thorough definition where each part through its functions worked well to move towards the result. To consolidate is not just to provide stability but to create the necessary change. To deduce from the reports and findings of the history of Nigeria democracy, the country is in its 21st year since it returns to democracy, it is easier to say the country is stable in democracy because there have been successful six national elections. Nevertheless, all the elections were to some extent characterized by violence, rigging, and distrust hence creating a continuous rift and distrust among the nationals despite the cosmetic presentations of the INGOs. What signals the end of history in the period of democratic transition and the beginning of the stage of consolidation is when consensus on procedures are achieved and co-owned through extensive mass participation in governance and elections and other institutional processes.

The commitment of the INGOs towards legitimate democratization of developing countries is further surveyed against a specific interpretation of the citizen concern. An assessment to measure the INGO representation of the citizens. It is observed that the INGOs frequently do not feel the full need to either draft an approach base citizen demand but mostly to execute the agenda of their

funders. Thereby underplaying the ability to be fully accountable to the individuals whose lives they influence the most. It can be deduced that such action expands the gap between the intent of the INGOs and delivery. Poor responsibility and disconnected methodology of the INGOs at the international level increases the dangers of undermining the compatibility between the affected people that are being administered, and the 'individuals' that should oversee". The significant authenticity issue emerging from this absence of involvement as for INGOs is that the group that always makes the decisions might end up implementing the policies, regulations, and rules, that have a substantial impact on the lives of citizens who they bearly understand. They are not able to hold these decision-makers to account. The obvious normative problem at the global level lies in making these decision-makers accountable to the affected communities.

The added gap is on the notion that INGOs can enhance the democratic legitimacy of international institutions. Sympathetic voices, on the one hand, recognize the democratizing possibility of the INGO spectacle in carrying the voices and needs of the often-neglected groups or communities to global attention, forging contacts between citizens' groups across the world and contribution citizens unswerving channels of involvement in global affairs. including securing the groups a peep into the affairs of the state. The case of Nigeria. What this paper, however, deduced is that that these groups often fail to adhere to the same level of accountability, that is, holding the leaders to account if they fail to comply with what they promise. There is likewise the threat that few incredible gatherings end up pocketing and controlling the relationships with the INGOs, expecting influential gatekeeping roles in the process and leaving less powerful groups on the margins. The INGO staff leave on lush salaries, leaving between hotels with dedicated drivers and per-diem. A benefit they will do anything to keep, including writing a false report.

The additional common deduction that hinders the productivity of the INGOs is their use of consultants, mostly foreign consultants. The INGOs operate an extensive program, budgets, and staffing contingents, as well as their use of foreign consultants, which can cause them to 'crowd out' local development organizations. The consultants, their Ivy League Universities educated staff, and technical assistance designed their programs, designed their models, and crafted the implementations strategies. The imported models, therefore, cannot be easily understood or implemented by the local development partners who, on the other hand, have a better understanding of the challenges in their communities. Thereby creating gaps between the development agent who understands the problem and the expert alien who has the funds. Attempts are made by Major INGOs the bridge that gap. As a result, creating an expensive budget which pieces of training and retraining, retreats, workshops, and seminars to teach the crafted models to the local NGOs for implementation. As a result, further spending the funds that could that are meant for direct impact on the affected communities on the hotel-based training. The knowledge, skills, and capacities are more closely linked, without one proper delivery are often halted.

Actual result delivery on the impact of INGOs in the democratization of developing countries is also affected by the tension, rivalry, and hostility in the relationship between government and element of the INGOs. And among the NGOs themselves. Instead, of them working together, ego and competition for funds often make them adversaries. The shine theory propagates "shining together" for a better result where the NGOs and government work as agents and partners complimenting each other on development. Their officials view each other as foes trying to take power and legitimize it for control. The inability to build networks effectively among INGOs creates a gap in sustainability and fuel division within the sector. Intense competition for funds fuels the atmosphere of competition instead of collaboration.

It can also be deduced that the INGOs receive low trust, low acceptability hence the inability to succeed because of its roots and origin in capitalism. INGOs and democratization are seen by scholars as deduced as an extension of domination of the capitalist system. That they did not achieve their anticipated results because they were not set out to achieve them but to extend the expansion of capitalism to capture the market and to keep dominance. For the scholars, democracy, and democratization agents as a failure. Most of them admit that more states are joining democracy,

which signifies an individual shared interest for the elites to enlarge their profit ventures. However, they also agree that societies are worse now than what they were in the past.

More than ever before, INGOs, policymakers, and scholars see the need for improved measures of democracy that can precisely monitor the global trend of democratization and assess and reflect its meaning in the process of policy-making that will improve better living. For instance, the U.S. Agency for International Development has ordered a sequence of conferences to explore such measures as part of its Democratic Pluralism Initiative, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has been investigating ways of measuring political freedoms and electoral rights that will not just bring out liberalism but democratization that is accountable to the citizens.

Recommendation.

From the deductions and analysis above, issues that hinder the delivery of the definite democratization by the INGOs can be deduced to three main sets of factors. The first factor is directly related to the internal formation of the INGOs. The INGOs are formed based on models and programs. Hired consultants write the models and the programs from trusted institutions in the funder's country. The second factor is linked to the approaches adopted by the INGOs to achieve their goals. The gap in the approach is not just limited to the use of the hired consultants to execute the projects but also ignoring the local communities and, importantly, the poor collaboration among the NGOs and between the INGOs and the government. Lastly, the third important factor is poor accountability. The INGOs present cosmetic liberalism and democratization, while they produce beautiful reports and spend billions of dollars, the lives of the people they are working to improve, keep getting worse. Because they can not be held easily accountable, they become tools of capitalism. The INGOs were struggling to keep all receipts and bills to be accountable to the accountants. They write beautiful cosmetic reports to the funders but with less concern on the accountability to the affected people.

This paper deduced a mediation to these flaws by redefining the paths that earlier define what the INGOs should be. The research created a collaborative approach base on the existing theories and the selected methodologies of the INGOs. Hence, introducing the trio theory. The Trio-Theory, as a recommended theory for this research, is a product of the three theoretical approaches of the INGOs in the democratization of the developing countries. Some of the INGOs adopt the theory of Change as a general guide, others adopt the shine theory, and others adopt the Accountability to affected people. However, after years of interventions, the expected results are not visible as expected. Most of the developing countries, including Nigeria, have written beautiful reports on the progress it made in democratization. Elections are held continuously since 1999 without interruption. Poverty and the gap between the rich and the poor have widened more during the period. Also, violent conflict has increased with cries on non-free and fair elections. To be able to address such a gap. This paper recommends the adoption of the Trio-Theory, a Theory that combines the attributes of the theory of Change, the Shine Theory, and the Theory of Accountability to Affected people simultaneously in implementations. That way, each theory will complement the visible gaps in the other theory.

Conclusion

This paper attempted to study the impact of INGOs in the democratization of developing countries. It has touched, reviewed, and study an upward of 100 journals, reports, and conference proceedings. It has touched on various contributions and assertions. The deductions have brought together insights from the reviewed literature representing global politics and the role of INGOs and the existing analysis. It followed the interpretive approach, which does not give the paper a piece of conclusive evidence in itself but helps in understanding the problem more efficiently. Importantly in the limitations is the use of case study as a means to infer. Social science concepts, including Developing Countries and how they interact with other variables like the INGOs, can change base on the nature of people and interactions. The use of Nigeria as a case study to infer on all developing

countries can be limited due to the socio-economic variance of other developing countries. Hence, slight changes can be seen when the outcome of this research is used in other regions.

Did the proliferation of INGOs give rise to better democratization in developing countries? The paper has explained the gaps and forward approach. What got better is liberalization, not democratization. NGOs being the third party of government and market, makes the lead actors within the global society. Their position allows them to be facilitators for lasting and sustainable active citizenship. They are the right tool to lead the process of democratization and civic participation in the civic space if the trio-theory is adopted. There is a need for them to develop a relationship with main actors of civil society such as non-traditional CSOs, media houses, traditional and religious authorities, and local community-based organizations, among others, to assist the developing countries towards actualizing democratization that will be of benefit to the citizens. As signaled by Cohen (1994), the conceptualization of INGOs as the third sector of societal development makes it a key role player in democratization. Thus, it is pointed out by this research that, because of the changes and challenges posed by the expansion of capitalism and globalization, the ineffectiveness of these INGOs can be caused great harm with various nefarious consequences of loss of resources, trust, and hope. This great consequence will also continue if a dependable means of improving the methods of engagements of these INGOs are not conditions to reflect the trio-theory approach truly.

Communities and local Civils societies, as observed in the paper, seek donors' assistance and guides to actualize developments and improve another democratic index like human rights, access to justice, civic engagement, and accountability. The funding support from donors has turned small CBOs and local grassroots private charity organizations into more full-fledged development agencies. Reshaping their involvement and definitions as local NGOs. Because of the discussions in this research, it is suggested that INGOs needs to reposition themselves for better all-inclusive methods that will take into account the need of the citizens, that will support the activities of each other, and that will achieve a defined goal to achieve. The INGOs are still a needed catalyst in democratization. If they properly position themselves, they will dominate the vacant space that is between government and market as civil societies, NGOs, and GONGOs. Regardless of which parlance of a name they appear as, with clear objectives, they will all have prominent roles to play in all the societal sectors.

The deliberate and focused activities and strategies adopted by many INGOs, including the use of technology-based tools and exploiting citizens' active usage of online social media, have indeed advertently shaped the discussion and terrain of democratization and open, participatory governance in developing countries. Nevertheless, also the rapid rise of protest and the ability to voice our concerns in these countries within a short period. The contributions of many INGOs were featured in most works of literature as a catalyst for citizen engagement promoting open and participatory governance. There are indications that the movement for Transparency Accountability and Citizen Participation has emerged as a result of rising in the number of protests, and the result of several surveys also shows that Nigerian citizens are increasingly cooperating to participate in actions demanding for good and open governance. It is also observed that campaigns and demonstrations by INGOs catalyze this developing movement, which is a positive development as legitimate demands for open governance and unpretentious policy reforms arise from the grassroots level. Additionally, the speedy and efficient practice of open governance is achieved when there is good synergy between these organizations. A look across most of the developing countries indicated that good collaboration among INGOs has aided in the provision of a conducive environment for operations of NGOs in places that were previously clouded by hostility between NGOs and governments. Therefore, it is essential to emphasize the need for INGOs to increase collaboration through the proposed Trio-theory to build alliances in order to achieve more significant strides in sustainable development, the socio-economic policy as well as building public policy atmosphere that will strengthen and enhance participatory governance. This agrees with Banki Moons' observation that Broad partnerships are the key to solving broad challenges. When governments, the

United Nations, businesses, philanthropies, and CSOs work hand in hand, great things can be achieved (UN, 2011)

Important to bridge the missing gap between acceptance of the importance of the INGOs and how to actualize their work and improve acceptance and validity. Consequently, The INGOs need to unlearn impositions of ideas, working alone and borrowing models to embrace localization, collaboration and consultation (Trio-theory) to leverage on local and other CBOs' network of advocacy in order to strengthen and guarantee citizens' rights to information, vis-a-vis proper democratization that will be transformative to the lives of people living in the developing countries.

This paper is limited because of its choice of methodology. Like all other methodologies, no agreed research design is flawless. First, the limitations are the troubles of reliability, validity, and generalizability. Using Nigeria to generalize to all developing nations portray the same challenge the research drew as a flaw of INGOs to use a model to assume it will work everywhere. However, for this paper, the researchers used extensive reports globally that are done in Africa and other developing countries, and they have tried to extend the researches by analyzing conference proceedings and feedbacks. There was no attempt to eliminate what cannot be discounted. Nor was there any attempt to simplify what cannot be simplified. Thus, it is exactly because the case examines paradoxes and acknowledges that there are no easy answers, that it may and need to qualify as the Final Acceptable standard.

As it is understood in this research, the trio theory of change, shine, and accountability to the affected people is more useful and effective in increasing transformative based democratization that improves lives. An approach that is achieved through proper and active citizen participation and engagement. The approach where tested has shown that citizens have relinquished their sense of docility and rise to the challenge of building a modern nation through rooting for governance where transparency and accountability is a way of life. Governance where they can critically engage government and hold government institutions accountable. Governance where all the actions can lead to Shin (1994) Democratization.

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