

1 *Type of the Paper (Review)*

2 **A Survey on Access Control in the Age of IoT**

3 **Jing Qiu**¹, **Chunlai Du**², **Shen Su**^{1,*}, **Qi Zuo**^{3,*} and **Zhihong Tian**¹

4 ¹ Cyberspace Institute of Advanced Technology, Guangzhou University; qiuqing@gzhu.edu.cn;
5 johnsuhit@gmail.com; tianzhihong@gzhu.edu.cn

6 ² School of Computer, North China University of Technology; duchunlai@ncut.edu.cn

7 ³ Beijing Computing Center; zuoqi@bcc.ac.cn

8 * Correspondence: Shen Su, johnsuhit@gmail.com; Qi Zuo, zuoqi@bcc.ac.cn

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10 **Abstract:** With the development of IoT technology, various information resources, such as social
11 resources and physical resources, are deeply integrated for different comprehensive applications.
12 Social networking, car networking, medical services, video surveillance and other forms of IoT
13 information Service model gradually change people's daily life. Facing the vast amounts of IoT
14 information data, IoT search technology is used to quickly find accurate information to meet real-
15 time search needs of users. However, IoT search requires to use a large number of user privacy
16 Information, such as personal health information, location information, social relations information,
17 to provide personalized services. User privacy information will meet security problems if an
18 effective access control mechanism is missing during the IoT search process. Access control
19 mechanism can effectively monitor the access activities of resources, and ensure authorized users to
20 access information resources under legitimate conditions. This survey examines the growing
21 literature on access control for IoT search. Problems and challenges of access control mechanism are
22 analyzed to facilitate the adoption of access control solutions in real-life settings. This paper aims to
23 provides theoretical, methodological and technical guidance for IoT search access control
24 mechanism in large-scale dynamic heterogeneous environment. Based on the literature study, we
25 also analyzed future development direction of access control in the age of IoT.

26 **Keywords:** IoT search; access control; attribute-based access control; survey

27

28 **1. Introduction**

29 IoT devices are collecting diverse data, such as electricity consumption, location information,
30 and sensor data, from Internet, sensor networks, and online social networks. The development of IoT
31 search realizes information sharing and improves the efficient use of devices. It can solve the problem
32 of information island, improve the comprehensive utilization rate of social resources, and reduce the
33 production and service costs. However, IoT search also collects, stores and analyses a large amount
34 of private data, while providing convenience to users. Therefore, IoT search is a "double-edged
35 sword". On the one hand, it will bring convenience to people's lives if it is used properly. On the other
36 hand, it's also a serious threaten to personal privacy and national security.

37 Whether IoT search can be widely accepted and popularized depends on its ability of prevent
38 sensitive information leakage. Access control, as the backbone technology to ensure information
39 security, can effectively monitor the access of resources and prevent the unauthorized flow of
40 information. However, IoT search is a relatively new research field, traditional access control
41 methods and techniques cannot fully solve the access control problems faced by IoT search because
42 of node heterogeneity, open environment, multi-party sharing of resources.

43 In this survey, we present a thorough analysis of the current state-of-the-art technologies of
44 access control for IoT search. We also provide an overview of the research challenges in access control.
45 Such as, IoT search needs to integrate data from different data sources, so how to dynamic division

46 of authorization for different data sources and integrate different access control policies are big
47 challenges. The next section describes the background of access control for IoT search, which includes
48 development history of access control and the Attribute-based access control (ABAC) model. Section
49 3 reviews the ABAC-based access control policy integration technologies. Section 4 reviews the
50 ABAC-based access control policy authorization technologies. Section 5 reviews other ABAC-related
51 technologies. Section 6 identifies open issues and draws a roadmap for future research. Finally,
52 Section 7 concludes the article.

53 2. Background of Access Control for IoT Search

54 2.1. Access Control Background


55 While providing convenience to people, IoT search uses a large amount of authorized personal
56 privacy data. However, the protection of these privacy data is not enough. Once the privacy data is
57 leaked, it may bring huge losses to the organizations. Access control technology ensures that
58 resources can only be accessed by authorized users according to the pre-defined access control policy,
59 so it can prevent unauthorized access to privacy information.

60 By the 1970s, access control system is mainly used in mainframe system, such as BLP model [1]
61 and Biba model [2]. BLP model is designed according to the military security policy, which aims to
62 solve access control problem with confidential hierarchy information. It is the first mathematical
63 model of access control model with strict theoretical proof. BLP model is widely used to describe the
64 security of computer systems. Biba Model developed by Kenneth J. Biba in 1975. It is a formal state
65 transition system of computer security policy that describes a set of access control rules designed to
66 ensure data integrity. Data and subjects are grouped into ordered levels of integrity. The model is
67 designed so that subjects may not corrupt data in a level ranked higher than the subject, or be
68 corrupted by data from a lower level than the subject. Clark–Wilson model was described in 1987 by
69 Clark and Wilson. This model is used to control and audit subject's state transition and run time
70 adjustment of low-water-mark policy parameters. Compared with Biba, Clark–Wilson model
71 provides a complete integrity protection by means of controlled state transaction, while Biba model
72 provides a simple multi-level integrity access control scheme but it needs the introduction of trusted
73 subject to ensure the usability.

74 By the 1980s, with the continuous improvement of requirements of the credibility of computer,
75 researches proposed more flexible access control mechanisms. One of the representative works is the
76 Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) which is created by The United States
77 Government Department of Defense (DoD). TCSEC is a standard that sets basic requirements for
78 assessing the effectiveness of security. According to TCSEC, access control can be divided into
79 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [3] and Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [4] depend on
80 different roles of access authority users. DAC model allows legitimate users to access objects as users
81 or groups, while preventing unauthorized users from accessing objects, some users can also
82 independently grant access rights to objects they own to other users. DAC model can meet the
83 security needs of resource owners, however, because of the way of access depends on user
84 authorization, the management of access authorities in DAC model is more decentralized. At the
85 same time, DAC needs to manage the users, authorities and resources manually, which makes it not
86 appropriate for IoT search due to the high complexity management works. MAC model is a means
87 of assigning access rights based on regulations by a central authority. This class of policies includes
88 examples from both industry and government. The applications of MAC are usually based on multi-
89 level security model. Although MAC model solves the problem of decentralized resource
90 management by centralizing authorization management, but for the users of IoT search, the
91 management efficiency of MAC model is lower.

92 Around 2000, with the development of Internet and increasing large-scale applications of
93 information system in enterprises, the traditional models of access control (i.e. DAC, MAC and its
94 extension models) are difficult to handle complex application layer access requirements. To solve this
95 problem, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [5] is prosed to restricting system access to authorized

96 users. The components of RBAC (i.e. role-permissions, user-role and role-role relationships) make it
 97 simple to perform user assignments. Figure 1 shows the relationship between roles and users in
 98 RBAC model. RBAC can be used to facilitate administration of security in large organizations, and
 99 meeting the information integrity requirements of information systems. RBAC is different from MAC
 100 and DAC, however it can enforce these policies without any complication.
 101



102
 103

Figure 1. Role and user relationship of RBAC.

104 Fast development of new computing environments such as IOT search brings big challenges to
 105 the applications of access control technology. Traditional closed environment-oriented access control
 106 models (i.e. DAC, MAC, RBAC) are not adapt to the new computing environments. In this case,
 107 Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [6] is proposed as an emerging form of access control, where
 108 subject requests to perform operations on objects are granted or denied based on assigned attributes
 109 of the subject, assigned attributes of the object, environmental conditions, and a set of policies that
 110 are specified in terms of those attributes and conditions [7]. The concept of role is very common in
 111 real life. Ferraiolo and Kuhn first introduced it into the Information System Access Control Research
 112 Institute in 1992 and named it RBAC [5]. Such Different from the traditional access control models
 113 which manual assignment of roles, ownership, or security labels by a system administrator, ABAC
 114 allows for the creation of access policies based on the existing attributes of the users and objects in
 115 the system.

116 Since attributes can describe entities in different views, it allows user to change access control
 117 strategies according to actual situations. Temporal-RBAC (TRBAC) [8] is an extension of RBAC model,
 118 which supports periodic role enabling, disabling, and temporal dependencies by using role triggers.
 119 Concept Usage Control (UCON) was developed in [9], which enables finer-grained control over usage of
 120 digital objects than that of traditional access control policies and models. The advantages of ABAC can
 121 effectively solve the problem of fine-grained access control in dynamic large-scale environment. ABAC
 122 is an ideal access control model in new computing environment, and has broad application prospects.

123 2.2. ABAC Background

124 ABAC makes access control decisions based on the attributes of access control entities. These
 125 attributes are often represented by a four tuple $\langle S, O, P, E \rangle$.

126 *S* Attributes (Subject Attributes). Attributes of the subjects of the system. Such as name, age,
 127 home address, job title and so on.

128 *O* Attributes (Object Attributes). Attributes of the resources of the system. Such as documents,
 129 pictures, audio files and so on.


130 *P* Attributes (Permission Attributes). Various operations on object resources. Such as files or
 131 database read, write, create operations and so on.

132 *E* Attributes (Environment Attributes). Attributes derived from the current state of the
 133 system's environment. Such as session start time, system location and so on.

134 The ABAC system can be divided into two stages depending on the type of operation it
 135 performs: Access control policy Management and Access control policy execution. The access control

136 Policy Management is primarily responsible for the collection of attributes, and describing and
 137 matching access control policies. The access control policy execution phase is primarily responsible
 138 for responding to access requests.

139 A simplified ABAC model is given in Figure 2, where Attribute Assignment (AA) aims to assign
 140 attributes to subjects and objects, Policy Permission Relation (PPR) is the relation between policies
 141 and the permissions they grant, Policy is the set of all policies that govern access in the system.



142

143 **Figure 2.** Core ABAC model. Attributes include both subject attributes and object attributes. Thin
 144 solid arrows denote many-to-many relations, thick solid lines denote relation with policy engine, and
 145 dotted lines denote information used by the policy engine to evaluate a certain policy.

146 Although ABAC achieves effective control over users' access to resources, the security of the
 147 private data is not fully considered. Based on the idea of traditional ABAC, researchers have
 148 proposed Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [10] where objects are encrypted based on attribute-
 149 based access policies. ABE mainly consists of key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [11] or ciphertext-policy ABE
 150 (CP-ABE) [12]. In KP-ABE, the access structure used to describe the access control policy is combined
 151 with the user's private key, and the attribute set is associated with the resource to be accessed. In this
 152 model, user freedom is relatively high and data owner freedom is lower. Because only attributes can
 153 be used to describe the data, the data owner cannot set the corresponding access control policies. CP-
 154 ABE is the reverse of KP-ABE, using an attribute-based policy to encrypt an object, and the access
 155 structure used to describe the access control policy is combined with resource to be accessed and the
 156 attribute set is associated with the user's private key. In this model, the access control policy is set by
 157 data owner, so that data owner freedom is higher.

158 3. Conflicts Resolution and IoT Application

159 3.1. Conflicts Resolution and Model Combination

160 In large scale network, different policies . Thus, the policy conflicts detection and resolution has
 161 an important role in the ABAC, and there is a lot of research on it.

162 In the paper of XACML Policy Evaluation Engines design research [13], the authors mentioned
 163 Kolovski et al.[14] formalize XACML policies with description logics (DLs), a decidable fragment of
 164 the first-order logic, and exploit existing DL verifiers for policy verification, detecting redundant
 165 XACML rules and removing redundant rules from XACML policies. Other scholars [15-19] proposed
 166 other conflicts detection and resolution methods to

167 Servos D etc. [20] summarized research and open problems in ABAC. As they mentioned, hybrid
 168 models of ABAC aim to combine attributes into existing models of access control or to extend the
 169 traditional models with identity-less or policy-based access control concepts. Sun et al. [21] have

170 proposed ARBAC (attribute- and role-based access control) that has an advantage of both ABAC and
171 RBAC to fulfill the needs of highly distributed network environment. They also have done a conflict
172 detection and policy optimization.

173 Servos and Osborn [21] attempted to create a formal general model of ABAC that provides a
174 group based hierarchical representation of object and user attributes. In this model, entitled
175 Hierarchical Group and Attribute-Based Access Control (HGABAC), attributes are assigned both
176 directly to access control entities and indirectly.

177 3.2. *IoT Application*

178 Much efforts have been done in application of traditional methods of access control to IoT
179 scenarios. N. Ye [22] introduced ABAC in web services into IoT networks to reduce the number of
180 rules resulting from role explosion.

181 Both in [23] and [24], scholars discussed the research direction in IoT. In [24], Sicari S etc.
182 summarized the security, privacy and trust in IoT, they discussed the limitation of RBAC and ABAC
183 in IoT. As mentioned in [24], Gusmeroli S etc. [25] affirm that authorization frameworks like RBAC
184 and ABAC (Attribute Based Access Control) do not provide sufficient scalable, manageable, and
185 effective mechanisms to support distributed systems with many interacting services and the dynamic
186 and scaling needs of IoT text. A problem common to ACLs (Access Control Lists), RBAC and ABAC
187 is that in these systems it is hard to enforce the principle of least privilege access.

188 Because of the large-scale network in the IoT area, there must be model combination and novel
189 strategy, such as blockchain. In addition, although the research on combined model of ABAC has
190 achieved certain research results, the application to IoT scenarios are lacking. The independent and
191 complete set of ABAC strategy application and content-based access control is the basis for building
192 access control system in IoT area. How to design an excellent algorithm to get the best mixed strategy
193 with low computational complexity is the key scientific problem to be solved in the future.

194 4. Access Control and Authorization

195 4.1. *Attribute Discovery Mechanism*

196 The accessing entities and the accessed entities have many intrinsic attributes. how to select
197 appropriate attributes directly affects performance of access control system. The conceptual model of
198 attribute aggregation fuses the many user attributes contained in multiple IdPs (Identity Providers)
199 and further generates a complete user attribute based on the reliability of the information provided
200 by each LS (Linking Service) [26]. Because not considering the dynamic changes of IdP's reputation,
201 an attribute aggregation method based on multi-node cooperation [27] is proposed to obtain
202 attributes from multiple mutually cooperative nodes when an attribute that the system does not
203 recognize appears. The nodes participating in cooperation calculate the reputation values of the
204 neighboring nodes based on their background knowledge, and then upload the reputation value
205 when the SPs (service providers) makes the attribute query. After the SP calculates all the reputation
206 values, it determines whether the node providing data is trusted according to the preset threshold,
207 and filters the information provided by the untrusted node. This method solves the problem of
208 reputation in attribute aggregation. although solving multi-attribute aggregation problems by multi
209 vector convergence operator [28], but the solution does not consider the security (for example:
210 privacy exposure) caused by attribute aggregation. Thus, several recent researches have been
211 conducted for the privacy-preserving for the IoT based services. PAgIoT which is a Privacy
212 preserving Aggregation protocol suitable for IoT settings enables multi-attribute aggregation for
213 groups of entities while allowing for privacy-preserving value correlation [29]. This mechanism
214 enables aggregating data concerning several attributes of each entity in a single operation ensuring
215 data authenticity and privacy. Literature [30-31] achieves the scheme of attribute aggregation for
216 privacy protection with OpenID or pseudo-ID. Location anonymization attempts to make user's
217 location indistinguishable from a certain number of other users in open environment so that it is one
218 of most important techniques of IOT. The FINE framework working for mobile devices employs

219 anonymous attribute based on encryption technique [32]. Attribute discovery depends on data
220 aggregation which is responsible for increasing the network lifetime and reducing the energy
221 consumption [33]. Literature [34] proposed a method of lifetime balanced data aggregation, in which
222 the aggregation delays of adjacent devices are adjusted together in a collaborative fashion.

223 Because the data aggregation has an important role in the IoT, there is not any systematic and
224 comprehensive study about analyzing its important mechanisms [34]. In addition, although the
225 research on attribute discovery of IoT has achieved certain research results, the mining method of
226 independent and complete attribute for large scale data are lacking in noisy environments. The
227 independent and complete set of attributes is the basis for building ABAC. The independence of the
228 attributes ensures that the set of attributes required to build access control does not contain
229 redundant attributes with repeated meanings. And the completeness of the attributes ensures that
230 the attribute set includes all the attributes needed to accurately respond to the access request.
231 Therefore, under the condition of satisfying independent and complete constraints, how to design an
232 excellent algorithm to get the best query attribute set with low computational complexity is the key
233 scientific problem to be solved in the future.

234 4.2. Association Generation of Attribute and Permission

235 A wide variety of users and devices bring a huge variety of attributes in the IoT environment.
236 These attributes contain too many redundant attributes, which are not necessary to build the access
237 control system, to manually filter. Therefore, it is necessary to study the automated association
238 between user-attribute and attribute-privilege. Literature [35] discusses the security threats in IoT
239 including Authentication, Confidentiality and Access Control. Besides ABAC (Attribute-Based
240 Access Control) [36], RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) is also a policy mechanism which are based
241 on the role of users in the system and the permissions given to them [37]. Although RBAC is one of
242 the access control types [38], RBAC can be seen a single attribute special case of ABAC. RBAC is
243 suitable for scenarios where there is an easy identification of permitted tasks for each user or service
244 [37].


245 By drawing on the role engineering in RBAC, we can provide some ideas for the research of
246 attribute association. Role engineering can be divided into top-down and bottom-up. The top-down
247 method refers to the analysis of the security requirements and business processes by experts with the
248 help of relevant knowledge, abstracting the role set, completing the role-permission assignment
249 relationship, and ultimately achieving the goal of building a secure access control system. However,
250 these methods mainly rely on experts to understand the real application scenarios, and the artificial
251 dependence is strong. Using data mining techniques or matrix decomposition methods, the bottom-
252 up method automatically filters and generates candidate role sets based on the existing user-privilege
253 correspondence. Probabilistic approach is introduced into attribute extraction [39]. Literature [40]
254 proposes a probabilistic model to reflect the correlation between role and privileges. With top-down
255 and bottom-up methods, we can study the semantic relationship between the newly mined attributes,
256 measure the similarity between the newly mined attributes and the attributes in the original access
257 control system, and build the association between attribute and privilege.

258 For the generation and maintenance of ABAC rules, manually migrating to ABAC is more
259 difficult than migrating to RBAC. The changes like mergers and acquisitions can make the rules
260 inaccurate. If the change is too frequent, it is very difficult to manually specify or maintain an ABAC
261 rule set. Therefore, automatically mining ABAC rules is an alternative. Literature [41] presents an
262 ABAC policy mining algorithm which iterates over tuples in the given user-permission relation, uses
263 selected tuples as seeds to construct candidate rules, and generalizes each candidate rule to cover
264 additional tuples in the user-permission relation by replacing conjuncts in attribute expressions with
265 constraints.

266 Since access logs reflect not only access control rules but also requesters' behaviors, so that
267 mining the access logs helps to reconstruct the access rule for reducing the cost of migration to ABAC.
268 Literature [42] analyzes that logs generally provide incomplete information about granted privilege
269 and only a lower bound information. The algorithm does not take the order of log entries into account

270 but summarize the log by the user-privilege relation induced by the log and the frequency function.
 271 Literature [43] use RBMs (Restricted Boltzmann Machines) to infer ABAC access rules from logs.
 272 RBMs are energy-based models capable to perform unsupervised learning so that they can work in
 273 the scenarios that there are only positive examples.

274 The access logs required by mining algorithm are not sparse. Otherwise these mining algorithms
 275 [41-43] as discussed above cannot mine useful ABAC policy. These sparse access logs maybe contain
 276 only a fraction of all possible requests. How to utilize sparse logs to mine useful ABAC policy become
 277 a requirement. Literature [44] proposes a mining algorithm Rhapsody which has been built on
 278 APRIORI-SD by replacing its last two stages with two new stages. On one hand, Rhapsody computes
 279 the reliability of each rule and removes those rules whose reliability value is below a given threshold.
 280 on the other hand, Rhapsody removes those rules that have equivalent shorter rules. In order to test
 281 the accuracy of mining algorithm, cross-validation is necessary which splits the log into a training
 282 and a testing log. Cross-validation on logs is shown in **Figure 1**. The Arabic numerals describe the
 283 processing stage. **Table 1** shows the comparison of mining algorithms mentioned above.



284
285

286 **Figure 1. cross-validation**

287
288

Table 1. State-of-the-art ABAC policy mining algorithms

Algorithm	Sparse logs	Shortest rules
Literature [16]	No	No
Literature [17]	No	No
Literature [18]	No	No
Literature [19]	YES	YES

289

290 There are two challenges. One is the limitations of existing approaches to policy mining is that
 291 the logs contain negative authorizations with varying levels of incompleteness. Another is noise in
 292 raw data which greatly affects the accuracy of results. How to deal with noise in raw data is a focus
 293 in the future.


294 4.3. Policy Matching

295 An efficient access control model or algorithm for the IoT requires to select an appropriate access
 296 policy language to implement corresponding access policies. The most well-known access control
 297 schemes used in IoT environments are XACML (Extensible Access Control Markup Language),
 298 OAuth (Open Authorization), and UMA (User-Managed Access). these protocols or frameworks will
 299 accelerate policy matching.

300 The XACML provide a standardized description of access control policies and is used in many
 301 IoT-related works such as [45]. XACML evaluation engine uses traversal matching so that Literature
 302 [46] uses the statistical analysis to reorder the policies and rules, put the frequently invoked policies
 303 and rules in front and cluster the policies, and clusters the policies and rules. Based on the XACML
 304 logic model, a decision graph of multiple types of data is proposed to manage the XACML strategy
 305 [47]. The mechanism of Hybrid access control enforces XML access control. HyXAC preprocess user

306 queries by rewriting queries and removing parts of violating access control rules, and evaluates the
 307 re-written queries using subviews [48]. OAuth has been designed to provide an access control scheme
 308 to Web Services and applications. OAuth provides OAuth-based solutions for IoT. Literature [49]
 309 proposes a secure authentication policy, using OAuth 2.0 protocol. UMA which extends OAuth is a
 310 promising mechanism for access control. Literature [50] proposes a multi-level cache optimization
 311 mechanism that reduces the size of the strategy and digitizes the attribute values to improve the
 312 matching speed. Literature [51] selects XACML for the proposed AdRBAC (Adaptive Risk-Based
 313 Access Control) model. AdRBAC has four inputs which are user context, resource sensitivity, action
 314 severity and risk history. These four factors are used to estimate the security risk associated with each
 315 access request. The estimated risk value is then compared against the risk policies to make the final
 316 access decision.

317 Literature [52] proposes a Blockchain-based framework for access authorizations. Although the
 318 Blockchain was design for Bitcoin transactions, it uses the Blockchain to store access control rules,
 319 relationships, contexts and accountability information. Blockchain include Relationships Blockchain,
 320 Context Blockchain, Accountability Blockchain and Rules Blockchain as shown in Figure 2. The access
 321 information should be recorded on the Accountability Blockchain by the access control. It proposes
 322 a Decoder but lacking details that how to translate ABAC model and rules to the four Blockchain.
 323 **Although authors do not explain the technical details of Decoder for which there is not theoretical
 324 proof or experimental test [52], it is worth introducing Blockchain to the research of access control
 325 of IoT.**
 326



327
 328

329 **Figure 2. Framework overview**

330 5. Other ABAC Models

331 Permissions in ABAC are closely related to attributes, and changes in user attributes can lead to
 332 corresponding changes in their access permissions. Access permission could be revoked on user level,
 333 user attribute level, and system attribute level. In either permission revoke level, new access control
 334 policies need to be generated when attributes are changed. The large-scale attributes and the many-
 335 to-many relationship between attributes and permissions in IoT search increase the complexity of
 336 permission updating.

337 Some researchers proposed to maintain attribute-permission list directly and manually. In [53],
 338 a simple direct revocation is described. In this method, labels of the revoked attributes are reversed
 339 to relate with permission policies to ensure these revoked attributes cannot be access by users.
 340 However, this way increases the description complexity of access control policies. To solve this
 341 problem, [54] proposed an attribute direct-revocable CP-ABE scheme with constant ciphertext length.

342 Although direct revocation can achieve fine-grained access control, it cannot achieve efficient
 343 fine-grained management between attributes and permissions. To overcome this limitation,
 344 researchers proposed indirect revocation. In [55], an identity-based encryption scheme was proposed
 345 to significantly improves key-update efficiency on the side of the trusted party, and ensure efficient

346 for the users at the same time. This method updates the access control policy periodically, and
347 revocation only occur when the period of user attributes is expired. Thus, indirectly increasing the
348 workload of authorization engine. To overcome this drawback, [56] describes an efficient and revocable
349 data access control scheme for multi-authority cloud storage systems. Multiple authorities co-exist in the
350 system, and each authority can issue attributes independently. A revocable multi-authority CP-ABE
351 scheme is also proposed in this article, which is applied as the underlying techniques to design the data
352 access control scheme. Indirect approach does not require a full list of users, however, the exchange of key and
353 data, and access control must be performed through a trusted third party. In article [57] He et al. limit attributes
354 to user credentials that have been verified by a trusted third party. Both static and dynamic delegation in the
355 context of the Role Graph Model are presented, and sessions are added to the RGM. Edge-labeling method is
356 using in RBAC model to achieve session-oriented dynamic delegation.

357 In ABAC systems, user permissions are only associated with attributes, users may not be known
358 until runtime due to this increased flexibility provided by attribute-based policies and the identity-
359 less nature. At present, the research on auditing techniques of user identity in ABAC mainly focuses
360 on Attribute-based Signature (ABS). Combined with the idea of digital signature, researchers
361 proposed the ABS mechanism. The introduction of digital signature technology, such as ring
362 signature [58] and group signature [59], guarantees the integrity of user attribute information. In
363 article [60], an adaptive-predicate unforgeable and private attribute-based signature (ABS) scheme is
364 described in the standard model. The ABS mechanism in multi-authority environment is designed
365 and the corresponding security proof is given in the paper. In [61], the first decentralized multi-
366 authority attribute-based signature (DMA-ABS) scheme is presented. No central authority and no
367 trusted setup are required in this scheme. However, due to the limitation of access structure, the
368 scheme is not suitable for large-scale environment. Although ABS mechanism protects the privacy of
369 signers, malicious users may use ABS's anonymity to perform malicious operations. Traceable ABS
370 mechanism is proposed to track user identity while ensure the privacy of signers. In [62], a traceable
371 ABS mechanism (Decentralized TABS, DTABS) is proposed in distributed environment. Based on
372 DTABS, paper [63] improve the state-of-art in three dimensions. The model proposed in the paper
373 minimizes the trust placed in attribute authorities and provides a stronger definition for non-
374 frameability. The model also captures the notion of tracing soundness.

375 6. Conclusions and Research Trends of Key Technologies

376 This article has introduced the background of access control and a taxonomy of current areas of
377 ABAC for IoT search, provided a literature review of different ABAC models, and identified a number of
378 open problems. Access control divided into Access control policy Management and Access control
379 policy execution phases in this paper. For the first phase, Section 3 provides the review of ABAC
380 oriented access control policy integration. For the second phase, the review of ABAC oriented access
381 control and authorization in Section 4 describes the Attribute discovery mechanism, attribute-
382 permission relation generation mechanism, and policy matching mechanism. Section 5 complements
383 other key technologies in ABAC mechanism. The open problems examined in Section 6 serve as
384 potential starting points for new research efforts.

385 The literature surveyed in this paper covered a number of different types of ABAC models.
386 However, as the application environment becomes more and more diverse and complex, there is still
387 challenge problems to be solved in ABAC research. One of the challenge problems to be solved is
388 policy conflict resolution which is caused by features of IoT search. To ensure the security of IoT
389 search and access control system, it is urgent to carry out related research. The other challenge
390 problem is noise data identification and elimination for user-permission relations, since the noise
391 data greatly affects the accuracy of the policy generation, and brings great security risks to access
392 control systems.

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