

1 Article

## 2 **Towards a new paradigm in water management: 3 Cochabamba's Water Agenda from an ethical 4 approach**

5 **Francesc Bellaubi,<sup>1\*</sup>, Rocío Bustamante,<sup>2</sup>**

6 <sup>1</sup> Consultant, Prenzlauer Promenade 183, 13189 Berlin, Germany; [bellaubi@hotmail.com](mailto:bellaubi@hotmail.com)

7 <sup>2</sup> Lecturer/Researcher, Centro Andino del Agua, Universidad Mayor de S. Simón, Facultad de Agronomía,  
8 Av. Petrolera Km 5, Cochabamba, Bolivia; [Rocio.bustamante.centroagua@gmail.com](mailto:Rocio.bustamante.centroagua@gmail.com)

9 \* Correspondence: [bellaubi@hotmail.com](mailto:bellaubi@hotmail.com); Tel.: +49 176 70749133

10 **Abstract:** Through the process of paradigm change (water as a resource towards water as a  
11 common), the authors examine, from a theoretic point of view, the water governability proposed  
12 by Agenda del Agua Cochabamba (AdA) – Cochabamba Water Agenda – in the Cochabamba  
13 Valley (Bolivia), identifying barriers and drivers to the process that could take place. The rise of  
14 Evo Morales in Government in 2006 suggested that policy making would somehow take a  
15 fundamental turn resulting in more poor environmental-oriented water policies. However, if that  
16 was indeed the case, the implementation of these policies remain controversial as strong power  
17 asymmetries still exist at a local level that interfere with national policies shaping the political area.  
18 The Cochabamba Water Agenda echoes this debate on the political arena and contributes a  
19 politically contested water management through a paradigm change envisaging the difficulties  
20 through its implementation. The question remains if this “political” solution to paradigm change in  
21 water management may reduce water conflicts.

22 **Keywords:** water management; water paradigm; water governability; water conflicts; Cochabamba  
23

---

### 24 **1. Introduction**

25 In April 2000, the city of Cochabamba was at war. The cause was due to the contracting out of  
26 water services to a private company, Aguas del Tunari (a joint venture involving the USA group  
27 Bechtel), under the policy of private sector participation (PSP), to provide “improved” water  
28 services to the city of Cochabamba. Aguas del Tunari was confronted with a situation of low  
29 coverage of the system and poor quality of the services with already high tariffs. The citizens’  
30 opposition to Aguas del Tunari was on two fronts. The first and the most well-known reason was the  
31 increasing price of drinking water before any investment was made to improve the quality of the  
32 service [1]. However, the second and most important reason was the fact that the management  
33 contract was perceived by many as the first step to jeopardising community water systems that were  
34 managed according to customary law. The main outcome of Cochabamba’s Water War was the clear  
35 negative from the citizenship to the marketisation and commercialisation of water and the  
36 participation of the private sector in water services’ management.

37 The Water War marked a turning point in how water was perceived as an element of  
38 sociocultural identity. Years later, the rise of Evo Morales, as president of the Bolivian Pluristate,  
39 brought a definitive change in policy and enacted institutional reforms to protect local and  
40 customary usage rights. Privatisation of water sources and management services by the private  
41 sector was prohibited and priority was accorded to social participation in water management and  
42 policy decisions, together with the establishment of a water governance system supported by a  
43 constitutional framework and legislation; this was exemplified by [2] and the policy of el Desarrollo  
44 Integral para el Vivir Bien [Holistic Development for Well-being].

45 Today, almost 18 years after the Cochabamba Water War, the complexity of the water problems,  
46 which is far from being resolved by populist policies, has increased. A clear example of this  
47 growing complexity can be seen in the challenges faced by SEMAPA (the public Cochabamba  
48 provider). SEMAPA publicly admits 50% losses in its network while the pollution of the Rocha  
49 River (the main water source) has been denounced by the National Audit Office [3]. For the  
50 irrigation systems, irrigation efficiencies at plot level are estimated at around 50% as declared by the  
51 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), in a personal communication in  
52 September 2016). Urban areas boosted by rural immigration make the informal and technically  
53 "illegal" water market a lucrative business. Meanwhile, climate change is exacerbating drought and  
54 floods, and increasing demand and competition among water-using sectors (domestic, irrigation  
55 and energy) within the Cochabamba region, exemplified by strategic national projects, such as  
56 Misicuni, have increased the levels of conflict. Where there was water scarcity, this is nowadays  
57 accentuated by grabbing the water resource (appropriation) through misinterpretation of customary  
58 laws, transforming use rights into property rights in an attempt to secure water.

59 To confront this situation and promoted by the Dirección de Gestión Integral del Agua del  
60 Gobierno Autónomo de Cochabamba (Cochabamba Prefecture Water Directorate), la Agenda del  
61 Agua Cochabamba (AdA) (Cochabamba Water Agenda) appears as a politically contested water  
62 management paradigm.<sup>1</sup> The Cochabamba Water Agenda is presented as an opportunity to address  
63 the challenges in water management in the Cochabamba Department, mainly in the Cochabamba  
64 Valley. The AdA proposes a paradigm shift changing from water as a resource to water as a common  
65 through social agreements. Ultimately, it is about the elaboration of a public social policy  
66 articulating the public investment process with citizens' initiatives through the social agreements  
67 within the scope of the River Basin Management Plans.

68 In this context, the following question arises: will AdA be able to establish a new water  
69 paradigm considering water as a common and not as a resource and, thus, overcome the actual  
70 hydraulic paradigm based on the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) concept? Or, in  
71 other words, what are the drivers and barriers for AdA to take place? To answer this research  
72 question, this paper is organised as follows: Chapter 2 defines the existing conflicting water  
73 paradigm in Bolivia in a context of conflicts and power struggle describing the values of AdA.  
74 Chapter 3 describes the "water management" arrangements under AdA within a governability  
75 framework. Chapter 4 presents an example of how AdA can be implemented through water user  
76 agreements in a specific case. Chapter 5 concludes with the question of whether a change of values  
77 may trigger a reduction of water related conflicts.

## 78 **2. The Conflicting Water Management Paradigms in Bolivia**

79 In a territory, water networks or water landscapes play an unquestionable role relating different  
80 socioeconomic, cultural and historical realities, at different scales and levels over time, so there are  
81 both temporal and spatial dimensions. However, people perceive water differently according to  
82 their relationship with it; especially when there is a physical proximity and a lived experience  
83 through channels, ditches, wells, and lagoons. There is a hydro-temporal-spatial network that  
84 shapes the hydro-social network of interrelations and coexistence with water from its ecological,  
85 sociocultural and productive value based functions. In this way, water concepts, such as "upstream"  
86 and "downstream", are abstract and distant elements for most inhabitants of a river basin.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Paradigm refers to how reality is understood (epistemology) from its objective perception (ontology) and how it can be transformed (axiology) from certain principles [4].

<sup>2</sup> The basin remains an external construction for both rural and urban communities. The concept is closer to a territory in constant dialogue with humans. In this sense the basin must be understood as a space-time reality, a territory as a dynamic-social construction: the natural habitat of water in its interaction with social actors.

87 La Agenda del Agua Cochabamba (AdA) is set in a conflicting water context as part of a reform  
88 process from the institutions themselves. The PROMIC was a BTC/COSUDE funded programme  
89 that lasted from 1991 to 2012. The PROMIC looked at the integrated watersheds' management in the  
90 Cordillera del Tunari in Cochabamba. The main objective was integrated river basin management  
91 articulated with a productive rural development, integrating the water resources sector with a focus  
92 on user participation and consultation. In 2012, the Swiss cooperation put an end to this programme  
93 resulting in the creation of the River Basin Departmental Service – Servicio Departamental de  
94 Cuencas (SDC) – with the mission to implement the Plan Nacional de Cuencas (PNC) – River Basin  
95 National Plan – in Cochabamba Department, mainly regarding the elaboration of Planes de Cuenca  
96 – River Basin Management Plans – under an IWRM approach. However, in the attempt to  
97 implement the above mentioned River Basin Management Plans, the SDC faced two apparently  
98 conflicting paradigm approaches: one clearly stated by the PNC as Integral Water Resources  
99 Management (IWRM) and the other in the irrigation water sector laws and by-laws based on water  
100 customary usage rights according to [5].

101 The PNC clearly approaches water management according to the concept of IWRM. However,  
102 this paradigm is due to a utilitarian hydro-engineering 'vision' that continues to see water as a  
103 resource, the limited participation of social actors still strongly conditioned by state actors, and a  
104 focus on the basin as a management unit that does not take into account the hydro-social  
105 relationships, thus perpetuating the so-called problems of efficiency and equity in the allocation and  
106 distribution of water. An interesting point may be to consider whether the problem is a shortage  
107 (deficit), either as a result of the balance between the available physical supply and the demand of  
108 the different "consumer" sectors (uses), or an allocation/distribution issue related to the water  
109 availability resulting from a specific water management with regard to real water needs.

110 Another paradigm of water management recognised by [6], specifically under [5], has been that  
111 based on water customary usage rights. The different levels of management, according to the uses  
112 and customs, refer to the allocation of water between water systems and its distribution for a specific  
113 or shared use between users within the systems. The customs are habits or tendencies acquired  
114 through the frequent practice of an act (uses). Custom, in law, is "the uniform and uninterrupted  
115 way of acting that, for a long period of time, adopts the members of a community, with the belief  
116 that this way of acting responds to a legal need, and is mandatory"<sup>3</sup> [7]. Uses and customs vary over  
117 time: management rules are adapted to external or internal changes as they are eminently practical  
118 and operational in nature. They also vary between communities and systems (i.e. spatially). This  
119 "adaptation" makes management based on usage and customs especially resilient and robust in face  
120 of seasonal variations and institutional changes. Changes that affect the availability make it  
121 necessary to renegotiate new rules and adapt to the water needs. From this point of view, the water  
122 customary usage is closer to the concept of Adaptive Water Management (AWM) [9].<sup>4</sup> However, the  
123 fact that the "rules" are not clearly documented or transcribed allows them to be reinterpreted in

---

<sup>3</sup> Rights of access to water are complex. The "right to water" includes different elements: rights of access, consumption (irrigation, etc), usufruct rights (for activities that allow obtaining benefits from water without consumption), management rights and exclusion of users, sanctions, etc). This text uses the term 'uses and customs' to refer to the elements of management of access and distribution of water and includes the rights mentioned [7]. In Bolivia the distinction between right to water and right of water is made. The first refers to access to clean water as a human right [8], whilst the second considers the access to the water source.

<sup>4</sup> The Adaptive Water Management (AWM) seeks to increase the resilience of the water system, and reduce vulnerability to uncertainty and change. The AWM has two aspects: 1) The AWM supports the actors involved in water management to understand, adjust and plan water management projects in situations of uncertainty, and 2) The AWM implies learning as a 'systematic process to improve the policies and management practices through learning processes based on the results obtained from previously implemented management strategies' [9].

124 favour of specific actors and communities who see a source of law (acquired right) in their uses and  
125 customs.

126 Bolivia has a long and complex sociocultural history. There are strong power asymmetries  
127 resulting from territorial fragmentation that have their origins in pre-colonial cultures. The Incas  
128 displaced a large number of populations and these displacements were kept during the colonial time  
129 through haciendas as a administrative power organisation. In general terms, it is possible to observe  
130 the overlapping of sociocultural and economic patterns through different historical periods, where  
131 the dominant socioeconomic and cultural organisation took over the previous "status quo",  
132 adapting their own ideology, believing in societal concerns in the relationship/management with  
133 natural resources and water. In this way, people identity became dissipated with overlapping ethics  
134 and sociopolitical and administrative-imposed frameworks and a lack of historical vision.

135 In general, territories cannot be associated to ethnic groups as these groups appear scattered.  
136 The result is that the social power exerted by different sociocultural groups is not linked to a specific  
137 territory. It is, however, superposed to existing social realities that share the same geographical  
138 space and, so, creates imbalances of power of the groups in each of the roles they play in resource  
139 management. Power asymmetries are determined at different levels, both in time and space, to be  
140 the evolution of a territory. Thus, territorial asymmetries of power define the governability of a  
141 socio-ecologic system, and water is a part of it.

142 These asymmetries of power are manifested in the way different groups have access to natural  
143 resources for their own interest, how investments are made on infrastructures to make resources  
144 available across the territory, and how both aspects interact in allocating the resources under certain  
145 rules of priority for their use and benefit.

146 The organisational behavioural norms that define the water political arena, based on territorial  
147 asymmetries of power, happen at the intersection of two levels. One level is the community norms  
148 and rules that relate to the cosmological vision of water and have an anthropological background.  
149 This level is constituted by the inhabitants of the communities and is based on strong links with the  
150 Pachamama (Mother Earth), articulated through rituals.

151 The other, ulterior level is that of the leaders ("dirigentes") and representatives of WUA (Water  
152 User's Associations – "sindicatos" and "centrales campesinas") that constitute, up to certain degree,  
153 the bases of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) government of Evo Morales. At this level, the  
154 actors consider the political benefits of their trade off (political and social cost) for themselves and  
155 for the community according to their social links (see [10] on community capture). This level is  
156 organised around the uses and customs that took over from previous sociocultural traditions, which  
157 were adopted and modified conflicting with the institutional rules (normative positive law).

158 This behavioural set up is at the core of the territorial power asymmetries that are mimicked  
159 outside the communities and state level. Thus, the Bolivian state can be also seen as a big  
160 "community" with the citizens behaving under certain rules, and the leaders behaving in accordance  
161 with the political cost of their actions, balancing private gains with the social costs of their actions.

162 Under this political context, in 2014 the Water Directorate – Direccion de Gestion del Agua  
163 (DGA) – was established as a political and normative entity for the whole water sector in  
164 Cochabamba; in part as a result of the increasing conflict in dealing both with an IWRM and a water  
165 custom usage rights approach. From 2014, DGA and SDC elaborated and implemented some River  
166 Basin Management plans with the help of international donors, which mainly focused on the  
167 development of institutional platforms on the basis of existing communal organisations and the  
168 reinforcement of local organisations and actors to make the water governability possible in the  
169 Cochabamba Department. The key and most interesting point is that the DGA's institutional set up  
170 and way forward is inspired by the Agenda del Agua Cochabamba (AdA) but also there are other  
171 avenues, meaning that the AdA receives feedback on the developing institutional processes through  
172 social actors, rules about how they relate in terms of water allocation-distribution and the space  
173 within which they interact though these thematic and territorial platforms.

174 The AdA itself was drafted by a group of experts and intellectuals related to the water sector in  
175 Cochabamba during 2012-2013, as a need to give a sustainable, holistic and comprehensive answer

176 to the water issues in Cochabamba. The AdA proposes a social dialogue to change the vision and  
177 relationship with the water: moving from the project-supply view (offer management) to go beyond  
178 the demand management, to understand water as a common, not in the economic sense ("good") but  
179 in the community sense, and meaning water as a key element in shaping the collective identity in the  
180 Andean culture. At its core, the AdA seeks collective action to establish a social agreement to  
181 develop a social-public water policy and, thus, create a new paradigm in water management.

182 Thus, the Cochabamba Water Agenda (AdA) is a clear politically contested process, addressing  
183 the existing power asymmetries, seeking social agreement through collective action for the  
184 elaboration and implementation of a social public water policy. To effect this suggests a radical  
185 change of values that goes beyond the statement that access to clean water is a human right [8], and  
186 water cannot be treated as a simple commodity (water is a social and economic good). Water  
187 cannot be considered a public or private resource or either a common good within the community of  
188 users ("res communis omnium" – right of use for each person). The fundamental point is that the  
189 AdA recognises water as a common, meaning its right as a living being accepting its diversity in the  
190 way water expresses itself through rivers, lakes, and streams [11]. By doing this the AdA recovers  
191 traditional Andean values where the Mother Earth Rights are above the Human Rights and where  
192 water becomes a key element of territorial identity in rebuilding communities (communities of  
193 water). The AdA compiles these ideas into three basic principles for water management:

- 194 • Autonomy in the territorial management of water (a concept that differs from that of  
195 decentralisation, delegation or devolution), understood as the recognition of the relationship  
196 between the inhabitants of a territory and the water.
- 197 • Equity in access. From a management point of view, water can be seen as a resource that may  
198 be private, public, or common good according to access and rivalry criteria, or even, as  
199 mentioned by [12], different management categories may coexist within a water system. Water  
200 usage customs do not grant property rights but are concerted priorities of allocation and  
201 distribution (Paragraph 2, Article 374 of the CPE). According to the AdA, water is a common.  
202 This must be also clearly distinguished from water as community managed under the concept  
203 of commons [1].
- 204 • Responsibility in the relationship with the water, not only in terms of efficient and effective use  
205 of water based on real needs and availability through the service for multiple uses but with  
206 special focus on recognising the different water 'bodies' needs (rivers, lakes, streams...)  
207 through ecological yields including landscape concerns.

### 208 3. The Management Arrangements under AdA

209 This section examines how the AdA unfolds in a new paradigm in water management using the  
210 concept of governability. According to [13], governability relates to qualities of the object of  
211 governance (the system-to-be-governed), its subject (the governing system) and the relationship  
212 between the two [13]. The authors propose a governability analytical framework to examine the  
213 AdA as a water management paradigm comparing its governability qualities with the other two  
214 conflicting paradigms in water management in Bolivia, as exposed in section 2: that of IWRM  
215 promoted by the PNC, and the one based on water usage custom rights mainly compiled in [5]. The  
216 governability framework considers the relationship between the institutional rules framed by  
217 specific policies (system to be governed), the organisational structures grounded in territorial  
218 asymmetries of power for water control that delineate the water political process also known as  
219 hydro-politics (the governing system), and the resulting management practices that characterise the  
220 water paradigm [14]. The authors suggest (see Table 1) that changing of values in how rules are  
221 elaborated and implemented has implications for the water management practices. In turn, the  
222 management practices may characterise the governability of a system and be expressed through a  
223 certain level of conflict.

225

**Table 1.** Different water paradigms under the governability qualities suggested by the authors

Paradigm			Governability qualities
Water rights	Cultural-geography	IWRM	
Territory, hydro-social relations	Landscape evolution, identity	Natural systems, socio-hydraulic solutions	Governing system (rules, governance)
Water rights – pragmatic decisions over demand	Social learning and benefit sharing	Master and volumetric supply control	System-to-be-governed (power/organizations)
Water as a community good	Water as a common	Water as a social and economic good	Governing interaction (management)
Social justice	Environmental moral	Utilitarian view	Understanding values

226

227 The authors consider that the water management paradigm proposed by the AdA may be  
 228 under the umbrella of cultural geography. Whilst the historic ecology somehow reflects part of the  
 229 AdA ideas on how the water landscapes reproduce the dialogue between humans and water  
 230 through time and space, a missing element is that of identity echoed by cultural geography. Cultural  
 231 geography does not define per se an object of study but a way of how to look at thought processes  
 232 under an identity-territorial dual logic. In this sense, the dialogue of human and water not only  
 233 shapes landscapes but defines a specific cultural identity and feelings of belonging, being ancient  
 234 traditions and knowledge and, finally, water management being an expression of it.

235 The concept of cultural geography brings in two fundamental and complementary aspects in  
 236 how to articulate the AdA as a "new paradigm" of water management. First is to consider the  
 237 different overlapping social-economic, administrative, and hydraulic actor layouts on a territory for  
 238 water management extending the concept of "hydro-social territory"<sup>5</sup> to that of water trajectories,  
 239 and going beyond that of a water network or paths as it looks at the dialogue of humans and water  
 240 through time and space creating a specific cultural identity in the sense of communities of water.  
 241 This dialogue is expressed in hydraulic works that modify the water landscape and extend water  
 242 communities and identities in the form of customs and norms that coexist in the territorial space and  
 243 evolve over time being progressively adopted by the positive law.

244 The second point relates to the need to revisit the concept of the existing customs and norms,  
 245 expressed as water rights looking for a consensus between the individual and collective sphere in  
 246 water management, considering that the social justice of water and the universal right to water can  
 247 only be achieved if a new environmental moral is put into practice through two coordinated forms of  
 248 action: revisiting the existing rights and "redistribution" or "re-legitimation" of those rights  
 249 (adapted from [7]).

<sup>5</sup> The concept is similar to that of the "bassin versant et bassin deversant" [12]. There is a vast literature review on why the river basin, as the basic unit to implement IWRM, faced a number of problems. Undoubtedly water flows beyond the river basin; besides the IWRM concept applied in a territory is not holistic since it considers water as the most important resource. Meanwhile, water management is interconnected with other resources considering the full ecosystem. In this paper, the authors view river basins as an external construction for both rural and urban communities, where there is a greater awareness of the reality of the territory they manage rather than that of the basin alone. In this sense, the basin is understood as a spatial-temporal reality; a territory as a dynamic social construction (i.e. the natural habitat of water in its interaction with social actors).

250 Reality in Bolivia has showed that uses and customs are not sufficient to resolve conflicts within  
251 and between systems [15]. There are conflicts within systems that cannot be solved by mere uses and  
252 customs and require a supra local intermediary (public actor) to facilitate negotiation agreements on  
253 water. This conflict also extends between systems because scarcity of water forces the search for new  
254 sources of water introducing "new" uses and, thus, new customs for a more effective water  
255 management of different systems.

256 Within hydro-social systems, the rules and norms that determine the operational management  
257 of water lie in the customs and practices, as stated by national policies [5]. These policies conflict  
258 with the visions of the PNC under the IWRM paradigm as they should also take into account the  
259 notion of socioeconomic justice and provide for a redistribution of water, rights and powers ([2],  
260 Article 19).<sup>6</sup> Accept water as a common, as proposed by AdA, means water must serve the general  
261 interest and be accessible to all in sufficient quantity and quality, including the Mother Earth of  
262 which rivers and streams are an expression of the existence of water (e.g. through an ecological  
263 yield). Customary law does not promote equity per se in water allocation and distribution but  
264 revisiting water custom usage on hand with positive law can improve water management.

265 Likewise from a socio-hydraulic perspective, public initiatives defined by development and  
266 investment plans intervene in the hydro-social territory and require new consensus and agreements,  
267 as new projects overlap and interact with existing water systems, modifying the relationships  
268 between and within them. As a result, a new network of "hydro-technocrats", actors at the political  
269 and technical level, is added to the existing hydro-social local network.<sup>7</sup>

270 The AdA suggests both "levels" should articulate and coordinate development projects  
271 integrating different visions and perceptions, but also regulate a relationship in order to minimise  
272 conflicts. Thus, the Strategic Framework 2015-2020 of the SDC and DGIA establishes that: "The  
273 Water Institutions of the Department of Cochabamba is a network of organisations and institutions  
274 of the department of Cochabamba, integrated by the political normative and technical instances of  
275 the Departmental Autonomous Government (Water Directorate – DGA, and Departmental Service  
276 of Watersheds -SDC) and by the social actors who are involved in the water management at a local  
277 level".

278 The DGA recognises two levels of management authority in the river basins<sup>8</sup>: the technical  
279 political authority constituted by the DGA and the SDC, and the networks of local actors directly  
280 involved in water management at the system level. Looking at the process of implementation of the  
281 AdA, there are four elements to take into account:


- 282 • Actors at the political and technical level: Water Management Directorate (DGA) and the River  
283 Basin Departmental Service (SDC) of Departmental Autonomous Government of Cochabamba  
284 (GADCB) involved in strategic planning and policy making.
- 285 • Local actors involved in local operational water management and project/initiatives  
286 development, such as water communities, municipalities and municipal commonwealth  
287 ("mancomunidades").
- 288 • Processes of consultation/negotiation and decision-making between the mentioned actors  
289 articulated through agreed rules and norms, and regulations that reflect on uses and customs.
- 290 • Platforms, networks, forums... to articulate the decisions between the actors, their  
291 implementation and follow-up.

<sup>6</sup> Rights are social constructs that reflect certain relationships of power and forces [7].

<sup>7</sup> The idea of the network suggests the way in which actors with a common interest connect with one another. The actors in the network exchange resources and negotiate possible solutions to specific problems that also evolve in time.

<sup>8</sup> Here river basin is used in the sense of "the house of the water"; the basin is not a closed space (system) but open.

292 Of special consideration is how water management is enacted through this set of actors and  
 293 processes. Management involves the exercise of power (water control) in the scope of a set of rules  
 294 and through an organisational framework in order to converge to a common end result in a  
 295 negotiated decision-making process. Hence, the administration of power entails the existence of a  
 296 management authority considering the AdA's principle of autonomy, for the distribution and  
 297 allocation of water. As evidence suggests the peasant and irrigation communities, based on the  
 298 habits and customs, constitute de facto the institutional framework within water systems. The AdA  
 299 looks into a more co-management model. A co-management model raises the need for consensus  
 300 levels where the newly created DGA and SDC, the traditional local water management organisations  
 301 and other stakeholders, such as the private sector, development organisations, and universities, are  
 302 in a position to meet and have a dialogue. Furthermore, the AdA suggests a management  
 303 "interaction" (see Figure 1) where the different actors participate in a process of agreement for  
 304 decision-making. This is not only a question of increasing local participation levels (which have  
 305 often failed because of the lack of available information), but rather of putting citizen-users at the  
 306 level of decision-making that determines distribution and access once the information is available  
 307 [16].



308  
 309 **Figure 1.** Different water management interactions

310 *3.1. Drivers and Barriers to implementing AdA*

311 The analysis of drivers and barriers to implement the AdA examines the relationships between  
 312 institutions, actors/organisations and their power interests in order to visualise the scenario in which  
 313 the AdA is implemented. The results are presented in Table 2 below to identify dialogue processes  
 314 and key actors (drivers) that may allow the implementation of the AdA. Table 2 shows the key to  
 315 institutional change remains with the Water Management Directorate (DGA).

316 The process of building an institutional and organisational framework in the public-social  
 317 sphere is the strength. The existence of the Water Management Directorate (DGA) and the  
 318 Departmental River Basin Service (SDC) of the Departmental Autonomous Government of  
 319 Cochabamba (GADCB) has allowed the development agencies to have a valid interlocutor for the  
 320 elaboration of common visions reflected in the Cochabamba Water Agenda (AdA). This favourable  
 321 environment facilitates the attraction of financial resources. It also has an inter-institutional  
 322 consultation platform that contributes to the exchange of knowledge.

323 Among the main barriers to the implementation are the political situation and the doubts of the  
 324 departmental political authorities about the process of the construction of the AdA. In addition,  
 325 there is low organisational capacity and insufficient intra-institutional coordination, which leads to a  
 326 delay in the positioning of the AdA in the institutional context.

327        Regarding the external institutional context, the framework of the Bolivian Plurinational State is  
328        identified as an opportunity, which prioritises the water theme, creating the Ministry of Water and  
329        Environment, which has the River Basin Plans as a water management instrument. These aspects  
330        facilitate the elaboration of a portfolio of investments working with the actors involved. Finally,  
331        since water is a highly sensitive issue for the Cochabamba people, the AdA is seen as an instrument  
332        that can coordinate and facilitate consultation with local practices and knowledge rooted in  
333        grassroots social initiatives, creating, as mentioned before, a favourable environment for the  
334        channelling of new, concurrent, financial resources.


Table 2 Drivers and barriers in the AdA implementation

<b>Situation:</b> AdA as an instrument of political orientation of water management that seeks compromises and consensus between the different public-private actors and civil society				
<b>'Status quo' variables</b>		<b>Factors of change</b>		
<b>Institutions/rules</b>	<b>Actors/organisations</b>	<b>Power interest</b>	<b>Emerging key actors (motivation and abilities)</b>	<b>Dialogue processes (triggers)</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Water law in the process of formulation</li> <li>- Incomplete regulations and legislation</li> <li>- Distortion of the concept "Uses and Customs" as legitimacy</li> <li>- Sector regulation (drinking water) but not on the overall water sector</li> <li>- In general there is an overlap of roles and functions at the institutional level</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- National: MMAyA and PNC (development vision "not in tune" with territorial reality), ENDE (geo-economic priority), World Bank and development agencies (not well understood)</li> <li>- Departmental: Cochabamba prefecture directorates, farmer's union, Misicuni municipal water utilities and local managed water utilities, Metropolitan Council (interferences and political opportunism, "changing")</li> <li>- Locals: NGOs (looking for a "niche"), mancomunidad (in "reformulation"), municipalities ("tied" by political commitments), peasant and irrigating organisations (core of territorial power), civil society (fragmented and disorganised)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Little devolution of powers in institutional terms</li> <li>- Political influences on major infrastructure and territorial investment projects</li> <li>- "Manipulation" of uses and customs to maintain "status quo of control" and hoarding</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- DGIA as a body with normative-regulatory functions in integral water management</li> <li>- Commonwealth / Metropolitan Council / municipalities as managers of change "protagonists of a territorial integrity" with possible funds management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Creation of river basin organisations in the role of authorities under the PNC</li> <li>- Increasing but still "diffuse" demand for greater transparency accountability and participation in decision-making processes</li> </ul>

337 **4. Community Initiatives: the Case of Kusikuna School**

338 The starting point for moving the AdA towards its implementation is the interrelationship  
 339 between available technical information, grassroots community initiatives, and public investment  
 340 projects at the local/municipal level. The River Basin Plans are instruments that seek at  
 341 operationalise the AdA through agreements between the different actors involved in water  
 342 management, generating social cohesion and commitment leading to a strong sense of identity  
 343 around rivers, lakes, and streams. Considering that the objective of the AdA is the transit of water as  
 344 the resource for water as a common, it is necessary to facilitate the construction of the new water  
 345 management paradigm, through emerging social initiatives, as an "agent of change" in line with  
 346 public investment.

347 The AdA 2016-2020 strategy proposes social initiatives as the central element for the strategy  
 348 implementation. Initiatives rely on the volunteering commitment of social actors that facilitates the  
 349 transit of water as a resource towards water as a common. Accompanying and promoting existing  
 350 initiatives and facilitating the emergence of new ones is expected to generate a multiplier effect and  
 351 make visible the need to act together. These converge with ongoing public investment projects  
 352 within the framework of the River Basin Plans (see Figure 2).

353 **Figure 2. The role of the AdA initiatives**354  
355

356 An example of the initiatives is that of Kusikuna, which in Quechua means "we will rejoice",  
 357 assuming the educational fact as an act of permanent joy. The school, Kusikuna, has been carrying  
 358 out its educational activity since 2000 as an educational and pedagogical project supported by Ajayu,  
 359 a non-governmental organisation. This organisation is made up of parents and educators who wish  
 360 to participate and by people interested in carrying out an alternative educational experience. The  
 361 education principles and the school itself are set as an eco-community that proposes a daily praxis of  
 362 forms of education and transforming of society in terms of reciprocity and respect for diversity.  
 363 Kusikuna is eco-active because it is a fusion between ecology and active education, to affirm the  
 364 processes of life in our world. Thus, the school defends and promotes the practice of ecological  
 365 principles as a way of life and in full respect of nature and the environment.

366 It is an education from and for life, with an open and flexible curriculum that favours active  
 367 learning based on situations and significant elements for students, starting from practice, play and  
 368 creativity to reach the concept. It provides for the use of concrete materials for all ages and subjects.  
 369 It is respectful of the life processes of the students taking into account their stages of development  
 370 and learning rhythms. To this end, the different educational activities are developed in a flexible  
 371 system, according to the needs and interests of the students. It is a multicultural school, respectful of  
 372 diversity in all its manifestations: cultural, social, gender, and religious or political creed. It reaffirms  
 373 the practice of reciprocity and complementarity, where dialogue and non-directivity are the main  
 374 elements that help children and young people to grow in autonomy and responsibility.

375 Economically, the school is maintained by the share of parents, starting from a principle of  
 376 solidarity economy, in which those who have more contribute more and those who have less

377 contribute less, consequently. With this principle, it is considered that no child will be excluded for  
378 any reason, much less for economic reasons, whenever he/she wants to be in the school. For this  
379 reason, an Ayni system is developed (in Quechua it means reciprocity). With the Ayni, families  
380 participate of volunteer work to ensure that their children can attend school.

381 Under this perspective, the AdA constitutes a pedagogical area among students, educators and  
382 families of Kusikuna. The school was granted a small initiative fund in 2016 by COSUDE to  
383 implement a number of activities aiming to boost the construction of a new culture of relationship  
384 with water. In this sense, Kusikuna became the first school in Cochabamba, and the first educational  
385 experience, to develop a systematisation process of their own significant experiences related to the  
386 theme of education for water care, generating materials and educational tools transferable to other  
387 social and educational contexts, as a decisive contribution in the debate and construction of an  
388 alternative culture in relation to water.

## 389 5. Conclusions

390 In spite of the change overtaken by Evo Morales' government, the IWRM hydraulic paradigm  
391 to address the water scarcity remains focused on augmenting supply. This is, in part, justified by  
392 donors pushing for policies to tackle climate change and looking to increase the resilience of  
393 vulnerable populations that constitute the broad rural support of Evo Morales' MAS party. The  
394 government is engaged in a campaign to increase irrigation areas through both bilateral projects and  
395 nationally funded projects, such as "Mi Riego" and "Mi Agua", with a focus on more infrastructures  
396 to improve water access services. However technical and financial efficiencies of the irrigation and  
397 drinking water systems remain low and inequities amongst the population and farmers are still  
398 high. This is expressed by an increase in the number of water conflicts.

399 Besides, there is lack of consensus in the whole project cycle implementation, which increases  
400 the tensions between current and potential future users. It is also observed that in the Cochabamba  
401 Valley there is an insufficient commitment from actors that manage and who take advantage of the  
402 water by competing for different uses, such as farmers, industrial and domestic users, as well as  
403 touristic activities. The lack of a water law contributes to the creation of a confused competence  
404 framework, including the lack of fulfilment of the roles of some sub-national actors, the dispersion in  
405 public and private investments and the limited inter-institutional coordination. As a result, the  
406 management paradigm, based on the concept of the Integral Water Resources Management (IWRM)  
407 and promoted by the Ministry of Environment and Water, is that of increasing the offer whilst  
408 ignoring the management demand.

409 Thus, water scarcity seems to have increased through management practices resulting in certain  
410 water policies in line with territorial interests, which are disputed in the political area and where  
411 asymmetries of power play an important role. On the opposite side, very little has been done to  
412 contain demand and definitely nothing to enhance water management from a holistic point of view.  
413 As a paradox, it may seem the water policies changed but the hydraulic paradigm remained the  
414 same because the existing water politics maintain the hydrocratic elite in power; a paradigm that is  
415 broadly and socially accepted in an unquestioned manner.

416 In this context, the Water Agenda Cochabamba (AdA) appears as an opportunity for social  
417 change to move from water as a resource towards water as a common. Recognising water as a  
418 common means recognising water as a being with which one lives, accepting the diversity of its  
419 expressions in rivers, lakes and streams. The AdA is understood as an on-going politically contested  
420 political process that sits as a new water management paradigm based on "new" governability  
421 values, where stakeholders come under negotiated agreements allowing reduced conflict levels and  
422 looking for sustainable solutions on water related issues. However, in order to reduce levels of  
423 conflict, it is necessary to better articulate the institutional framework and actors' coordination in a  
424 way that the power asymmetries are smoothed through negotiation and conciliation in the water  
425 allocation and distribution decision-making process in the Cochabamba Valley.

426 The question remains whether politicians, the public sector, and civil society are determined on  
427 a paradigm that gains its biggest strength through its capacity to absorb individuals under a  
428 common idea. Pedagogical approaches seem key to do so calling for the construction of an identity  
429 in defending a social and historical territory that remains at the core of any civil society initiative. In  
430 this way, citizens of any type and without distinction may become really empowered in a  
431 transparent, accountable and participatory dialogue with water.

## 432 References

- 433 1. Bakker, K. The "commons" versus the "commodity": Alter-globalization, anti-privatization and the human  
434 right to water in the Global South Journal compilation. *Antipode* 2007, 39, 393-570.
- 435 2. Ley No. 300 Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien. Available online:  
436 <https://bolivia.infoleyes.com> (accessed on 25 April 2017).
- 437 3. Gobierno Autónomo Departamental de Cochabamba. *Plan director cuenca del Rio Rocha*, 2015; Available  
438 online: <http://bibliotecadelagua.sirh.gob.bo/docs/pdf/210.pdf> (accessed on 15 April 2017).
- 439 4. Wesselink, A.; Kooy, M.; Warner, J. Socio-hydrology and hydrosocial analysis: toward dialogues across  
440 disciplines. *WIREs* 2016, 4, doi: 10.1002/wat2.1196.
- 441 5. Ley No. 2878 de Riego. Available online: <https://bolivia.infoleyes.com> (accessed on 25 April 2017).
- 442 6. Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. Available online: <https://bolivia.infoleyes.com>  
443 (accessed on 25 April 2017).
- 444 7. Coordination SUD. *Por una justicia social del agua: garantizar el acceso de las agriculturas familiares del Sur al*  
445 *Agua*; Comisión de Agricultura y Alimentación de Coordination SUD: France, 2012.
- 446 8. United Nations. *United Nations Resolution A/RES/64/292*, July 2010; Available online:  
447 <http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=A/RES/64/292&lang=E> (accessed on 21 February 2017).
- 448 9. Pahl-Wostl, C.; Sendzimir, J.; Jeffrey, P.; Aerts, J.; Berkamp, G.; Cross, K. Managing change toward  
449 adaptive water management through social learning. *Ecology and Society* 2007, 12, art 30.
- 450 10. Bellaubi, F.; Visscher, J.T. Enhancing integrity to improve service delivery in water service supply  
451 provision. In Proceedings of the IRC Symposium on Pumps, Pipes and Promises: Costs, Finances and  
452 Accountability for Sustainable WASH Services, The Hague, Netherlands, 16-18 November 2010;  
453 Butcherwood, J., Ed, IRC: The Hague, Netherlands, 2010; 19.
- 454 11. Agenda del Agua. *Estrategia ADA 2016-2020*; Available online: <http://www.aguacockabamba.com>  
455 (accessed on 15 March 2017).
- 456 12. Ruf, T. Comprendre le maillage territorial d'un bassin versant, une étape préliminaire pour engager une  
457 gestion concertée sur l'eau. In Proceedings of Gestion intégrée de l'eau au sein d'un bassin versant. Actes  
458 de l'atelier du PCSI, Montpellier, France, 2-3 décembre 2003; Le Goulven, P.; Bouarfa, S.; Kuper, M., Eds.
- 459 13. Kooiman, J.; Bavinck, M.; Chuenpagdee, R.; Mahon, R.; Pullin, R. 2008. Interactive governance and  
460 governability: an introduction. *Jnl of Transdisciplinary Environmental Studies* 2008, 7, 1-11. Available online:  
461 <http://dare.uva.nl/document/2/59200> (accessed on 12 January 2017).
- 462 14. Bellaubi, F.; Boehm, F. *Management practices and corruption risks in water service delivery in Kenya and Ghana*,  
463 2016; Available online: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2844913> (accessed on 01 December 2016).
- 464 15. Antequera, N. *Inventario de conflictos y acuerdos por el agua en Cochabamba*; Gobierno Autónomo  
465 Departamental de Cochabamba: Cochabamba, Bolivia, 2016; pp. 72, Available online:  
466 <http://observatoriodelagua.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Informe-Final-Conflictos.pdf> (accessed on 18  
467 December 2016).
- 468 16. Molle, F. Defining water rights: by prescription or negotiation? *Water Policy* 2004, 6, 207-227.