Article

The aspect of subjectivity in scientific thinking – where did it actually come from?

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Abstract: Subjectivity has always been a part of philosophical speculations. However, Immanuel Kant is mentioned as the main figure to bring in subjectivity in modern philosophy by comparing the *Critique of Pure Reason* with the Copernican revolution. We might include Descartes as well, and not least the followers of Kant, like Fichte and Hegel. Yet none of these end up with subjectivity as the only premise for thinking, but rather combine it with objectivity. Hence, subjectivity has appeared as a stranger in philosophy and yet not fully accepted.   In this paper, I try to pursue the aspect of subjectivity by not looking at philosophy, but rather at psychology. The appearance of the term can be dated back to 1520 when the Croatian humanist Marcus Marulus published the thesis entitled "Psychology, the Nature of the Soul". This thesis is lost, but by pursuing the appearance of the term, four different movements seem to contribute with and highlight an aspect of subjectivity. One is Humanism, the other is Reformation, the third is a focus on the empirical aspects of science and the fourth is the dissemination of folk culture to academics and aristocracy by means of the art of printing. The finding, therefore, is that psychology is not to be regarded as a discipline that grows out of philosophy, but rather as a discipline that conflicts philosophy, but nevertheless intervenes it and makes it progress.

Keywords: history of psychology; humanism; reformation; metaphysics; empirical psychology

1. Introduction

There is of course still a big discussion if subjectivity is to be regarded as a valid factor in scientific research and thinking. Nevertheless, subjectivity is a factor that is more or less accepted depending on the scientific perspective the researcher may have. After Kant and Kierkegaard the aspect of subjectivity has been accepted as an ingredient of philosophy. The fundamental question is rather to what extent it is a factor we should accept or avoid. In this question Kant and Kierkegaard stands on oppositional sides. Kant took subjectivity as a point of departure, but tried to derive some objective fundamentals out of it, whereas Kierkegaard accepted subjectivity as the ultimate truth. Subjective aspects, however, are traceable in all philosophy, even in Plato's dialogues, like the *Symposion*, *Ion*, *Faidros* and other places where Plato opens up for deep emotional experiences. In this sense, one may say there is a continuous line in philosophy to which subjectivity has appeared as an underlying factor.

However, philosophy is highly influenced by Kant. It is characterized by admitting that subjectivity is a factor, but at the same time there is a tendency to mitigate its role as much as possible. However, Søren Kierkegaard was the first one to highlight subjectivity as a sort of ideal by launching "truth is subjectivity" as a strategic slogan (Kierkegaard 2009). He also formed it as a basis for existentialism, which in the posterity has been an accepted and well-established direction in philosophy. Yet, Kierkegaard was quite clear about the fact that the aspect of subjectivity did not belong to philosophy, but rather to psychology (Klempe 2014). Hence he was also quite clear about the fact that philosophy and psychology contradicted each other. This was an aspect that had great influence on Edmund Husserl (Hanson 2009), which is traceable in for example Husserl's long discussions about psychologism in logic (Husserl 1970). Husserl's aim, however, is also to establish a

transcendental foundation for, not only logic, but for philosophy and science in general (Husserl 1935), and by this to make philosophy free and maybe even detached from psychology.

In line with this, there seems to have existed a deep conflict between philosophy and psychology, and that there are reasons to look at the differences and define them as different and separate sciences. Other places, I have suggested that ontology may represent a demarcation criterion for dividing philosophy from psychology (Klempe 2015). The argument is; if psychology is about subjective impressions of particularities, the truth-value of an impression's ontological existence is not the most interesting aspect of it. Just the subjective statement of something should be sufficient to call for psychological attention. This is not the case for philosophy, in which the truth-value of a phenomenon's existence will be at the core of a philosophical investigation. This argument is also embedded with some historical aspects as the term ontology was not applied in philosophy before Rodolphus Goclenius launched an embryonic version of the term in his philosophical lexicon from 1613 – not as a headword, though, but as a part of an article on "*Abstractio*" (Mengal 2005). Furthermore, Goclenius was also the scholar that stands behind the first and still preserved thesis in the history that mentions 'psychology' in the title. Allegedly, Marcus Marullus had already applied the term in the title of a book published around 1520 (Krstic 1964), but this we do not have. Marullus was an important poet who belonged to the movement of Italian Humanism, and Goclenius was an important professor at the new, Protestant University in Marburg. Hence, both were associated with the new ideological movements in the renaissance, and there are reasons to see the term as being strongly associated with those movements. Thus with these aspects in mind there are reason to ask if psychology back then represented a new perspective that had not been included in philosophy earlier, and therefore add a question mark to the notion that psychology has always been a part of philosophy. This is the question I will pursue in this paper, specifically if psychology at that time is a stranger, which more or less invades philosophy, and then changes many of the philosophical premises in the posterity. This will be done by pursuing the aspect of subjectivity as one of the core characteristics of psychology, which it for sure was on a certain stage in the history.

2. Psychology as the science of subjectivity

Karl Rosenkranz (1805-1879) published in 1837 a book entitled: Psychology, or the Science of the subjective Spirit. According to the historian Frederick Copleston, he represented the "centre of the Hegelian movement" (Copleston 1963, p. 293). His emphasis on subjectivity was a consequence of Hegel's philosophy, which must be regarded as a continuation of Kant's critical philosophy. The twelve innate categories Kant came up with to define and form the premises for our scientific understanding of the outer world implied also that an investigation of the outer world, almost by necessity, turns out to be an investigation of the investigator even as much as the world itself. The investigator is a thinking being, and consequently there is a kind of differentiated identity between reason, or the spirit, and the real. They are united in a sense, but they are at the same time discernable. Rosenkranz brings this Hegelian point a step further by focusing on the sensory (Empfindungen) aspects that form the connection between the outer and the inner world. And this leads to psychology as "the science of the subjective spirit", which is the subtitle of his publication on psychology (Rosenkranz 1863). Thus a sensory experience cannot be isolated from the experiencer, and this makes that the experience represents a totality, in which the spirit is highly involved. This makes that the experiences of the particular, which characterizes a sensory experience, is immediately dissolved and replaced by a general understanding, which is the contribution of the spirit. On this basis Rosenkranz states that the spirit fulfils a world that basically appears in its particularities ("Der Geist hat daher an seinen Empfindungen die Erfüllung seiner particularren Welt." Rosenkranz 1863, p. 162).

This understanding of psychology formed the background for Søren Kierkegaard's philosophy. Rosenkranz, and especially the first version of this publication, is one of the few contemporaneous sources Kierkegaard actually refers to (Kierkegaard 1980). This highlights that Kierkegaard must be regarded as a Hegelian, although he distanced himself from Hegel and criticized him harshly. They

97   both drew the same conclusion about the role of subjectivity as an unalterable factor in human
98   understanding and reasoning. Yet there is one important difference between the two. Hegel lets
99   objectivity and subjectivity be united in the spirit. This is also the perspective Rosenkranz promotes
100 in his thesis. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, does not accept any unification or mediation between
101 subjectivity and objectivity. This is the point he highlights when he criticizes Hegel's logic.
102 According to Kierkegaard, logic must be regarded as a static and objective science: "In logic, no
103 movement must *come about*, for logic is, and whatever is logical only *is*" (Kierkegaard 1980, p.12f,
104 original italics). Logic is not a part of the actual life, but a part of our way of thinking. The actual life,
105 on the other hand, is characterized by instability in terms of movement and changes. According to
106 Kierkegaard, these aspects are mixed up in Hegel's logic, and Kierkegaard cannot resist the
107 temptation to make fun of Hegel's more or less dynamic logic:

108   If anyone would take the trouble to collect and put together all the strange pixies and
109   goblins who like busy clerks bring about movement in Hegelian logic (such as this is in
110   itself and as it has been improved by the [Hegelian] school), later age would perhaps be
111   surprised to see that what are regarded as discarded witticisms once played an important
112   role in logic, not as incidental explanations and ingenious remarks but as masters of
113   movement, which made Hegel's logic something of a miracle and gave logical thought
114   feet to move on, without anyone's being able to observe them. (Kierkegaard 1980, p. 12.)

115   It may sound as a paradox that Kierkegaard, who founded existentialism and launched the
116 slogan "truth is subjectivity" (Kierkegaard 2009), at the same time highlights an insurmountable
117 distinction between objectivity and subjectivity. Yet this is pointing at the core of Kierkegaard's
118 existentialism, specifically that a human's life is expelled in the middle of the tension between the
119 disparate and irreconcilable aspects of the ideal and the actual – the objective and the subjective. As
120 long as we are living human beings, we are embedded in the subjective experiences of the actual,
121 and this makes that truth has to be subjectivity.
122   Thus Kierkegaard needed to find a science that actually brings in subjectivity, and he found
123 psychology, not least because of Rosenkranz' book, which explicitly defines psychology as the
124 science of subjectivity. This was, however, not the only source at hand for understanding
125 psychology. The background for his religious and philosophical ponderings, he says, was his father.
126 He writes about his father as one who never treated him as a child when he was a child. He rather
127 used him as a sparring partner for his religious ponderings, and his father's favourite reading was
128 Christian Wolff's "Reflections on God, the World, the Soul of Man, and Things in general" (Hannay
129 2001, p. 36). Yet this book was not just a speculative book about everything and nothing; it was one
130 of the philosophical pre-works Wolff published in 1719 before he worked out one of the most
131 important and influential contribution he came up with in philosophy: a systematization of
132 metaphysics. Although metaphysics can be traced back to Aristotle, it had changed during the
133 medieval time. During that time, philosophy had been intertwined with theology and theological
134 doctrines, and consequently, metaphysics had ended up with containing exactly what the title of this
135 book of Wolff refers to – almost everything. The publications Wolff made in the 1730ies aimed at
136 delineate and define the content of metaphysics. These were *Philosophia prima, sive Ontologia* (1730),
137 *Cosmologia generalis* (1731), *Psychologia empirica* (1732), *Psychologia rationalis* (1732), *Theologia naturalis*
138 (in two volumes 1736-1737). Except from natural theology, which can be traced back to the Roman
139 scholar Marcus Terentius Varro from the 1st Century BC, the other three terms, ontology, cosmology
140 and psychology, were all invented and launched during the 16th and 17th centuries. Yet Wolff was the
141 first one to bring them together to let them define metaphysics and what was supposed to be about.
142 Thus this systematization had a prehistory that might be more or less narrowed down to the 16th and
143 17th centuries, in which the aspects of subjectivity and its relationship to psychology also seem to
144 have been shaped.
145   Subjectivity was not supposed to be a part of metaphysics. It was rather the opposite;
146 subjectivity contradicted metaphysics. Hence subjectivity was not even supposed to be a part of
147 psychology when Wolff included it in metaphysics. If we want to trace from where subjectivity in
148 philosophy actually did come, several sources have to be considered and taken into account. Here, I

149 will point at four of them: the rise of Humanism in the renaissance, the Lutheran Reformation in
150 Germany, the increasing interest in doing empirical research among scholars, and finally, the
151 dissemination of folk culture among academics and the aristocracy by means of the art of printing.
152 Additionally, the political turmoil in especially Germany at that time is of course also an important
153 factor, but neither the term nor the content of psychology appear as most salient by examining the
154 political and economical situation. The other four factors, on the other hand, are embedded with or
155 pointing at psychology as an important aspect. In other words, there are reasons to pursue the aspect
156 of psychology to get a fully understanding of the role of subjectivity in philosophy.

3. Humanism and the very first appearance of psychology

158 According to the historian Lewis White Beck (1969), humanism can refer to many different
159 aspects and it varies with countries and centuries. But according to him, there is one thing
160 humanism always have in common: "they are always against doctrines, practices, and institutions
161 which seem to confine human interests and talents, they are protests of the whole man against the
162 partial man produced by and for institutions and systems of thought which seem for that very
163 reason to be oppressive and restrictive" (p. 89). The one that allegedly used the term 'psychology'
164 first was the Croatian humanist Marcus Marulus (1450-1524), who applied the term in the title of his
165 publication "*Psichiologia de ratione animae humanae*" ("Psychology, the nature of the human soul")
166 from around 1520 (Krstic 1964). He lived most of his life in Split, which was a part of Dalmatia with
167 Venice as the capital. Thus he wrote in Latin, Croatian and Italian. He is primarily known for his
168 poems, but he wrote also theses, out of which one of them was "On the Kings of Dalmatia", which
169 expresses a deeply felt affiliation to this empire. The thesis on psychology is allegedly lost, but the
170 poetry is characterized by Biblical motives that are treated with poetic freedom by means of
171 allegories and metaphors. Thus the ideological turn humanism contributed with in European
172 intellectual history was not only the independency of the individual, but also to highlight the
173 importance of the text and the freedom that was embedded in a literary use of it. The notable aspect
174 here, therefore, is the fact that the term psychology appears in the wake of this movement where
175 independency, autonomy and literature where salient traits of the ideological atmosphere, and most
176 likely were regarded as salient trait of "the nature of the human soul" – to quote the title of Marulus'
177 publication.

4. Psychology and the Lutheran Reformation in Germany

179 The question, however, is not to find the original content of psychology, but rather to detect the
180 tendencies the appearance of the term actually was a part of. Another movement psychology in fact
181 was a part of, was the German Reformation (Vidal 2011). Rudolph Goclenius the Elder (1547-1628)
182 was a professor at the Protestant University of Marburg, and he published in 1590 an anthology
183 entitled: "*Yuchologia: hoc est De hominis perfectione, animo et in primis ortu hujus, commentationes ac*
184 *disputationes quorundam theologorum & philosophorum nostrae aetatis*" (Krstic 1964). The fact that he
185 applied the original Greek form "yuch" instead of Marulus' form "psych" indicates that he probably
186 did not know very much about Marulus' thesis. Goclenius' thesis is still available, and the title also
187 reveals that it is first of all about theological and philosophical questions that were at stake at that
188 time (Mengal 2005). One important contribution to the understanding of psychology that this
189 publication came up with was to reintroduce the distinction between the spiritual, immaterial and
190 immortal part of the soul (i.e. *anima*), and the intellectual faculties of it (i.e. *animus*). This distinction
191 was crucial for how the content of psychology was to be understood. Very soon, psychology became
192 more and more associated with intellectual faculties, and not so much with the spiritual aspects of
193 the soul. The latter became rather associated with the term "pneumatology", which was in use up to
194 the end of the nineteenth century (Vidal 2011). This distinction represented an important step that
195 pointed in two directions: One is that the term psychology from the very beginning became
196 associated with a secular meaning of it. The other is that the intellectual faculties overlapped and
197 became intertwined with the philosophical interests.

198   There is, however, a close connection between humanism and the Reformation. The transition
199 figure here was Philipp Melanchthon (1497-1560), who started up as a professor in Greek in
200 Wittenburg in 1518 after a recommendation from Erasmus of Rotterdam. Melanchthon and Martin
201 Luther (1483-1546) started up a lifelong collaboration, which became crucial for the development of
202 psychology. The two represented two different perspectives that more or less merged within the
203 movement of Reformation. Luther was highly sceptical to Aristotle, and called him the worst things.
204 Melanchthon, on the other hand, pointed at Aristotle as one of his main sources, but the
205 understanding of Aristotle in the fifteenth century was quite different from how for example
206 Thomas Aquinas had used him. Melanchthon pointed first of all on *De Anima* and the *Rhetoric*, which
207 also Luther more or less reluctantly accepted, and the historian Fernando Vidal has found a
208 quotation from the beginning of Melanchthon's lectures on De Anima, which says a lot about how
209 this thesis was understood in the sense that it was used as a foundation for developing a sort of
210 anthropology that aimed at achieving a fully understanding of the human nature:
211   "In so doing, we shall have to explain at the same time the whole nature of the body, above all
212 the human body. That is why this part of Physics should have as its title not only *De anima*, but also
213 *On the nature of man in his entirety*" (Melanchthon *Commentarious*, cited from Vidal 2011, p. 38, original
214 italics). This sentence reveals all about how a broad anthropological understanding gradually
215 appeared as the content of psychology.
216   The need for a deeper understanding of the human nature among Protestants was intimately
217 connected with the new interpretation of the Bible Luther had disseminated through the 95 theses
218 and other scriptures. By refusing acts, doctrines, rituals and institution as the foundation for
219 Christian justification and salvation and replaced them with focusing on the faith alone, the most
220 important argument for this theological turn was to point at the original sin as the most fundamental
221 and determining factor in each individual's actual life. The original, hereditary sin permeates the
222 human nature, and when the individual realize this fact, the individual is compelled to admit and
223 accept the need for a saviour. Thus the knowledge of the sinful human nature became highly
224 required to end up with a proper faith. *De Anima* contributed to this knowledge, but it was just one
225 source out of many. Melanchthon was also the one that revived Galenos' teaching about the four
226 tempers that brought the mind in close interaction with the body (Petersen 1921/2015). Paradoxically
227 enough, it was the Protestant's theological aversion against the sinful body's nature that opened up
228 for a severe interest in exactly the same. And as long as psychology could be defined as the science of
229 the human nature, it became a highly needed type of science for the Protestants.

230 **5. Metaphysics as a secularized philosophy of science**

231   However, psychology was never regarded as a part of theology. According to Luther, faith is
232 not depending on any kind of science; it can only rely on the gospel given in the Bible. This
233 independency went the other way round as well; the Bible could never be a source for scientific
234 knowledge. This created the radical turn in German philosophy, which first of all made all scientific
235 knowledge secular and detached from theological doctrines. Philosophy, therefore, had to stay alone
236 and rely on itself as the basis for scientific knowledge. This secularization of scientific knowledge
237 made that metaphysics in German philosophy went through a radical change as well. It had been
238 used as a paramount label for all the old scholastic philosophy, in which Thomas Aquinas may count
239 as an example. Although he also stated that some Christian doctrines could not be proved
240 philosophically, like the Trinity and the original sin, the interpretation and use of both Aristotle and
241 Plato had always been in line with what the Bible said (Hartmann 1899, Petersen 1921/2015). The aim
242 of Thomas Aquinas' writing was to be edifying for the reader – for the scholar as well as for the
243 laymen. This made that metaphysics embraced all these aspects, which included both theological
244 doctrines and philosophical speculations, and not least the different aspects that gradually appeared
245 to become associated with the term psychology.
246   The scholastic understanding of metaphysics, therefore, changed radically in German
247 philosophy in the wake of Protestantism during the 17th century. Since the Bible was not regarded as
248 an authority in philosophy and science any more, it had to be replaced by other foundations. The

249   most important subject was to define the ontological foundation for both philosophy and science.
250   However the term "ontology" did not exist before – again – Rodolphus Goclenius the elder
251   published the highly influential *Lexicon Philosophicum* in 1613 (Mengal 2005). The term did not
252   appear as a headword, but was mentioned within an article under the label "*abstractio*". Yet, having
253   been applied in this article did not set the content of the term, but it was adopted by different
254   scholars and became more and more used and filled up with a content, which gradually became
255   comparable with how it is used today. The Cartesian scholar Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665)
256   published for example an "*Ontosophia*" in 1647, but he applied the term more or less synonymously
257   with "metaphysics" and was "concerned with separating various disciplines from each other"
258   (Verbeck 1999, p. 186). The final contribution to this discussion about separating the different
259   sciences, defining metaphysics and giving psychology and ontology a specified content, was given
260   by Christian Wolff when he, as already mentioned, defined metaphysics as consisting of the four
261   different subjects: Ontology, cosmology, psychology and natural theology in the 1730ies.

262   All the three first terms must be regarded as neologisms that appeared during the 16th and the
263   17th centuries. Even the term "Cosmology" was used for the first time in 1656 in Thomas Blount's
264   English dictionary "*Glossographia*". Yet this dictionary was just a compilation of strange and not so
265   common used English terms, and consequently, cosmology was not presented within a theoretical
266   framework. Such a presentation was done when Christian Wolff published "*Cosmologia generalis*" in
267   1731 as one out of the six volumes that altogether systematized and defined how metaphysics was to
268   be understood.

269   **6. *Psychologia empirica* and the increased interest in empirical research**

270   To define natural theology as a delineated and independent subject reflects some aspects of the
271   theological turmoil the German Reformation went through. Although Luther had insisted on
272   making a clear distinction between theology and science, and this paved the way for developing a
273   new ontology independent of theology, natural theology represented anyway a reminiscence of the
274   need for justifying investigations of nature by means of theology. This aspect of justifying the
275   activity of doing research is to be regarded as the overall aim of developing and defining
276   metaphysics the way Wolff did in the early eighteenth century. The ontology justified all being as
277   such, and the cosmology focused on the physical world and the universe. In the preface of the latter,
278   Wolff emphasizes also that the cosmology is closely related to natural theology, but the focus is
279   anyway different (Wolff 1731/1737). In the preface of the *Psychologia empirica* (1732/1738), on the
280   other hand, Wolff emphasizes that the topic of this book is about how humans acquire ideas through
281   experiences and observations by means of the faculties of the soul. In other words, *psychologia*
282   *empirica* was predominantly a kind of justification of the act of doing observation and to learn from
283   experiences. It was not about how to make psychology empirical, which represents a much later
284   understanding. By combining all these types of justifications of investigations of the real world,
285   metaphysics had went through a transition that started in the renaissance and culminated with these
286   publications of Wolff from the 1730ies. Metaphysics was no longer a theodicy, or a justification of
287   God's existence, but rather a basis for exploring the world, or an embryonic methodology, as it
288   formed the foundation for valid statements in all types of sciences (Petersen 1921/2015), and the
289   Calvinist and encyclopaedist Johann Friedrich Alstedt (1588-1638) combined the two terms in a
290   publication from 1620: *Methodus metaphysicae* (Muller 2001). Yet, it was of course Renée Descartes
291   that made the relationship between the method and a new foundation for valid knowledge by
292   publishing *A Discourse of Method* in 1637.

293   Empirical psychology was one of these meta-scientific fields, but it cannot be regarded as a
294   natural part of metaphysics as it focused on sensation, which is about the particular. There are at
295   least two reasons for why psychology on a certain historical point ended up as a part of metaphysics.
296   One is the fact that observation had already been applied as a part of scientific discoveries. Both
297   Galileo Galilei and Johannes Kepler may count as early and good examples of exactly this. However
298   neither of them refers only to observation as such as their discoveries emerge from problematizing
299   the cosmology presented in Plato's dialogue *Timaeus*. The fundamental thesis in this dialogue of

300 Plato, specifically that the universe is governed by a certain order, is retained by both Galilei and
301 Kepler, but the order is explained differently, not in terms of a geocentric perspective and that the
302 planets move in circles, but in terms of a heliocentric standpoint and elliptic movements of the
303 planets. Those new discoveries based on observations could not be accepted unless the basis for
304 scientific knowledge was released from the content of the Bible, and based on the subject that made
305 the research.

306   Thus, these examples of new discoveries were very much in line with the Cartesian idea of
307 founding trustable knowledge on the subject. This became a widespread notion, but they were also
308 very much in line with Descartes' more conservative tendencies, which were salient in his proofs of
309 God's existence where the argument was related to clearness. Premodern perspectives also
310 governed Descartes' psychology and his psychology was not very much referred to (Vidal 2011).
311 Christian Wolff, on the other hand became tremendous popular with his systematization of
312 metaphysics, and *Psychologia empirica* had a peculiar breakthrough, not least by inspiring a lot of
313 scholars that followed up by presenting metaphysics after the same pattern and systematization as
314 Wolff had formulated. This was true especially in Northern Europe. Yet, Wolff became also popular
315 in French spoken areas, and the *Psychologia empirica* was translated and published in an abridged
316 version already in 1745. One of the statements given by the translator says a lot about why empirical
317 psychology had become a part of metaphysics when he refers to "La justesse naturelle de votre
318 esprit" (The natural correctness of your mind, Wolff 1745/1998, p. *3). This implies predominantly
319 that we can trust human rationality, but it means also that we need to examine the human nature to
320 get a better understanding of the foundation for all the knowledge that has been acquired through
321 the senses. Hence scientific activities required a fully understanding of the anthropological premises
322 for doing research. This was what *Psychologia empirica* was supposed to be about.

323   There is no doubt that Wolff's psychology aimed to form a basis for scientific activities.
324 Even *Psychologia rationalis* contributed to this by formulating the rational capacities of the soul and
325 provided "the natural correctness of your mind". *Psychologia empirica* on the other hand focused on
326 the experiential aspects. The translator discusses on a certain stage the use of the term. When Wolff
327 called the psychology 'empirical', he uses the Greek term for 'experience'. The translator, on the
328 other hand, prefers to use the French term 'experiméntale'. Thus according to him, experimental
329 psychology must be regarded as the same as empirical psychology. To regard them as synonyms
330 seems to have been widespread in the immediate posterity, as both terms appeared depending on
331 language and country. The translator also emphasizes that Monsieur Wolff through *Psychologia*
332 *empirica* presents a method for making scientific discoveries:

333   C'est la Psychologie expérimentale, nous dit il, qui etablit & confirme ce que nous avons
334   découvert par la Psychologie rassionée; c'est elle qui lui fournit ses principes; a peu près
335   commes nous voions dans la Physique & l'Astronomie un habile Observateur tirer
336   succesivement de ses Observations, de quoi établir sa Théorie, & de sa Théorie de quoi
337   apuier ses observations, & par ce double secours s'éleverà de nouvelles connoissance, qui
338   lui auroient échappé sans ce concert et cette intelligence. (Wolff 1745/1998, p. 23)[1]

339   Thus, the reciprocity between observations and theory appears as a more or less necessary
340 condition to achieve new knowledge, and this requires both the empirical and the rational
341 psychology to attain a fully understanding of the nature of the senses and the mind.

342   These perspectives on the process of acquiring scientific knowledge were strange, new, and not
343 exactly fully accepted. In the *New Essays on Human Understanding*, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz
344 refers, through the voice of Philaletes, to the common understanding that "la Philosophie
345 experimentale" is not able to generate "*connoissance scientifique*" – scientific knowledge (Leibniz 1985,

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[1]   It is Empirical Psychology, he [Wolff] tells us, which establishes and confirms what we have discovered by
       Rational Psychology that provides all the principles. Similar to what we see in physics and astronomy, a
       skilful observer establishes successively from his observations the Theory, and the Theory supports his
       observations, and by this double assistance arises new knowledge, which would have escaped from him
       without this concert and intelligence. (Translated by this author.)

346 p. 308, original italics). Even the Swedish famous scientitist, Karl von Linné had some concerns
347 about doing observations. In the introduction to the *Systemae natura* from 1735 Linné presents some
348 considerations around the use of observations (Frankelius 2007). According to him a scientist has to
349 do observations, and he presents 20 paragraphs that describe some fundamental principles, but also
350 the steps one has to take in scientific explorations. In paragraph number 18, he declares:

351   In every case I have applied the new method, predominantly consisting on own and
352   private annotations, yet when it comes to observations, I have carefully learnt that very few
353   of them are to be trusted straightaway. (Frankelius 2007, p. 107, translated by this author)

354 Linné, therefore, applied observations, but they did not work as a warranty for true knowledge.
355 Instead he sketches a type of method that must be described as deductive and axiomatic. He follows
356 three fundamental principles that form the premises for this method: (1) No new species will be
357 created, (2) the offspring is always a replica of the parents, and (3) similarities define the specie. A
358 fourth premise is that Linné envisages the whole nature is being governed by a purpose given by the
359 Creator. Thus natural theology forms an important condition for Linné's research and the method he
360 is applying. The expediency or purpose is detected by classification and naming of the exemplar.
361 The method therefore starts with a general understanding given by paramount labels, and the
362 activity consists of categorizing each exemplar properly and in accordance with the overall
363 categories. On this background the aspect of subjectivity is partly present through observations, but
364 it is compensated for and almost set aside by the guidance of some general principles that bring the
365 observations back to an objective and general understanding of the exemplar.

7. Psychology and Kant's idea of the pure science

367 In all those three areas that apparently include features of subjectivity, they also seem to
368 overrule subjectivity with an ultimate ideal of objectivity. This is also true when it comes to
369 philosophy of science, to which Immanuel Kant and the *Critique of Pure Reason* formulated the
370 modern basis. It is typical for his thesis and the German philosophy at that time that he, in the
371 preface, refers to subjectivity as a premise for the whole thesis. By including the aspect of subjectivity
372 he states that he contributes with a kind of Copernican revolution in philosophy by saying in the
373 Preface to the second edition: "We here propose to do just what Copernicus did in attempting to
374 explain the celestial movements", and he continues: "If the intuition must conform to the nature of
375 objects, I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori. If, on the other hand, the object
376 conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can easily conceive the possibility of such an a
377 priori knowledge" (Kant 2010, p. 13-14). By referring to the "faculty of intuition", Kant is very close
378 to psychologizing theory of knowledge. However, this is exactly what he aims to avoid with this
379 thesis. *Critique of Pure Reason* is in fact an attempt at restoring the ideal of objectivity in philosophy
380 after Wolff had included psychology as a part of metaphysics.
381 Kant's critical philosophy must in many ways be regarded as a counter-attack to the fact that
382 psychology had already invaded metaphysics and introduced the aspect of subjectivity to
383 philosophy. This is certainly true for the first critique. Yet the strategy is predominantly to be friend
384 with the most essential part of the enemy, which is the aspect of subjectivity. Consequently,
385 transforming subjectivity up to a transcendental level where the a priori aspects are highlighted can
386 provide this. According to Kant, no empirical sciences can be brought up to that level, and they will
387 by necessity contradict with the very idea of achieving a pure science. This is why he also concludes:
388 "Empirical psychology must therefore be banished from the sphere of metaphysics, and is indeed
389 excluded by the very idea of that science" (Kant 2010, p. 472). However, Kant cannot place it
390 completely aside as it has been a part of metaphysics for such a long time, and "we must permit it to
391 occupy a place in metaphysics – but only as an appendix to it" (loc. cit.), and he continues: "It is a
392 stranger who has been long a guest; and we can make it welcome to stay, until it can take up a more
393 suitable abode in a complete system of anthropology – the pendant to empirical physics (loc.cit.).
394 Immanuel Kant followed up this, first of in the last thesis he completed, the *Anthropology from a*

395　*Pragmatic Point of View* that was published in 1798, but also the next two critiques, must be regarded
396　in the light of this perspective.

397　　　Psychology was on the way to be an established part of metaphysics when Kant entered the
398　philosophical arena. Although Kant refers to psychology as an old part of metaphysics, he is referring
399　to the content and not to the term, as it was Christian Wolff and no one before him to explicitly define
400　psychology as a part of metaphysics. Yet it is an open question what psychology was supposed to be
401　about. Empirical psychology was predominantly about the sensorial capacity of acquiring knowledge,
402　and rational psychology was supposed to be about the general principles that formed the reliability of
403　knowledge acquired through senses. Additionally, however, the sensorial activity is by necessity
404　including an aspect of subjectivity. This was what Karl von Linné referred to, and he was sceptical to
405　trust private observations. Immanuel Kant shared this scepticism, which also was the driving force for
406　developing his critical philosophy. He apparently included subjectivity, but in the first critique the aim
407　was definitely to overcome it. Thus the fundamental question in this paper about how subjectivity
408　intervened and became a part of philosophy is not completely answered yet. It is obvious though that
409　psychology perpetuated and brought subjectivity on the philosophical stage, but we see also that all
410　efforts in including psychology in philosophy comprise at the same time a fundamental reluctance
411　against subjectivity. Thus the source for subjectivity is just partly given by psychology, and there must
412　be additional source for bringing subjectivity to such an important part of philosophy.

413　**8. Subjectivity in folk culture**

414　　　The sources for subjectivity are probably not to be found in the academic writing, but maybe
415　rather in the folk culture. There are different aspects to look at in this respect. One is the relationship
416　between folk culture and Italian Humanism, in which literature for certain, but also music could be
417　examined in the achievement of getting a better understanding of how the general idea of humans as
418　subjective individuals became an accepted perspective among scholars. It could be that Marcus
419　Marullus' thesis on psychology and the human nature from the 1520ies could tell us something
420　about this, but unfortunately, we do not know the content of this thesis. Yet, when it comes to
421　literature from that time, Mikhael Bakhtin's thesis on the French author and humanist François
422　Rabelais (ca. 1490-1553) points at some aspects that should be taken into account in this examination
423　of sources for subjectivity in academic writings. Rabelais' novels are characterized by an extreme use
424　of humour with caricatures and irony, and Bakhtin summarizes these traits by launching the
425　technical term 'grotesque' (Bakhtin 1984). Bakhtin's point is that Rabelais is not just an exceptional
426　and independent author that invented and perpetuated the grotesque in his novels, but he stood in a
427　tradition with deeply entrenched humorous storytelling for centuries. Thus the background for
428　understanding Rabelais' novels is revealed through the history of the laughter.

429　　　In Bakhtin's thesis on Rabelais, he starts with pursuing the history of the laughter. One of the
430　main findings in this examination is:

431　　　　Laughter is not a universal, philosophical form. It can refer only to individual and
432　　　　individually typical phenomena of social life. (Bakhtin 1984, p. 67.)

433　　　By this statement he says that the laughter is predominantly a subjective experience; or, even
434　more correctly: The laughter highlights the experience of oneself as a subject. This type of experience
435　of oneself as a subject is provided by several factors. One is that the laughter itself promotes the
436　individual's participation in the humorous situation. Another is that this participation is related to a
437　very peculiar situation. A third aspect is that both the participation and the laughter itself are given
438　by and through the body. On this background the laughter is primarily a sensorial experience that is
439　located to and depending on a certain place and time.　Consequently, it appears in certain events,
440　such as marketplaces, popular festivals and the like. These are the places where people are gathered
441　with the presence of their bodies, but also places where intellectual and moral speeches are
442　inappropriate unless they have the form of caricatures and irony. If so, they are more than welcome,
443　and this is the background for Rabelais' novels.

However the more important finding in Bakhtin's examination of the history of the laughter is that, in the renaissance, he says, the laughter "emerged from the depth of folk culture" (Bakhtin 1984, p. 72). This implies that also all the embedded aspects of the laughter, which includes individual subjectivity, must be regarded as having been entrenched in the "depth of the folk culture" for centuries. Apparently, this may sound as a truism, but it is not seen from the perspective of how subjectivity became a part of the academic thinking. It is obvious that philosophy, with Descartes and Kant in the front, just reluctantly accepted subjectivity as a premise, and when they actually did so; their efforts were invested in turning subjectivity into a sort of objectivity. It was the same for the Lutheran Reformation. They emphasized the personal and subjective confession of a proper faith as the only foundation for salvation, but this was at the same time grounded on a doctrine formulated by St. Paul in the letter to the Romans and therefore based on a general statement. Both literature and the Reformation were closely related to the humanistic movement that governed Europe in the renaissance, so even humanism as movement must be regarded as something that "emerged from the depth of folk culture".

9. Conclusions

Not only psychology, but also subjectivity must be regarded as a stranger in philosophy. Hence it is a mystery that both, on a certain historical point, invaded philosophy and became an important part of it. In this paper, however, it has been communicated that there must be several sources and reasons for why subjectivity appeared as a factor in philosophy. It is first of all highly related to the appearance of psychology in the sixteenth and seventeenth century where the aspect of subjectivity hardly can be detached from psychology. This is a conclusion other scholars have ended up with as valid for psychology in general (Danziger 1990). Kant, on the other hand, did neither attack subjectivity nor psychology as such, as he pinpointed subjectivity as a point of departure and applied aspects from rational psychology in the method he applied for investigation the pure reason. He rather attacked the applied aspects of empirical sciences in general, which also included empirical psychology. The aim of his critical philosophy was nevertheless to overcome the individual aspects of subjectivity, which made the outcome of observations unpredictable and unreliable. And this aim must be regarded as an attack on subjectivity as well.

The same paradoxical love-and-hate relationship to subjectivity appears as a salient trait of the Lutheran Reformation as well. On the one hand it emphasizes the personal faith as an objective source for salvation, and salvation as a general truth as long as it is in accordance with what the Bible says. Yet this implies, on the other hand, that subjective investments and efforts are necessary requirements to achieve a proper faith. This also brings in the need for psychology as proper faith is also depending on insight on the sinful human nature. This is the paradox that Kierkegaard struggled with, which ended up with the conclusion that truth is nothing else than subjectivity.

Humanism on the other hand, does not represent the same kind of paradox. By going back to Beck's (1969) definition, he emphasizes "they are always against doctrines" (p.89). This implies that humanism is to be regarded more or less as a rebellious attitude, which can be related to a folk driven movement even as well as to individuals. Thus it seems that both the Reformation and the philosophical turn was governed by an underlying movement that perpetrated subjectivity, which stakeholders in both the Reformation and in philosophy reluctantly adopted and incorporated in a certain way. Bakhtin's thesis on Rabelais reveals some important aspects of this folk movement, however it looks like it was the gradual appearance of psychology that brought the aspect of subjectivity in front – both in theology and in philosophy.

in the decision to publish the results must be declared in this section. If there is no role, please state "The founding sponsors had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript, and in the decision to publish the results".

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