Article

A Monte Carlo-based Outlier Diagnosis Method for Sensitivity Analysis

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Abstract: An iterative outlier elimination procedure based on hypothesis testing, commonly known

- ⁶ Graduate Program in Geodetic Sciences, Federal University of Paraná, Curitiba, 81531-990, PR, Brazil
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- as Iterative Data Snooping (IDS) among geodesists, is often used for the quality control of the modern measurement systems in geodesy and surveying. The test statistic associated with *IDS* is the extreme normalised least-squares residual. It is well-known in the literature that critical values (quantile values) of such a test statistic cannot be derived from well-known test distributions, but must be computed numerically by means of Monte Carlo. This paper provides the first results about Monte Carlo-based critical value inserted to different scenarios of correlation between the outlier statistics. From the Monte Carlo evaluation, we compute the probabilities of correct identification, missed detection, wrong exclusion, overidentifications and statistical overlap associated with IDS in the presence of a single outlier. Based on such probability levels we obtain the Minimal Detectable Bias 10 (MDB) and Minimal Identifiable Bias (MIB) for the case where IDS is in p lay. MDB and MIB are 11 sensitivity indicators for outlier detection and identification, r espectively. The results show that 12 there are circumstances that the larger the Type I decision error (smaller critical value), the higher 13 the rates of outlier detection, but the lower the rates of outlier identification. For that case, the larger the Type I Error, the larger the ratio between MIB and MDB. We also highlight that an outlier
- the probability of identification.

becomes identifiable when the contribution of the measures to the wrong exclusion rate decline

simultaneously. In that case, we verify that the effect of the correlation between the outlier statistics

on the wrong exclusion rates becomes insignificant from a certain outlier magnitude, which increases

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 System; Reliability; Random Number Generators.

1. Introduction

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In recent years, Outlier Detection has been increasingly applied in sensor data processing [1–9]. Despite the countless contributions made over the years, there is continuing research on the subject, mainly because there has been an increase in computational power. One can argue that the computational complexity is becoming high due to the era of information overload. However, this

limitation have been overcome over the years, mainly by the rapid development of computers, which now allow advanced computational techniques to be used efficiently on personal computers or even on handheld computers [10]. Therefore, computational complexity is no longer a bottleneck because today we have fast computers and large data storage systems at our disposal [11,12].

Here, we assume that an outlier is a measurement that is so probably caused by a blunder that it is better not used or not used as it is [13]. Failure to identify an outlier can jeopardise the reliability level of a system. Due to its importance, outliers must be appropriately treated to ensure the quality of data analysis.

Two categories of advanced techniques for the treatment of dataset contaminated by outliers have often been developed and applied in various situations: Robust Adjustment Procedures (see e.g. [14–18]) and Statistical Hypothesis Testing (see e.g. [2,12,19–23]. The first one is outside the scope of this paper. Besides the undoubted advantages of Robust Estimation, here we focus on the hypothesis test-based outlier. The following advantages of outlier test are mentioned by [24]:

- 1. Opportunity to investigate the causes of outlier;
- Identified outliers can be re-measured; and

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If the outliers were discarded from the measurements then the standard adjustment software, 3. 42 which operates according to the least-squares criterion, can be used.

In this paper, we consider the iterative data snooping (IDS), which is the most common procedure found in the geodetic practice. Most of conventional geodetic studies have a chapter on IDS, see e.g. [25,26]. IDS has also become very popular and is routinely used in adjustment computations [27]. Important to mention that *IDS* is not restrict to the field of geodetic statistics, but it is a generally applicable method [22].

IDS is an iterative outlier elimination procedure, which combines estimation, testing and adaptation [28]. Parameter estimation is often conducted in the sense of the least-squares estimation (LSE). Assuming that no outlier exists, the LSE is the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) [26]. The LSE has often been used in several remote sensing applications (see e.g. [29–32] However, outliers can inevitably occur in practice and cause loss of LSE BLUE-property. Then, hypothesis testing is performed with the aim to identify any outlier that may be present in dataset. After identification, the suspected outlier is then excluded from the dataset as a corrective action (i.e. adaptation), and the LSE is restarted without the rejected measurement. If the model redundancy permits, this procedure is repeated until no more (possible) outliers can be identified (see e.g. [26], pp. 135). Although here we restrict ourselves to the case of one outlier at a time, IDS can also be applied for the case of multiples (simultaneous) outliers [33]. For more details about multiples (simultaneous) outlier refers to [34–36].

Of particular importance for quality control purposes are the decision probabilities. The probability levels have already been described in the literature for the case where data snooping is run once (i.e. only one single estimation and testing) and as well as for the case where the outlier is parametrized in the model (see e.g. [2,19-21,23,28,37,38]). In that case, the probability of correct detection (\mathcal{P}_{CD}) and correct identification (\mathcal{P}_{CI}) and their corresponding Minimal Detectable Bias (MDB) and Minimal Identifiable Bias (MIB) have already been described for data snooping [28,37].

MDB is defined as the smallest value of an outlier that can be detected given a certain \mathcal{P}_{CD} . The MDB is an indicator of the sensitivity of the data snooping for outlier detection and not for outlier identification. On the other hand, MIB is defined as the smallest value of an outlier that can be identified given a certain \mathcal{P}_{CI} , i.e. MIB is an indicator of the sensitivity of the data snooping for outlier identification. It is important to highlight that "outlier detection" only informs whether or not there might have been at least one outlier. However, the detection does not tell us which measurement is an outlier. The localization of the outlier is a problem of "outlier identification". In other words, "outlier identification" implies the execution of a search among the measurements for the most likely outlier.

However, the both MDB and MIB cannot be used as a diagnostic tool when IDS is in play. In this contribution, we highlight that the correct outlier identification for IDS is not only dependent on the correct/missed detection and wrong exclusion, but also others decision probabilities.

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The evaluation of the probability levels associated with *IDS* is not a trivial task. As data snooping for single run, the probabilities of *IDS* are multivariate integrals over complex regions [2,38]. This complexity is due to the fact that *IDS* is not only based on multiple hypothesis testing, but also on multiple rounds of estimation, testing and exclusion. Because an analytical formulae is not easy to compute, a Monte Carlo method should be run to obtain the probabilities and the minimal biases MDB and MIB indicators for *IDS*. The Monte Carlo allows insights into these cases where analytical solutions are extremely complex to fully understand, are doubted for one reason or another, or are not available [12]. Monte Carlo method for quality control proposals has already been applied in geodesy (see e.g. [2,10,22,23,37,39–43]). For an in-depth coverage of Monte Carlo methods consult, for instance, [44–46].

Recent studies by Rofatto et al. [12,47] provide an algorithm based on Monte Carlo to determine the probability levels associated with *IDS*. In that case, they described five classes of decisions for *IDS*, namely probability of correct identification (\mathcal{P}_{CI}), probability of missed detection (\mathcal{P}_{MD}), probability of wrong exclusion (\mathcal{P}_{WE}), probability of over-identification positive (\mathcal{P}_{over+}) and probability of over-identification negative (\mathcal{P}_{over-}), as follows:

- \mathcal{P}_{CI} : Probability of identifying and removing correctly an outlying measurement;
- \mathcal{P}_{MD} : Probability of not detecting the outlier (i.e. Type II decision error for *IDS*);
- \mathcal{P}_{WE} : Probability of identifying and removing a non-outlying measurement while the 'true' outlier remains in the dataset (i.e. Type III decision error for IDS);
- \mathcal{P}_{over+} : Probability of identifying and removing correctly the outlying measurement and others; and
- \mathcal{P}_{over-} : Probability of identifying and removing more than one non-outlying measurement, whereas the 'true outlier' remains in the dataset.

However, the procedure by these authors [12,47] has not been allowed the user to control the Type I decision error (denoted by α'). The probability level α' (known as significance level of a test) defines the size of a test and is often called as "false alarm probability". In this paper, we highlight that the test statistic associated with *IDS* does not have a known distribution and therefore their critical values (i.e. a percentile of its probability distribution) cannot be taken from the well-known statistical tables (e.g. normal distribution).

Here, a critical value is computed by Monte Carlo such that a user-defined Type I decision error α' for IDS is warranted. In other words, the Type I decision error α' is effectively user-controlled when both the functional and stochastic parts of the model are taken into account. To do so, we employ the Monte Carlo method, because the critical region of the test statistic associated with IDS is too complicated. The critical region is the subset of the measurements, for which the null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 is rejected [12]. Therefore, the false alarm rate can be user-controlled by setting the appropriate size of the critical region.

We highlight that one of the advantages of having critical values based on distribution test of IDS is that the dependencies between the least-squares residual are captured by Monte Carlo simulation. In this paper, we present the first results about Monte Carlo-based critical value posed in two different scenarios of correlation between outlier test statistics. We also discuss that in the context of well-known Bonferroni correction [48] to control the Type I decision error α' for IDS.

Moreover, a new class of decision is taken into account here when the *IDS* is performed, which corresponds to the probability of flagging simultaneously two (or more) measurements as outliers. We call this probability of "statistical overlap" (\mathcal{P}_{ol}). This means that \mathcal{P}_{ol} occurs in cases where one alternative hypothesis has the same distribution as the another one. In other words, these hypotheses cannot be distinguished, i.e. they are nonseparable and an outlier cannot be identified [28].

We also investigate the probabilities of making the correct decisions and the risks of incorrect decisions when the *IDS* is performed in the presence of an outlier in two different scenarios of correlation between outlier test statistics. Based on the probability levels associated with *IDS* (i.e. \mathcal{P}_{CI})

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 $\mathcal{P}_{MD}/\mathcal{P}_{CD}$, \mathcal{P}_{WE} , \mathcal{P}_{over+} , \mathcal{P}_{over-} and \mathcal{P}_{ol}), we also show here how to find the both sensitivity indicators MDB and MIB for IDS. We also analyse the relationship between the sensitivity indicators MDB and MIB for IDS.

2. Binary Hypothesis Testing versus Multiple Hypothesis Testing: The True Data Snooping

The random measurement errors in a system are unavoidable. The stochastical properties of the measurement errors are directly associated with the assumption of the probability distribution of these errors. In geodesy and many other scientific branches the well-known normal distribution is one of the most used as measurement error model. Its choice is further justified by both the central limit theorem as well as the maximum entropy principle. Some alternatives of measurement errors models can be found in [11].

Therefore, the null hypothesis, denoted by \mathcal{H}_0 , is formulated under the condition that the random errors are normally distributed with expectation zero. In other words, the model associated with the null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 consists of that one believes to be valid under normal working conditions, i.e. in the absence of an outlier. When it is assumed to be 'true', this model is used to estimate the unknown parameters, usually in a least-squares approach. Thus, the null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 of the standard Gauss–Markov model in linear or linearised form is given by [25]:

$$\mathcal{H}_0: \mathbb{E}\{y\} = Ax + \mathbb{E}\{e\} = Ax; \ \mathbb{D}\{y\} = Q_e \tag{1}$$

where $\mathbb{E}\{.\}$ is the expectation operator, $\mathbb{D}\{.\}$ is the dispersion operator, $y \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times 1}$ the vector of measurements, $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times u}$ the Jacobian matrix (also called design matrix) of full rank $u, x \in \mathbb{R}^{u \times 1}$ the unknown parameter vector, $e \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times 1}$ the unknown vector of measurement errors and $Q_e \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ the positive-definite covariance matrix of the measurements y.

Under normal working conditions (i.e. \mathcal{H}_0), the measurement errors model is then given by:

$$e \sim N(0, Q_e),$$
 (2)

Here, we confine ourselves to the case that A and Q_e have full column rank.

The best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) of e under \mathcal{H}_0 is the well-known estimated least-squares residual vector $\hat{e} \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times 1}$, which is given as:

$$\hat{e} = y - A\hat{x}
= y - A(A^{T}WA)^{-1}(A^{T}Wy)
= Ax + e - A(A^{T}WA)^{-1}(A^{T}W(Ax + e))
= e - A(A^{T}WA)^{-1}(A^{T}We)
= (I - A(A^{T}WA)^{-1}A^{T}W)e
= Re,$$
(3)

with $\hat{x} \in \mathbb{R}^{u \times 1}$ being the BLUE of x under \mathcal{H}_0 , $W \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ the known matrix of weights, taken as $W = \sigma_0^2 Q_e^{-1}$, where σ_0^2 is the variance factor, $I \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ is the identity matrix and $R \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ is known as the redundancy matrix. The R matrix is an orthogonal projector that projects onto the orthogonal complement of the range space of A.

We restrict ourselves to regular models, and therefore the degrees of freedom r (redundancy) of the model under \mathcal{H}_0 (Equation 1) is:

$$r = rank(Q_{\hat{e}}) = n - rank(A) = n - u, where$$
(4)

$$Q_{\hat{e}} = Q_e - \sigma_0^2 A (A^T W A)^{-1} A^T \tag{5}$$

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On the other hand, an alternative model is proposed when there are doubts on the reliability level of the model under \mathcal{H}_0 . Here, we assume that the validity of the null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 in Equation 1 can be violated if the dataset is contaminated by outliers. The model in alternative hypothesis, denoted by \mathcal{H}_A , is to oppose Equation 1 by an extended model including the unknown vector $\nabla \in \mathbb{R}^{q \times 1}$ of deterministic bias parameters, as follows ([20,26]):

$$\mathcal{H}_A: y = Ax + C\nabla + e = \begin{pmatrix} A & C \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} x \\ \nabla \end{pmatrix} + e,$$
 (6)

where $C \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times q}$ is the matrix relating bias parameters, i.e. the values of the outliers to observations.

We restrict ourselves to matrix $(A \ C)$ having full column rank, such that:

$$r = rank \left(A \quad C \right) = u + q \le n \tag{7}$$

One of the most usual procedure based on hypothesis testing for outlier in linear(or linearised) models is the well-known data snooping [19,20]. This procedure consists of screening each individual measurement for the presence of an outlier [33]. In that case, the data snooping is based on a local model test, such that q = 1, and therefore the n alternative hypothesis is expressed as:

$$\mathcal{H}_{A}^{(i)}: \mathbf{y} = A\mathbf{x} + c_{i}\nabla_{i} + \mathbf{e} = \begin{pmatrix} A & c_{i} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{x} \\ \nabla_{i} \end{pmatrix} + \mathbf{e}, \forall i = 1, \cdots, n$$
(8)

Now, the matrix C in Equation 6 is reduced to a canonical unit vector c_i , which consists exclusively of elements with values of 0 and 1, where 1 means that an ith bias parameter of magnitude ∇_i affects an ith measurement and 0 otherwise. In that case, the rank of $(A \ c_i) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times (u+1)}$ and the vector ∇ in Equation 6 reduces to a scalar ∇_i in Equation 8, i.e. $c_i = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 1^{i_{th}} & 0 & \cdots & 0 \end{pmatrix}^T$. When q = n - u, an overall model test is performed. For more details about the overall model test, see e.g. [37,38].

Note that the alternative hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_A^{(i)}$ in Equation 8, is formulated under the condition that the the outlier act like systematic effect by shifting the random error distribution under \mathcal{H}_0 by their own value [13]. In other words, the presence of an outlier in dataset can cause a shift of the expectation under \mathcal{H}_0 to a nonzero value. Therefore, hypothesis testing is often employed to check whether a possible shifting of the random error distribution under \mathcal{H}_0 by an outlier is in fact a systematic effect (bias) or merely a random effect. This approach based on hypothesis testing is called *mean-shift model* [20]. Mean-shift model has been widely employed in a variety of applications, such as structural deformation analyses, sensor data processing, the integrity monitoring of GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) models and the design and quality control of geodetic networks (see e.g. [1,3,6,8,12,19–22,36,43,49–53]). The alternative to the mean-shift model is the variance inflation. Up to now it is rarely used in geodesy because it is more difficult to derive a powerful test and a reliability theory for it [12,13,54].

2.1. Binary Hypothesis Testing

In the context of mean-shift model, the test statistic involved in the data snooping is given by the normalised least-squares residual, denoted by w_i . This test statistic, also known as Baarda's w-test, is given as follows:

$$w_{i} = \frac{c_{i}^{T} Q_{e}^{-1} \hat{e}}{\sqrt{c_{i}^{T} Q_{e}^{-1} Q_{\hat{e}} Q_{e}^{-1} c_{i}}}, \forall i = 1, \cdots, n$$
(9)

Then, a test decision is performed as[55]:

Accept
$$\mathcal{H}_0$$
 if $|\mathbf{w}_i| \le k$, reject otherwise in favour of $\mathcal{H}_A^{(i)}$ (10)

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Note that the decision rule 10 says that If the Baarda's w-test statistic is larger than some critical value k, i.e. a percentile of its probability distribution, then we reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative hypothesis. This is the a special case of testing the null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 against only one single alternative hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_A^{(i)}$ and therefore the rejection of null hypothesis automatically implies acceptance of the alternative hypothesis, and vice-versa [37,38]. In other words, the outlier detection automatically implies outlier identification, and vice versa. This is due to the fact that the formulation of the alternative hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_A^{(i)}$ is based on condition that an outlier exists and it is located at a pre-specific position in the dataset. In other words, the alternative hypothesis in a binary testing says that "a specific measurement is an outlier".

Because Baarda's w-test in its essence is based on binary hypothesis testing, in which one decides between the null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 and only one single alternative hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_A^{(i)}$ of 8, it may lead to wrong decisions of Type I and Type II. The probability of Type I Error α_0 is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 when it is true, whereas the Type II error β_0 is the probability of failing to reject the null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 when it is false (note: the index '0' represents the case of a single hypothesis testing). Instead of α_0 and β_0 , there is the confidence level $CL = 1 - \alpha_0$ and power of the test $\gamma_0 = 1 - \beta_0$, respectively. The first deals with the probability of accepting a true null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 ; the second with the probability of correctly accepting the alternative hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_A^{(i)}$. In that case, given a probability of a Type I decision error α_0 , we find the critical value k_0 as follows:

$$k_0 = \Phi^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \tag{11}$$

where Φ^{-1} denotes the inverse of cumulative distribution function (cdf) of two-tailed standard normal distribution N(0,1).

The normalised least-squares residual w_i follows a standard normal distribution with the expectation that $\mathbb{E}\{w_i\}=0$ if \mathcal{H}_0 holds true (there is no outlier). On the other hand, if the system is contaminated with a single outlier at the *i*th location of the dataset (i.e. under $\mathcal{H}_A^{(i)}$), the expectation of w_i is:

$$\mathbb{E}\{w_i\} = \sqrt{\lambda_0} = \sqrt{c_i^T Q_e^{-1} Q_{\hat{e}} Q_e^{-1} c_i \nabla_i^2}$$
(12)

where λ_0 is the non-centrality parameter for q=1. Note therefore that there is an outlier that causes the expectation of w_i to become $\sqrt{\lambda_0}$. The square-root of the non-centrality parameter $\sqrt{\lambda_0}$ in Equation 12 represents the expected mean shift of a specific w-test. In such case, the term $c_i^T Q_e^{-1} Q_\ell Q_e^{-1} c_i$ in Equation 12 is a scalar and therefore it can be rewritten as follows [56]:

$$|\nabla_i| = MDB_{0(i)} = \sqrt{\frac{\lambda_0}{c_i^T Q_e^{-1} Q_{\theta} Q_e^{-1} c_i}}, \ \forall i = 1, \cdots, n$$
 (13)

where $|\nabla_i|$ is the Minimal Detectable Bias $(MDB_{0_{(i)}})$ for the case of having only one single alternative hypothesis, which can be computed for each of the n alternative hypotheses according to Equation 8. For a single outlier, the variance of estimated outlier, denoted by $\sigma^2_{\nabla_i}$, is:

$$\sigma_{\nabla_i}^2 = \left(c_i^T Q_e^{-1} Q_{\hat{e}} Q_e^{-1} c_i\right)^{-1}, \forall i = 1, \cdots, n$$
(14)

Thus, the MDB can also be written as:

$$MDB_{0(i)} = \sigma_{\nabla_i} \sqrt{\lambda_0}, \ \forall i = 1, \cdots, n$$
 (15)

where $\sigma_{\nabla_i} = \sqrt{\sigma_{\nabla_i}^2}$ is the standard-deviation of estimated outlier ∇_i .

The MDB in Equation 13 or 15 of an alternative hypothesis is the smallest magnitude outlier that can lead to rejection of a null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 for a given α_0 and β_0 . Thus, for each model of the

alternative hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_A^{(i)}$, the corresponding MDB can be computed [12,40,57]. The limitation of that MDB is that it was initially developed for the binary hypothesis testing case. In that case, MDB is a sensitivity indicator of the Baarda's w-test when only one single alternative hypothesis is taken into account. In this article, we are confined to multiple alternative hypotheses. Therefore, both MDB and MIB will be computed by considering the case of multiple hypothesis testing.

2.2. Multiple Hypothesis Testing

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The alternative hypothesis in Equation 8 has been formulated under the assumption that the measure y_i for some fixed i is an outlier. From a practical point of view, however, we do not know which measurement is an outlier. Therefore, a more appropriate alternative hypothesis would be [22]: "There is at least one outlier in the vector of measurements y_i ". Now, we are interested in knowing which of the alternative hypotheses may lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis with a certain probability. This means testing \mathcal{H}_0 against $\mathcal{H}_A^{(1)}$, $\mathcal{H}_A^{(2)}$, $\mathcal{H}_A^{(3)}$, ..., $\mathcal{H}_A^{(n)}$. This is known as multiple hypothesis testing (see e.g. [1,2,12,21,23,28,37,58–61]). In that case, the test statistic coming into effect is the maximum absolute Baarda's w-test value (denoted by max-w), which is computed as [12]:

$$\max w = \max_{i \in \{1, \dots, n\}} |w_i| \tag{16}$$

The decision rule for this case is given by:

Accept
$$\mathcal{H}_0$$
 if $\max - w \leq \hat{k}$
Otherwise,
$$Accept \ \mathcal{H}_A^{(i)} \ if \ \max - w > \hat{k}$$
(17)

The decision rule in 17 says that if none of the n w-tests gets rejected, then we accept the null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 . If the null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 is rejected in any of the n tests, then one can only assume that a detection occurred. In other words, If the max-w is larger than some a percentile of its probability distribution (i.e. some critical value \hat{k}), there is evidence that there is an outlier in the dataset. Therefore, "outlier detection" only informs whether the null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 is accepted or not.

However, the detection does not tell us which alternative hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_A^{(i)}$ would have led to the rejection of the null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 . The localization of the alternative hypothesis, which would have rejected the null hypothesis, is a problem of "outlier identification". Outlier identification implies the execution of a search among the measurements for the most likely outlier. In other words, one seek to find which one of the Baarda's w-test is the maximum absolute value max-w and if that max-w is greater than some critical value \hat{k} .

Therefore, the data snooping procedure of screening measurements for possible outliers is actually an important case of multiple hypothesis testing, and not a single hypothesis testing. Moreover, note that the outlier identification only happens when the outlier detection necessarily exists, i.e. the "outlier identification" only occurs when the null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 is rejected. However, the correct detection does not necessarily imply correct identification [2,12,37].

3. Probability levels of the data snooping for a single run under multiple alternative hypotheses

Two sides of the multiple testing problem can be formulated. One under the reality of null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 , i.e. an event that there is no outlier in the dataset, and another one coinciding with an alternative hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_A^{(i)}$, i.e. an event that there is an outlier. The probability levels associated with data snooping for both events are presented in Table 1.

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Table 1. Probability levels associated with data snooping under multiple alternative hypotheses.

Reality	Result of the test						
unknown	\mathcal{H}_0	$\mathcal{H}_A^{(1)}$	$\mathcal{H}_A^{(2)}$		$\mathcal{H}_A^{(n)}$		
\mathcal{H}_0	Correct decision $1-\alpha'$	Type I Error α_{01}	Type I Error $lpha_{02}$		Type I Error α_{0n}		
$\mathcal{H}_A^{(1)}$	Type II error eta_{10}	Correct identification $1-\beta_{11}$	Type III error κ_{12}		Type III error κ_{1n}		
$\mathcal{H}_A^{(2)}$	Type II error eta_{20}	Type III error κ_{21}	Correct identification $1-\beta_{22}$		Type III error κ_{2n}		
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$\mathcal{H}_A^{(n)}$	Type II error eta_{n0}	Type III error κ_{n1}	Type III error κ_{n2}		Correct identification $1-\beta_{nn}$		

3.1. On the scenario coinciding with null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0

For the scenario coinciding with the null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 , there is the probability of incorrectly identifying at least one alternative hypothesis. This type of wrong decision is known as *family-wise error rate* (*FWE*). The *FWE* is defined as

$$FWE = \alpha_{0i} = \mathcal{P}\left(|\mathbf{w}_i| > |\mathbf{w}_j| \ \forall j, \ |\mathbf{w}_i| > k(i \neq j) \ \middle| \ \mathcal{H}_0 : true\right), \ \forall i = 1, ..., n$$

$$(18)$$

The probability of accepting the null hypothesis in test i is $1-\alpha$, $\forall i=1,...,n$, where α is the significance level or size of the test for a single hypothesis testing. The classical and well-known procedure to control the *FWE* is Bonferroni correction [48]. If all tests are mutually independent, then the probability that a true \mathcal{H}_0 is accepted in each test is approximately

$$(1-\alpha)^n = 1 - \alpha' \tag{19}$$

where α' is the the Type I Error for the entire dataset. Thus, we have:

$$\alpha = 1 - (1 - \alpha')^{1/n} \tag{20}$$

which is approximately

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$$\alpha = \frac{\alpha'}{n} \tag{21}$$

The quantity in Equation 21 is just equal to the upper bound of Bonferroni inequality, i.e. $\alpha' \leq n\alpha$. Controlling the FWE at a pre-specified level α' corresponds to controlling the probability of a Type I decision error when carrying out a single test. In other words, one uses a global Type I Error rate α' that combines all tests under consideration instead of an individual error rate α that only considers one test at a time [61]. In that case, the critical value k_{bonf} is computed as:

$$k_{bonf} = \Phi^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{\alpha'}{2n} \right) \tag{22}$$

where Φ^{-1} denotes the inverse of c.d.f. of two-tailed standard normal distribution. Note that the number 2 in the denominator is because we perform a two-sided test.

It is easier for a single hypothesis testing, given a probability of a Type I decision error α_0 , we find the critical value based on the Equation 11. On the other hand, the rate of Type I decision error for multiple testing, α' , cannot be directly controlled by the user. One can argue about the application of Bonferroni [48] by Equation 22. However, Bonferroni is a good approximation for the case where the alternative hypotheses are independent. In practice, however, the test results always depend on

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each other to some degree, because we always have correlation between the w-tests. The correlation coefficient between any Baarda's w-test statistics (denoted ρ_{w_i,w_i}), say w_i and w_j , is given as [21]:

$$\rho_{w_i, w_j} = \frac{c_i^T Q_e^{-1} Q_{\hat{e}} Q_e^{-1} c_j}{\sqrt{c_i^T Q_e^{-1} Q_{\hat{e}} Q_e^{-1} c_i} \sqrt{c_j^T Q_e^{-1} Q_{\hat{e}} Q_e^{-1} c_j}}, \forall (i \neq j)$$
(23)

The correlation coefficient ρ_{w_i,w_i} can assume values within the range [-1,1].

Here, the extreme normalised residuals max-w (i.e. maximum absolute) in Equation 16 are treat directly as a test statistic. Note that using Equation 16 as a test statistic, the decision rule is based on one-sided test of the form max- $w \le \hat{k}$. However, the distributions of max-w cannot be derived from well-known test distributions (e.g. normal distribution). Therefore, critical values cannot be taken from a statistical table, but must be computed numerically. This problem has already been addressed by Lehmann [22]. In that case, the dependencies between the residuals are not neglected, because the critical values are based on the distribution of the max-w, which depends on the correlation between w-test statistics ρ_{w_i,w_i} .

According to Equation 23, the correlation ρ_{w_i,w_j} depends on the matrices A and Q_e , and therefore the distribution of the max-w also depends of those matrices. In other words, the critical value depends on the uncertainty of the measurement sensor and the mathematical model of the problem.

In order to guarantee the user-defined Type I decision error α' for data snooping, the critical value must be computed by Monte Carlo.

The key of the Monte Carlo are the artificial random numbers (*ARN*) [62]. Artificial because the random numbers are generated using a deterministic process. A random number generator is a technology designed to generate a deterministic sequence of numbers that does not have any pattern, therefore appear to be random. It is *'random'* in the sense that the sequence of numbers generated passes the statistical tests for randomness. For this reason, random number generators are typically referred to as pseudo-random number generators (PRNG).

A PRNG simulates a sequence of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) numbers chosen uniformly between 0 and 1. PRNGs are part of many machine learning and data mining techniques. In simulation, a PRNG is implemented as a computer algorithm in some programming language, and is made available to the user via procedure calls or icons [63]. A good generator produces numbers that are not distinguishable from truly random numbers in a limited computation time. This is, in particular, true for Mersenne Twister, a popular generator with a long period length of 2^{199371} -1 [64].

In essence, the Monte Carlo replaces random variables by computer *ARN*, probabilities by relative frequencies, and expectations by arithmetic means over large sets of such numbers [12]. A computation with one set of *ARN* is a Monte Carlo experiment [41].

The procedure to compute the critical value of max-w is given step-by-step as follows:

1. Specify the probability density function (pdf) to w-test statistics. The pdf assigned to the w-test statistics under \mathcal{H}_0 -distribution is:

$$(w_1, w_2, w_3, \cdots, w_n)^T \sim N(\mathbf{0}, \mathcal{R}_w)$$
 (24)

where $\mathcal{R}_w \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ is the correlation matrix with the main diagonal elements equal to 1 and the off-diagonal elements being the correlation between w-test statistics computed by Equation 23.

In order to have w-test statistics under \mathcal{H}_0 , uniformly distributed random number sequences are produced by the Mersenne Twister algorithm ans then they are transformed into a normal distribution by using the Box–Muller transformation [65]. Box–Muller has already been used in geodesy for Monte Carlo experiments [22,41,66]. Therefore, a sequence of m random vectors from the pdf assigned to the w-test statistics are generated according to Equation 24. In that case, we have a sequence of m vectors of the w-test statistics as follows:

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$$\left[(w_1, w_2, w_3, \cdots, w_n)^{T(1)}, (w_1, w_2, w_3, \cdots, w_n)^{T(2)}, \cdots, (w_1, w_2, w_3, \cdots, w_n)^{T(m)} \right]$$
 (25)

318 3. Compute the test statistic by Equation 16 for each sequence of w-test statistics. Thus, we have:

$$\left(\max_{i\in\{1,\dots,n\}} |w_i|^{(1)}, \max_{i\in\{1,\dots,n\}} |w_i|^{(2)}, \dots, \max_{i\in\{1,\dots,n\}} |w_i|^{(m)}\right)$$
(26)

Sort out in ascending order the maximum test statistic in Equation 26, getting a sorted vector \tilde{w} , such that:

$$\tilde{w}^{(1)} < \tilde{w}^{(2)}, \tilde{w}^{(3)}, \cdots, < \tilde{w}^{(m)} \tag{27}$$

The sorted values \tilde{w} in Equation 27 provide a discrete representation of the cumulative density function (cdf) of the maximum test statistic max-w.

5. Determine the critical value \hat{k} as follows:

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$$\hat{k} = \tilde{w}_{[(1-\alpha')\times m]} \tag{28}$$

where [.] denotes rounding down to the next integer that indicates the position of the selected elements in the ascending order of \tilde{w} . This position corresponds to a critical value for a stipulated overall false alarm probability α' . This can be done for a sequence of values α' in parallel.

It is important to mention that the probability of Type I decision error for multiple test α' is larger than Type I for a single test α_0 . This is due to the critical region of the multiple testing is larger than the single hypothesis testing.

3.2. On the scenario coinciding with alternative hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_A^{(i)}$

The other side of the multiple testing problem is the situation in which there is an outlier in dataset. In that case, apart from Type I and Type II errors, there is a third type of wrong decision associated with Baarda's w-test. Baarda's w-test can also flag a non-outlying observation while the 'true' outlier remains in the dataset. We are referring to the Type III error [59], also referred as to probability of wrong identification (\mathcal{P}_{WI}). The description of the Type III error (denoted by κ_{ij} in Table 1) involves a separability analysis between the alternative hypotheses [2,21,23,58]. Therefore, we are now interested in the identification of the correct alternative hypothesis. In that case, the non-centrality parameter in Equation 12 is not only related to the sizes Type I and Type II decision errors, but it is also dependent on the correlation coefficient ρ_{w_i,w_i} given by Equation 23.

Based on the assumption that one outlier is in the *i*th position of the dataset (i.e. $\mathcal{H}_A^{(i)}$ is 'true'), the probability of Type II error (also referenced as probability of "missed detection", denoted by \mathcal{P}_{MD}) for multiple testing is

$$\mathcal{P}_{MD} = \beta_{i0} = \mathcal{P}\left(\bigcap_{i=1}^{n} |w_i| \le \hat{k} \mid \mathcal{H}_A^{(i)} : true\right), \tag{29}$$

and the size of Type III wrong decision (also called "misidentification", denoted by \mathcal{P}_{WI}) is given by

$$\mathcal{P}_{WI} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \kappa_{ij} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{P}\left(|\boldsymbol{w}_{j}| > |\boldsymbol{w}_{i}| \ \forall i, \ |\boldsymbol{w}_{j}| > \hat{k}(i \neq j) \ \middle| \ \mathcal{H}_{A}^{(i)} : true\right)$$
(30)

On the other hand, the probability of correct identification (denoted by \mathcal{P}_{CI} is

$$\mathcal{P}_{CI} = 1 - \beta_{ii} = \mathcal{P}\left(|\mathbf{w}_i| > |\mathbf{w}_j| \ \forall j, \ |\mathbf{w}_i| > \hat{k}(i \neq j) \ \middle| \ \mathcal{H}_A^{(i)} : true\right)$$
(31)

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with

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$$1 - \mathcal{P}_{CI} = \beta_{ii} = \beta_{i0} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \kappa_{ij}, \ for \ (i \neq j)$$
 (32)

Note that the three probabilities of missed detection \mathcal{P}_{MD} , wrong identification \mathcal{P}_{WI} and correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} sum up to unity, i.e. $\mathcal{P}_{MD} + \mathcal{P}_{WI} + \mathcal{P}_{CI} = 1$.

The probability of correct detection \mathcal{P}_{CD} is the sum of the probability of correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} (selecting a correct alternative hypothesis) and the probability of misidentification \mathcal{P}_{WI} (selecting one of the n-1 other hypotheses), i.e.:

$$\mathcal{P}_{CD} = \mathcal{P}_{CI} + \mathcal{P}_{WI} \tag{33}$$

The probability of wrong identification \mathcal{P}_{WI} is identically zero, $\mathcal{P}_{WI} = 0$, when the correlation coefficient is exactly zero, $\rho_{w_i,w_i} = 0$. In that case, we have

$$\mathcal{P}_{CD} = \mathcal{P}_{CI} = 1 - \mathcal{P}_{MD} \tag{34}$$

The relationship given in Equation 34 would only happen if one neglected the nature of the dependence between the alternative hypotheses. In other words, this relationship is valid for the special case of testing the null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 against only one single alternative hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_A^{(i)}$.

Since the critical region of the multiple hypothesis testing is larger than the single hypothesis testing, the Type II decision error (i.e. \mathcal{P}_{MD}) for multiple test becomes smaller [12]. This means that the correct detection for the binary hypothesis testing (γ_0) is smaller than the correct detection \mathcal{P}_{CD} under multiples hypothesis testing, i.e.:

$$\mathcal{P}_{CD} > \gamma_0 \tag{35}$$

It is easier to detect in the case of multiple hypothesis testing than a single hypothesis testing. However, the probability of correct detection \mathcal{P}_{CD} under multiple tests is spread out over all alternative hypotheses, and therefore identifying is harder than detecting. From Equation 33 note also that the detection do not depends on the identification. However, the outlier identification depends of the correct outlier detection. Therefore, we have the following inequality:

$$\mathcal{P}_{CI} \le \mathcal{P}_{CD} \tag{36}$$

Note that the probability of correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} depends on the probability of missed detection \mathcal{P}_{MD} and wrong identification \mathcal{P}_{WI} for the case where data snooping is run only once, i.e. a single round of estimation and testing. However, in this paper we deal with data snooping in its iterative form (i.e. IDS), and therefore the probability of correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} depends on other decision rules.

4. On the probability levels of iterative outlier elimination and its Sensitivity Indicators

In the previous section the probability levels were described for the case where data snooping procedure is applied only once according to the detector given by Equation 16. In practice, however, data snooping is applied iteratively: after identification and elimination for a single outlier, the model is reprocessed and the outlier identification is restarted. This procedure of iterative outlier elimination is known as iterative data snooping (*IDS*) [26]. Therefore, *IDS* is not only a case of multiple hypothesis testing, but also a case of multiple run of estimation, testing and adaptation. In that case, the adaptation consists of removing a possible outlier.

Rofatto et al. [12,47] have showed how to compute the probability levels associated with *IDS* procedure. They have introduced two new classes of wrong decisions for *IDS*, namely over-identification positive and over-identification negative. The first is the probability of *IDS* flagging

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simultaneously the outlier and good observations. Second is the probability of *IDS* flagging only the good observations as outliers (more than one) while the outlier remains in the dataset.

This paper has extended the current decision errors of IDS for the case where there is a single outlier in dataset. In addition to the probability levels described so far, there is the probability of detector in 16 flagging simultaneously two (or more) observations during the round of the IDS. Here, this is referred to as statistical overlap. The statistical overlap is when two (or more) Baarda's w-test statistics are equal. For instance, if the correlation coefficient between two w-test statistics (ρ_{w_i,w_j}) were exactly 1.00 (or -1.00), i.e. if $\rho_{w_i,w_j}=\pm 1.00$, the alternative hypothesis, say $\mathcal{H}_A^{(i)}$, would have the same distribution as the another one, $\mathcal{H}_A^{(j)}$. That would mean that those hypotheses would not be distinguished, i.e. they would not be separable and an outlier would not be identified [2]. Note that the correlation ρ_{w_i,w_j} provides an indication whether or not the system redundancy is sufficient to identify an outlier. When correlation coefficient between two w-test statistics is exactly 1.00 (or -1.00), i.e. $\rho_{w_i,w_j}=\pm 1.00$, statistical overlap \mathcal{P}_{ol} is expected to occur. We have more to say about \mathcal{P}_{ol} when presenting the results.

Different from the data snooping single run, the success rate of correct detection \mathcal{P}_{CD} for *IDS* depends on the sum of the probabilities of correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} , wrong exclusion (\mathcal{P}_{WE}), over-identification cases (\mathcal{P}_{over+} and \mathcal{P}_{over-}) and statistical overlap (\mathcal{P}_{ol}), i.e.:

$$\mathcal{P}_{CD} = 1 - \mathcal{P}_{MD} = \mathcal{P}_{CI} + \mathcal{P}_{WE} + \mathcal{P}_{over+} + \mathcal{P}_{over-} + \mathcal{P}_{ol}$$
(37)

It is important to mention that the probability of correct detection is the complement of the probability of missed detection. Note from Equation 39 that the probability of correct detection \mathcal{P}_{CD} is available even for cases where the identification rate is null, $\mathcal{P}_{CI} = 0$. However, the probability of correct identification (\mathcal{P}_{CI}) necessarily requires that the probability of correct detection \mathcal{P}_{CD} be greater than zero. For the same reasons given for data snooping single run in the previous section, detecting is easier than identifying. In that case, we have the following relationship for the success rate of correct outlier identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} :

$$\mathcal{P}_{CI} = \mathcal{P}_{CD} - (\mathcal{P}_{WE} + \mathcal{P}_{over+} + \mathcal{P}_{over-} + \mathcal{P}_{ol}), \tag{38}$$

such as

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$$\exists (\mathcal{P}_{CI}) \in [0,1] \iff (\mathcal{P}_{CD}) > 0 \tag{39}$$

It is important to mention that the wrong exclusion \mathcal{P}_{WE} describe the probability of identifying and removing a non-outlying measurement while the 'true' outlier remains in the dataset. In other words, \mathcal{P}_{WE} is the Type III decision error for *IDS*). The overall wrong exclusion \mathcal{P}_{WE} is the result of the sum of each individual contribution to \mathcal{P}_{WE} , i.e.:

$$\mathcal{P}_{WE} = \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \mathcal{P}_{WE(i)} \tag{40}$$

We can also compute a weighting factor, denoted by $p_{i(\mathcal{P}_{WE})}$, for each individual contribution to \mathcal{P}_{WE} as follows:

$$p_{i(\mathcal{P}_{WE})} = \frac{\mathcal{P}_{WE(i)}}{\mathcal{P}_{WE}}, \forall i = 1, ..., n - 1,$$
 (41)

so that

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n-1} p_{i(\mathcal{P}_{WE})} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \mathcal{P}_{WE(i)}}{\mathcal{P}_{WE}}$$
 (42)

The weighting factor $p_{i(\mathcal{P}_{WE})}$ is within a range of [0,1].

Based on the probability levels of correct detection \mathcal{P}_{CD} and correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} , the the sensitivity indicators of minimal biases, Minimal Detectable Bias (MDB) and Minimal Identifiable Bias (MIB), for a given α' can be computed as follows:

$$MDB = \arg\min_{\nabla_i} \mathcal{P}_{CD}(\nabla_i) > \tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CD}, \forall i = 1, \cdots, n$$
(43)

$$MIB = \arg\min_{\nabla_i} \mathcal{P}_{CI}(\nabla_i) > \tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CI}, \forall i = 1, \cdots, n$$
(44)

The Equation 43 gives the smallest outlier ∇_i that leads to its detection for a given correct detection rate $\tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CD}$, whereas the 44 provides the smallest outlier ∇_i that leads to its identification for a given correct identification rate $\tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CI}$.

As a consequence of the inequality in 36, the MIB will be larger than MDB, i.e. $MIB \ge MDB$. For the special case of having only one single alternative hypothesis, there is no difference between MDB and MIB [37]. The computation of MDB_0 is easily performed by the Equation 13 or 15, whereas the computation of MDB in Equation 43 and MIB in Equation 44 must be computed based on Monte Carlo, because the acceptance region (as well as the critical region) for the multiple alternative hypotheses case is analytically intractable.

The non-centrality parameter for detection $(\lambda_{q=1}^{(MDB)})$ and identification $(\lambda_{q=1}^{(MIB)})$ for *IDS* can be computed similarly to Equation 12 as follows, respectively:

$$\lambda_{q=1}^{(MDB)} = \frac{MDB_{(i)}^2}{\sigma_{\nabla_i}^2} \tag{45}$$

$$\lambda_{q=1}^{(MIB)} = \frac{MIB_{(i)}^2}{\sigma_{\nabla_i}^2} \tag{46}$$

Thus,

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$$\frac{MIB_{(i)}}{MDB_{(i)}} = \sqrt{\frac{\lambda_{q=1}^{(MIB)}}{\lambda_{q=1}^{(MDB)}}}$$
(47)

Note from Equation 47 that the relationship between the non-centrality parameters for detection $(\lambda_{q=1}^{(MDB)})$ and identification $(\lambda_{q=1}^{(MIB)})$ does not depend of the variance (or standard-deviation) of estimated outlier σ_{∇}^2 .

In the case of \overrightarrow{IDS} , the power does not depend only the rate of Type II and Type III decision errors, but also the rate of over-identifications and probability of statistical overlap. In the next section, we provide a procedure for computing the errors and success rates associated with IDS.

5. Computational procedure for the estimation of success and failure rates of the iterative outlier elimination

After finding the critical value \hat{k} by in Section 3.1, the procedure also based on the Monte Carlo is applied to compute the probability levels of the *IDS* when there is an outlier in dataset as follows (summarised as a flowchart in Figure 1).




Figure 1. Flowchart of the algorithm for computation of the probability levels of *IDS* for each measurement in the presence of an outlier.

First, random error vectors are synthetically generated based on a multivariate normal distribution, because the assumed stochastic model for random errors is based on a matrix covariance of the

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observations. Here, we use the Mersenne Twister algorithm [64] to generate a sequence of random numbers and Box–Muller [65] to transform it into a normal distribution.

The magnitude intervals of simulated outliers are user-defined. The magnitude intervals are based on a standard deviation of observation, e.g. $|3\sigma|$ to $|6\sigma|$, where σ is the standard deviation of observation. Since the outlier can be positive or negative, the proposed algorithm selects randomly the signal of the outlier (for q=1). Here, we use the discrete uniform distribution to select the signal of the outlier. Thus, the total error (ε) is a combination of the random errors, and its corresponding outlier as follows:

$$\varepsilon = e + c_i \nabla_i \tag{48}$$

In the Equation 48, e is the random error generated from normal distribution according to Equation 2, and the second part $c_i \nabla_i$ is the additional parameter that describes the alternative model according to Equation 8. Next, we compute the least-squares residuals vector according to Equation 3, but now with total error (e) as follows:

$$\hat{e} = R\varepsilon \tag{49}$$

For *IDS*, the hypothesis of 8 for q=1 (one outlier) is assumed and the corresponding test statistic is computed according to 9. Then, the maximum test statistic value is computed according to Equation 16. Now, the decision rule is based on the critical value \hat{k} computed by Monte Carlo (see the steps 24-28 from subsection 3.1). After identifying the measurement suspected as the most likely outlier, it is excluded from the model, and least-squares estimation (LSE) and data snooping are applied iteratively until there are no further outliers identified in the dataset. Every time a measurement suspected as the most likely outlier is removed from the model, it is checked whether the normal matrix A^TWA is invertible or not. If determinant of A^TWA is 0, $det|A^TWA| = 0$, then there is a necessary and sufficient condition for a square matrix A^TWA to be non-invertible. In other words, it is checked whether or not there is a solution available in the sense of ordinary LSE after removing a possible outlier.

The *IDS* procedure is performed for m experiments of random error vectors with each experiment contaminated by an outlier in the ith measurement. Therefore, for each measurement contaminated by an outlier there is v = 1, ..., m experiments.

The probability of correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} is obtained by the ratio between the correct identification cases and possible cases. Thus, if m is the total number of Monte Carlo experiments (possible cases), we count the number of times that the outlier is correctly identified (denoted as n_{CI}), and then approximate the probability of correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} as:

$$\mathcal{P}_{CI} = \frac{n_{CI}}{m} \tag{50}$$

Similar to Equation 50, the false decisions are also computed as

$$\mathcal{P}_{MD} = \frac{n_{MD}}{m} \tag{51}$$

$$\mathcal{P}_{WE} = \frac{n_{WE}}{m} \tag{52}$$

$$\mathcal{P}_{over_{+}} = \frac{n_{over_{+}}}{m} \tag{53}$$

$$\mathcal{P}_{over_{-}} = \frac{n_{over_{-}}}{m} \tag{54}$$

$$\mathcal{P}_{ol} = \frac{n_{ol}}{m} \tag{55}$$

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- n_{MD} is the number of experiments in which the IDS does not detect the outlier (\mathcal{P}_{MD} corresponds to the rate of missed detection);
- n_{WE} is the number of experiments in which the *IDS* procedure flags and removes only one single non-outlying measurement while the 'true' outlier remains in the dataset (\mathcal{P}_{WE} is the wrong exclusion rate);
- $n_{over_{+}}$ is the number of experiments where the *IDS* identifies and removes correctly the outlying measurement and others. $\mathcal{P}_{over_{+}}$ corresponds to its probability;
- $n_{over_{-}}$ represents the number of experiments where the IDS identifies and removes more than one non-outlying measurement, whereas the 'true outlier' remains in the dataset ($\mathcal{P}_{over_{-}}$ is the probability corresponding to that error probability class); and
- n_{ol} is the number of experiments in which the detector in Equation 16 flagging simultaneously two (or more) measurements during a given iteration of the *IDS*. Here, this is referred to as number of statistical overlap n_{ol} and \mathcal{P}_{ol} corresponds to its probability.

Different from [12], in this paper the probability levels associated with *IDS* are evaluated for each observation individually and for each outlier magnitude. Furthermore, we take care to control the *family-wise error rate*. In the next sections, we apply the algorithm described in Figure 1 to compute statistical quantities for *IDS*.

6. On the probability levels of iterative outlier elimination

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In this experiment, we consider two closed levelling network, one with low and another one with high correlation between the residuals. For the low correlation case we use the network given by Rofatto et al. [52], whereas for the high correlation we choose the network from Knight et al. [34]. Figures 2 and 3 show the configuration of those networks, respectively.




Figure 2. Levelling geodetic networks: (a) Levelling network adapted from [52] with low correlation between *w*-test statistics; (b) Levelling network adapted from [34] with high correlation between *w*-test statistics.

Figure 3 shows an example of levelling for a single line. The equipment used to measure the level difference is an electronic digital level. In that case, the instrument is designed to operate by employing electronic digital image processing and is used in conjunction with a special bar-coded staff (also called barcode rod). After an operator accomplishes rough levelling with a bull's eye bubble, the electronic digital level could be used to obtain digitally the bar-coded staff reading. The result can be

recorded manually on a levelling field-book or else automatically stored in the data collector of the digital level. A simple height difference is obtained from the difference between the backsight staff reading and foresight staff reading. An example of a "digital level – bar-code staff" system is displayed in the Figure 4. For more details about digital level see e.g. [67–69].




Figure 3. Example of a single line levelling: the digital level instrument is placed between the points which height difference is to be find. Special bar-coded staff are placed at that points and sighted them through digital level instrument.



Figure 4. Example of a *digital level – bar-code staff* system.

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There are several levelling lines available for a levelling geodetic network. In the absence of outliers, i.e. under \mathcal{H}_0 , the model for levelling geodetic network can be written in the sense of standard Gauss-Markov model in Equation 1 as follows:

$$\Delta h_{i-j} + e_{\Delta h_{i-j}} = h_j - h_i,\tag{56}$$

where Δh_{i-j} is the height difference measured from point i to j and $e_{\Delta h_{i-j}}$ is the random error associated with the levelling measurement. Generally, one of these points has known height h, from which the height of another point is determined. The point with known height is referred here as control point or benchmark (denoted by CP).

From network (a) in Figure 2, we have one control point, and 4 points with unknown heights (A, B, C and D), totalling four minimally constrained points. The control point is fixed (hard constraint or non-stochastic variable). In that case, the matrix *A* is given by:

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} -1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ -1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & -1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & -1 \\ -1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & -1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$(57)$$

In Figure 2 the red dashed lines are the external connections among the points of the network (a), whose measurements are Δh_{A-CP} , Δh_{A-B} , Δh_{B-C} , Δh_{C-D} and Δh_{D-CP} , whereas the blue dashed lines are the internal connections, whose measurements consist of Δh_{A-D} , Δh_{A-C} , Δh_{B-CP} , Δh_{B-D} and Δh_{C-CP} . The distances of the external and internal connections were considered 240 m and 400 m, respectively. The equipment used is a spirit level with nominal standard deviation for a single staff reading of 0.02 mm/m. Lines of sight distances are kept at 40 m. Each partial height difference, in turn, involves one instrument setup and two sightings: forward and back. Thus, the standard deviation for each total height difference equals to:

$$\sigma_{\Delta h_{i-j}} = \sqrt{2p} \times 40m \times \frac{0.02mm}{m}$$

$$= \sqrt{2p} \times 0.8mm,$$
(58)

where *p* is the number of partial height differences. In that case, each total height difference between external or internal connections is made of, respectively, three or five partial height differences. The readings are assumed uncorrelated and with equal uncertainty. In that case, the standard deviation of the measures for external and internal connections are 1.96 mm and 2.53 mm, respectively.

On the other hand, from network (\mathbf{b}) in Figure 2, there are two control station (fixed) and three user stations with unknown heights. In that case, the matrix \mathbf{A} is given by:

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & -1 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$
 (59)

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For network (**b**), we have the following measurements: $\Delta h_1 = \Delta h_{CP_1-P_2}$, $\Delta h_2 = \Delta h_{P_2-P_3}$, $\Delta h_3 = \Delta h_{P_3-CP_4}$, $\Delta h_4 = \Delta h_{CP_4-P_5}$, $\Delta h_5 = \Delta h_{P_5-CP_1}$ and $\Delta h_6 = \Delta h_{P_2-P_5}$. In that case, the covariance matrix of the measurements (metro units) is given by [34]:

$$Q_e = \begin{pmatrix} 5.5 & 3.7 & 0.3 & -3.2 & -0.5 & 0.1 \\ 3.7 & 3.9 & 0.0 & -0.8 & -0.6 & -0.7 \\ 0.3 & 0.0 & 0.8 & -1.4 & 0.1 & 0.8 \\ -3.2 & -0.8 & -1.4 & 5.4 & -0.3 & -2.1 \\ -0.5 & -0.6 & 0.1 & -0.3 & 0.2 & 0.3 \\ 0.1 & -0.7 & 0.8 & -2.1 & 0.3 & 1.4 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$(60)$$

The correlation coefficient ρ_{w_i,w_j} between w-test statistics were computed for both network (**a**) and network (**b**) according to Equation 23. Table 2 provides the correlation ρ_{w_i,w_j} for the network (**a**) and Table 3 for the network (**b**). In general, the correlation ρ_{w_i,w_j} for the network (**b**) are much higher than network (**a**).

From Table 2, we observe that the maximum correlation is $\rho_{w_i,w_j} = \pm 0.4146$ for network (a) (i.e. $\rho_{w_i,w_j} = \pm 41.46\%$). In that case, as the correlation coefficient is less than 50%, the missed detection rate \mathcal{P}_{MD} is expected to be larger than the others decision errors of IDS.

From Table 3, it is expected that wrong exclusion rate \mathcal{P}_{WE} will be significantly more pronounced than others wrong decision of *IDS*. This is due to the high correlation between the test statistics for the network (b). Note also that correlation coefficient between the second (Δh_2) and third Δh_3 measurement is exactly 1.00 (i.e. $\rho_{w_i,w_j}=100\%$). It means that if one of these measurements were an outlier, their corresponding w-test statistics would overlap. Therefore, an outlier can never be identified if it occurs in one of these measurements, but can be detected.

Table 2. Correlation matrix of *w*-test statistics for levelling network (a).

Δh_{i-j}	A-CP	A - B	C-B	D-C	CP-D	D-A	C-A	CP-B	D-B	C-CP
A-CP	1.0000	-0.4146	-0.0488	-0.0488	-0.4146	-0.3464	-0.3134	-0.3464	-0.0660	-0.3134
A - B		1.0000	0.4146	0.0488	0.0488	-0.3134	-0.3464	0.3464	0.3134	0.0660
C-B			1.0000	0.4146	0.0488	-0.0660	-0.3464	-0.3134	-0.3464	0.3134
D-C				1.0000	0.4146	-0.3134	0.3134	-0.0660	-0.3464	-0.3464
CP-D					1.0000	0.3464	0.0660	-0.3134	0.3134	-0.3464
D-A						1.0000	-0.2565	-0.0223	-0.2565	0.0223
C-A							1.0000	0.0223	-0.0223	0.2565
CP-B								1.0000	-0.2565	-0.2565
D-B									1.0000	-0.0223
C-CP										1.0000

Table 3. Correlation matrix of *w*-test statistics for levelling network (b).

Δh_{i-j}	Δh_1	Δh_2	Δh_3	Δh_4	Δh_5	Δh_6
Δh_1	1.00	-0.41	-0.41	0.96	0.98	0.97
Δh_2		1.00	1.00	-0.36	-0.50	-0.61
Δh_3			1.00	-0.36	-0.50	-0.61
Δh_4				1.00	0.98	0.93
Δh_5					1.00	0.98
Δh_6						1.00

In the following subsections, we compute and analyse the probability levels associated with *IDS* for two cases. In the first one, we consider the dataset is free of outliers, whereas the second one there is an outlier in the dataset.

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6.1. Scenario coinciding with the null hypothesis: absence of outlier

In this context, we investigated to what extent the Bonferroni correction deviates from the distribution of max-w based on Monte Carlo. For this purpose, we consider the following Type I decision error rates: $\alpha' = 0.001$, $\alpha' = 0.0027$, $\alpha' = 0.01$, $\alpha' = 0.025$, $\alpha' = 0.05$ and $\alpha' = 0.1$. Important to mention that the probability of Type I Error of $\alpha' = 0.0027$ corresponds to a critical value of k = 3 in the case of single test, which is known as 3σ -rule [24]. We also set up m = 200,000 Monte Carlo experiments as proposed by [12]. For each α' , we compute the correspondent critical value according to Bonferroni from Equation 22 and based on Monte Carlo from procedure described in Section 3, specifically from step 24 to 28. Both methods are applied for the networks (a) and (b) in Figure 2. The result is displayed in Figure 5.




Figure 5. Critical values of max-w for the both levelling network (**a**) in blue and (**b**) in red. *Solid curves* obtained from Monte Carlo procedure 4 by m = 200,000 Monte Carlo experiments. Dashed curves obtained from Bonferroni 22.

From Figure 5, we observe that the critical values computed from Monte Carlo are always smaller than those values computed by Equation 22 for both networks. This is because the matrix R in Equation 3 promotes the correlation between the residuals. Note that the matrix R depends on the network geometry given by matrix R. It means that we will always have some degree of correlation between the residuals. If we neglect the correlation between the residuals as in 22, we are assuming that there is no association between the residuals. Thus, we overestimate the probability of max-w by using 22 and the dashed curve in Figure 5 is always above the solid curve. Therefore, the user has no full control over Type I Error by Bonferroni. We can point out some particularities as follows.

Bonferroni can only be used with a good approximation to control the Type I Error of *IDS* for the case where we have a measurement system with high redundancy, low residual correlation (i.e. low correlation between w-test statistics ρ_{w_i,w_j}) and for small α' . This is the case for network (**a**). On the other hand, Bonferroni does not work well for network (**b**). In the latter case, the effect is more pronounced, because there is a low redundancy and a high residual correlation. In general, under the condition that the correct decision is made when the null hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 is accepted, it is less likely to get large max-w than predicted by 22.

Here, we treat the extreme (i.e. maximum absolute) normalised residuals max-w in 16 directly as a test statistic. The Figure 6 shows the distribution of max-w for both networks (a) and (b). We observe that the distribution of max-w for network (a) gets closer to normal distribution than network (b). This

means that the smaller the correlation between the residuals, the smaller the Type I decision error rate α' , therefore larger are the critical values. The Figure 7 shows the cumulative distribution of max-w for both networks (a) and (b). From Figure 7, we evidenced that at the same level error probability, the critical value for network (a) is always smaller than the one computed for network (b).




Figure 6. Probability histograms of max-w for network (a) in blue and (b) in red.




Figure 7. Cumulative frequency of max-w for networks (a) in blue and (b) in red.

Until now, our outcomes have been investigated under the condition that \mathcal{H}_0 is true. In the next subsection, we analyse the probability levels of *IDS* in the presence of an outlier. In that case, the decision rule will be based on critical values from max-w distribution as detailed in Table 4. Important to note that the critical value 3 of 3σ -rule is not valid for a multiple test case. Actually, the critical values for outlier identification (i.e. multiple test) depends on the geometry of the network and the sensor uncertainty. Therefore, the probability associated with 3σ -rule for network (a) would be close to α' =0.025 and for network (b) α' =0.0067.

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Table 4. Critical values from Bonferroni and Monte Carlo procedure for network (a) and (b).

α'	k_{bonf} from 22 for net (a)	k_{bonf} from 22 for net (b)	\hat{k} from 28 for net (a)	\hat{k} from 28 for net (b)
0.001	3.89	3.76	3.89	3.56
0.0027	3.64	3.51	3.64	3.28
0.01	3.29	3.14	3.28	2.88
0.025	3.02	2.87	3	2.56
0.05	2.81	2.64	2.77	2.29
0.1	2.58	2.39	2.52	2

6.2. Scenario coinciding with an alternative hypothesis: presence of an outlier

In this scenario, there is an outlier in dataset. Thus, the correct decision is taken when an alternative hypothesis $\mathcal{H}_A^{(i)}$ from Equation 8 is accepted. Here, we compute the probability levels of the *IDS* based on the procedure in Section 5. The decision rule is based on critical values computed by Monte Carlo. These values were presented in Table 4. We arbitrarily define the outlier magnitude from $|3\sigma|$ to $|8\sigma|$ for network (a) and $|1\sigma|$ to $|12\sigma|$ for network (b).

The sensitivity indicators MDB and MIB were also computed according to Equation 43 and 44, respectively. The success rate for outlier detection and outlier identification were taken as equals to 0.8, i.e. $\tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CD} = \tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CI} = 0.8$, respectively.

6.2.1. Geodetic network with low correlation between residuals

We start from network (a) with low correlation between residuals. We observe that there is a high degree of homogeneity for that network (a). It is can be explained by the redundancy numbers, denoted by (r_i) . The redundancy number are the elements of the main diagonal of the matrix R in Equation 3. The redundancy number (r_i) is an internal reliability measure that represents the ability of a measurement to project the measurement error in the least-squares residuals. Then the higher the number of redundancy, the higher the resistance of the measurement to outliers.

The redundancy numbers for the measurements constituting external connections are identical and equals to $r_i = 0.519$, whereas the measurements constituting external connections are also identical and equals to $r_i = 0.681$. Consequently, the probability levels associated with *IDS* were practically identical for both external and internal connections. Thus, we subdivide our result in two parts: mean values of the probability levels for external connections and mean values of the probability levels for internal connections.

Figure 8 shows the probability of correct identification (\mathcal{P}_{CI}) and the correct detection (\mathcal{P}_{CD}) in the presence of an outlier for both external and internal connections. In general, we observe that the larger the Type I Error α' (or lower critical value \hat{k}), the higher the rate of correct detection \mathcal{P}_{CD} . This is not fully true for outlier identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} .

We observe that the probability of correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} becomes constant from a certain outlier magnitude. Moreover, the larger α' , the faster the success rate of outlier identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} stabilizes. In other words, the larger α' , the higher the \mathcal{P}_{CI} , but up to a certain limit of outlier magnitude. After this bound, there is an inversion, the larger the α' , the lower the probability of correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} . This is can be explained by the following: (i) the larger α' , the larger the critical region (or the smaller the acceptance region) of the working hypothesis \mathcal{H}_0 ; (ii) the larger the critical region, the smaller the size of the test; (iii) the smaller the size of the test, the less likely the hypothesis test will identify a small difference. In other words, there is no significant difference among the probabilities of correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} for outliers lying within a certain location of the critical region. Therefore, the probabilities of correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} for those outliers are practically identical.

Let us take the probability of correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} for external connections in Figure 8 as example. If the user chose an $\alpha' = 0.1$, the test would be limited to a 90% of acceptance region. In this case, an outlier of 6.6σ would have practically the identical probability of correct identification

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of $\mathcal{P}_{CI} = 90\%$ of an outlier of 8σ (or greater than 8σ). However, if one chose an $\alpha' = 0.001$ (99.9% of acceptance region), a 6.6σ outlier would not be identified with the same rate for a 8σ outlier. Therefore, in that case, the Type I decision error α' (or the critical value \hat{k}) restricts the maximum rate of correct outlier identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} .

Note also that there are no significant differences between detection \mathcal{P}_{CD} and identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} rates for small Type I decision error (see e.g. $\alpha' = 0.001$ and $\alpha' = 0.0027$).

Furthermore, the probability of correct detection \mathcal{P}_{CD} and identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} are greater for internal than external connections. For an outlier of 4.5σ and $\alpha'=0.1$, for instance, the probability of correct identification is $\mathcal{P}_{CI}=67\%$ for external connections, whereas for internal connections is $\mathcal{P}_{CI}=80\%$.




Figure 8. Probability of correct identification (\mathcal{P}_{CI}) and the correct detection (\mathcal{P}_{CD}) for network (a): (a) \mathcal{P}_{CI} for the measurements constituting external connections. (b) \mathcal{P}_{CI} \mathcal{P}_{CI} for the measurements constituting internal connections. (c) \mathcal{P}_{CD} for the measurements constituting external connections. (d) \mathcal{P}_{CD} for the measurements constituting internal connections.

Here, we compare the sensitivity indicators MDB and MIB by considering the success rate of 0.8 (80%) for both outlier identification and outlier detection, i.e. $\tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CI} = \tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CD} = 80\%$ (see Equation 43 and 44). The user can also find the MDB and MIB for other success rates. The result is displayed in Figure 9. We observe that the larger the Type I decision error α' , the more MDB deviates from the MIB. It is harder to identify than to detect an outlier. Therefore, the MIB will always be greater than or equal to MDB.

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


Figure 9. MDB and MIB for each α' : (a) MDB and MIB for measurements that constitute the external connections. (b) MDB and MIB for measurements that constitute the internal connections.

The standard-deviation of estimated outlier σ_{∇_i} for external and internal connections measurements are 2.7 mm and 3 mm, respectively. Those σ_{∇_i} were obtained by means of square-root from Equation 14. Note from Equation 45 and Equation 46 that the higher the accuracy of the outlier estimate, the lower MDB and MIB, respectively. However, note from Equation 47 that the relationship between MIB and MDB does not depend on the $\sigma_{\nabla_i}^2$. This is true when the outlier is treated as bias. In other words, if outlier is treated as bias then they act like systematic errors by shifting the random error distribution by their own value [13]. The result for $\tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CI} = \tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CD} = 0.8$ is summarised in Table 5.

As can be seen from Table 5, in general, MIB does not deviates too much from MDB. Is is due to low correlation between residuals. The difference becomes larger when the Type I decision error α' is increased. Note, for instance, that the MDB and MIB are practically identical for Type I decision error of $\alpha' = 0.001$ and $\alpha' = 0.0027$. In other words, an outlier is detected and identified with the same probability level when there is low correlation between residuals and for small α' . Therefore, we observe the larger α' , the greater the difference between MIB and MDB becomes. In that case, the difference between MIB and MDB is governed by the user-defined α' .

Table 5. Relationship between MDB and MIB for network (a) by considering $\tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CI} = \tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CD} = 0.8$.

(External connections)				(Inte	(Internal connections)		
α'	$\lambda_{q=1}^{(MDB)}$	$\lambda_{q=1}^{(MIB)}$	MIB/MDB	$\lambda_{q=1}^{(MDB)}$	$\lambda_{q=1}^{(MIB)}$	MIB/MDB	
0.001	22.27	22.61	1.01	22.36	22.52	1.00	
0.0027	19.95	20.27	1.01	20.01	20.23	1.01	
0.01	16.86	17.46	1.02	17.03	17.37	1.01	
0.025	14.3	15.7	1.05	14.41	15.69	1.04	
0.05	12.46	14.85	1.09	12.59	14.41	1.07	
0.1	10.51	14.58	1.18	10.63	14.10	1.15	

From Table 6 it can be also noted that the MIB is higher for internal than external connections. This is because the internal connections are less precise than external connections. Therefore, the effect on the heights (model parameters) of an unidentified outlier would be greater if that outlier magnitude were equal to MIB of the internal connections. However, from Figure 8, we observed that it would be easier to identify an outlier if it occurred in the measurements that constitute the internal connections than external connections.

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Table 6. MIBs for each α' and for $\tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CI} = 80\%$.

α'	MIB (m) (external connections)	MIB (m) (internal connections)
0.001	0.0129	0.0145
0.0027	0.0122	0.0138
0.01	0.0114	0.0128
0.025	0.0108	0.0121
0.05	0.0105	0.0116
0.1	0.0104	0.0115

Important to mention that both MDB and MIB are 'invariant' with respect to the control point position *CP*. This is well-known fact and can already follow from the MDB and MIB definition in Equation 45 and 46, respectively, which shows that both MDB and MIB are driven by the variance matrices of the measurements and adjusted residuals.

Figure 10 provide the result for the Type III decision error (\mathcal{P}_{WE}). In the worst case, we have $\mathcal{P}_{WE} = 0.12(12\%)$ for $|3\sigma|$. In general, \mathcal{P}_{WE} is larger for external than internal connections. This is linked to the fact that the residual correlation ρ_{w_i,w_j} in Table 2 is higher for external than internal connections. Furthermore, the larger Type I error rate α' , the larger \mathcal{P}_{WE} for both internal and external connections. Due to the low probability of \mathcal{P}_{WE} decision error for network (a), the user may opt for a larger α' so that the Type II decision error \mathcal{P}_{MD} be as small as possible. Thus, it is possible to guarantee a high outlier identification rate. This kind of analysis can be performed, for instance, during the design stage of a geodetic network (see e.g. [52]).




Figure 10. Probability of committing Type III decision error (\mathcal{P}_{WE}) for network (**a**): (**a**) \mathcal{P}_{WE} for external connections. (**b**) \mathcal{P}_{WE} for internal connections.

Figure 10 gives only the overall rate of \mathcal{P}_{WE} . Figure 11, on the other hand, displays the individual contributions to the \mathcal{P}_{WE} according to Equation 40 for $\alpha'=0.1$. As expected, the higher correlation coefficient between w-test statistics ρ_{w_i,w_j} , the greater the contribution of the measurement to \mathcal{P}_{WE} (see e.g. [2]). In that case, we also verified from Figure 12 that the larger the redundancy number r_i , the smaller the \mathcal{P}_{WE} . Moreover, the larger the outlier magnitude, the smaller the \mathcal{P}_{WE} . We also observe from Figure 13 that the larger ρ_{w_i,w_j} , the larger the weighting factor $p_{i(\mathcal{P}_{WE})}$. The weighting factors $p_{i(\mathcal{P}_{WE})}$ for the highest correlations (i.e. $\rho_{w_i,w_j}=0.415$ for $r_i=0.519$ and $\rho_{w_i,w_j}=0.346$ for $r_i=0.681$) increased as the outlier magnitude has increased. However, this was not significant. While the weighting factor $p_{i(\mathcal{P}_{WE})}$ for the highest correlation coefficient increased by around 1%, the overall \mathcal{P}_{WE} decreased around 20%. In general, the weighting factor $p_{i(\mathcal{P}_{WE})}$ was relatively constant. The weighting factor $p_{i(\mathcal{P}_{WE})}$ was obtained by Equation 41.




Figure 11. Individual contribution of the external and internal connections to the overall \mathcal{P}_{WE} and their relationship with the correlation coefficient ρ_{w_i,w_j} for network (a). (a) Individual contribution to \mathcal{P}_{WE} by external connections. (b) Individual contribution to \mathcal{P}_{WE} by internal connections.




Figure 12. Individual contributions to the overall \mathcal{P}_{WE} for network (a) and their relationship with the redundancy number r_i for residuals with the same correlation coefficient ρ_{w_i,w_j} and $\alpha' = 0.1$.




Figure 13. Weighting factors $p_{i(\mathcal{P}_{WE})}$ for network (a) and for $\alpha' = 0.1$. (a) Weighting factors $p_{i(\mathcal{P}_{WE})}$ for external connections. (b) Weighting factor $p_{i(\mathcal{P}_{WE})}$ for internal connections.

The over-identification cases \mathcal{P}_{over+} and \mathcal{P}_{over-} are presented in Figure 14. In general, the larger the Type I decision error α' , the larger the over-identification cases for that network. The larger the magnitude of the outlier, the larger the \mathcal{P}_{over+} and smaller the \mathcal{P}_{over-} .

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For small α' we observe that \mathcal{P}_{over-} and \mathcal{P}_{over+} were practically null (see e.g. for $\alpha'=0.001$ and $\alpha'=0.0027$).

In general, the larger the correlation coefficient ρ_{w_i,w_j} , the smaller \mathcal{P}_{over+} and the larger the \mathcal{P}_{over+} . Moreover, we also observe that the larger the redundancy number r_i , the larger the \mathcal{P}_{over+} and the smaller \mathcal{P}_{over-} .

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


Figure 14. Over-identification cases for network (a). (a) \mathcal{P}_{over+} for external connections. (b) \mathcal{P}_{over+} for internal connections. (c) \mathcal{P}_{over-} for external connections. (d) \mathcal{P}_{over-} for internal connections.

The probability of statistical overlap \mathcal{P}_{ol} was practically null for that network. This is because the each point of the network (a) has at least four connections. This means that even with an exclusion, there are still three level measurements per point (i.e. three connections per point), which guarantees the minimum redundancy necessary for the second round of the *IDS*. The very low residual correlation of that network also contributes to the non-occurrence of statistical overlap.

The results presented so far are valid for the case of having a system with high redundancy and low residual correlation. In the next section, we present the results for a system with low redundancy and high residual correlation.

6.2.2. Geodetic network with high correlation between residuals

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Now, the correlation between the residuals is very high. This is the case for network (**b**) detailed in Figure 2. Since the measurements are correlated for network (**b**), not the redundancy numbers but the reliability numbers (\bar{r}_i) should be given as internal reliability measure, as follows [34]:

$$\bar{r}_i = c_i^T Q_{\hat{e}} c_i c_i^T W Q_{\hat{e}} W c_i, \forall i = 1, \cdots, n$$
(61)

The reliability numbers (\bar{r}_i) in Equation 61 is equivalent to the redundancy numbers when it is assumed that the measurements are uncorrelated. Table 7 gives the reliability numbers (\bar{r}_i) , standard-deviation of each measurement $\sigma_{\Delta h_{i-j}}$ and the standard-deviation of each estimated outlier σ_{∇_i} for network (b).

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Table 7. Reliability numbers (\bar{r}_i) , standard-deviation $\sigma_{\Delta h_{i-j}}$ and standard-deviation of estimated outlier σ_{∇_i} for network (**b**).

Δh_{i-j}	\bar{r}_i	$\sigma_{\Delta h_{i-j}}$ (m)	σ_{∇_i} (m)
Δh_1	10.58	2.35	0.72
Δh_2	0.62	1.97	2.50
Δh_3	0.13	0.89	2.50
Δh_4	13.68	2.32	0.63
Δh_5	1.95	0.45	0.32
Δh_6	3.56	1.18	0.63

The probabilities of correct identification (\mathcal{P}_{CI}) for that network are displayed in Figure 15. The critical values (\hat{k}) for network (\mathbf{b}) were those given in Table 4. Different from network (\mathbf{a}), the probability of correct identification (\mathcal{P}_{CI}) for network (\mathbf{b}) is different for each measurement. It was also found that the larger the Type I decision error α' , the higher the probability of correct identification (\mathcal{P}_{CI}). However, it is only true to a certain level of outlier magnitude. After that magnitude level, the larger the Type I decision error α' , the lower the probability of correct identification (\mathcal{P}_{CI}). The user-defined Type I error α' has indeed become less significant to a certain outlier magnitude. Note, for example, that the probability of correct identification for measurement Δh_1 to $\alpha' = 0.1$ is higher than $\alpha' = 0.001$ when the outlier magnitude is between 1σ and 1.5σ . For a magnitude greater than 1.5σ , we note that the larger Type I decision error α' , the lower the probability of correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} . The choice of Type I error α' , however, had no significant effect on the probability of correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} for an outlier magnitude greater than 1.5σ . This analysis can also be done to Δh_4 , Δh_5 and Δh_6 .




Figure 15. Probability of correct identification (\mathcal{P}_{CI}) for network (**b**). (**a**) \mathcal{P}_{CI} for Δh_1 . (**b**) \mathcal{P}_{CI} for Δh_4 . (**c**) \mathcal{P}_{CI} for Δh_5 . (**d**) \mathcal{P}_{CI} for Δh_6 .

There is no any probability of identification for both measurements Δh_2 and Δh_3 . This is because the residual correlation of those measurements is exactly equal to one (i.e. $\rho_{w_i,w_j}=1.00$). Furthermore, the reliability numbers (\bar{r}_i) in Table 7 for those measurements are close to zero. However, if one of those measurements were affected by a single outlier, the *IDS* would have the ability to detect it. In other words, there is reliability in terms of outlier detection for Δh_2 and Δh_3 . The probability levels of correct detection (\mathcal{P}_{CD}) are provided in Figure 16. We observed that the higher the reliability numbers in Table

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3, the higher the power of detection \mathcal{P}_{CD} and identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} . In general, the larger Type I decision error α' , the lower the probability of miss detection \mathcal{P}_{MD} and therefore the higher the probability of correct detection \mathcal{P}_{CD} .




Figure 16. Probability of correct detection (\mathcal{P}_{CD}) for network (**b**). (**a**) \mathcal{P}_{CD} for Δh_1 . (**b**) \mathcal{P}_{CD} for Δh_4 . (**c**) \mathcal{P}_{CD} for Δh_2 . (**d**) \mathcal{P}_{CD} for Δh_3 . (**e**) \mathcal{P}_{CD} for Δh_5 . (**f**) \mathcal{P}_{CD} for Δh_6 .

The sensitivity indicators MDB and MIB for Δh_1 , Δh_4 , Δh_5 and Δh_6 are shown in Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11, respectively. Both MIBs and MDBs were computed for each α' and for both outlier detection and identification success rate of 0.8 (80%), i.e. $\tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CD} = \tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CI} = 80\%$. The non-centrality parameters for outlier detection and identification were computed according to Equation 45 and 46, respectively. In general, the larger the Type I decision error α' , the larger the MIB and the smaller the MDB. In other words, the larger the Type I decision error α' , the greater the chances of outlier detection, but the lower the chances of outlier identification. In that case, the larger the Type I Error α' , the larger the MIB/MDB ratio. Therefore, an outlier with the size of the MDB should be enlarged in order to identify it [1,2,12,37].

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Table 8. Relationship between MDB and MIB for Δh_1 and for $\tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CD} = \tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CI} = 80\%$.

α'	MIB	MDB	$\lambda_{q=1}^{(MIB)}$	$\lambda_{q=1}^{(MDB)}$	MIB/MDB
0.001	3.700σ	1.327σ	145.839	18.759	2.788
0.0027	3.700σ	1.240σ	145.839	16.380	2.984
0.010	3.750σ	1.109σ	149.807	13.102	3.381
0.025	3.840σ	1.009σ	157.084	10.846	3.806
0.050	3.980σ	0.930σ	168.747	9.214	4.280
0.100	4.320σ	0.830σ	198.810	7.339	5.205

Table 9. Relationship between MDB and MIB for Δh_4 and for $\tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CD} = \tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CI} = 80\%$.

α'	MIB	MDB	$\lambda_{q=1}^{(MIB)}$	$\lambda_{q=1}^{(MDB)}$	MIB/MDB
0.001	2.558σ	1.170σ	88.735	18.564	2.186
0.0027	2.566σ	1.093σ	89.291	16.201	2.348
0.010	2.598σ	0.982σ	91.532	13.077	2.646
0.025	2.659σ	0.895σ	95.902	10.863	2.971
0.050	2.784σ	0.820σ	105.107	9.118	3.395
0.100	3.082σ	0.738σ	128.771	7.390	4.174

Table 10. Relationship between MDB and MIB for Δh_5 and for $\tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CD} = \tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CI} = 80\%$.

α'	MIB	MDB	$\lambda_{q=1}^{(MIB)}$	$\lambda_{q=1}^{(MDB)}$	MIB/MDB
0.001	11.290σ	3.065σ	252.065	18.577	3.684
0.0027	11.260σ	2.863σ	250.727	16.209	3.933
0.010	11.315σ	2.565σ	253.183	13.011	4.411
0.025	11.360σ	2.328σ	255.201	10.717	4.880
0.050	11.530σ	2.127σ	262.896	8.947	5.421
0.100	11.940σ	1.906σ	281.925	7.184	6.264

Table 11. Relationship between MDB and MIB for Δh_6 and for $\tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CD} = \tilde{\mathcal{P}}_{CI} = 80\%$.

α'	MIB	MDB	$\lambda_{q=1}^{(MIB)}$	$\lambda_{q=1}^{(MDB)}$	MIB/MDB
0.001	5.680σ	2.289σ	113.183	18.375	2.482
0.0027	5.700σ	2.134σ	113.981	15.976	2.671
0.010	5.695σ	1.908σ	113.781	12.769	2.985
0.025	5.825σ	1.729σ	119.035	10.492	3.368
0.050	6.021σ	1.579σ	127.180	8.747	3.813
0.100	6.394σ	1.409σ	143.426	6.965	4.538

The overall wrong exclusion probabilities (\mathcal{P}_{WE}) for network (**b**) are provided in Figure 17. In general, we observe that the wrong exclusion rate (\mathcal{P}_{WE}) increased up to a certain outlier magnitude and, from this point on, the wrong exclusion rate (\mathcal{P}_{WE}) started to decline and the effect of the user-defined Type 1 decision error (α') on \mathcal{P}_{WE} became neutral in practical terms. This effect is due to the residuals correlation. To see that effect more clearly, we also compute the individual contribution of each measurement to the overall wrong exclusion \mathcal{P}_{WE} and their corresponding weighting factors given by Equation 40 and Equation 41, respectively.

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


Figure 17. Probability of wrong exclusion (\mathcal{P}_{WE}) for network (**b**). (**a**) \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_1 . (**b**) \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_4 . (**c**) \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_2 . (**d**) \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_3 . (**e**) \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_5 . (f) \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_6 .




Figure 18. Individual contribution of each measurement to the overall wrong exclusion probability (\mathcal{P}_{WE}) for network (b) and for $\alpha' = 0.1$. (a) Individual contribution to \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_1 . (b) Individual contribution to \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_2 . (c) Individual contribution to \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_3 . (e) Individual contribution to \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_3 . (e) Individual contribution to \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_3 . (e) Individual contribution to \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_3 .

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The individual contribution to overall \mathcal{P}_{WE} and their weighting factors for $\alpha'=0.1$ are displayed in Figure 18 and Figure 19, respectively. Important to mention that the behaviour shown in Figure 18 and Figure 19 was similar to others α' . We observe that the correlation coefficient (ρ_{w_i,w_j}) does only have direct relationship with the \mathcal{P}_{WE} for a certain outlier magnitude. Let us consider the case where Δh_6 was set up as outlier. In that case, the larger correlation coefficient (ρ_{w_i,w_j}) , the higher the individual contribution to \mathcal{P}_{WE} . Of course, that only holds true if the outlier magnitude is larger than 3.2σ . This is also evident from the results of the weighting factors in Figure 19.




Figure 19. Weighting factors $(p_{i(\mathcal{P}_{WE})})$ of each measurement to the overall wrong exclusion probability (\mathcal{P}_{WE}) for network (**b**) and for $\alpha' = 0.1$. (**a**) Weighting factors to \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_1 . (**b**) Weighting factors to \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_4 . (**c**) Weighting factors to \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_2 . (**d**) Weighting factors to \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_3 . (**e**) Weighting factors to \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_5 . (**f**) Weighting factors to \mathcal{P}_{WE} for Δh_6 .

An important highlight there is association between MIB and the contribution of each measurement to the probability of wrong exclusion \mathcal{P}_{WE} in Figure 18. We observe that it is possible to find the value of a MIB with high success rates when the individual contributions to the overall wrong exclusion \mathcal{P}_{WE} of a given outlier start to decrease simultaneously. It is important to mention that this simultaneous decay occurs when there is a direct relationship between the correlation coefficient (ρ_{w_i,w_j}) and the wrong exclusion rates \mathcal{P}_{WE} . In that case, the identifiability of a given outlier can be verified for a given significance level α' and probability of correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} . Figure 20 illustrates an example for measurements Δh_1 and Δh_4 . The black dashed line corresponds to the probability of correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} and their respective MIB for $\alpha' = 0.001$. Note that when the effect of all measurements on \mathcal{P}_{WE} decreases, it is possible to find an outlier magnitude which can be identified. In other words, the effect of the correlation between the residuals (ρ_{w_i,w_j}) becomes insignificant from a certain outlier magnitude, which increases the probability of identification.

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


Figure 20. Relationship of the individual contributions to the overall probability of wrong exclusion (\mathcal{P}_{WE}) with correct identification rate \mathcal{P}_{CI} and MIB for $\alpha'=0.001$. (a) Example for measurement Δh_1 . (b) Example for measurement Δh_4 .

The probability of wrong exclusion for both Δh_2 and Δh_3 were smaller than the other cases. This is due to the correlation between the residuals (ρ_{w_i,w_j}) . In fact, we also note that although there is no reliability in terms of outlier identification for cases where the correlation is $\rho_{w_i,w_j}=1.00$ (i.e. 100%), there is reliability for outlier detection. In that case, the outlier detection is caused by overlapping w-test statistics. The result for statistical overlap (\mathcal{P}_{ol}) is displayed in Figure 21. In general, the larger Type 1 decision error α' , the larger the statistical overlap (\mathcal{P}_{ol}) .




Figure 21. Probability of statistical overlap (\mathcal{P}_{ol}) for network (**b**). (**a**) \mathcal{P}_{ol} for Δh_1 . (**b**) \mathcal{P}_{ol} for Δh_4 . (**c**) \mathcal{P}_{ol} for Δh_2 . (**d**) \mathcal{P}_{ol} for Δh_3 . (**e**) \mathcal{P}_{ol} for Δh_5 . (**f**) \mathcal{P}_{ol} for Δh_6 .

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The over-identification cases (\mathcal{P}_{over+} and \mathcal{P}_{over-}) are displayed in Figure 22 and Figure 23, respectively. We observe that the larger Type I decision error (α'), the larger the over-identification cases. It should be noted that the \mathcal{P}_{over-} was always larger than \mathcal{P}_{over-} . The over-identification \mathcal{P}_{over-} was practically null.




Figure 22. Probability of over-identification (\mathcal{P}_{over+}) for network (**b**). (**a**) \mathcal{P}_{over+} for Δh_1 . (**b**) \mathcal{P}_{over+} for Δh_4 . (**c**) \mathcal{P}_{over+} for Δh_5 .




Figure 23. Probability of over-identification (\mathcal{P}_{over-}) for network (**b**). (**a**) \mathcal{P}_{over-} for Δh_2 . (**b**) \mathcal{P}_{over-} for Δh_3 . (**c**) \mathcal{P}_{over-} for Δh_4 . (**d**) \mathcal{P}_{over-} for Δh_5 . (**e**) \mathcal{P}_{over-} for Δh_6 .

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7. Conclusions and Outlook

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In this paper we have proposed a procedure to compute the probability levels associated with an iterative outlier elimination procedure. This iterative outlier elimination procedure is known among geodesists as iterative data snooping *IDS*. Based on the probability levels of the *IDS*, the sensitivity indicators, Minimal Detectable Bias (MDB) and Minimal Identifiable Bias (MIB), can also be determined for a given measurement system.

We emphasize that the probability levels associated with IDS in the presence of an outlier were analysed in function of the user-defined Type I decision error (α'), outlier magnitude (∇_i), correlation between test statistics (ρ_{w_i,w_j}) and the reliability indicators (i.e. redundancy number r_i and reliability number \bar{r}_i). It is important to highlight that these probability levels were based on the critical values optimized via Monte Carlo.

We highlight the main findings of the paper:

- 1. If one would adopt the Bonferroni correction to compute a critical value of the test statistic associated with *IDS*, one would not have control over Type I decision error. This would only be true for small α' and for a measurement system with high redundancy and low correlation of test statistics.
- 2. If one would stay under the condition of a measurement system with low correlation of test statistics, the probability of wrong exclusion \mathcal{P}_{WE} would be too low. In that case, one should opt for a larger α' so that the probability of missed detection \mathcal{P}_{MD} would be as small as possible. Thus, it would be possible to guarantee a high outlier identification rate. However, under certain circumstances, we verify that the larger the Type I decision error α' , the higher the probability of correct detection \mathcal{P}_{CD} , but the lower the probability of correct identification \mathcal{P}_{CI} . For that case, the larger the Type I Error α' , the larger the ratio between the sensitivity indicators MIB/MDB.
- 3. The larger the Type I error (α'), the higher the probability of correct outlier identification (\mathcal{P}_{CI}). However, it is valid only to a certain limit of outlier magnitude (threshold). There is an inversion when the outlier magnitude is greater than that threshold, i.e. the larger the α' , the lower the \mathcal{P}_{CI} . This is more critical in the case of a measurement system with high correlation of test statistic. Moreover, the Type I decision error α' restricts the maximum rate of \mathcal{P}_{CI} .
- 4. We also observe that it is possible to find the value of a MIB when the contribution of each measurements to the probability of wrong exclusion \mathcal{P}_{WE} start to decline simultaneously. In that case, the identifiability of a given outlier can be verified for a given α' and \mathcal{P}_{CI} . In other words, from a certain outlier magnitude the effect of the correlation between test statistics becomes insignificant, which increases the probability of identification. Moreover, if a small outlier magnitude (outlier with magnitude close to measurement uncertainty) were to arise for a measurement system with high correlation of test statistics, the alternative hypotheses would not be distinguished, i.e. that outlier would never be identified.
- 5. The larger the Type I decision error α' , the larger the over-identification cases. The over-identification case \mathcal{P}_{over+} is always larger than \mathcal{P}_{over-} . We also note that the lower the correlation between test statistics, the higher the probability of over-identification positive \mathcal{P}_{over+} . For small α' (close to $\alpha' = 0.001$) the \mathcal{P}_{over-} is practically null.
- 6. When the correlation between two test statistics is exactly equal 1.00, \mathcal{P}_{CI} does not exist, but there is the \mathcal{P}_{CD} which is mainly caused by the \mathcal{P}_{ol} .

The computation procedure presented in this paper has been successfully applied to a practical example of geodetic networks. Although the procedure was applied in geodetic networks, it is a generally applicable method. The authors have been working on solutions to find a relationship between the variables computed deterministically (e.g. local redundancy, residuals correlation) with the probability levels computed by Monte Carlo. It will no longer need to use Monte Carlo to get the MIB, if a model is found. Moreover, further investigation is required to apply this analysis to general problem with multiple outliers problem.

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