

Review

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Review

Breaking The Vicious Circle: How Some Countries Unlocked Underdevelopment

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Abstract

In most poor and developing countries, the authorities largely pursue different objectives, which naturally end up diverging in different directions. This divergence arises from the outset due to the inability of these same governments to effectively align these objectives with what they actually want in the short, medium and long term in particular. In this particular approach, I analyse some implications related to the objectives pursued by policy makers in most poor countries. Evidence shows that governments that pursue targeted objectives, such as those related to spending on education, research and development, have been the countries that have managed to break the vicious circles. On the other hand, other factors also contribute to this growth in particular. For example, countries that pursue a non-exclusive democracy aligned with the objectives of the majority tend to differ significantly from governments that pursue democracies aligned with the objectives of a small group. However, in some countries where democracies are in fact at the service of vicious circles, there tends to be strong resistance to how these vicious circles should be broken. democracies are at the service of vicious circles, they tend to show strong resistance to how they should break the vicious circles.

Keywords: public policy; democracy; poverty; public expenses; education expenses

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1. Introduction

The failure of a large number of countries is, however, associated with the continuing shortcomings of their systems of governance on the one hand, and on the other hand with the shortcomings related to the levels of their existing political institutions and the dynamics of growth in these societies in particular. However, much of the literature analyses economic failures related to the poor distribution of wealth itself. Naturally, there are many other factors that particularly influence the existence of this evidence, such as the fact that most societies are unable to achieve the growth that should be desirable from the outset.

Failures related to institutions promote increased economic and political stagnation in most of these institutions. These failures can, however, be quantified by the intensification of the particular interests of a small group that has always controlled and held most of the country's wealth. However, on the other hand, this leads to the inefficient distribution of wealth to the majority of vulnerable populations. Naturally, this stagnation brings with it a series of failures, such as the fact that the distribution of wealth is totally inefficient in most developing societies. On the other hand, the emergence of vicious circles shows the effects that these countries in particular should guarantee from the outset in order to be able to naturally translate significant institutional change in a context of uncertainty and unprecedented multidimensional poverty. The vicious circles remain intact with their respective continuity, but to a large extent this continuity has to do with some very relevant aspects, such as those related to the insistence of private desires by a small minority. However, political minorities, especially those intensified through a party group, aim to transform most of their

private and particular desires into a set of factors that mean that only this minority has, in fact, almost everything necessary to be able to guarantee plausible and significant growth.

Poor societies characterised by political parties have held absolute control over the country and its institutions for decades, as can be seen in Angola and Mozambique. They fight to strengthen the presence of these vicious circles and their political parties as the best way to promote the significant growth of their particular interests, for example. Thus, most of those within the vicious circles have a large part of their economic institutions in place, which guarantees them personal and private growth in most of the governing power in particular.

Much more important than the existence of vicious circles is the fact that there are a number of factors that help and contribute to the formation of these vicious circles, such as the existence of an economy strongly aligned with the particular objectives and interests of a small minority. On the other hand, there are factors that stem from governmental inefficiencies, for example, which have been quantified through the great inability of societies to establish greater dynamics of plausible differentiation. However, these differences may also be associated with political factors that contribute to political and economic instability. However, democracy at the service of vicious circles is the main and greatest promoter of political exclusion in most poor countries, where these vicious circles generally exist from the outset. However, it is the particularities that show how inefficient public policies in these countries generally continue to be, as factors of exclusion and integration, for example.

Exclusive democracy is and continues to be the main driver of exclusion in most poor and developing countries, as most of these democracies are naturally unable to guarantee the integration of the majority of their stakeholders into their political systems. This leads to a number of inefficiencies that are highly plausible given the specific needs of their populations. This evidence can, for example, be proven through a set of measures that these countries should naturally have to introduce in most of their interventions. Thus, the political institutions in these countries converge towards a democracy that is largely at the service of a small group that governs the country, as is the case in Angola, for example. the party that has been in power for 50 years has naturally created a set of vicious circles, which largely aim to ensure the continued existence of political institutions that are aligned with the objectives of these groups, whose integration capacities are not in line with the objectives that political decision-makers naturally wish to implement in order to ensure greater social inclusion and dynamism. Thus, when democracies are at the service of vicious circles, they end up not having to guarantee, for example, what is necessary for them to be able to introduce, for example, a significant set of social protections that may in fact have to do with the implementation of fundamental guarantees, especially those that can in fact promote greater political and social inclusion from a political and economic point of view in particular.

Thus, the emergence of vicious circles brings with it a set of inefficiencies, such as those related mainly to the failures of countries. Naturally, most countries, unable to translate a dynamic different from that which most are unable to translate, end up creating failed societies. However, failed societies arise mainly when most of these states naturally end up failing due to a set of inefficiencies, especially with regard, first, to the lack of an economy strongly aligned with the objectives of economic transformation and, second, to the failure to satisfy most of the basic needs of a large part of their societies. The approach to basic needs is, however, relevant enough to ensure that, on the other hand, there is naturally a significant set of political and economic institutions that actually contribute and help to ensure that there is, for example, a great capacity for integration and significant economic growth. However, most institutions prove to be insufficiently adequate to promote these levels of efficiency. In practice, most societies whose governments have ultimately failed naturally prove to be promoters of their vicious circles, insofar as the needs for private contributions help, for example, to contribute to the respective strengthening of these same societies on the one hand, on the other hand, because most institutions are, for example, unable to ensure that these same societies can naturally promote a different dynamic that naturally reflects the existence of a set of objectives that nevertheless tend not to contribute significantly to their respective strengthening in particular, and

on the other hand, because they cannot, for example, guarantee that there is a plausible set of factors that can naturally ensure that the interests of a large part of societies are safeguarded in particular.

Much evidence suggests that the strengthening of these circles is not, on the one hand, relatively in the interests of most of their economic and political systems. among the set of factors that can actually help contribute to the efficiency of governance capacity, there are, for example, other factors that may naturally be associated with these factors, such as the fact that a large part of politics in particular is significantly linked to the failures that societies themselves present and tend to promote, for example, higher levels of inefficiency when, in fact, these factors are more closely aligned with the objectives that all governments should in fact promote in order to ensure that, in particular, there is, for example, a significant set of institutional change capacities capable of presenting a set of plausible factors that can be used as a greater anchor for the strengthening and growth of most of the objectives that are sought, both short-term and long-term in particular. this evidence, on the other hand, can in fact contribute more significantly to strengthening and growth, particularly in terms of the growth capacity of these countries in particular, as is naturally the case in most poor countries.

In this particular approach, I will show how significantly failed societies failed to ensure, on the one hand, the need for them to have, for example, a significant set of capabilities that enable the strengthening and growth of their societies in a context of uncertainty, naturally not aligned with the objectives that, from the outset, should, for example, translate into high standards of sustainable and significant growth in most of these societies in particular. This evidence, for example, helps to contribute to the existence of a set of factors and premises that are, on the other hand, capable of ensuring greater efficiency and practical capacity for these countries in particular to be able to guarantee, for example, a significant set of capabilities with greater resilience in general. However, most of the evidence does not contribute to the ability of governments to break these vicious circles, which initially aim to ensure that there is, for example, a strong and plausible capacity for these circles to be broken. Thus, in particular, the premise for breaking vicious circles may still have to do with the fact that these circles are not initially capable of naturally translating a set of efficiencies and capabilities that can, for example, translate into a significant set of capabilities, both in terms of transformation and the ability to show greater dynamism, which may, on the other hand, have to increase levels of resilience, both economic and political resilience in particular. However, a large part of these societies in particular end up failing as most of them tend to show trends of non-growth and inconsistencies, especially with regard to their levels and capacities to, for example, translate some significant objectives, especially those that can naturally guarantee greater inclusiveness and a dynamic that has to do, for example, with the fact that these societies in particular can bring about significant institutional change. The formation of vicious circles, beyond their great relevance, there are many other factors that influence these circles, such as those largely related to the way in which particular countries may, on the other hand, allow a significant set of initiatives to exist that have always been able, for example, both to control the capacity of their institutions and, on the other hand, to determine the optimal levels of their institutions in particular. Thus, societies with exclusive democracies tend to contribute significantly to failure and great political instability, especially fiscal instability, which has to do, for example, with a strong contribution from the particular needs of the majority of their inhabitants, aligned with the major plausible factors that can in fact promote inconsistencies, both in general policies and economic inconsistencies, which from a structural point of view are in fact relevant. The work of (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013) naturally shows that they are nevertheless promoters of great consistency and relevance of political and economic institutions, but with great emphasis on the reasons that nevertheless end up contributing to the confrontation, both of the respective societies and of the levels of applicability of the policies adopted significantly for the guarantees of economic prosperity. However, perhaps a large part of modern societies trapped in failure and underdevelopment can, on the other hand, determine, for example, how they should promote greater consistency with regard to the great capacity of these same political institutions to adopt strong mechanisms, both for sustainable growth and of great significance for increasing the levels of capacity that these economies may otherwise have to present in order to naturally break

most of these vicious circles. The continued existence of regimes and systems in particular are, however, other strong reasons that help to promote these inconsistencies. In reality, these tend to show their main characteristics aligned above all with the great inefficiency and political instability that exist in most economies and countries in particular, as much of the evidence naturally suggests.

Much of the work on vicious circles naturally shows that there are some inconsistencies that have to do particularly with the fact that they cannot contribute to the plausible independence of their institutions in particular. Most vicious circles are strongly dependent on stagnant and inconsistent democracies. However, when most of these democracies fail to guarantee a major feature from the outset, which is mainly related to how they should nevertheless guarantee a great capacity for change, on the other hand, the circles end up intensifying significantly, which naturally shows a stark contrast between societies, especially in those societies where the intensification of vicious circles promoted by the weak capacity of democracies is most effective, naturally when these end up being excluded. Non-inclusiveness, that is, both of democracies and political institutions, ultimately promotes strong political inconsistencies, the origin of which has to do, for example, with the factors that make these same institutions incapable of guaranteeing, for example, optimal levels of resilience, especially in the context of uncertainty in which most vulnerable societies find themselves. Thus, breaking the vicious cycles involves, on the other hand, breaking down the levels of political institutions that do not naturally guarantee a plausible set of functioning, especially in relation to how a large part of these institutions must, for example, ensure that there are greater levels of consistency in both the short and long term, particularly in relation to how the capacity of policies in these societies in particular can naturally have plausible effects that are, for example, in line with the medium and long-term objectives defined by policy makers in particular.

However, there are some factors that may, for example, reflect certain political inconsistencies. These inconsistencies are linked to the levels of literacy and education in general among a large part of the population. Naturally, societies whose inhabitants have relatively higher levels of education are better able to break vicious circles. However, this premise is based on the fact that, for example, when a society is significantly educated, it can easily make decisions that can guarantee the future of the society, on the one hand, and secondly, its inhabitants can become resilient as they have a significant set of actions that contribute effectively to key decision-making. Naturally, some differences between vicious and virtuous circles have been widely discussed in the literature, but the most significant characteristic is that the virtuous circle promotes high levels of growth and development in particular. In Menéndez, A. J. L., & Cowell, F. A. (2013), they analyse how these characteristics can, on the other hand, translate into greater effectiveness. In countries where there are, for example, high standards of inclusive institutions, vicious circles have had little time to assert themselves in particular. Some examples can significantly demonstrate this plausible relationship, such as the recent example of Botswana in Southern Africa. The example of Botswana, on the other hand, diverges significantly from the examples of the Democratic Republic of Congo and, more recently, Angola, where vicious circles are in fact strongly prevalent in general. In Corção, G. (1959), poverty is shown on the one hand as a continuous causal effect, being significantly a vicious circle of great relevance, and on the other hand, the best way to break these circles has to do, for example, with institutional changes and strong transformations, especially the economic transformations promoted by institutional changes over the years. Vicious and virtuous circles as causal models of interaction and economic development growth are strongly motivated by political reasons. However, on the other hand, market failures ultimately contribute to this strengthening in particular, especially in relation to the great capacity of virtuous circles to naturally promote strong reasons capable of ensuring high standards of economic and social transformation in particular. Krueger, A. O. (1993), for example, emphasises these relationships in particular.

Many studies analyse the vicious circle, significantly related to poverty, where, according to Bauer, P. T. (2019), these circles are most relevant when, for example, a large part of developing countries show strong differences in terms of both in terms of wage levels and the levels of wealth accumulation of their inhabitants. Naturally, these particularities are very pronounced, as these

cycles promote factors of social exclusion, largely driven by political systems in line with the systems of governance that still exist in most poor countries. For example, in Libânio, G., & Castigo, C. J. (2021), they show how there is, on the other hand, a strong and continuous persistence of vicious circles, which are naturally very permanent in Mozambique. Bergquist, P. (2009), on the other hand, analyses factors such as microfinance as being in fact a driving force for acceleration, particularly with regard to breaking vicious circles. On the other hand, the persistence of these circles is significantly notable when there are in fact high levels of lack of necessary skills, which are nevertheless necessary for significant poverty reduction in particular. In Bacaksızlar, N. G., & Barlas, Y. (2015), they analyse this with some relevance. In some African countries, there is indeed a strong persistence of exclusion from public services, with most basic public services that should serve as a major factor for sustainable growth being virtually non-existent. This approach is reinforced in Hamilton, A., & Svensson, J. (2017).

The manifestation of vicious circles through poverty represents, however, the greatest weakness between, on the one hand, what institutions should in fact guarantee for greater prosperity and, on the other hand, the various policies that have largely been unable to naturally guarantee greater sustainability from a functional point of view. In most developing countries, breaking vicious circles can indeed be a major challenge, especially when these challenges are also related to how these vicious circles are largely created in the first place. Most experiences in poor countries show that there is a plausible inability on the part of their authorities to actually break most of these circles. Thus, these cycles tend to create strong levels of political and economic stagnation in general. Both microcredit and initiatives related to levels of entrepreneurship can in fact serve as a basis for promoting and reducing the levels of vicious circles in most countries, as analysed in Rohima, S., Suman, A., Manzilati, A., & Ashar, K. (2013).

There is, of course, strong evidence that these circles remain unbroken. This particularity has to do above all with the levels and types of institutions, that is, both economic institutions and those related to politics itself, in most countries. The evidence seems to show strong inefficiencies in the practical application of the capacities of institutions to, for example, guarantee practical efficiency that is sustainably effective and viable, especially on the other hand, that it is in fact capable of aligning the short- and long-term objectives that most institutions should establish as a goal from the outset.

In most poor and developing countries, policies are not actually geared towards addressing the vast majority of social needs, with inefficiency mainly related to the failure of social protection levels. However, most of the economic failure of developing societies stems from their weak capacity to actually guarantee high levels of social protection, which should, on the one hand, enable the growth of these societies and, on the other hand, ensure that these societies can actually guarantee high levels of social integration through policies that should be characterised by inclusive policies. When there are high levels of social exclusion, societies tend not to promote the interests of the vast majority of their inhabitants. This particularity allows us to understand how the failure of developing societies is linked to the failures of weak social sustainability. Perry, G. (2006), for example, shows how sustainability in developing countries tends to affect both growth levels and poverty reduction levels themselves. However, poverty reduction is strongly linked to the major goals that most economies tend to achieve, especially in the short term, which naturally ends up determining the levels at which this poverty can be reduced, i.e., considering above all the application of different policies that are naturally considered incapable of determining the optimal levels of transformation capacity as a strong measure and trend to nevertheless guarantee this significant reduction. In Sarmah, P. (2022), they show in particular that there are strong implications that determine, on the one hand, vicious circles as the cause of the continued permanence of these circles, in particular, as the evidence suggests.

2. The Vicious Circle of Poverty Around the World

Most developing countries naturally have some vicious circles based particularly on their distinct incapacities, especially with regard to how these countries in particular should naturally make available a significant set of structural reforms capable of determining, on the other hand, with greater relevance, for example, the great capacity of these countries, on the other hand, to build a promising legacy from the outset or, first, according to the legacy of continued prosperity. Thus, for decades, most of these countries have naturally failed to provide the basic conditions for the majority of their inhabitants, whose basic needs largely dominate and naturally determine both the growth and the non-strengthening of their institutions and their respective economic policies capable of determining the viable path to long-term prosperity in particular.

The persistence of these vicious circles also has some other characteristics that are considered to be those that, in the medium and long term, tend to plausibly determine the most viable economic and political structure capable of ensuring causal strengthening, both of institutions and of a plausible set that has mostly to do with the long-term objectives to be achieved by most policy makers. Thus, there is strong evidence that naturally shows a large and strong plausible relationship between these institutions and their specific capacities, which may in fact become a plausible set of economies whose capacity for integration ends up being significant with some particularity in itself.

However, vicious circles have one strong and significant characteristic: they naturally have to do above all with the levels themselves, related first and foremost to the formation of particular interests on the part of the majority of political decision-makers, where, from the outset, policy makers take most of the decisions that have naturally led to profound institutional changes in the short term, the effects of which tend not to have a particularly significant impact in the medium and long term. Most of the decisions taken by policy makers tend to focus on the main particular interests, and most of these interests end up, for example, plausibly determining the great capacity for continuous formation of these particular interests in most developing countries. On the other hand, however, some evidence naturally ends up showing a strong and plausible existence of significant incapacities in terms of levels of governability and governance itself, where governance tends to determine the great capacity, on the one hand, of countries to deal with different levels of political integration in particular and economic integration, which, on the one hand, does not largely comply with the principles themselves that have to do, for example, with the capacity to form inclusive societies. In most societies, whose policies are mostly characterised by being in fact extractive and exclusive policies according to the work on the failure of nations, precisely as defended by (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013). Thus, when there is a natural intensification of non-inclusive policies in most developing countries, for example, they tend to create high levels of fragmentation, which tend to affect the levels of formation of most poor societies. Poor societies largely originate from the great capacity and diversity they present, especially with regard to the form itself. For example, most of these societies should, on the other hand, determine with greater relevance the great capacity, that is, both for non-inclusion and exclusion.

Most exclusive policies prove to be the greatest promoters of both inefficiencies and the very ineffectiveness of most governments. However, they have the capacity to create and strengthen the dynamics related to the formation of dual societies. Thus, the social duality referred to in most cases originates, on the one hand, from a strong incapacity that has to do with practical inefficiency and actions of great relevance, as is in fact the case in most developing countries where, from the outset, levels of integration end up not matching the main capacities that can, for example, influence the great capacity of some economies to actually become significantly resilient in a context of uncertainty. In this context, most societies are able, for example, to translate certain differentiations based on criteria adopted by most policy makers, where policy makers tend to ensure, for example, high levels of growth and high levels that have to do with the great capacity of these economies to actually stand out and, on the other hand, promote a strengthening of both institutions and growth itself, which has to do with how some policies should in fact focus on the significant formation of changes with greater institutional relevance and changes capable of producing, on the one hand, strong levels of growth

and, on the other hand, integration, as much of the evidence suggests and may in fact suggest profound changes whose objectives have to do with affirmation itself, both in the international context and in the context of institutions being able to produce strong evidence that ends up being largely preponderant for the strengthening of their respective societies in particular.

The vicious circle of poverty is in fact continuous due to a number of plausible reasons which, on the one hand, have been decisive in shaping the perception of how these circles are naturally created, However, the creation of vicious circles also ensures that there is strong evidence that helps to greatly strengthen the capacity of the type of policy to be adopted, for example, as criteria that can largely enable and accelerate levels of growth and development. However, much of the evidence also helps us to understand some mechanisms whose strengthening ultimately depends largely, firstly, on strengthening itself, which is capable of providing greater plausible resistance, and secondly, on how these same countries should promote strong levels and capacity for inclusion. that is, both political and economic inclusion, which can in fact provide high standards of organisation and the promotion of inclusion at different levels in particular. Promoting, for example, profound and significant changes may indeed be relevant for most societies, however, considering that these changes and strong transformations depend in particular on the formation of the different objectives that have to do with strengthening itself, both of institutions and of the different other areas of great institutional relevance from the outset.

In countries where the levels and capacities of most institutions show high contrasts, in comparison with modern societies and societies that naturally show strong evidence of high levels of strengthening, there may still be other particularities that may in fact have to do with the fact that most societies are not aligned with the development objectives sought by most developing countries. These particularities may still have to focus primarily on institutional failure, and secondly with the failure of public policies that do not yet show any plausible strengthening capable of guaranteeing significant structural changes and changes capable of affecting the formation of societies themselves. Most dual societies actually originate from these differences, which end up being differences with associated incapacities in particular. Of course, there may in fact be strong reasons that can contribute to the strengthening of these particularities, as much of the evidence shows and tends to reveal. From a structural point of view, societies that have, for example, high levels of non-strengthening, both in terms of institutions and policies, tend to allow for the existence of other factors that could, for example, promote strong institutional changes. naturally, these institutional changes may still have to deal with some factors such as the fact that they are not in fact plausibly capable of promoting the growth of these institutions with any efficiency and relevance in a context where they can in fact guarantee some plausible growth capable, on the other hand, of dealing with medium and long-term objectives, as most of the evidence ultimately shows.

Thus, while most vicious circles grow continuously, on the other hand, there are naturally some significant inconsistencies that have to do with the strengthening of only a minority that holds and controls political power in most regions. However, on the one hand, there is the continuous control of non-inclusive public policies and public policies that are characterised by their inability to assert themselves, both in the short and long term. In the long term, most policies end up being unable to promote any degree of efficiency, especially in their practical application, as much evidence in poor countries suggests. These, in particular, bring with them strong inconsistencies, on the one hand the inconsistency that has to do with the non-assertion of these same societies, however, many societies are unable to guarantee greater plausible affirmation due, on the one hand, to certain factors that naturally tend not to promote viable and meaningful social structures with the objectives that most countries aim to achieve, both in the short and long term, in particular where most poor countries remain trapped. However, most developing countries remain trapped and unsuccessful, particularly some African countries that remain trapped in their colonial legacy. Most French-speaking African countries exhibit these characteristics, largely characterised by the fact that they are unable to introduce a significant set of efficient and effective institutional capacities capable of ensuring that there is, from the outset, a greater capacity that is in fact plausible to guarantee that these countries

can naturally promote most of the necessary and profound institutional changes to be able to promote strong levels of resilience and high standards of institutional growth, particularly in the short and long term, as is in fact largely the case in most countries.

The medium and long-term objectives can in fact be achieved if, on the other hand, these economies manage to determine with the greatest possible relevance the optimal capacity that each particular society should establish as the most important criterion capable of strongly promoting political and governmental inclusion, which most developing and poor governments are currently unable to provide to the majority of their inhabitants. However, policy makers must ensure that there are strong reasons to guarantee, on the one hand, the great resilience that has to do with promoting the economy itself in establishing a greater dynamic that is very resilient from a structural point of view. these particularities can also contribute with some relevance to the affirmation of the policy itself, firstly as a mechanism that must in fact guarantee with some plausible relevance the strengthening of the economy itself, secondly, it will have to do with the plausible formation of the inconsistencies in these same societies in being able to effectively promote and guarantee certain particularities related to the degree of complexity and the degree to which these institutions must in fact contribute significantly to most of the relevant and significant type of growth, as the approaches may in fact suggest.

The approach to dual societies, on the other hand, naturally has to do with the fact that these societies are not sufficiently capable of actually contributing, both to the strengthening of societies themselves and to the strengthening of the main factors that ultimately contribute with some plausible relevance to high levels of economic growth and high levels of economic prosperity, that is, both in the short term and in the long term. in most situations in the long term, there are in fact strong reasons that contribute both to the establishment of greater economic interaction and to greater economic integration itself, which, on the one hand, highlights how countries may, for example, have to promote high standards of institutional resilience and resilience that is naturally capable of promoting greater responsiveness in the short and medium term. However, for the most part, the short- and medium-term objectives of policy makers have not been very structured from a plausible point of view, which naturally has to do with the statement itself and the levels of uncertainty in the context. However, in a context of uncertainty, most policy makers are in fact faced with high levels of indecision, which ultimately leads them to promote high levels of inconsistency. These inconsistencies may naturally have to guarantee how weak the different public policies actually are, particularly those applied to ensure, on the one hand, the efficiency of the main actions that governments should largely have to implement in response to the different capacities capable of actually changing the patterns and inconsistencies that persist in most of these institutions, which, for example, end up becoming engines that strongly promote high levels of inconsistencies inconsistencies that are in fact implausible and not aligned with the objectives sought in most of their institutions, in response to the possible strengthening, which is plausible in itself, of the different levels of inclusion of policy in general.

However, both political centralisation, especially in unitary countries, and the exclusion of different public policies tend to a large extent to promote strong links between the inability to implement public policies and the inability of the criteria that nevertheless define the strong functioning of governmental capacity as the main and greatest instrument capable of influencing the different strategies that have to do with the plausible formation of dual societies. Thus, most dual societies end up being, in fact, a goal that, in the short term, most institutions and most governments tend to pursue as the main goal capable of actually introducing very profound changes and transformations. However, these transformations may, on the other hand, still have to do with factors related to politics and the economy itself. In particular, most economies' policy makers tend to have to make decisions that, for the most part, do not provide for a plausible strengthening of the economy itself and governance itself, in particular. Thus, most short- and medium-term objectives, according to the evidence, cannot in fact be achieved, even though there are strong reasons that can naturally contribute to ensuring a plausible affirmation of the capacity for transformation on the part of most

institutions that in fact present these same characteristics in particular. Both governance and the types of institutions themselves tend, on the other hand, to show a lack of strengthening in terms of how most governments are actually able to pursue the medium- and long-term objectives that are largely intended to be achieved by the governments of most poor countries and developing countries in particular. Poor countries tend to exhibit these characteristics, which are caused by vicious circles due, on the one hand, to certain other factors that, from a structural point of view, are relevant to the assertion that their governments should focus on the main decisions that have been relevant to ensuring, for example, plausible and sustainable growth in most countries where, in fact, the capacities, both inclusion and non-inclusion, nevertheless end up diverging significantly. However, these divergences have, on the other hand, other major plausible factors that, from a structural point of view, are in fact not relevant to promoting greater affirmation in the context of uncertainty.

However, unlike vicious circles, virtuous circles tend to consistently promote greater efficiency and effectiveness in terms of economic growth and plausible growth, which has to do with the formation of dynamics capable of altering and promoting profound and significant changes. However, these changes initially accompany the dynamics of both institutions and the dynamics of the desired level of development itself, as most evidence suggests. For example, countries that for decades were strongly characterised by virtuous circles managed to promote high standards of efficiency and inclusive sustainable growth. the inclusion of sustainability in most of these societies was linked to factors promising development and factors promising sustainable and inclusive growth, as most evidence in developing countries tends to prove.

Thus, the virtuous circle systematically converges towards strengthening the medium- and long-term dynamics that are particularly relevant to its growth. On the other hand, in most of this evidence, there are strong reasons that actually contribute to the issue that has to do with economic stability and political stability in particular, for example, economic and political stability, which is the main factor that actually helps to contribute to establishing, in particular, the levels of their inability to promote strong changes. These should also have to translate into some degree of efficiency with regard to the establishment itself of some other factors, such as the type of policy to be implemented by most policy makers, as policy makers are in fact the main decision-makers of the destinies of a large part of societies, as the approach of poor countries may in fact suggest. Thus, most countries where extreme poverty is still significant naturally have, on the other hand, other factors capable of contributing to and leading most of these countries to significant failure and without any real prosperity, based above all on the fact that a large part of these countries should have adopted a significant set of policies, above all in order to be able to drive their own plausible growth in particular.

3. Potentiators that Strengthen Breaking Vicious Circles

Naturally, there are certain specific enablers that contribute both to strengthening institutions and to strengthening the distinct capacities of their societies to be able to guarantee certain particularities that, on the one hand, are in fact plausible with the objectives that are initially intended, that is, both in the short term and in the medium and long term. In most cases, the medium and long-term objectives may naturally diverge. this divergence arises mainly due to aspects that have largely to do with the non-partisanship of these institutions and governance in power, which can in fact plausibly guarantee a degree of growth that is, on the other hand, relevant and important, for example, in the transformations necessary for the transformations to be, in fact, above average and, on the other hand, the main drivers capable of generating, in the medium to long term, a degree of resilience and a degree of political prosperity. However, prosperity depends in fact on factors such as political inclusion by a large part of governments and the dynamics of inclusion. Thus, some countries do in fact have a significantly slow dynamic of inclusion. This particularity is due to the fact that most of these countries are naturally unable to guarantee high standards of economic and political prosperity, which is in fact necessary to promote, on the one hand, certain standards of consistency and resilience in particular. However, these distinct characteristics show that they may

in fact be largely misaligned with the objectives that they intend and intended to achieve in the short and medium term. Fiscal policy itself has a significant set of enablers capable of promoting medium- and long-term objectives more efficiently and effectively. On the other hand, these enablers have been characterised as the main basic conditions for leveraging the levels of growth and prosperity of most developing governments. In fact, when these enablers are applied, they translate into powerful mechanisms capable of changing the economic structure and growth structure of societies themselves. There is, of course, another strong reason that promotes the reduction of dual societies based on these enablers. When there is truly inclusive and sustainable growth, economies and societies tend to promote both economic and political integration and consistently tend to promote, through inclusion, significant growth that actually helps and contributes to strengthening the very dynamics of these societies, enabling them to demonstrate greater plausible resilience from the outset, according to the evidence and characteristics of a large part of developing societies. Thus, dual societies emerge from the plausible contribution of a large part of countries in being able to ensure that there is a significant set of dynamics that has greater applaudable relevance, which has to do above all with the way in which most both countries and institutions must initially promote some significant changes that may still affect the way in which most public policies should and may in fact have to contribute to the plausible establishment of these same dual societies. Thus, a policy that is consistent and resilient with medium- and long-term objectives tends to be one that favours long-term inclusive sustainable growth and lasting sustainable growth. Lasting sustainable growth, on the other hand, has strong characteristics that naturally help to strengthen the degree of development necessary to establish lasting sustainable growth from the outset.

Thus, a fiscal policy that may initially favour increased public spending on education, for example, ends up being a medium- and long-term goal to be pursued by political authorities in the short term. On the other hand, short-term policies whose objectives can in fact be achieved in the medium term in terms of investment in education tend, on the other hand, to favour greater access to capital-intensive training capacity on the part of policy makers. However, public spending on education is still the main objective pursued by policy makers as the main tool for ensuring that most of the basic conditions that can and should provide high standards of growth and resilience are in place, particularly those related to factors that tend to ensure a degree of efficiency in the implementation of public education policies. High levels of spending on education, research and development are nevertheless the biggest driver for policy makers to naturally ensure high standards of growth and high standards of economic and political resilience. There may naturally be high standards of correlation between expenditure channelled into education, research and development and the educational policies implemented in response to the different capacities of these infrastructures, which must in fact guarantee, with some plausible relevance, strong reasons that can actually introduce and promote high standards of significant change in a context of uncertainty. Naturally, many countries are able to guarantee high standards of development and institutional growth in a context of uncertainty by naturally applying a set of response capabilities that largely end up pursuing the objectives sought by key policymakers. For the most part, policy makers tend to make and channel non-priority expenditures that largely exacerbate fiscal inefficiency and the inefficiency of different educational policies. These must have some plausible relevance and significant long-term effects, as evidence can indeed contribute to this type of inefficiency in general.

Countries that tend to allocate public spending on education correctly, on the other hand, are able to translate this into a higher degree of efficiency, which is plausible given the way in which these particularities can still influence and determine the overall education system in terms of the objectives that policy makers largely seek to guarantee and fulfil. In line with education and development spending, infrastructure levels themselves contribute significantly to making it easier to break vicious circles. these particularities may also be aligned with the state of indebtedness of developing societies and of a large number of countries that naturally lag significantly behind in terms of their economic and educational structure in particular. In line with education expenditure as a relevant and predominant factor in ensuring, on the one hand, alignment between what policy

makers want and short-, medium- and long-term objectives. On the other hand, increased education spending may also have to be related to some other factors, such as those that can in fact lead most societies towards the eradication of dual societies and, on the other hand, put an end to the plausible incapacity of institutions to, for example, build a significant network that can, on the other hand, promote some relevant factors capable of altering the different capacities that naturally have to do with the way in which most policy makers should initially pursue the main objectives sought by a large majority of these societies in response to the capacities for transformation that they initially tend to present in response to the different capacities that they may, on the other hand, have to contribute in a plausible way. Some countries that have consistently broken the vicious circles present, for example, a strong particularity related to the fact that these economies in particular have channelled most of their education spending as a strategic tool that, in the short term, could in fact have had a significant influence on strengthening the levels of leverage of technology in particular. Most of these countries managed to leverage industry with a set of technologies coming particularly from universities. Thus, the examples of China and other emerging economies such as India clearly demonstrate this significant feature. On the other hand, breaking vicious circles largely involves a strong correlation between medium- and long-term expenditure adopted by the authorities. However, the expenditure adopted by the authorities in the long term has managed to distinguish itself from other expenditure, which was largely associated with strengthening both the economy and industrialisation in particular, as most of this evidence tends to show.

However, democracy is another relevant factor that promotes higher standards of prosperity in line with the formation of dual societies existing in most poor and developing countries. However, non-democratic societies have consistently tended to show democratic incapacity, which is naturally the main factor in social exclusion and exclusion from key public policies, which are mainly associated with the failure of political institutions in general.

4. Conclusion

Breaking vicious circles continues to be the main obstacle in most poor governments in developing countries, such as most African countries. The vicious circles that have persisted for decades are precisely those whose continued existence is naturally linked to high levels of private interests, most of which tend to promote significant control over the economy and democracies. democracies controlled by a set of vicious circles naturally tend to promote political stagnation and economic stagnation in most economies. However, political stagnation as a factor in the exclusion of vicious circles has other objectives, which nevertheless naturally contribute to the strengthening of poverty promoted by politics and democracy. Poverty promoted by democracies and non-inclusive policies tends, on the other hand, to present an implausible relationship between the respective democracies and politics itself. When countries pursue different objectives, they do not guarantee that these vicious circles will be broken and, consequently, that political and democratic inclusion will emerge, which is naturally associated with the main objectives to be achieved in the short term, in particular most of the objectives and results sought by the majority of policy-makers. Thus, when policy makers pursue objectives that are not aligned with governance capacity and medium- and long-term growth capacity, these policy makers naturally tend not to promote and leverage high standards that could, for example, break these circles. Naturally, breaking vicious circles may still have to be related to some plausible factors, such as those related to democracy itself. However, democracies that are not consistently inclusive cannot in fact be aligned with long-term objectives, such as those that mainly involve strategic and political tools capable of generating strong levels of inclusive transformation.

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