

Article

Not peer-reviewed version

---

# Writing from the Body to Understand Nasty Rhetoric: Hate, Threats and Violence in Swedish Climate Politics

---

[Fredrik von Malmberg](#) \*

Posted Date: 22 October 2024

doi: 10.20944/preprints202409.0960.v3

Keywords: Climate politics; democracy; embodiment; emotions; far-right populism; hate; nasty politics; neoliberalism; threats; vertical temporality; vulnerability; writing differently



Preprints.org is a free multidiscipline platform providing preprint service that is dedicated to making early versions of research outputs permanently available and citable. Preprints posted at Preprints.org appear in Web of Science, Crossref, Google Scholar, Scilit, Europe PMC.

Copyright: This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

## Article

# Writing from the Body to Understand Nasty Rhetoric: Hate, Threats and Violence in Swedish Climate Politics

Fredrik von Malmberg

Division of Political Science, Dept. of Management & Engineering, Linköping University, SE-581 83 Linköping, Sweden; fredrik.von.malmberg@liu.se. Phone: +46 13 28 40 54.

**Abstract:** In this paper I dig deep down along the slope of what touches me deeply – a democratic decline in climate politics with increasing use of hateful and threatening rhetoric – nasty rhetoric. I follow the course of critical researchers in management and organization studies, striving to move away from traditional, horizontal norms of academic writing that elision the author from the text, to-wards a more vertical writing incorporating the voice of the author. Embodying and resonating with my own emotional experiences of far-right hate and threat campaigns, I qualitatively analyze written, spoken and visual material from newspapers, magazines, blogs, podcasts, photos, vid-eos, television, radio and social media, to understand the nature of nasty rhetoric in Swedish climate politics, and the implications thereof for democracy. A far-right populist nativist party is currently holding tangible powers, dictating the ambitions, content and process of Swedish climate politics. In less than two years, Swedish climate politics have turned into an antidemocratic divisive politics portraying climate science as “a point of view”, female climate journalists as “moron hags” that should be “fired” and “raped”, and the climate justice movement as “terror-ists” and “a threat to Swedish democracy” that should be “sent to prison” and “executed”. Nasty rhetoric is used not only by anonymous trolls in social media, but openly by the prime minister, cabinet ministers and parliamentarians. Their use of nasty rhetoric aims to silence the opponents to the current paradigm shift in Swedish climate policy, breaching democratic norms such as legitimacy, accountability and justice, but also to mobilize followers and expand their hate and threats. The opposition is also using nasty rhetoric, but of a less aggressive nature, to reveal far-right populist climate policy and politicians as a naked emperor. Nasty rhetoric is a powerful tactic to mobilize more offenders, while leaving its targets with fear and anxiety and a need for disappearance from public debate. Many targets resign or stay silent, negatively affecting pluralistic debates and the scrutiny of power in democracies. I chose to break the silence and write differently to increase our knowledge of the phenomenon of nasty rhetoric.

**Keywords:** Climate politics; democracy; embodiment; emotions; far-right populism; hate; nasty politics; neoliberalism; threats; vertical temporality; vulnerability; writing differently.

## 1. Introduction

*In an instant I was a targeted foe Hated and threatened*

Studying the agency of policy entrepreneurs in Swedish climate policymaking, I identified systematic use of hatred and threats towards different opponents in the rhetoric of the right-wing government and its supporters (von Malmberg, 2024a). It is not only a tactic of the anonymous far-right movement but also of leading politicians, including the prime minister (PM), to use hate and threats to delegitimize and dehumanize climate activists, climate scientists and climate journalists (von Malmberg, 2024b, 2024c). A leading Swedish newspaper recently described Swedish climate politics as “a musty rant with accusations of betrayal, sin and devil pacts”. This is a dangerous phenomenon – for the persons targeted and for democracy.

Given the rise of such ‘nasty rhetoric’ (Zeitsoff, 2023), this paper aims at digging deeper along the slope of what touches me deeply – a democratic decline in climate politics – a wicked problem that needs strong democracy to be governed – and a democratic decline in Sweden more generally. Writing differently, embodying emotions triggered by hate and threats I received myself, I explore


and explain the nature of nasty rhetoric in Swedish climate politics, addressing the following research questions:

- Who uses nasty rhetoric, in what forms and in which forums?
- Who is targeted?
- Why is nasty rhetoric used?
- Is there a difference in form and purpose depending on who is using nasty rhetoric?
- What are the implications of nasty rhetoric for democracy?

The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 presents the theory of nasty politics and rhetoric, including previous research on its use in climate politics. Section 3 presents the method and material used to analyze nasty rhetoric in the case of Swedish climate politics, including the context of the case study. As part of the method and material used, section 3 also reflects on how to write academically about nasty rhetoric. Sections 4–7 are the key sections of the paper, making up a story of better understanding the phenomenon of nasty rhetoric. Section 4 presents emotionally my own experiences of nasty rhetoric. Sections 5 and 6 present, analyze and discuss the results of the case study: Here's what I found going back to understand the nature of nasty rhetoric in Sweden. Section 7 draws conclusions and presents actions to take: Here's what the analysis might mean in the future.

## 2. Theory of nasty rhetoric

The phenomenon of hate and threat rhetoric targeting oppositional politicians, scientists, journalists and activists in Swedish climate politics has recently got a name in social science literature – nasty politics and nasty rhetoric. *Nasty politics* is an “umbrella term for a set of tactics that politicians can use to insult, accuse, denigrate, threaten and in rare cases physically harm their domestic opponents” (Zeitsoff, 2023, p. 6). *Nasty rhetoric*, central to nasty politics, is characterized by divisive and contentious rhetoric with insults and threats containing elements of hatred and aggression that entrenches polarization and ‘us vs. them’ narratives, designed to denigrate, deprecate, delegitimize, dehumanize and hurt their target(s) to make them silent (Kalmoe et al., 2018). Zeitsoff (2003) has proposed a typology of nasty rhetoric (Figure 1).



**Figure 1.** Typology of nasty rhetoric. Based on Zeitsoff (2023).

### 2.1. Nasty Rhetoric and Far-Right Populism

## 2.2. Nasty Rhetoric and Emotional Governance

## 2.3. Nasty Rhetoric in Climate Politics

### 3. Method and Materials

#### 3.1. Qualitative Case Study

This paper analyzes the nature of nasty rhetoric, with a focus on climate politics. I will address questions like: What does it mean? Who is using it and in which forums? Who is targeted? Why is it used? Is there a difference in types of hate and threat and forums used between different groups of users? What are the implications for democracy?

I do this in a qualitative case study of Sweden, chosen since the use of nasty rhetoric has skyrocketed in only a few years, linked to a recent far-right turn of Swedish politics entrenching a populist 'us vs. them' polarization of Swedish climate politics (von Malmberg, 2024a). I will analyze the use of nasty rhetoric by politicians and their supporters from all quarters, climate advocates and climate sceptics, as found in written texts, photos and audio-visual material. To enhance the understanding of the phenomenon, I will also use my own experiences as a target of nasty politics. The study focuses primarily on the use of nasty rhetoric from early 2022 and onwards, when it became a topic in Swedish media.

##### 3.1.1. Far-Right Populist Takeover

##### 3.1.2. From Climate Policy Role Model to International Scapegoat

Sweden used to be considered an international role model in climate policy (Matti et al., 2021), advocating high ambitions in global and EU climate governance as well as nationally. In 2017, the Swedish Riksdag adopted with support of all parties but SD a new climate policy framework, including:

- A. A target that Sweden should have net-zero emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 2045;
- B. A Climate Act, stating among other things that the government shall present to the Riksdag a Climate Action Plan (CAP) with policies and measures to reach the targets, at the latest the calendar year after national elections; and
- C. Establishment of the *Swedish Climate Policy Council* (SCPC), an independent and interdisciplinary body of climate scientists, to evaluate the alignment of the government's policies with the 2045 climate target.

Sweden's GHG emissions in total decreased by approximately 37% from 1990 to 2022 and a decoupling of emissions and economic growth began in 1992, when Sweden introduced carbon dioxide taxation. This long-term trend of emissions reductions was halted when the Tidö government supported by SD entered office. They advocated a radical change of Swedish climate policy and governance. SD has long since been vocal as a climate change denier (Jylhä et al., 2020; Vihma et al., 2021), wanting to abort national climate targets and climate policies. SD is culturally and cognitively motivated by conflicting 'evil' beliefs of previous governments for decades, both S-led and M-led. Like other European far-right populist parties, SD is mobilizing a 'cultural war' on climate change, making climate policy less ambitious (Buzogány & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2022; Marquardt et al., 2022; Cunningham et al., 2024). Climate policy was purposefully included in the Tidö Agreement by SD, opening a window of opportunity for SD to dictate and veto the government's climate policy. Bargaining on finalizing the CAP, SD now accepts the 2045 target but managed to reduce overall climate policy ambitions by deleting short- and medium-term targets and actions important for reaching long-term targets. The Tidö quartet focuses entirely on emission reductions by 2045, ignoring climate science saying that reducing every ton of GHG emitted from now to 2045 is what counts (Lahn, 2021).

Tidö climate policy can be characterized as anti-climate action with increased GHG emissions. The CAP was welcomed by the *Confederation of Swedish Enterprise* (CSE) and its neoliberal thinktank *Timbro*, but heavily criticized domestically by the political op-position, climate scientists, economists,

government authorities, the environmental and social justice movement, business associations other than CSE, citizens and editorial writers in leading national newspapers for its lack of short- and medium-term domestic action, manipulation of information, and a large focus on new nuclear power and cli-mate compensation in other countries. SCPC (2024) and Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (2024) claimed that Tidö policies lead to increases of annual GHG emissions, corresponding to more than 10 % of Sweden’s total annual emissions, and that the CAP will not suffice for Sweden to reach the target on climate neutrality by 2045, nor Sweden’s responsibilities in relation to EU’s 2030 climate target.

In critique of Tidö climate policy, three out of four parties in the Riksdag opposition (C, MP and V) tabled a motion of non-confidence, calling for the setting aside of climate minister Romina Pourmokhtari (L) for failing to deliver policies that reduce GHG emissions. The critique towards Pourmokhtari also refers to the fact that she herself promised to resign if Sweden does not meet Swedish and EU climate targets – which it will not. In addition, more than 1 350 critical L-politicians from local and regional levels demanded the resignation of Pourmokhtari because she and L gave way to SD’s influence over the CAP, implying crossing several red lines of L’s party program and ideology. When the Riksdag voted, the critics did not gather enough support to set Pourmokhtari aside.

Besides domestic criticism, Tidö climate policies were criticized also internation-ally, claiming that Sweden is losing its role as climate policy frontrunner and risk dragging the EU down with it. The European Commission has rejected Sweden’s ap-plication for SEK 40 billion funding from the EU Recovery Fund since Sweden will meet neither national nor EU climate targets for 2030.

3.2. Materials

3.3. Reflections on Academic Writing

3.4. Embodying Emotions to Enhance the Understanding of Nasty Rhetoric

4. My Emotions and Vulnerabilities Embodied

5. Exploring Nasty Rhetoric in Swedish Climate Politics

5.1. Nasty Rhetoric of the Tidö Parties and Climate Sceptics

5.1.1. Insults

5.1.2. Accusations

5.1.3. Intimidations

The third level of nasty rhetoric advocates economic and/or legal action against an opponent, e.g., that they should be fired, be investigated or sent to prison. Intimidations are mainly directed to climate activists, suggesting stronger state repression, but also towards climate scientists and journalists (Table 4).

Table 4. Intimidations.

Sender	Channel	Target	Rhetoric	Context
Tobias Andersson (SD), chair of the Riksdag’s industry committee, Johan	Debates in the Riksdag, interviews in newspapers	Climate activists performing roadblocks at demonstrations	Climate activists are “saboteurs” to be “charged with sabotage, not disobedience	Response to climate activist roadblocks



Forsell (M), minister of migration			to law enforcement”.	
Justice minister Gunnar Strömmer (M)	Interviews in newspapers, debates in the Riksdag	Climate activists performing roadblocks at demonstrations	“Climate activists should be sentenced to long periods in prison.”	Response to climate activist roadblocks
Martin Kinnunen (SD), climate policy spokesperson	Press conference on SCPC annual report	Climate scientists, SCPC	“I will make sure your mandate is revised.”	Response to critique of SCPC and climate scientists on the Tidö government’s climate policy
Gustav Boëthius, former gas supply coordinator at Swedish Energy Agency	Text messages	New gas supply coordinator at Swedish Energy Agency, privately in Mother Rebellion	Do as I say, or you will be fired. I know people in the government.	Indignation over being fired from Swedish Energy Agency due to misconduct
Civil defence minister Carl- Oskar Bohlin (M)	X/Twitter	Climate activist engaged in Mother Rebellion	Important that measures are taken to ensure that something like this never happens again	Response to news articles on climate activist working at Swedish Energy Agency, after calling the Director General of the Agency
Minister of education and research Mats Persson (L)	Interview in public service television	Climate scientists	“Scientists’ climate activism undermines public trust in science.”	Comment on climate actions of Scientist Rebellion
Anonymous far- right climate deniers	E-mail	Climate journalists	“Damn you, I pay your salary and will make sure you’re fired.”	Critique towards public service reports on climate change

In spring 2024, the intimidation towards climate activists was further accentuated when the chair of the Riksdag industry committee, Tobias Andersson (SD), deliberately walked across a banner of climate activists, including Greta Thunberg, demonstrating and blocking the entrance to the Riksdag (Figure 2). The situation was filmed and posted on an SD-related YouTube channel (Video showing Tobias Andersson (SD) intimidating Greta Thunberg and other climate activists. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZlBy2uc6JuU&t=2s>), showing how Andersson redirects his steps when identifying Greta Thunberg in an act of showing power, that he owns her.



**Figure 2.** Tobias Andersson (SD) intimidating Greta Thunberg and other climate activists.

Climate scientists and public service journalists are often intimidated with threats of getting fired since they are often paid by taxpayers' money. Journalists scrutinizing the actions of the far-right movement related to climate activists are also seriously harassed, starting with insults but rapidly expanding to accusations or intimidations. An SD-related media person attacked a male journalist in an interview, where part of the interview was posted on social media and set in motion a hate drive:

"You are a showman, an idiot, a dishonest person, a political activist. There is no reason for me to be serious with you. The only way I can treat you is to fool around. I will post this conversation just so you know."

#### 5.1.4. Incitements

#### 5.1.5. Physical Violence

### 5.2. *Nasty Rhetoric of the Opposition and Climate Advocates*

The data reveals that climate scientists and activists as well as journalists are also using nasty rhetoric, in response to how they perceive of Tidö climate policy. A significant difference is that climate advocates only use insults and accusations of a rather mild kind.

#### 5.2.1. Insults

#### 5.2.3. Accusations

## 6. Understanding Nasty Rhetoric in Climate Politics

Data from the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ, 2023a) shows that about one third of politically elected representatives at local, regional and national level were targeted by hate and threats during the election year 2022, mainly via social media. Almost 70 % of these were exposed more than once. Women and young people and representatives of MP are targeted more often than others. In most cases the perpetrators were anonymous, but if identifiable, they were usually angry middle-aged men often related to the far-right (extremist) movement. In addition to C and MP politicians as targets, hate and threats targeting climate scientists, climate journalists and particularly climate activists have increased since the Covid-19 pandemic. Several people active in the climate debate testify that hatred and threats have increased even more since the national

elections in 2022. Hate crimes related to climate change is not yet a category in Swedish statistics and hate crime surveys (BRÅ, 2023b).

### 6.1. *How is Nasty Rhetoric Used?*

### 6.2. *Why is Nasty Rhetoric Used?*

#### Fear of system critique

Obviously, the highest representatives of Tidö parties as well as CSE and Timbro regard strong climate policy, requiring green economic and industrial transition, and climate activists as threats. Climate activists formulate system criticism based on climate science calling for a just transition (Evans & Phelan, 2016; Wang & Lo, 2021). Tidö parties' response is to demonize and delegitimize non-violent climate activists "a threat to democracy", "totalitarian forces" or simply "terrorists" to be "sent to prison" and "executed". Such accusations, intimidations and incitements are not a matter of isolated occasions, and it cannot be considered innocent mistakes. The words come from the highest-ranking politicians, including the PM, whose rhetoric agitates that climate activists really are a threat to democracy.

But when Nazis attacked participants in an antifascist meeting in a Stockholm suburb with fist fights and spray cans, the same politicians were not as sharp in their words. Contrary to the political opposition, Tidö leaders did not take the words Nazi or far-right extremists in their mouths. The PM did not mention the perpetrators at all but spoke sweepingly about how "an attack on a democratic meeting is an attack on our entire democracy". When another Nazi attack targeting the premises of V occurred in late summer 2024, neither the PM nor any other minister commented the hate crime. They were silent. The situation was similar when it was revealed that SD party leader Åkesson invited the president of a criminal MC gang to his recent wedding. The PM didn't dare to criticize him, even though the PM as well as Åkesson have stated that the actions of criminal gangs in Sweden can be equated with terrorism.

How come that we have a political climate in Sweden where Tidö politicians talk of climate activists as if they were Nazis, but not about Nazis as... Nazis? I want to believe that these politicians know that climate activists are not dangerous to Swedish citizens, that their actions of civil disobedience are not threatening our democracy. The only threat they pose is to expose the failures of Tidö and previous governments to embark on the just transition journey, and to form opinion for what possibly scares politicians and transition averted business more than appearing bad: an economic and political system that must change fundamentally.

That Greta Thunberg has gone from pet peeve to pariah among Tidö parties, CSE and Timbro and other climate sceptics is no coincidence. The change follows a sharpening of the climate activists' message – economic degrowth (Heikkurinen, 2021). It is about the realization that the whole economic system of today is wrongly inverted (Bailey et al., 2011; Davidson, 2012). An insight transformed into a critique of the neoliberal economic system and its focus on free markets and economic growth (Euler, 2019; Khmara & Kronenberg, 2020). In addition, a critique of the hegemonic (neo)liberal democratic system with its increasing focus on restricted and competitive participation, as opposed to a more deliberative and inclusive ecological democracy (Pickering et al., 2020; von Malmberg, 2024a). Degrowth and a resulting perceived intrusion upon their dominant status in society is what right-wing and far-right politicians painting a threatening picture of climate activists are afraid of. Instead of answering the degrowth narrative with good arguments in a public debate, Tidö politicians use nasty rhetoric to silence the outgroup.

A similar fear of system critique, Olof Palme's attacks on neoliberal economics and libertarian political philosophy as threats to the welfare state, and Annie Lööf's socio-liberal views on migration policy, made Swedish right-wing and far-right politicians in M, KD, SD and AfS and their supporters paint pictures that Palme and Lööf stood for something evil. For this, they should be punished – silenced:

"There shall be only One Truth!"



### 1.1.1. Libertarian and far-right populism

This fear is also why neoliberal and libertarian thinktanks such as *Atlas Network* and Timbro have orchestrated lobbying in Sweden and world-wide (The Atlas Network: Big Oil, Climate Disinformation and Constitutional Democracy. Research Seminar, University of Technology Sydney, 8 December 2023. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tIQOw6qpblY>), financed by the oil and gas industry, to initiate climate denying movements and cast doubt on climate science and climate policy, influence politicians, and attack climate activists (Ekberg & Pressfeldt, 2022; Walker, 2023). The current Swedish PM and minister of justice, both from M, worked at Timbro when the campaigning started. The former CEO of Timbro, responsible for nasty rhetoric towards climate activists and journalists, was recently appointed Swedish minister of development aid and trade. Eight other Tidö ministers, including the climate minister, were educated at the Sture Academy, Timbro's cutting-edge education in libertarian ideology, politics and opinion formation. Timbro also approached SD to make them take on a sceptical position on climate change and climate policy.

Initially championing environmentalism, being an important ingredient in 'blood and soil' nationalist narratives, SD and other far-right populist parties began to deny climate change a decade or two ago. Based on a combination of anti-establishment rhetoric, knowledge resistance and emotional communication of doubt, industrial/breadwinner masculinities and ethnonationalism, SD is mobilizing a 'culture war' on strong climate policies (Hultman et al., 2019; Jylhä et al., 2020; Agius et al., 2021; Vihma et al., 2021; Vowles & Hultman, 2021a). They look back to a great national past during the oil-fueled record years of the 1950s and 60s, when men had lifelong jobs in industry and sole access to society's positions of power. It is mainly white older men that support SD and are climate sceptics (Vowles & Hultman, 2021a).

Accusing Swedish established media of being "climate alarmist propaganda centers" belonging to a "left-liberal conspiracy", SD and other nationalist right-wing groups built their own ecosystem of digital media news sites, blogs, video channels and anonymous troll accounts in social media, which did not have to relate to the rules of press ethics. Normalizing knowledge resistance and using nasty rhetoric were central to their strategy of structural policy entrepreneurship (von Malmberg, 2024a). And the tie between Tidö ministers and climate denying SD is tighter and stronger than the Tidö Agreement. At the center is Timbro and CSE, two of few organizations that welcomed Tidö low-ambition climate policies. Tidö climate governance, including nasty rhetoric, adheres not only to populism, but also libertarian neoliberalism. Many strategies and actions of far-right populists around the world ascend from libertarian philosophy and neoliberal economics and the 'There is no Alternative' narratives used to support it (Goldwag, 2017; Séville, 2017).

Timbro had a significant role also in the hate and threats targeting Olof Palme. In 1984, they published the book "Who is Olof Palme?" (Östergren, 1984), the most elaborate and offensive attack on Palme as a person and politician.

### 1.1.1. The emperor is naked

Contrary to nasty rhetoric of Tidö parties and the far-right movement, nasty rhetoric of the political opposition, climate activists and scientists does not aim to silence their opponents. They value pluralism and freedom of speech. Like Kamala Harris and Tim Walz are calling Donald Trump and J.D. Wance "weird", former party leaders of MP, Per Bolund and Märta Stenevi show with their accusations and the eye of a child that the PM and climate minister are "naked emperors" – that the Tidö quartet lack credible political reforms, no visions of building a climate neutral society. Tidö's response to the climate emergency is "Tourette-like tirades" about new nuclear power at upfront costs of about USD 30–60 billion and USD 1 000 in annual nuclear taxation per Swedish household. The nasty rhetoric of Bolund and Stenevi, an everyday call to laugh at the emperor's nakedness, can arouse broad popular engagement. This is indicated by the results of the 2024 EU elections, where Swedish left-wing and green parties more than doubled their votes compared to the national elections in 2022, collecting almost 25 % of the votes in total. SD dropped from 20.5% in the national elections to 13 % in the EU elections, for the first time ever getting reduced support in a nationwide election.

The main reason for the success of the red–green parties and decline of SD was the high interest in climate policy among the voters, ranking it as a top three issue in the elections (von Malmborg, 2024a).

### 6.3. *The Nature of Nasty Rhetoric*

#### 6.3.1. Nasty Rhetoric as a Double-Edged Sword

#### 6.3.2. Nasty Rhetoric as a Swarm of Instantants

### 6.4. *A Threat to Liberal Democracy*

According to Zeitzoff (2023), nasty rhetoric is divisive and contentious and includes insults and threats with elements of hatred and aggression that entrenches ‘us vs. them’ polarization, designed to denigrate, deprecate, hurt and delegitimize their target(s). As found in this study, nasty rhetoric is used by climate sceptic right-wing and far-right people to emotionally hurt their enemies, threatening them to silence.

In all, this study confirms but also adds to previous research on nasty politics, focusing on its implications for democracy (see Zeitzoff, 2023). When politicians view their opponents as traitors or illegitimate, they violate a core principle in liberal and deliberative democracy – pluralism of ideas (von Malmborg, 2024a). Uncivil disagreement between political opponents breeds general mistrust in politics (Mutz & Reeves, 2005). Previous studies tell that some politicians make these nasty appeals (i) to grab media attention and attention of targeted groups (Ballard et al., 2022), (ii) to be persuasive and strike an emotional chord and solidify ingroup members (Schulz et al., 2020; Dimant, 2023), and (iii) pave the way for democratic breakdown (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Zeitzoff (2023, p. 53) argues that nasty politics bear some positive effects to democracy since it provides a tactic for marginalized groups and politicians to exercise power, but that the negative impacts are more detrimental:

- It makes people more cynical of democracy and less willing to vote and participate;
- Politicians in power can use nasty politics as a tool to demonize their political rivals and stay in power, eroding the democracy in the process;
- An increase in nasty politics leads good politicians to choose not to run and to re-tire, and nastier politicians take their place; and
- Heightened nasty politics precedes actual political violence.

The latter three have been identified and described in this study. But the literature primarily focuses on nasty rhetoric between politicians and the silencing of politicians like Annie Lööf, who resigned as party leader and from all political assignments after years of steady-fast resistance against the haters – “They shouldn’t fucking win”. Anxiety and fear eventually made her fed up with politics, crying herself to sleep. It hooks onto what she and many other elected officials have been exposed to for many years by digital online warriors who hide behind their computer screens: “traitor”, “assassinate”, “kill”.

But Zeitzoff and other scholars do not analyze and problematize nasty rhetoric targeting activists, scientists and journalists. These groups have important roles in a liberal democracy. As argued below, nasty rhetoric leads good scientists, journalists and non-violent activists to silence, giving space to nastier people to take their place, eroding the democracy in the process.

#### 1.1.1. Silencing climate activists

Some climate activists use civil disobedience to protest governments’ lack of action to reduce GHG emissions (Berglund & Schmidt, 2020). Failure to understand such climate actions as a right to demonstrate is a mistake, in an antiliberal democratic direction where constitutional rights are at stake. The right to demonstrate is a central building block in every democratic society. It is protected in Swedish constitution and through several international conventions. Even civil disobedience is covered by the right to demonstrate if violence is not used.

Since 2020, 310 persons have been prosecuted in Swedish district courts for different crimes related to civil disobedience, some of them several times. Of these, 200 persons were convicted, mainly to fines or suspended sentence. In 2022, without change of legislation, prosecutors around

Sweden suddenly began to charge climate activists performing roadblocks at demonstrations for sabotage. Between summers 2022 and 2023, 25 persons were convicted for sabotage, some of which were sentenced to prison, but most were later acquitted in the Court of Appeal. Several climate activists felt that this change in the judicial system was an act of political commissioning following the campaigning and nasty rhetoric of leading SD and M politicians.

The new legal praxis in lower courts, cheered by the minister of justice, can be seen as a threat to human rights and freedom of demonstration. Swedish law professor Anna-Sara Lind considers, in an interview in Swedish newspaper *Dagens Arena*, the criminal classification of roadblocks as sabotage to be disproportionate. "Limitations of constitutional rights may only take place in the manner specified in the constitution", Lind says and specify that a "restriction may not extend so far that it constitutes a threat to the free formation of opinion". Categorizing roadblocks as sabotage gives the police the right to preventive interception of people without concrete criminal suspicions, and a person can be charged of sabotage for just planning a roadblock. This happened in the UK in July 2024, when several climate activists were sentenced to four years in prison for planning a roadblock in a Zoom meeting.

A similar development of increased state repression of climate activists is seen in other European countries, e.g. Austria, France, Germany, Spain and the UK. UN special rapporteur on environmental organizations' rights under the Aarhus Convention, Michel Forst, claims that "by categorizing environmental activism as a potential terrorist threat, by limiting freedom of expression and by criminalizing certain forms of protests and protesters, these legislative and policy changes contribute to the shrinking of the civic space and seriously threaten the vitality of democratic societies" (Forst, 2024, p. 11). But not all who perform roadblocks are considered terrorists. Think of farmers blocking highways in Europe and burning hay bales in Brussels months before the EU elections in June 2024. Some even destroy public buildings. They were not treated as terrorists but hailed as heroes by far-right populist politicians such as Marine le Pen and Victor Orbán. It's a matter of money and political clout.

In relation to state repression of climate activists in Sweden, Michel Forst recently criticized the Tidö government for its handling of a case where a person engaged in *Mother Rebellion* was fired from her job at the Swedish Energy Agency due to accusations and intimidations of her predecessor, right-wing media and minister for civil defence that she was a threat to Swedish national security. In a letter to the Swedish government, Forst states:

*"She appears to have been subjected to punishment, persecution and harassment because of her climate commitment and participation in peaceful environmental demonstrations. [...] In this time of climate emergency, I am gravely concerned that the government has deemed her participation in peaceful environmental protests a threat to national security. [...] I am also deeply concerned about minister Bohlin's public statements. Bohlin, as a minister in the Swedish government, has a responsibility under the Aarhus Convention to protect citizens' right to be active in environmental issues."*

Sentence to prison and getting fired are not the only retributions of climate activists. A young female climate activist being intimidated by SD at a FFF demonstration testifies how the hatred affected her:

*"They never said who they were but wanted to ask a few questions. I had no idea that they had evil intent. It was very naïve. [...] They had put on clown music and cut the interview so that I appeared stupid and ignorant. I felt extremely humiliated. The video had over 2,000 comments and the tone was very harsh and mocking. From fear that right-wing extremists would start harassing me, I didn't dare to respond to the comments."*

#### 1.1.1. Silencing climate journalists

Independent media plays an important role to raise awareness in societies, which is why the first actions of autocratizers are often directed against established media (Laebens & Lührmann, 2021). Attacks on public service and independent media can discourage critical scrutiny of power. When journalists are hated and threatened, it risks that investigations are not carried out and important facts are never published. Consequently, citizens lose important information. In Sweden, Tidö

parties, the far-right movement and other climate sceptics consider climate journalists in established media to belong to a left-liberal conspiracy censoring the climate debate and being climate alarmist propaganda centers. Public service journalists have experienced an increase of insults and incitement since 2019 when financing of Swedish public service changed from a license fee to taxation.

A widespread culture of silence and self-censorship has taken hold. In a recent survey by the Swedish Union of Journalists, as many as 39 % state that they engage in self-censorship to avoid hate and threats, 48 % that they have adapted their reporting for the same reason (Swedish Union of Journalists, <https://www.sjf.se/yrkesfragor/yttrandefrihet/hot-och-hat-mot-journalister>). A long-since female climate journalist testifies how the hate and threats affected her:

*“At the same time as I have carried out my assignment as a climate journalist, I have been in a storm of hatred, threats and insults. Lies about my person and alleged political affiliation have been glued to me. My feeling of powerlessness has been paralyzing at times. I have, to use an old-fashioned word, felt dishonored. Therefore, I have now resigned as a journalist.”*

Besides hate and threats targeting journalists, Tidö parties have recently reviewed the guidelines for public service, proposing that public service journalism in the future must be evaluated by external reviewers, and adapt the content to a certain type of populist political opinion, which goes against basic journalistic principles of impartiality, neutrality of consequences and truth-seeking (Bjereld, 2024). As a response, Swedish public service television and radio have decided not to keep their climate correspondents, effectively reducing the dissemination of information and knowledge about climate change and climate policy to Swedish citizens.

#### 1.1.1. Silencing climate journalists

Nasty rhetoric attacks on climate scientists are made to delegitimize individual researchers, but also to cast doubts on the scientific community and the role of science in providing knowledge for citizens, businesses, public authorities and politicians to make informed decisions. After being attacked, many researchers refrain from researching in areas that have become politically charged, and those who conduct research in such areas are often afraid to communicate their research results to the public. When scientists feel attacked and pressured by the far-right, it risks leading to perspectives that are considered controversial being weeded out. A Swedish professor of climate policy testifies how hatred and threats affected him:

*“I’ve received hate and threats for long. Being criticized in substance is part of being a researcher, that is what brings science forward. But being criticized in person, often related to conspiracy theories, is detrimental. Once, haters threatened to send a death squad to the university. The hatred and threats drain me of energy and to avoid it, I refrain from participating in the public discussion on climate policy.”*

Claims that climate science is “just an opinion” and that science based climate activism is “undermining public trust in science” invokes knowledge resistance (Strömbäck et al., 2022), that poses grave challenges for the functioning of liberal democracy, e.g. (i) citizens ability to evaluate public policy, hold politicians accountable and make informed votes (Wikforss, 2021), (ii) undermining democratic processes by corrupting political discussions (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Dahl, 1998), and (iii) undermine the legitimacy of the democratic system as such (Lago & Coma, 2017).

Many scientists have asked themselves how they can spread awareness about climate science results when political decision-makers are constantly ignoring warnings published in scientific journals, magazines and newspapers. Some have turned to climate activism within *Scientists Rebellion*. Such activism may be perceived as political. Then minister of education and research Mats Persson (L) claimed, contrary to scientific findings, that scientists' climate activism undermines trust in science and should be stopped. But such activism is based on scientific knowledge and well in line with the third duty of Swedish scientists according to the law on higher education: “Knowledge shall be disseminated about what experience and knowledge has been gained and about how these experiences and knowledge can be applied”. Swedish professor of philosophy of science, Harald A. Wilsche, argues that passive consent, non-activism, would be contrary to what is expected of Swedish scientists under Swedish law. One does not have to look far at history to see that science-based activism and civil disobedience have been instrumental in ending social injustices such as



discrimination, slavery, apartheid, and providing universal suffrage, and thereby in building our modern liberal society.

#### 1.1.1. It is the whole that worries

Swedish scholars of democracy (Rothstein, 2023; Silander, 2024; V-Dem Institute, 2024; von Malmborg, 2024a) as well as CRD and UNAS argue that the current developments in Swedish politics and society risk weakening Sweden's liberal democracy and may be another step in the process of gradual autocratization overseen by democratically elected but antidemocratic leaders. Tidö parties use democratic institutions to erode democratic functions, e.g. censoring media, imposing restrictions on civil society, harassing activists, protesting, and promoting polarization through disrespect of counterarguments and pluralism (Silander, 2024; V-Dem Institute, 2024; von Malmborg, 2024a). Even the editorial offices of Sweden's largest newspapers, independent liberal *Dagens Nyheter*, and Sweden's largest tabloid, independent social democrat *Aftonbladet*, are worried of the development, arguing that "Sweden is now taking step after step towards less and less freedom".

Autocratization is hard to identify since it often takes place gradually in democratic states (Sato et al., 2022). It is the sum of the decisions and the style of governance of il-liberal and anti-democratic actors that leads to defective democracies with increasingly illiberal characteristics (Lührmann et al., 2020; Mudde, 2021; Merkel & Lührmann, 2021). It is this whole that worries, or as stated by Merkel and Lührmann (p. 870), "if the illiberal virus persists long enough, it transforms the liberal dimension, polarizes the political space, and may affect the institutional core of democracies as well".

This concern of democracy experts made opposition and party leader Magdalena Andersson (S) write a critical op-ed in *Dagens Nyheter* six months after the Tidö government entered office, accusing the government of showing totalitarian tendencies:

*"Instead of a traditional government, we have a right-wing regime led by Sweden Democrats. A regime that uses its position of power to threaten and silence critical voices. /.../ The SD led government destroys what makes Sweden Swedish."*

Following this claim, 18 representatives of labor unions, civil society organizations and left-liberal thinktanks recently called in an op-ed for a commission to (i) appoint an inquiry with proposals to defend and strengthen democracy, (ii) protect the right to freedom of organization and assembly, and (iii) strengthen support for civil society and journalism.

Shortly after, 74 scientists, journalists and writers in Sweden, including myself, made an appeal in Sweden's largest newspaper that Swedish opinion leaders, including the Tidö government and the Riksdag, must take measures to end nasty rhetoric due its detrimental effects on democracy. The appeal includes 25 emotional testimonies embodying the emotions and vulnerabilities of the targets of nasty rhetoric. Many of us were threatened to silence but chose to raise our voice again in company of others, to stand the grounds for liberal democracy. We spoke also for those who continue to stay silent. Those who don't dare to speak of fear to be hated and threatened again.

Significant for the political climate in Sweden and the self-positioning of libertarians and far-right populists as morally superior, this call was immediately attacked by a leading Swedish libertarian YouTube influencer. Manipulating his 50K followers on Facebook, he claimed that we, the signatories, are "inflated prima donnas" performing a "Princess and the Pea coterie" being sad and call for political action to restrict freedom of speech because "some insults made us lose our privilege of interpretation". In his post, he ignored the testimonies of incitement, threats of assault and death. Our call for an end to nasty rhetoric was not about our privilege of interpretation, but about our dignity as human beings and more importantly about safeguarding basic norms and institutions in a liberal, pluralistic democracy.

## 7. Conclusions

### Epilogue

As a target of nasty rhetoric, fear and anxiety indeed made me silent for five years, but I also reacted with anger. I had a desire to talk about the decline of Swedish democracy and the nasty



aspects of Swedish climate politics. Not in a traditional way, because nasty politics is not traditional politics. Echoing the words of Sylvia Plath (1986), I had a desire to write differently, vulnerably, embodying my emotions to ease my mind:

*I write only because  
There is a voice within me  
That will not be still.*

Declarations

**Funding:** This research was funded by the Swedish Energy Agency (Grant No. P2022-00877).

**Data availability statement:** All data used comes from secondary sources, which are referenced either in Appendix A, footnotes or the reference list.

**Acknowledgments:** The author is grateful to Erika Bjerström and Prof. Åsa Wikforss for inspira-tion to end my silence and write from my body about nasty rhetoric, and to Dr. Jenny Helin and Prof. Kristina Fjelkestam for inspiration and valuable comments on writing differently. The author would like to thank the editor for valuable comments on previous drafts of the paper.

Appendix A

Table A1. Data sources.

Types of sources	Documents and audio-visual material analysed
Policy documents	<i>The Tidö Agreement: An agreement for Sweden</i> , 14 October 2022; <a href="https://www.liberalerna.se/wp-content/uploads/tidoavtalet-overenskommelse-for-sverige-slutlig.pdf">https://www.liberalerna.se/wp-content/uploads/tidoavtalet-overenskommelse-for-sverige-slutlig.pdf</a>
	<i>Tidö government's Climate Action Plan</i> , 2023; <a href="https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/990c26a040184c46acc66f89af34437f/232405900webb.pdf">https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/990c26a040184c46acc66f89af34437f/232405900webb.pdf</a>
	<i>Tidö government's energy and climate action plan to the EU</i> , 2024; <a href="https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/0b8182fb427d434caee89090457dab6f/sveriges-uppdaterade-nationella-energi--och-klimatplan-for-2021-2030.pdf">https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/0b8182fb427d434caee89090457dab6f/sveriges-uppdaterade-nationella-energi--och-klimatplan-for-2021-2030.pdf</a>
	<i>Constitutional committee scrutiny report on the government</i> , 2023; <a href="https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/A7ADEA2E-FDB8-4136-9484-809FE4C4BD2B">https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/A7ADEA2E-FDB8-4136-9484-809FE4C4BD2B</a>
	<i>Legislative Council report on secrecy on electricity support</i> , 2022; <a href="https://www.lagradet.se/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Sekretess-vid-Forsakringskassans-handlaggning-av-arenden-om-elstod-och-slop-ad-kontrolluppgiftsskyldighet.pdf">https://www.lagradet.se/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Sekretess-vid-Forsakringskassans-handlaggning-av-arenden-om-elstod-och-slop-ad-kontrolluppgiftsskyldighet.pdf</a>
	Information from the <i>Riksdag</i> on the motion on non-confidence against climate minister Pourmokhtari, 17 January 2024; <a href="https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/aktuellt/aktuelltnotiser/2024/jan/9/omrostning-om-misstroendeforklaring-mot-romina_cmsb96e46b0-deff-43b2-a12f-6a9c7e9c1480sv/">https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/aktuellt/aktuelltnotiser/2024/jan/9/omrostning-om-misstroendeforklaring-mot-romina_cmsb96e46b0-deff-43b2-a12f-6a9c7e9c1480sv/</a> ; <a href="https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/aktuellt/aktuelltnotiser/2024/jan/17/ingen-misstroendeforklaring-mot-klimat-och_cms402569eb-17b1-4da9-8b7a-1074371827aesv/">https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/aktuellt/aktuelltnotiser/2024/jan/17/ingen-misstroendeforklaring-mot-klimat-och_cms402569eb-17b1-4da9-8b7a-1074371827aesv/</a>
Political debates in the Riksdag	Party leader debate, 16 November 2022; <a href="https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/partiledardebatt/eu-politisk-partiledardebatt_hac120221116pd/">https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/partiledardebatt/eu-politisk-partiledardebatt_hac120221116pd/</a> Interpellation debate on Sweden's climate target for the transport sector, 11 November 2022; <a href="https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/sveriges-klimatmal-for-transportsektorn_ha104/">https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/sveriges-klimatmal-for-transportsektorn_ha104/</a>

---

Interpellation debate on policies for climate change mitigations, 6 December 2022; [https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/atgarder-for-att-na-klimatmalen\\_ha1039/](https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/atgarder-for-att-na-klimatmalen_ha1039/)

Interpellation debate on the government's climate action plan, 26 January 2023; [https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/klimathandlingsplanen\\_ha10112/](https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/klimathandlingsplanen_ha10112/)

Interpellation debate on negotiations on the climate action plan, 14 March 2023; [https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/forhandlingen-om-sveriges-klimathandlingsplan\\_ha10224/](https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/forhandlingen-om-sveriges-klimathandlingsplan_ha10224/)

Interpellation debate on green transition, 11 April 2023; [https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/den-grona-omstallningen-\\_ha10280/](https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/den-grona-omstallningen-_ha10280/)

Interpellation debate on measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 2022–2026, 2 June 2023; [https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/atgarder-for-att-minska-vaxthusgasutslappen-under\\_ha10322/](https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/atgarder-for-att-minska-vaxthusgasutslappen-under_ha10322/)

Interpellation debate on Sweden's national climate targets, 17 October 2023; [https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/sveriges-nationella-klimatmal\\_hb1044/](https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/sveriges-nationella-klimatmal_hb1044/)

Interpellation debate on repression against climate activists, 9 November 2023; [https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/atgarder-mot-klimataktivister\\_hb1074/](https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/atgarder-mot-klimataktivister_hb1074/)

Interpellation debate on the emission reduction trajectory of the climate action plan, 19 March 2024; [https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/klimathandlingsplanens-redovisade-utslappskurva\\_hb10538/](https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/klimathandlingsplanens-redovisade-utslappskurva_hb10538/)

Interpellation debate on railways – a climate issue, 12 April 2024; [https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/taget-en-klimatfraga\\_hb10654/](https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/taget-en-klimatfraga_hb10654/)

Interpellation debate on state support to civil society organizations, 3 May 2024; [https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/stod-till-civilsamhallet\\_hb10681/](https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/stod-till-civilsamhallet_hb10681/)

Interpellation debate on expectations on reduced greenhouse gas emissions, 14 May 2024; [https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/forvantningar-pa-minskade-utslapp-av-vaxthusgaser\\_hb10540/](https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/interpellationsdebatt/forvantningar-pa-minskade-utslapp-av-vaxthusgaser_hb10540/)

Government documents authorityInput from the *Swedish Environmental Protection Agency* to the government's climate policy report 2024; <https://www.naturvardsverket.se/49732a/globalassets/amnen/klimat/klimat-redovisning/naturvardsverkets-underlag-till-regeringens-klimatredovisning-2024.pdf>

Annual report 2024 of the *Swedish Climate Policy Council*; <https://www.klimatpolitiskaradet.se/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/klimatpolitiskaradetsrapport2024.pdf>

Annual report 2024 of the *Swedish Finance Policy Council*; <https://www.fpr.se/download/18.2d63770418f379d56435cd1/1714722716776/Svensk%20finanspolitik%202024.pdf>

Newspapers and magazines *Aftonbladet* (independent social democrat)

Op-ed, 19 May 2022, <https://www.aftonbladet.se/debatt/a/9KJB49/sd-slutas-kram-vara-barn-med-er-klimatangest>

Op-ed, 15 June 2023, <https://www.aftonbladet.se/debatt/a/3E78Ad/atta-forskare-klimatmotet-riskerar-bli-spel-for-gallerierna;>

Op-ed, 5 July 2023, <https://www.aftonbladet.se/debatt/a/5BwJJK/professor->

---

---

klimatforskare-maste-kunna-vara-aktivister  
 News article, 6 October 2023,  
<https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/O89GxO/pourmokhtari-stallde-in-mote-greenpeace-ilska>  
 Editorial, 22 November 2022,  
[https://www.aftonbladet.se/ledare/a/0QBb96/det-ar-sverigedemokraterna-som-ar-de-riktiga-extremisterna?utm\\_source=iosapp&utm\\_medium=share](https://www.aftonbladet.se/ledare/a/0QBb96/det-ar-sverigedemokraterna-som-ar-de-riktiga-extremisterna?utm_source=iosapp&utm_medium=share)  
 Editorial, 16 December 2023,  
<https://www.aftonbladet.se/ledare/a/l3qgky/vara-barn-kommer-att-se-pa-staten-som-ond>;  
 Op-ed, 16 January 2024, <https://www.aftonbladet.se/debatt/a/3E2vxL/1-350-debattorer-miljoministern-maste-avga-eller-avsattas>  
 Editorial, 9 February 2024,  
[https://www.aftonbladet.se/ledare/a/JQjA46/idiotiskt-att-stotta-bonderna-men-inte-klimataktivisterna?utm\\_source=iosapp&utm\\_medium=share](https://www.aftonbladet.se/ledare/a/JQjA46/idiotiskt-att-stotta-bonderna-men-inte-klimataktivisterna?utm_source=iosapp&utm_medium=share)  
 Editorial, 16 April 2024,  
<https://www.aftonbladet.se/ledare/a/O8vzzq/romina-pourmokhtari-erkanner-hon-duckar-journalister>  
 Editorial, 17 June 2024, [https://www.aftonbladet.se/ledare/a/xm4LE8/sa-vinner-oljebolagen-over-greta-thunberg?utm\\_source=iosapp&utm\\_medium=share](https://www.aftonbladet.se/ledare/a/xm4LE8/sa-vinner-oljebolagen-over-greta-thunberg?utm_source=iosapp&utm_medium=share)  
 Editorial, 25 July 2024, <https://www.aftonbladet.se/ledare/a/qPPxLO/fn-kritiserar-domen-mot-klimataktivisten>  
 Editorial, 22 August 2024,  
<https://www.aftonbladet.se/ledare/a/gwd82J/kristerssons-tystnad-ar-faktiskt-osmaklig>  
 Op-ed, 15 September 2024, <https://www.aftonbladet.se/debatt/a/B0yRJ7/17-organisationer-demokratin-i-sverige-ar-under-attack>  
*Aktuellt Hållbart* (independent, green business)  
 Editorial, 11 oktober 2023,  
[https://www.aktuellhallbarhet.se/miljo/miljopolitik/pourmokhtari-forsta-miljoministern-i-historien-som-inte-staller-upp-pa-en-intervju/\\_](https://www.aktuellhallbarhet.se/miljo/miljopolitik/pourmokhtari-forsta-miljoministern-i-historien-som-inte-staller-upp-pa-en-intervju/_)  
*Altinget* (independent)  
 Interview with Swedish minister of justice Gunnar Strömmer, 10 November 2023. <https://www.altinget.se/civilsamhalle/artikel/strommer-m-vill-se-haardare-domar-mot-klimataktivister>  
*Bloomberg* (business newspaper)  
 News article, 2 February 2023,  
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-02/transcript-zero-episode-25-meet-sweden-s-climate-minister?leadSource=uverify%20wall>  
*Dagens Arena* (independent progressive newspaper)  
 News article, 23 August 2023, <https://www.dagensarena.se/innehall/200-klimataktivister-domda-25-sabotage/>  
*Dagens ETC* (independent left)  
 News article, 24 June 2021, <https://www.etc.se/klimat-miljo/vag-av-hat-och-hot-mot-klimatjournalister>  
 News article, 26 August 2022, <https://www.etc.se/inrikes/haer-aer-sd-s-hemliga-trollarme-faar-order-av-aakesson>;  
 News article, 2 September 2022, <https://www.etc.se/inrikes/sd-toppen-styrde-trollarmen-gav-sig-paa-unga-under-klimatdemonstration>  
 Essay, 4 June 2024, <https://www.etc.se/story/saa-koepte-oljeaetten-exxon-inflytande-oever-moderaternas-miljoepolitik>  
 News article, 14 August 2024, <https://www.etc.se/klimat-miljo/erika-bjerstroem-svt-underskattar-publikens-intresse-foer-klimatjournalistik>

---

---

News article, 11 October 2024, <https://www.etc.se/klimat-miljo/sparkade-aktivisten-traeder-fram-jag-var-en-liten-bricka-i-ett-stoerre-spel>  
*Dagens Nyheter* (independent liberal)

News article, 26 August 2022, <https://www.dn.se/sverige/sa-sprids-hat-och-hot-mot-centerledaren-annie-loof/>

News article, 16 December 2022, <https://www.dn.se/sverige/annie-loof-jag-grater-nar-lampan-ar-slackt/>

News article, 14 June 2023, <https://www.dn.se/sverige/regeringens-klimatmote-vacker-fragor-i-forskarvarlden/>;

Op-ed, 22 September 2023. <https://www.dn.se/debatt/orimliga-straft-vantar-dem-som-deltar-i-klimataktioner/>

Op-ed, 11 December 2023. <https://www.dn.se/debatt/sverige-leds-just-nu-in-pa-vagen-mot-okad-autokrati/>

News article, 21 December 2023, <https://www.dn.se/sverige/ulf-kristersson-om-klimatet-karnkraft-viktigaste-atgarden/>

Editorial, 25 January 2024. <https://www.dn.se/ledare/sverige-tar-nu-steg-efter-steg-mot-allt-mindre-frihet/>

News article, 8 February 2024. <https://www.dn.se/sverige/kritik-mot-visitationszoner-oacceptabla-risker-for-diskriminering/>

News article, 11 April 2024, <https://www.dn.se/sverige/anna-ar-klimataktivist-blev-av-med-jobbet-pa-energimyndigheten>

News article, 16 April 2024, <https://www.dn.se/sverige/klimataktivist-anna-blev-av-med-jobbet-nu-ku-anmals-ministern-som-kontaktade-hennes-chef/>

News article, 25 May 2024, <https://www.dn.se/sverige/klimataktivist-blev-av-med-jobbet-fallet-anmals-till-jk/>

Op-ed, 20 May 2024, <https://www.dn.se/kultur/kjell-vowles-sd-trollar-ocksa-om-klimatet-nu-vill-de-riva-upp-eus-klimatpakt/>

Op-ed, 7 August 2024, <https://www.dn.se/debatt/darfor-kan-ordet-konstig-bli-det-som-faller-trump/>

Commentary, 12 August 2024, <https://www.dn.se/sverige/tomas-ramberg-mangmiljardfragan-ar-om-vi-alls-behover-ny-karnkraft/>;

Editorial, 13 August 2024, <https://www.dn.se/ledare/regeringens-karnkraftsplan-ar-en-enda-enorm-gladjekalkyl/>;

News article, 13 August 2024, <https://www.dn.se/ekonomi/expert-efter-karnkraftsbeskedet-tydligt-hur-dyrt-det-blir/>

Op-ed, 11 September 2024, <https://www.dn.se/debatt/sverige-har-blivit-tystare-och-sd-jublar/>

Op-ed, 22 September 2024, <https://www.dn.se/kultur/upprop-detta-maste-fa-ett-slut-for-demokratins-framtid/>

News article, 8 October 2024, <https://www.dn.se/sverige/fn-kritik-mot-sverige-for-fallet-anna-pa-energimyndigheten/>

Editorial, 11 October 2024, <https://www.dn.se/ledare/amanda-sokolnicki-har-vi-nagonsin-haft-en-raddare-statsminister/>

*Euractive* (independent, EU)

News article, 30 March 2023, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/swedish-right-wing-government-puts-country-on-wrong-climate-path/>

*Expressen* (independent liberal) <https://www.expressen.se/>

News article, 19 October 2016, <https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/sd-politik-styrs-dolt-av-klimatfornekare/>

News article, 2 December 2022, <https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/har-ar-sds-rotter-som-akesson-distanserat-sig-ifran/>

News article, 15 June 2022, <https://www.expressen.se/tv/nyheter/jan->

---

---

emanuels-likvideo-anvands-som-hot-mot-miljopartister/  
 Op-ed, 14 June 2023, <https://www.expressen.se/debatt/regeringens-klimatmote-framstar-som-ett-skamt/>  
 News article, 15 March 2024, <https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/sverige/sd-toppen-tobias-andersson-klev--pa-greta-thunbergs-banderoll/>  
*Fokus* (independent right-wing)  
 News article, 5 April 2024, <https://www.fokus.se/aktuellt/klimataktivist-anstalldes-pa-samhallskritisk-tjanst-i-energimyndigheten/>  
 Essay, 23 September 2024, <https://www.fokus.se/kronika/forolampningar-ar-inte-ett-hot-mot-demokratin/?purchaseCompleted=true>  
 News article, 8 October 2024, <https://www.fokus.se/aktuellt/fokus-avslojande-om-rebellmamman-har-lett-till-fn-kritik-mot-sverige/>  
*Fria Tider* (far-right populist)  
 News article, 29 August 2022, [https://www.friatider.se/klimataktivister-stoppar-ambulanser/](https://www.friatider.se/klimataktivister-stoppar-ambulanser;)  
*GöteborgsPosten* (independent liberal)  
 News article, 2024, <https://www.gp.se/politik/sd-kritiska-mot-klimatpolitiska-radet-ska-ses-over.e9469d5f-ec8b-4cb7-864b-68d51010c490>  
 Op-ed, 1 July 2023, <https://www.gp.se/debatt/m%C3%A5nga-avg%C3%B6rande-fr%C3%A5gor-saknas-i-regeringens-klimatpolitik-1.103017568;>  
*Landets Fria Tidning* (independent green)  
 News article, 20 August 2024, <https://landetsfria.nu/2024/nummer-513/nyforening-ska-ge-rattsligt-stod-till-klimataktivister/>  
*Le Monde* (independent liberal hum)  
 News article, 27 January 2024, [https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/01/27/sweden-is-moving-backward-on-climate-policy\\_6470373\\_4.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/01/27/sweden-is-moving-backward-on-climate-policy_6470373_4.html),  
*Magasinet Konkret* (independent liberal democratic)  
 Essay, 29 February 2024. <https://magasinetkonkret.se/visitationszoner-leder-till-rasism-och-fortryck/>  
 Essay, 13 March 2024, <https://magasinetkonkret.se/klimatroelse-hot-atlas-network/>;  
*Nyheter Idag* (far-right populist)  
 News article, 1 April 2022, <https://nyheteridag.se/jan-emanuel-ingrep-mot-klimataktivister-miljomuppar/>  
*Svenska Dagbladet* (independent conservative)  
 Essay, 30 August 2021, <https://www.svd.se/a/oWk7LK/palmehatet-exploderade-pa-1980-talet>  
 News article, 20 June 2022, [https://www.svd.se/a/8Qy7zd/jan-emanuels-video-kritiseras-vem-blir-klimathatets-nasta-offer](https://www.svd.se/a/8Qy7zd/jan-emanuels-video-kritiseras-vem-blir-klimathatets-nasta-offer;);  
 News article, 18 November 2022, [https://www.svd.se/a/JQOq4j/romina-pourmokhtari-lovar-avga-om-hon-inte-kan-sta-for-klimatpolitiken](https://www.svd.se/a/JQOq4j/romina-pourmokhtari-lovar-avga-om-hon-inte-kan-sta-for-klimatpolitiken;);  
 Commentary, 21 December 2023, <https://www.svd.se/a/3EneLP/torehammar-svek-och-djavulspakter-i-klimatpolitiken>  
 Interview with the chair of the SCPC, 21 December 2023, <https://www.svd.se/a/VPV2Al/klimatpolitiska-radet-klimatplanen-otillracklig>  
 Editorial, 4 April 2024, <https://www.svd.se/a/69ryGr/carl-oskar-bohlin-kalla-upp-energimyndigheten>  
*Tidningen Syre* (independent green liberal)  
 News article, 13 June 2022, <https://tidningensyre.se/2022/13-juni-2022/hogerextrem-infiltrationskampanj-mot-klimataktivister/>

---



---

	News article, 23 June 2023, <a href="https://tidningensy.se/2023/23-juni-2023/klimataktivist-det-kanns-som-att-lagforingen-ar-en-bestallning/">https://tidningensy.se/2023/23-juni-2023/klimataktivist-det-kanns-som-att-lagforingen-ar-en-bestallning/</a> , News article, 27 June 2023, <a href="https://tidningensy.se/2023/27-juni-2023/sd-kopplad-profil-avratta-aterstall-vatmarker-aktivister/">https://tidningensy.se/2023/27-juni-2023/sd-kopplad-profil-avratta-aterstall-vatmarker-aktivister/</a> News article, 27 June 2023, <a href="https://tidningensy.se/2023/27-juni-2023/hatkampanj-mot-syres-reporter/">https://tidningensy.se/2023/27-juni-2023/hatkampanj-mot-syres-reporter/</a> News article, 7 October 2023. <a href="https://tidningensy.se/2023/7-oktober-2023/ministrar-kritiserar-klimataktivist-de-stor-demokratin/">https://tidningensy.se/2023/7-oktober-2023/ministrar-kritiserar-klimataktivist-de-stor-demokratin/</a> Editorial, 11 February 2024. <a href="https://tidningensy.se/2024/11-februari-2024/extremhogerns-skeva-syn-pa-yttrandefrihet">https://tidningensy.se/2024/11-februari-2024/extremhogerns-skeva-syn-pa-yttrandefrihet</a> News article, 22 July 2024, <a href="https://tidningensy.se/2024/22-juli-2024/sverige-enda-land-som-inte-sokt-pengar-fran-eus-aterhamtningsfond/">https://tidningensy.se/2024/22-juli-2024/sverige-enda-land-som-inte-sokt-pengar-fran-eus-aterhamtningsfond/</a> <i>Östersunds-Posten</i> (independent liberal) Editorial, 23 August 2017, <a href="https://www.op.se/2017-08-23/oksanen-centerhatet-som-undergraver-svensk-borgerlighet">https://www.op.se/2017-08-23/oksanen-centerhatet-som-undergraver-svensk-borgerlighet</a> <i>Klägget</i> (independent power critical) Essay, 18 January 2024, <a href="https://klagget.nu/2024/01/18/sa-blev-sd-en-del-av-klagget/">https://klagget.nu/2024/01/18/sa-blev-sd-en-del-av-klagget/</a> <i>Smedjan</i> (independent neoliberal, Timbro) Essay, 11 November 2021, <a href="https://timbro.se/smedjan/klimatalarmismen-har-blivit-ett-storre-hot-an-klimatforandringarna/">https://timbro.se/smedjan/klimatalarmismen-har-blivit-ett-storre-hot-an-klimatforandringarna/</a> <i>Supermiljöbloggen</i> (independent green deliberative) Essay, 28 January 2022, <a href="https://supermiljobloggen.se/analys/svenskt-naringslivs-kamp-mot-miljororelsen-en-historisk-genomgang/">https://supermiljobloggen.se/analys/svenskt-naringslivs-kamp-mot-miljororelsen-en-historisk-genomgang/</a> Essay, 28 April 2024, <a href="https://supermiljobloggen.se/debatt/kronika-debatt/darfor-ar-regeringspartierna-livradda-for-klimataktivist/">https://supermiljobloggen.se/debatt/kronika-debatt/darfor-ar-regeringspartierna-livradda-for-klimataktivist/</a>
Blogs	<i>Älskade politik</i> (Beloved politics, Dagens Nyheter) 14 August 2024, <a href="https://www.dn.se/podd/alskade-politik/en-erogen-zon-for-regeringspartierna-karnkraftens-lockelse/">https://www.dn.se/podd/alskade-politik/en-erogen-zon-for-regeringspartierna-karnkraftens-lockelse/</a>
Podcasts	
Social media	Statement on X/Twitter by Prof. Johan Rockström, director of <i>Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research</i> , 21 December 2023, <a href="https://twitter.com/jrockstrom/status/1737888256149057692">https://twitter.com/jrockstrom/status/1737888256149057692</a> ; Statement on Instagram by Sweden's PM (@kristerssonulf), 4 October 2023. <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/Cx_RMVuMawb/">https://www.instagram.com/p/Cx_RMVuMawb/</a> Statement on X/Twitter by Jan Ericson (M) (@Ericson_ubbhult), 5 October 2023, <a href="https://riktpunkt.nu/2023/10/moderat-riksdagsledamot-terroristanklagar-klimataktivist/">https://riktpunkt.nu/2023/10/moderat-riksdagsledamot-terroristanklagar-klimataktivist/</a> ; Statement on X/Twitter by Fredrik Kärrholm (M), (@FredrikKarrholm), 23 September 2023, <a href="https://twitter.com/FredrikKarrholm/status/1705600537448587714">https://twitter.com/FredrikKarrholm/status/1705600537448587714</a> Statement on X/Twitter by minister of civil defence Carl-Oskar Bohlin (M), (@CarlOskar), 4 April 2024, <a href="https://x.com/CarlOskar/status/1775974564738089126">https://x.com/CarlOskar/status/1775974564738089126</a> Post on Facebook by Henrik Jönsson, libertarian influencer, 22 September 2024, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/share/p/T1ZT2edcMtdnewi/">https://www.facebook.com/share/p/T1ZT2edcMtdnewi/</a>
National television	<i>Sveriges Television</i> (public service): - Interview with minister of education Mats Persson (L), <i>SVT Agenda</i> , 30 April 2023; <a href="https://www.svtplay.se/video/epoJkZ4/agenda/son-30-apr-21-15?id=epoJkZ4">https://www.svtplay.se/video/epoJkZ4/agenda/son-30-apr-21-15?id=epoJkZ4</a> - Reportage on SD's strategies on climate policy, <i>Klimatdemokraterna</i> , 16 May 2023, <a href="https://www.svtplay.se/video/8opY72V/klimatdemokraterna">https://www.svtplay.se/video/8opY72V/klimatdemokraterna</a> - Interview with climate minister Romina Pourmokhtari, <i>30 Minuter</i> , 22 February 2024; <a href="https://www.svtplay.se/video/jp5m1ra/30-minuter/romina-pourmokhtari-l">https://www.svtplay.se/video/jp5m1ra/30-minuter/romina-pourmokhtari-l</a>

---

---

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Party leader debate prior to EU elections, 5 May 2024; <a href="https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/svts-partiledardebatt-i-agenda-2024">https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/svts-partiledardebatt-i-agenda-2024</a></li> <li>- News on Swedish public service television SVT, 25 April 2024, <a href="https://www.svt.se/nyheter/lokalt/stockholm/har-flyr-flera-maskerade-man-efter-attacken-i-gubbangen">https://www.svt.se/nyheter/lokalt/stockholm/har-flyr-flera-maskerade-man-efter-attacken-i-gubbangen</a></li> <li>- EU elections 2024: Final debate, SVT, 7 June 2024, <a href="https://www.svtplay.se/video/Kv1Yn2b/eu-val-2024-slutdebatten/avsnitt-1">https://www.svtplay.se/video/Kv1Yn2b/eu-val-2024-slutdebatten/avsnitt-1</a> TV4 (private):</li> <li>- Analysis of the Tidö parties' press briefing on the CAP, 21 December 2023, <a href="https://www.tv4.se/artikel/5MenofU2MHfkzfa4yGT6YF/analys-kompromissen-med-sd-baeddar-foer-hardare-strid">https://www.tv4.se/artikel/5MenofU2MHfkzfa4yGT6YF/analys-kompromissen-med-sd-baeddar-foer-hardare-strid</a></li> <li>- "SD runs a troll factory", Kalla Fakta, 7 May 2024; <a href="https://www.tv4.se/artikel/2VCWExxK0L1Xmai2Y60Z2/kalla-fakta-avslojar-sd-driver-en-trollfabrik">https://www.tv4.se/artikel/2VCWExxK0L1Xmai2Y60Z2/kalla-fakta-avslojar-sd-driver-en-trollfabrik</a></li> <li>- "Undercover i trollfabriken", Kalla Fakta, 14 May 2024; <a href="https://www.tv4.se/artikel/57wbqqgEiXcPt2qvqozl2L/jimmie-akesson-svarar-pa-kalla-faktas-avslojande">https://www.tv4.se/artikel/57wbqqgEiXcPt2qvqozl2L/jimmie-akesson-svarar-pa-kalla-faktas-avslojande</a></li> <li>- <a href="https://www.tv4.se/artikel/6FuOqCQdMy2ryScvcl9V47/kristersson-m-sd-maste-be-om-ursakt">https://www.tv4.se/artikel/6FuOqCQdMy2ryScvcl9V47/kristersson-m-sd-maste-be-om-ursakt</a></li> </ul>
National radio	<p><i>Sveriges Radio</i> (public service):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The climate activists that became saboteurs, <i>P1 Konflikt</i>, 19 January 2024; <a href="https://sverigesradio.se/avsnitt/klimataktivisterna-som-blev-sabotorer">https://sverigesradio.se/avsnitt/klimataktivisterna-som-blev-sabotorer</a></li> <li>- How Europe wants to stop climate activists, <i>P1 Konflikt</i>, 9 February 2024; <a href="https://sverigesradio.se/avsnitt/sa-vill-europa-stoppa-klimataktivisterna">https://sverigesradio.se/avsnitt/sa-vill-europa-stoppa-klimataktivisterna</a></li> <li>- Party leader debate on climate policy prior to elections to Swedish Riksdag, 27 August 2022; <a href="https://sverigesradio.se/avsnitt/riksdagspartierna-debatterar-miljo-och-klimat">https://sverigesradio.se/avsnitt/riksdagspartierna-debatterar-miljo-och-klimat</a></li> <li>- Feature on climate policy, Swedish public service radio, <i>P1 Godmorgon världen</i>, 62:00 minutes. <a href="https://sverigesradio.se/avsnitt/finland-gar-till-val-sveriges-tappade-klimatforsprang-och-regering-moter-banker-och-polis-i-bedragerimote">https://sverigesradio.se/avsnitt/finland-gar-till-val-sveriges-tappade-klimatforsprang-och-regering-moter-banker-och-polis-i-bedragerimote</a></li> </ul>

---

## References

1. Aalberg, T. & De Vreese, C. (2016) Introduction: Comprehending populist political communication, In: *Populist Political Communication in Europe*, Aalberg, T., Esser, F., Reinemann, C., De Vreese, C. & Stromback, J. (eds.), London: Routledge; 3-11.
2. Agius, C., Bergman Rosamond, A. & Kinnvall, C. (2021) Populism, ontological insecurity and gendered nationalism: Masculinity, climate denial and Covid-19, *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, 21(4), 432-450. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2020.1851871>
3. Anastasio, N., Perliger, A. & Shortland, N. (2021) How emotional traits and practices lead to support in acts of political violence, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 46(10), 1912-1932. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1905141>
4. Anderson, A.A. & Huntington, H.E. (2017) Social media, science, and attack discourse: How twitter discussions of climate change use sarcasm and incivility, *Science Communication*, 39(5), 598-620. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547017735113>
5. Andersson, M. (2021) The climate of climate change: Impoliteness as a hallmark of homophily in YouTube comment threads on Greta Thunberg's environmental activism, *Journal of Pragmatics*, 178, 93-107. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2021.03.003>
6. Arce-García, S., Díaz-Campo, J. & Cambroneo-Saiz, B. (2023) Online hate speech and emotions on Twitter: a case study of Greta Thunberg at the UN Climate Change Conference COP25 in 2019, *Social Network Analysis and Mining*, 13, 48. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13278-023-01052-5>
7. Bachelard, G. (2013) *Intuition of the Instant*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
8. Bailey, I., Gouldson, A. & Newell, P. (2011) Ecological modernisation and the governance of carbon: A critical analysis, *Antipode*, 43(3), 682-703. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2011.00880.x>

9. Ballard, P.J., Hoyt, L.T., Yazdani, N., Kornbluh, M., Cohen, A.K., Davis, A.L. & Hagan, M.J. (2022). Election-related sociopolitical stress and coping among college students in the United States, *Journal of American College Health*, early view, 1-11. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07448481.2022.2117556>
10. Beattie, A.R., Eroukhanoff, C. & Head, N. (2019) Introduction: Interrogating the 'everyday' politics of emotions in international relations, *Journal of International Political Theory*, 15(2), 136-147. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1755088219830428>
11. Beavan, K. (2019) (Re)writing woman: Unshaming shame with Cixous, *Management Learning*, 50(1), 50-73. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1350507618782486>
12. Bedford, K. (2017) Pepe the Frog and the rise of alternative-right memes, *The Point Magazine*, 26 April 2017. <http://www.thepointmagazine.com.au/post.php?s=2017-04-26-pepe-the-frog-and-the-rise-of-alternative-right-memes>
13. Benkler, Y., Faris, R. & Roberts, H. (2018) *Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation and Radicalization in American Politics*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
14. Berglund, O. & Schmidt, D. (2020) *Extinction Rebellion and Climate Change Activism: Breaking the Law to Change the World*, London: Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48359-3>
15. Bitonti, A. (2017) The role of lobbying in modern democracy: A theoretical framework, In: *Lobbying in Europe: Public Affairs and the Lobbying Industry in 28 EU Countries*, Bitonti, A. & Harris, P. (eds.), London: Palgrave Macmillan; 17-30.
16. Bjereld, U. (2024) SD:s hat påverkar public service framtid, *Magasinet Konkret*, 14 May 2024. <https://magasinetkonkret.se/sds-hat-paverkar-public-service-framtid/>
17. Björkenfeldt, O. & Gustafsson, L. (2023) Impoliteness and morality as instruments of destructive informal social control in online harassment targeting Swedish journalists, *Language & Communication*, 93, 172-187. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.langcom.2023.11.002>
18. Bleiker, R. (2018) *Visual Global Politics*, Oxford: Routledge.
19. Boasson, E.L. & Huitema, D. (2017) Climate governance entrepreneurship: Emerging findings and a new research agenda, *Environment & Planning C: Politics and Space*, 35, 1343-1361. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654417730713>
20. Boese, V.A., Lundstedt, M., Morrison, K., Sato, Y. & Lindberg, S.I. (2022) State of the world 2021: Autocratization changing its nature? *Democratization*, 29(6), 983-1013. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2022.2069751>
21. Boncori, I. & Smith, C. (2019) I lost my baby today: Embodied writing and learning in organizations, *Management Learning*, 50(1), 74-86. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1350507618784555>
22. BRÅ (2023a) *Politikernas trygghetsundersökning 2023: Förtroendevaldas utsatthet och oro för trakasserier, hot och våld under valåret 2022*, Report 2023:14, Stockholm: The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention. <https://bra.se/publikationer/arkiv/publikationer/2023-11-09-politikernas-trygghetsundersokning-2023.html>
23. BRÅ (2023b) *Hate crimes reported to the police in 2022*, Report 2023:16, Stockholm: The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention. <https://bra.se/bra-in-english/home/publications/archive/publications/2023-12-14-hate-crimes-reported-to-the-police-in-2022.html>
24. Bränström Öhman A. (2012) Leaks and leftovers: Reflections on the practice and politics of style in feminist academic writing, In *Emergent Writing Methodologies in Feminist Studies*, Livholts, M. (ed.), New York: Routledge; 27-40.
25. Bsumek, P.K., Schwarze, S., Peeples, J. & Schneider, J. (2019) Strategic gestures in Bill McKibben's climate change rhetoric, *Frontiers in Communication*, 4, 40. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2019.00040>
26. Buzogány, A. & Mohamad-Klotzbach, C. (2022) Environmental populism, In: Oswald, M. (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Populism*, Cham, CH: Palgrave Macmillan; 321-340.
27. CRD (2023) *Ett år med Tidöavtalet: Det är helheten som oroar* (One year with the Tidö Agreement: It is the overall pattern that worries), Stockholm: Civil Rights Defenders Sweden. <https://crd.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Civil-Rights-Defenders-granskning-Ett-ar-med-Tido.pdf>
28. Caramani, D. (2017) Will vs. reason: The populist and technocratic forms of political representation and their critique to party government, *American Political Science Review*, 111(01), 54-67. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055416000538>
29. Carlsen, A. & Sandelands, L. (2015) First passion: Wonder in organizational inquiry, *Management Learning*, 46(4), 373-390. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1350507614533756>
30. Cassese, E.C. (2021) Partisan dehumanization in American politics, *Political Behavior*, 43, 29-50. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-019-09545-w>
31. Chang, W.L. (2019) The impact of emotion: A blended model to estimate influence on social media, *Information Systems Frontiers*, 21, 1137-1151. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10796-018-9824-0>
32. Chiew, S., Mayes, E., Maiava, N., Villafaña, D. & Abhayawickrama, N. (2024) Funny climate activism? A collaborative storied analysis of young climate advocates' digital activism, *Global Studies of Childhood*, 14, early view. <https://doi.org/10.1177/20436106241241338>
33. Cixous, H. (1976) The laugh of the Medusa, *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 1(4), 875-893. <https://doi.org/10.1086/493306>

34. Cohen-Almagor, R. (2018) Taking North American white supremacist groups seriously: The scope and challenge of hate speech on the internet, *International Journal for Crime, Justice, and Social Democracy*, 7(2), 38-57. <https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.v7i2.517>
35. Crawford, N.C. (2014) Institutionalizing passion in world politics: Fear and empathy, *International Theory*, 6(3), 535-557. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971914000256>
36. Cunningham, K., Hix, S., Dennison, S. & Laermont, I. (2024) *A Sharp Right Turn: A Forecast for the 2024 European Parliament Elections*, Berlin: European Council on Foreign Relations. <https://ecfr.eu/publication/a-sharp-right-turn-a-forecast-for-the-2024-european-parliament-elections/>
37. Czarniawska-Joerges, B. (1995) Narration or science? Collapsing the division in organization studies, *Organization*, 2(1), 11-33. <https://doi.org/10.1177/135050849521002>
38. Dahl, R.A. (1998) *On Democracy*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
39. Davidson, S. (2012) The insuperable imperative: A critique of the ecologically modernizing state, *Capitalism Nature Socialism*, 23(2), 31-50. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2012.674147>
40. Dimant, E. (2023) Hate Trump's love: The impact of political polarization on social preferences, *Management Science*, 70(1), 1-31. <https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4701>
41. Ekberg, K. & Pressfeldt, V. (2022) A road to denial: Climate change and neoliberal thought in Sweden, 1988–2000, *Contemporary European History*, 31(4), 627-644. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S096077732200025X>
42. Eubanks, P. (2015) *The Troubled Rhetoric and Communication of Climate Change: The Argumentative Situation*, London: Routledge.
43. Euler, J. (2018) The commons: A social form that allows for degrowth and sustainability, *Capitalism Nature Socialism*, 30(2), 158-175. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2018.1449874>
44. Evans, G. & Phelan, L. (2016) Transition to a post-carbon society: Linking environmental justice and just transition discourses, *Energy Policy*, 99, 329-339. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.05.003>
45. Fischer, A., Joosse, S., Strandell, J., Söderberg, N., Johansson, K. & Boonstra, W.J. (2024) How justice shapes transition governance – a discourse analysis of Swedish policy debates, *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, 67(9), 1998-2016. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2023.2177842>
46. Fjelkestam, K. (2018) Does time have a gender? Queer temporality, anachronism and the desire for the past, In: *The Ethos of History: Time and Responsibility*, Helgesson, S. & Svenungsson, J. (eds.), New York: Berghahn; 112-123.
47. Forst, M. (2024) *State repression of environmental protest and civil disobedience: a major threat to human rights and democracy*, Position Paper by UN Special Rapporteur on Environmental Defenders under the Aarhus Convention, February 2024, Geneva: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. [https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/UNSR\\_EnvDefenders\\_Aarhus\\_Position\\_Paper\\_Civil\\_Disobedience\\_EN.pdf](https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/UNSR_EnvDefenders_Aarhus_Position_Paper_Civil_Disobedience_EN.pdf)
48. Gilmore, S., Harding, N., Helin, J. & Pullen, A. (2019). Writing differently, *Management Learning*, 50(1), 3-10. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1350507618811027>
49. Goldwag, A. (2017) Accelerating the climate of hate: The Austrian school of economics, Hayek, and 'The New Hate', In: *Hayek. A Collaborative Biography*, Leeson, R. (ed.), Cham: Palgrave Macmillan; 175-189.
50. Grey, C. & Sinclair, A. (2006) Writing differently, *Organization*, 13(3), 443-453. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508406063492>
51. Gustavsson, P. (2024) *Angreppet – så urholkar Tidöregeringen vår demokrati*, Lund, SE: Arkiv förlag.
52. Gutmann, A., & Thompson, D. (1996) *Democracy and Disagreement*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
53. Heikkurinen, P. (2021) The nature of degrowth: Theorising the core of nature for the degrowth movement, *Environmental Values*, 30(3), 367-385. <https://doi.org/10.3197/096327120X15973379803681>
54. Helin, J. (2019) Dream writing: Writing through vulnerability, *Qualitative Inquiry*, 25(2), 95-99. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800418810984>
55. Helin, J. (2023) Temporality lost: A feminist invitation to vertical writing that shakes the ground, *Organization*, 30(2), 380-395. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508420956322>
56. Hellström, A. (2023) The populist divide in far-right political discourse in Sweden: Anti-immigration claims in the Swedish socially conservative online newspaper Samtiden from 2016 to 2022, *Societies*, 13(5), 108. <https://doi.org/10.3390/soc13050108>
57. Henderson, L. & Black, A. (2017) Splitting the world open: Writing stories of mourning and loss, *Qualitative Inquiry*, 24(4), 260-269. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800417728958>
58. Höpfl, H. (2007) The codex, the codicil and the codpiece: Some thoughts on diminution and elaboration in identity formation, *Gender, Work and Organization*, 14(6), 6619-6632. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0432.2007.00374.x>
59. Hultman, M., Björk, A. & Viinikka, T. (2019) The far right and climate change denial, In *The Far Right and the Environment: Politics, Discourse and Communication*, Forchtner, B. (ed.), London: Routledge; 121-136. [https://books.google.se/books?id=qBmvDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT16&dq=info:-OJFZ9oVXewJ:scholar.google.com/&lr=&hl=sv&source=gbs\\_toc\\_r&cad=2](https://books.google.se/books?id=qBmvDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT16&dq=info:-OJFZ9oVXewJ:scholar.google.com/&lr=&hl=sv&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=2)



60. Jamieson, K.H. & Taussig, D. (2017) Disruption, demonization, deliverance, and norm destruction: The rhetorical signature of Donald J. Trump, *Political Science Quarterly*, 132(4), 619-650. <https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12699>
61. Jylhä, K.M., Strimling, P. & Rydgren, J. (2020) Climate change denial among radical right-wing supporters, *Sustainability*, 12(23), 10226. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su122310226>
62. Kalmoe, N. P., Gubler, J. R. & Wood, D. A. (2017) Toward conflict or compromise? How violent metaphors polarize partisan issue attitudes, *Political Communication*, 35(3), 333-352. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2017.1341965>
63. Kociatkiewicz, J. & Kostera, M. (2016) Grand plots of management bestsellers: Learning from narrative and thematic coherence, *Management Learning*, 47(3), 324-342. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1350507615592114>
64. Ketola, M. & Odmalm, P. (2023) The end of the world is always better in theory: The strained relationship between populist radical right parties and the state-of-crisis narrative, In: *Political Communication and Performative Leadership*, Lacatus, C., Meibauer, G. & Löffmann, G. (Eds.), London: Palgrave Macmillan; 163-177.
65. Khmara, Y. & Kronenberg, J. (2020) Degrowth in the context of sustainability transitions: In search of a common ground, *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 267, 122072. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.122072>
66. Kinnvall, C. & Svensson, T. (2022) Exploring the populist 'mind': Anxiety, fantasy, and everyday populism, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 24(3), 526-542. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481221075925>
67. Knight, G. & Greenberg, J. (2011) Talk of the enemy: Adversarial framing and climate change discourse, *Social Movement Studies*, 10(4), 323-340. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2011.614102>
68. Laebens, M.G. & Lührmann, A. (2021) What halts democratic erosion? The changing role of accountability, *Democratization*, 28(5), 908-928. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1897109>
69. Lago, I. & Coma, I. (2017) Challenge or consent? Understanding losers' reactions in mass elections, *Government & Opposition*, 52(3), 412-436. <https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2015.31>
70. Lahn, B. (2021) Changing climate change: The carbon budget and the modifying-work of the IPCC, *Social Studies of Science*, 51(1), 3-27. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312720941933>
71. Lazarus, R.S. (1991) *Emotion and Adaptation*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
72. Levitsky, S. & Ziblatt, D. (2018) *How Democracies Die*, New York City: Crown.
73. Lührmann, A., Gastaldi, L., Hirndorf, D. & Lindberg, S.I. (2020) *Defending Democracy Against Illiberal Challengers: A Resource Guide*, Gothenburg: V-Democracy Institute/University of Gothenburg. [https://www.v-dem.net/documents/21/resource\\_guide.pdf](https://www.v-dem.net/documents/21/resource_guide.pdf)
74. Lutz, P. (2019) Variation in policy success: radical right populism and migration policy, *West European Politics*, 42(3), 517-544. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1504509>
75. Marquardt, J., Oliveira, C. & Lederer, M. (2022) Same, same but different? How democratically elected right-wing populists shape climate change policymaking, *Environmental Politics*, 31(5), 777-800. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2022.2053423>
76. Matti, S., Petersson, C. & Söderberg, C. (2021) The Swedish climate policy framework as a means for climate policy integration: an assessment, *Climate Policy*, 21(9), 1146-1158. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2021.1930510>
77. McBath, J.H. & Fisher, W.R. (1969) Persuasion in presidential campaign communication, *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 55(1), 17-25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00335636909382924>
78. McDevitt, J., Levin, J., & Bennett, S. (2002) Hate crime offenders: An expanded typology, *Journal of Social Issues*, 58, 303-317. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-4560.00262>
79. Meléndez, C. & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2021) Negative partisanship towards the populist radical right and democratic resilience in Europe, *Democratization*, 28(5), 949-969. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1883002>
80. Merkel, W. & Lührmann, A. (2021) Resilience of democracies: responses to illiberal and authoritarian challenges, *Democratization*, 28(5), 869-884. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1928081>
81. Miller, C.O. & Bloomfield, E.F. (2022) "You can't be what you can't see": Analyzing Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's environmental rhetoric, *Journal of Contemporary Rhetoric*, 12(1), 1-16. [http://contemporaryrhetoric.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Miller\\_Bloomfield\\_12\\_1\\_1.pdf](http://contemporaryrhetoric.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Miller_Bloomfield_12_1_1.pdf)
82. Mouffe, C. (2013) *Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically*, London: Verso.
83. Mudde, C. (2004) The populist Zeitgeist, *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), 541-563. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x>
84. Mudde, C. (2021) Populism in Europe: An illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism, *Government and Opposition*, 56(4), 577-597. <https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2021.15>
85. Mutz, D.C. & Reeves, B. (2005) The new videomalaise: Effects of televised incivility on political trust, *American Political Science Review*, 99(1), 1-15. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055405051452>
86. Nordensvärd, J. & Ketola, M. (2022) Populism as an act of storytelling: analyzing the climate change narratives of Donald Trump and Greta Thunberg as populist truth-tellers, *Environmental Politics*, 31(5), 861-882. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2021.1996818>



87. Olson, G. (2020) Love and hate online: Affective politics in the era of Trump, In: *Violence and Trolling on Social Media: History, Affect, and Effects of Online Vitriol*, Polak, S. & Trottier, D. (eds.), Amsterdam, NL: Amsterdam University Press; 153-178. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1b0fvrn.11>
88. Oltmann, S.M., Cooper, T.B. & Proferes, N. (2020) How Twitter's affordances empower dissent and information dissemination: An exploratory study of the rogue and alt government agency Twitter accounts, *Government Information Quarterly*, 37(3), 101475. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2020.101475>
89. Östergren, B. (1984) *Vem är Olof Palme? Ett politiskt porträtt*, Stockholm: Timbro.
90. Page, T. (2017) Vulnerable writing as a feminist methodological practice, *Feminist Review*, 115(1), 13-29. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41305-017-0028-0>
91. Pandey, S. (2024) A comparative rhetorical analysis of Trump and Biden's climate change speeches: Framing strategies in politics, *Journal of Technical Writing and Communication*, early view. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00472816231225932>
92. Parker, M. (2014) Writing: What can be said, by who, and where? In *Critical Management Research: Reflections from the Field*, Jeanes, E. & Huzzard, T. (Eds.), London: Sage; 211-226.
93. Piazza, J.A. (2020b) When politicians use hate speech political violence increases, *The Conversation*, 28 September 2020. <https://theconversation.com/when-politicians-use-hate-speech-political-violence-increases-146640>
94. Pickard, S., Bowman, B. & Arya, D. (2020) "We are radical in our kindness": The political socialisation, motivations, demands and protest actions of young environmental activists in Britain, *Youth and Globalization*, 2(2), 251-280. <https://doi.org/10.1163/25895745-02020007>
95. Pickering, J., Bäckstrand, K. & Schlosberg, D. (2020) Between environmental and ecological democracy: Theory and practice at the democracy-environment nexus, *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, 22(1), 1-15. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2020.1703276>
96. Plath, S. (1986) *Letters Home*, London: Faber and Faber.
97. Pullen, A. & Rhodes, C. (2008) Dirty writing, *Culture and Organization*, 14(3), 241-259. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14759550802270684>
98. Radnitz, S. (2021) *Revealing Schemes: The Politics of Conspiracy in Russia and the post-Soviet Region*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
99. Renström, E.A., Bäck, H. & Carroll, R. (2023) Threats, emotions, and affective polarization, *Political Psychology*, 44(6), 1337-1366. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12899>
100. Ross, A.S. & Rivers, D.J. (2020) Donald Trump, legitimisation and a new political rhetoric, *World Englishes*, 39, 623-637. <https://doi.org/10.1111/weng.12501>
101. Rothstein, B. (2023) The shadow of the Swedish right, *Journal of Democracy*, 34(1), 36-49. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2023.0002>
102. Rydgren, J. & van der Meiden, S. (2016) *Sweden, Now a Country Like All the Others? The Radical Right and the End of Swedish Exceptionalism*, Sociology Working Paper Series 25, Stockholm: Stockholm University, Department of Sociology. <https://su.figshare.com/ndownloader/files/26487815>
103. SCPC (2024) *Klimatpolitiska rådets rapport 2024*, Stockholm: Swedish Climate Policy Council. <https://www.klimatpolitiskaradet.se/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/klimatpolitiskaradetsrapport2024.pdf>
104. SFPC (2024) *Finanspolitiska rådets rapport 2024*, Stockholm: Swedish Finance Policy Council. <https://www.fpr.se/download/18.2d63770418f379d56435cd1/1714722716776/Svensk%20finanspolitik%202024.pdf>
105. Sato, Y., Lundstedt, M., Morrison, K., Boese, V. & Lindberg, S. (2022) *Institutional Order in Episodes of Autocratization*, V-Dem Working Paper 133, Gothenburg, SE: V-Dem Institute. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4239798>
106. Sharman, A. & Howarth, C. (2017) Climate stories: Why do climate scientists and sceptical voices participate in the climate debate? *Public Understanding of Science*, 26(7), 826-842. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662516632453>
107. Schulz, A., Wirth, W., & Müller, P. (2020) We are the people and you are fake news: A social identity approach to populist citizens' false consensus and hostile media perceptions, *Communication Research*, 47(2), 201-226. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650218794854>
108. Schulz-Tomančok, A. & Woschnagg, F. (2024) Credibility at stake. A comparative analysis of different hate speech comments on journalistic credibility and support on climate protection measures, *Cogent Social Sciences*, 10(1), early view. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2024.2367092>
109. Schweppe, J. & Perry, B. (2021) A continuum of hate: Delimiting the field of hate studies, *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 77, 503-528. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-021-09978-7>
110. Séville, A. (2017) 'There is no Alternative': Politik zwischen Demokratie und Sachzwang, Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Campus Verlag.
111. Shah, T.M. (2024) Emotions in politics: A review of contemporary perspectives and trends, *International Political Science Abstracts*, 74(1), 1-14. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00208345241232769>
112. Shotter, J. & Tsoukas, H. (2014) Performing phronesis: On the way to engaged judgment, *Management Learning*, 45(4), 377-396. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1350507614541196>

113. Silander, D. (2024) Problems in Paradise? Changes and Challenges to Swedish Democracy, Leeds, UK: Emerald.
114. Sloam, J., Pickard, S. & Henn, M. (2022) Young people and environmental activism: The transformation of democratic politics', *Journal of Youth Studies*, 25(6), 683-691. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2022.2056678>
115. Strömbäck, J., Wikforss, Å., Glüer, K., Lindholm, T. & Oscarsson, H. (2022) *Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments*, New York, NY: Routledge.
116. Svatoňová, E., & Doerr, N. (2024) How anti-gender and gendered imagery translate the Great Replacement conspiracy theory in online far-right platforms, *European Journal of Politics and Gender*, 7(1), 83-101. <https://doi.org/10.1332/25151088Y2023D000000006>
117. Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (2024) *Naturvårdsverkets underlag till regeringens klimatredovisning 2024*, Stockholm: Swedish Environmental Protection Agency. <https://www.naturvardsverket.se/49732a/globalassets/amnen/klimat/klimatredovisning/naturvardsverkets-underlag-till-regeringens-klimatredovisning-2024.pdf>
118. Tidö Parties (2022) *Tidöavtalet: En överenskommelse för Sverige* (Tidö Agreement: An agreement for Sweden), 14 October 2022, Tidö, SE: Moderaterna, Kristdemokraterna, Liberalerna, Sverigedemokraterna. <https://www.liberalerna.se/wp-content/uploads/tidoavtalet-overenskommelse-for-sverige-slutlig.pdf>
119. UNAS (2023) *Varningslampor blinkar för demokratin i Sverige*, Stockholm: United Nations Association of Sweden. <https://fn.se/aktuellt/varldshorisont/varningslampor-blinkar-for-demokratin-i-sverige/>
120. V-Dem Institute (2024) *Democracy Winning and Losing at the Ballot: Democracy Report 2024*, Gothenburg, SE: University of Gothenburg. [https://v-dem.net/documents/43/v-dem\\_dr2024\\_lowres.pdf](https://v-dem.net/documents/43/v-dem_dr2024_lowres.pdf)
121. Vachhani, S.J. (2019) Rethinking the politics of writing differently through écriture feminine, *Management Learning*, 50(1), 11-23. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1350507618800718>
122. Vahter, M. & Jakobson, M.L. (2023) The moral rhetoric of populist radical right: The case of the Sweden Democrats, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, preprint. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2023.2242795>
123. Valcore, J., Asquith, N.L. & Rodgers, J. (2023) "We're led by stupid people": Exploring Trump's use of denigrating and deprecating speech to promote hatred and violence, *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 80, 237-256. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-023-10085-y>
124. Vihma, A., Reischl, G. & Andersen, A.N. (2021) A climate backlash: Comparing populist parties' climate policies in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, *The Journal of Environment & Development*, 30(3), 219-239. <https://doi.org/10.1177/10704965211027748>
125. Vowles, K. & Hultman, M. (2021a) Dead white men vs. Greta Thunberg: Nationalism, misogyny, and climate change denial in Swedish far-right digital media, *Australian Feminist Studies*, 36(110), 414-431. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08164649.2022.2062669>
126. Vowles, K. & Hultman, M. (2021b) Scare-quoting climate: The rapid rise of climate denial in the Swedish far-right media ecosystem, *Nordic Journal of Media Studies*, 3(1), 79-95. <https://doi.org/10.2478/njms-2021-0005>
127. von Malmborg, F. (2024a) Strategies and impacts of policy entrepreneurs: Ideology, democracy, and the quest for a just transition to climate neutrality, *Sustainability*, 16(12), 5272. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su16125272>
128. von Malmborg, F. (2024b) Tidöpolitiken hotar både klimatet och demokratin, *Syre*, 6 April 2024. <https://tidningensyre.se/2024/06-april-2024/tidopolitiken-hotar-bade-klimatet-och-demokratin/>
129. von Malmborg, F. (2024c) Regeringens klimatpolitik är populistisk, *Magasinet Konkret*, 12 March 2024. <https://magasinetkonkret.se/regeringens-klimatpolitik-ar-populistisk/>
130. Wahlström, M., Törnberg, A. & Ekbrand, H. (2021) Dynamics of violent and dehumanizing rhetoric in far-right social media, *New Media & Society*, 23(11), 3290-3311. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444820952795>
131. Wang, X. & Lo, K. (2021) Just transition: A conceptual review, *Energy Research & Social Science*, 82, 102291. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102291>
132. Walker, J. (2023) Silencing the Voice: The fossil-fuelled Atlas Network's campaign against constitutional recognition of indigenous Australia, *Cosmopolitan Civil Society*, 15(2), 105-125. <https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i2.8813>
133. Weeks, A.C. & Allen, P. (2023) Backlash against "identity politics": far right success and mainstream party attention to identity groups, *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 11(5), 935-953. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2022.2065318>
134. White, M. (2022) Greta Thunberg is 'giving a face' to climate activism: Confronting anti-feminist, anti-environmentalist, and ableist memes, *Australian Feminist Studies*, 36(110), 396-413. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08164649.2022.2062667>
135. White, J. (2023) *What Makes Climate a Populist Issue?* Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper 401, London: London School of Economics and Political Science. <https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/working-paper-401-White.pdf>
136. Widfeldt, A. (2023) The far-right Sweden, In: *The Routledge Handbook of Far-Right Extremism in Europe*, Kondor, K. & Littler, M. (eds.), London: Routledge; 193-206.
137. Wikforss, Å. (2021) *Därför demokrati. Om kunskapen och folkstyret*, Stockholm: Fri Tanke.

138. Yilmaz, F. (2012) Right-wing hegemony and immigration: How the populist far-right achieved hegemony through the immigration debate in Europe, *Current Sociology*, 60(3), 368-381. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392111426192>
139. Zeitzoff, T. (2023) *Nasty Politics: The Logic of Insults, Threats and Incitement*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

**Disclaimer/Publisher's Note:** The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.