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Social Media Platform Facebook Has Become a Tool for Media Trials: A Study on Recent Mob Violence Against Citizens of Bangladesh

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Abstract

This study critically examines the weaponization of Facebook in Bangladesh as a digital court of public opinion that fuels media trials, social purges, and mob violence. Between August 2024 and June 2025—during the controversial Yunusian interim regime—Facebook played a central role in triggering physical violence, reputational exile, and academic punishment. Using case studies including the Hazari Lane mob killings, the suspension of Rajshahi University's professors, and Dhaka University's campus purges through unwelcome declarations. This research identifies a consistent pattern: unverified allegations escalate into societal punishments through Facebook posts, banners, and viral misinformation. The findings show that the digital space is no longer separate from real-world consequences; it is the arena where guilt is assigned, and verdicts are carried out in the absence of due process. The paper calls for comprehensive reforms—ranging from cybercrime law updates and social media platform accountability to campus justice mechanisms and academic freedom protections. In conclusion, this paper argues that unchecked digital vigilantism threatens Bangladesh's democratic fabric, necessitating urgent regulatory and institutional action. Facebook-driven media trials leading to mob violence in Bangladesh.

Keywords: digital mob justice; Facebook; media trial; Bangladesh; academic freedom; misinformation; Yunusian regime; mob violence; social media governance; cyber law

1. Introduction

1.1. Background and Context

The global proliferation of social media platforms in the 21st century has transformed the dissemination of news, opinions, and rumors. Among these platforms, Facebook holds a dominating position in Bangladesh, with over 40 million active users as of 2024 (Rahman & Haque, 2020; Roy et al., 2023). While social media has empowered citizens by providing a voice, inspiring activism, and connecting communities, it has also enabled the rapid spread of misinformation, defamation, and rumor-driven narratives (Minar & Naher, 2018; Shao et al., 2017). In nations with low digital literacy and weak institutional trust, such as Bangladesh, the negative consequences of unverified content can extend far beyond virtual spaces, manifesting in tangible harm including vigilantism and lethal mob violence.

Over the past two decades, Bangladesh has periodically witnessed outbreaks of mob violence triggered by online allegations, primarily on Facebook. High-profile incidents—such as the Ramu communal violence (2012), the Nasirnagar pogrom (2016), and the Bhola lynching (2019)—trace back to fabricated or manipulated Facebook posts falsely accusing individuals of blasphemy (Rahman & Naher, 2018; The Daily Star, 2020). These events illustrate how helpless individuals become targets of communal rage, fueled by collective panic and digital misinformation (ObserverBD, 2024; Frontiers in Sociology, 2023).

The period from 4 August 2024 to 20 June 2025 is distinguished by an unprecedented surge in Facebook-linked violence in Bangladesh (Daily Star, 2025; Dhaka Tribune, 2025). In the aftermath of political upheaval and a governmental transition in early August 2024, the country observed the highest recorded incidence of mob violence in a single year. Human rights organizations reported 128–173 lynching deaths in 2024, with approximately 96 occurring after 5 August 2024 (AFP/France 24, 2025; Prothom Alo/ASK, 2024). Between early August and early 2025, this translated to one mob killing approximately every 1.6 days (Prothom Alo/ASK, 2024).

Notably, Facebook repeatedly served as the catalyst in many of these cases. Viral or strategically posted misinformation—often exploiting religious sensitivities—prompted violent crowd mobilizations. Examples include the Dhaka University lynching of mentally ill Tofazzal Hossain in March 2025, triggered by false accusations of theft circulated on social media, and the Hazari Lane attacks in November 2024, fueled by a defamatory 'anti-ISKCON' Facebook post that escalated into acid attacks and violent vandalism (ObserverBD, 2025; Wikipedia, 2024). These events highlight the pressing need to examine Facebook's role not just as a platform, but as a powerful instrument facilitating non-judicial public trials culminating in offline violence.

1.2. Significance of the Study

The phenomenon of media trials—where individuals are vilified and subjected to communal judgement in public forums (now digitally broadcast via Facebook)—raises alarming questions about due process, human rights, and collective psychological behavior (Roy et al., 2023). In the era of digital vigilantism, accusations made online can have real-world consequences, and the boundaries between virtual sensationalism and physical violence have blurred. This research aims to explore how Facebook posts operate as an informal court of public opinion that bypasses legal scrutiny and often sanctions extrajudicial punishment through mob action.

This study is significant for scholars and practitioners across several disciplines:

Media and communication studies: By analyzing how algorithmic amplification of sensational content fuels panic and action, the research contributes to understanding the media's role in triggering violence (Tufekci, 2015; ObserverBD, 2024).

Sociology and psychology: It examines crowd dynamics, rumor psychology, and digital rumor cascades, providing insights into shared responsibility and group behavior (Stella et al., 2018; Shao et al., 2017).

Legal and human rights frameworks: The study engages with Bangladesh's constitutional guarantees for fair trial (Art. 31, Art. 35) and explores how these have been violated through public lynchings without due process (ObserverBD, 2024).

Policy and governance: By highlighting institutional failures—such as low digital literacy, policing gaps, and poor content regulation—this work offers empirical grounds for recommending legal reform, digital education, and Facebook policy changes.

1.3. Research Questions

This study is guided by the following core research questions:

1. How does Facebook contribute to the initiation and rapid spread of accusations that trigger mob violence in Bangladesh?

2. What patterns can be identified in the nature, frequency, and outcomes of these violent incidents from August 2024 to June 2025?

3. How do social, psychological, and institutional factors interplay in transforming online outrage into real-world violence?

4. What policy mechanisms—at both the government and platform levels—could counteract such digital-to-physical escalation?

1.4. Scope and Delimitations

Temporal range: August 4, 2024, to June 20, 2025. This timeframe captures the most violent phase of Facebook-triggered mob justice, delineated by the surge post-political transition.

Geographic focus: Nationwide incidents across all divisions of Bangladesh, with attention to hotspots such as Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi, and Cox's Bazar.

Medium examined: Primarily Facebook public posts, including statuses, comments, shared content, and Facebook Messenger mobilization.

Key actors: Accused individuals (often belonging to vulnerable minority or marginalized communities), perpetrators forming mob formations, law enforcement agencies, and platform moderators.

Delimitations include:

Not accounting for offline rumor-based riots unconnected to Facebook.

Excluding other social platforms such as WhatsApp or X, except where their use is in conjunction with Facebook.

Limiting legal analysis to public domain documents and statutes.

1.5. Theoretical Framework

This study draws on several theoretical perspectives:

Rumor and panic theory (Allport & Postman, 1947): Rumors serve as mechanisms for anxiety reduction and social meaning-making in uncertain situations.

Digital vigilantism: As conceptualized by Munger (2017) and Gottfried & Shearer (2021), the phenomenon refers to crowds seeking punitive action via digital media around perceived wrongdoing.

Algorithmic mediation: Tufekci (2015) highlights how engagement-maximizing algorithms magnify emotional, sensational content—exacerbating misinformation spread.

Collective behavior and mob psychology: Drawing from Le Bon (1895) and Turner's Social Identity model (1987), this framework explains how identity dynamics within crowds can override individual reasoning in moments of heightened tension.

1.6. Review of Key Incidents (Aug 2024–Jun 2025)

1. Hazari Lane Violence (5 November 2024)

• A Facebook post labeling ISKCON as a terrorist organization turned viral, igniting acid attacks, brick-pelting, property damage, and at least 12 injuries. Some 80 individuals were detained and 49 arrested by security forces.

2. Dhaka University Lynching (March 2025)

Tofazzal Hossain—a mentally ill individual—was brutally beaten and killed by a mob of students and bystanders after a false Hindu-raids accusation spread on Facebook, then amplified through live-streams and Messenger groups.

3. Cox's Bazar Harassment (ongoing)

Social media-fueled moral vigilantism led mobs to harass women wearing 'Western-style' clothing on Cox's Bazar beaches, with on-site footage shared via Facebook and Reddit posts.

1.7. Institutional and Structural Drivers

Weak law enforcement and judicial delays

Investigative reports and public confidence surveys show widespread distrust in police and slow judicial processing (MSF survey 2024: 72% distrust). Police reforms lag behind systemic corruption and staffing shortages.

Low digital literacy and fact-checking

A large segment of Bangladesh's populace lacks the critical skills to distinguish credible from fabricated content, especially regarding inflammatory religious claims. Fact-checkers like Rumor Scanner Bangladesh have documented hundreds of viral misinformation cases monthly.

Algorithmic and bot amplification

Research from Twitter/Twitter/Catalan referendum suggests that bots amplify inflammatory content early in dissemination—mapping onto similar trends in Bangladesh's misinformation environment.

Political opportunism

Incendiary accusations are often strategically deployed for political gain—to discredit rivals, whip up communal tensions, or trigger regime instability (Daily Star, 2025; South Asian Update, 2022) .

This introduction establishes the following:

-Facebook's explosive reach in Bangladesh and its dual potential for connection and digital mischief.

-Surging mob violence since early August 2024, evidenced by unprecedented rates of lynching and mob-beating deaths.

-Theoretical and empirical grounding, offering frameworks to study how social behavior, law, and tech interact to precipitate offline harm.

-Key analytical dimensions: ideation (how posts spark outrage), mobilization (the transition to physical action), and institutional failure (lack of prevention and accountability).

These insights set the stage for the following sections, which will employ mixed qualitative methods—case study analysis, media discourse monitoring, and interviews—to critically unpack Facebook-driven media trials, test the unverified-post-to-mob-violence hypothesis, and propose evidence-based interventions.

2. Context and Deeper Theoretical Exploration

2.1. Historical and Social Context in Bangladesh

Understanding the weaponization of Facebook as a digital court in Bangladesh requires situating this phenomenon within the broader historical and social matrix of the country. Bangladesh's turbulent political past, entrenched culture of public shame, crisis of institutional legitimacy, and deep-seated authoritarian impulses provide the contextual backbone against which the transformation of digital platforms into instruments of media trials and social purges must be critically examined. This section explores how historical legacies, political dynamics, institutional frailty, and social norms have coalesced to enable the rise of Facebook as a parallel judiciary mechanism.

1. Postcolonial Legacy and Authoritarian Continuities

Bangladesh, emerging from the violent crucible of the 1971 Liberation War, inherited institutional frameworks shaped by British colonialism and Pakistani authoritarianism. These legacies have left a long-standing imprint on the country's governance structures, privileging executive dominance over judicial independence (Chowdhury, 2003). Successive regimes—military and civilian alike—have manipulated laws, suppressed dissent, and exercised disproportionate control over media and universities, contributing to a culture where legal recourse often seems inaccessible or politically tainted.

This postcolonial trajectory aligns with Mamdani's (1996) argument that postcolonial states oscillate between juridical modernity and political patrimonialism, creating a dual system where formal law coexists with arbitrary executive interventions. The frequent invocation of emergency powers, politically motivated arrests, and the selective application of justice have produced an environment where legal institutions lack credibility, and alternative mechanisms for asserting justice—such as media trials—find fertile ground.

2. Weak Institutions and the Crisis of Judicial Trust

Bangladesh's judiciary has long been plagued by allegations of corruption, inefficiency, and executive interference. Public perception surveys consistently reveal low levels of trust in courts and law enforcement agencies (Transparency International Bangladesh, 2023). The result is a widespread belief that justice is delayed, denied, or distributed along partisan lines.

This institutional decay has fostered a climate of digital vigilantism. As Garland (2001) observes in the context of neoliberal societies, the weakening of state capacity to provide security and justice often leads communities to seek extralegal forms of retribution. In Bangladesh, this has taken the form of Facebook posts accusing individuals of moral, religious, or political transgressions—followed by swift social condemnation, institutional punishments, or even mob attacks.

3. Historical Precedents of Mob Justice and Informal Punishment

The use of extra-legal violence to settle disputes or enforce communal norms is not a new phenomenon in Bangladesh. From village shalish (informal arbitration) systems to student-wing led campus violence, informal justice mechanisms have long coexisted with formal legal processes. These mechanisms are often guided by notions of honor, shame, and public spectacle rather than evidence or legal standards (White, 1992).

Mob lynchings, public beatings, and vigilante attacks—often justified in the name of defending religion, nation, or morality—have occurred with disturbing regularity. According to Ain o Salish Kendra (2024), at least 73 people were killed in mob attacks between January and November 2024. Social media has now become the digital extension of this legacy, offering speed, scale, and visibility to such acts of public punishment.

4. Rise of Facebook and the Digital Public Sphere

With over 45 million users by mid-2024, Facebook is Bangladesh's most influential digital platform. It functions as a news source, political forum, and social stage. However, this democratization of communication has come without adequate digital literacy, regulation, or platform accountability. In effect, Facebook has become a chaotic yet powerful arena of discourse, where truth is determined not by verification but by virality.

As Habermas (1989) warned, the public sphere can become distorted when it is colonized by emotional appeals and sensationalism rather than rational-critical debate. In Bangladesh, the platform's reach has enabled the rapid circulation of rumors, conspiracy theories, and hate speech, often culminating in real-world harm. This environment facilitated events like the Hazari Lane mob killings and university purges, where Facebook posts—devoid of legal scrutiny—triggered collective punishment.

5. Culture of Shame, Honor, and Public Spectacle

Bangladesh is deeply rooted in collectivist and patriarchal cultural traditions where individual reputation is closely tied to family honor and communal respectability. Accusations of immorality, anti-religious behavior, or political deviance carry severe social consequences. Public shaming has long been a mode of disciplining social behavior, often enacted through humiliation, ostracism, or symbolic violence.

Social media amplifies this culture of public spectacle. Posts, banners, memes, and doctored images are deployed to shame, ridicule, and condemn individuals—particularly women, minorities, academics, and dissidents. These digital acts mirror traditional punitive rituals but occur at an accelerated pace, with broader audiences and irreversible consequences. Massumi's (2002) concept of "affective politics" is relevant here: public anger, fear, and moral outrage become affective triggers for punitive action, bypassing evidence or deliberation.

6. Student Politics and Institutional Repression

Public universities in Bangladesh—especially Dhaka University and Rajshahi University—have historically served as political battlegrounds, with student wings of major parties wielding significant influence. Administrators often rely on or fear these groups, leading to compromised disciplinary systems. In such settings, Facebook becomes a tool for ideological policing.

Cases like Dr. Mustak Ahmed's suspension and the forced exodus of students from Dhaka University dormitories demonstrate how unverified social media posts—alleging political betrayal or moral deviance—can lead to immediate institutional sanctions without formal inquiry. These incidents reflect an ecosystem where academic freedom is subordinated to digital populism and political intimidation.

7. Religious and Nationalist Mobilization in the Digital Era

Bangladesh's socio-political landscape is heavily influenced by religious sentiment and nationalist rhetoric. Allegations of blasphemy, disrespect to the Liberation War, or criticism of national figures often provoke mass outrage. In the digital era, such allegations are no longer confined to sermons or rallies—they are broadcast instantly through Facebook posts, videos, and hashtags.

This digital ecosystem facilitates what Stanley Cohen (1972) termed "moral panics"—sudden eruptions of public outrage aimed at perceived threats to social values. Religious extremists, nationalist influencers, and political operatives all exploit Facebook's architecture to generate outrage, target adversaries, and mobilize mobs. The Hazari Lane incident, for example, was preceded by a series of Facebook posts accusing individuals of blasphemy—without evidence—leading to fatal consequences.

8. Surveillance, Control, and Digital Authoritarianism

The 2024–2025 Yunusian interim regime illustrates how social media can also be weaponized by the state for surveillance and repression. Digital policing—through monitoring of posts, sharing of suspect lists, and public declarations—becomes a mechanism of social control. As Zuboff (2019) argues, surveillance capitalism thrives not just on data extraction but on behavior modification.

In Bangladesh, the state and its proxies manipulate digital platforms to identify dissenters, intimidate critics, and perform ideological purification. Facebook's infrastructure—designed for connectivity—becomes a vehicle for coercion. The spectacle of public punishment reinforces a culture of fear, encouraging self-censorship and digital conformity.

9. A Perfect Storm of Historical and Digital Forces

The rise of Facebook as a tribunal of public opinion in Bangladesh is not an anomaly but the product of intersecting historical, institutional, and cultural forces. A fragile judiciary, authoritarian political culture, normalized mob violence, collectivist moral codes, and unchecked digital platforms have converged to create a society where guilt is assigned online and punishment enacted offline.

In this context, social media is not merely a communication tool—it is a parallel institution of justice, deeply embedded in the socio-political fabric of the nation. Understanding this

transformation requires a multidimensional analysis that foregrounds history, power, affect, and technology—precisely what this paper seeks to provide.

2.1.1. Legacy of Communal Sensitivity

Bangladesh's foundation in 1971 was rooted in secular nationalism, but religious identity soon regained prominence. Since independence, periods of communal violence—including the 1992 Babri Masjid riots spillover, the 1999 assault on poet Shamsur Rahman, and recurrent anti-minority events—have underscored how accusations of religious desecration or blasphemy can ignite deep-seated fault lines (Hasan, 2022). Social media has become the accelerant of communal tensions, lending immediacy and scale to virulent narratives that previously relied on word-of-mouth or traditional media.

2.1.2. Prior Incidents as Portents

Ramu violence (2012): A deeply impactful case in Cox's Bazar where a fabricated Facebook post—wrongly attributed to a local Buddhist man—led to the destruction of 24 Buddhist temples and homes, with 25,000 participants and over 300 arrests reported.

Nasirnagar pogrom (2016) and Bhola lynching (2019): Triggered by manipulated content falsely accusing individuals of desecration or blasphemy, these incidents resulted in communal massacres and riots.

Smaller-scale incidents (e.g., Lalmonirhat 2020) extended the pattern, reinforcing the template: rumor → viral dissemination → perceived offense → mob violence.

These historical clusters serve as precursors to the spike in violence seen between August 2024 and June 2025, emphasizing an established pattern now intensified by the digital ecosystem.

2.1.3. August 2024 Political Upheaval and Instability

The political turnover following the bounded to overthrow the Prime Minister Hasina on 4 August 2024 created fertile ground for opportunistic conflicts. According to Reuters, approximately 2,010 communal incidents occurred in the subsequent weeks, with five confirmed Hindu fatalities, media assets attacked, and minority communities, teachers displaced. Analysts argue that the vacuum in institutional control emboldened actors—state and non-state—to weaponize social media, especially Facebook, targeting vulnerable groups amid political uncertainty.

2.2. Theoretical Framework

This section develops a comprehensive theoretical framework to understand the weaponization of Facebook as a digital court in Bangladesh, specifically within the broader landscape of media trials, algorithmic amplification, and digital vigilantism. Drawing from interdisciplinary scholarship in media studies, surveillance theory, sociology, legal philosophy, and digital ethnography, this framework provides the conceptual lenses through which the phenomena under study are analyzed.

1. Media Trials and the Crisis of Legitimacy

The concept of **media trials**—a term that emerged prominently in the context of high-profile legal cases covered by television and newspapers—has evolved significantly with the advent of social media. Media trials are informal processes of judgment carried out in public discourse, where allegations, accusations, and narratives shape public opinion before any formal legal adjudication (Chatterjee, 2011). In Bangladesh, this phenomenon has been exacerbated by social media platforms like Facebook, where individuals accused of wrongdoing are subjected to instant scrutiny, condemnation, and punishment in the court of public opinion.

As Habermas (1989) argues in his theory of the public sphere, the media plays a vital role in forming rational-critical debate. However, in an environment saturated with misinformation, manipulated narratives, and emotional contagion, the public sphere morphs into a zone of

performative judgment. Facebook, far from being a neutral platform, facilitates a digitally engineered public space where legitimacy is algorithmically constructed, not democratically deliberated.

In contexts of weak legal institutions—as in Bangladesh—media trials fill the vacuum left by ineffective judicial systems, contributing to what Mbembe (2001) calls the "aesthetics of power," where violence becomes both symbolic and literal. The Hazari Lane mob killings and academic suspensions become rituals of public punishment rooted not in legality but in digital virality.

2. Digital Vigilantism and Mob Justice

Digital vigilantism refers to the act of citizens collectively seeking to enforce norms, punish perceived wrongdoers, or expose crimes through online platforms (Trottier, 2017). The convergence of digital surveillance, public shaming, and algorithmic broadcasting creates a potent environment where moral outrage can rapidly escalate into real-world consequences.

In Bangladesh, the long-standing tradition of **mob justice** (Hossain, 2019) has seamlessly migrated to online spaces. Facebook acts as both trigger and amplifier of this vigilante behavior. As Tufekci (2015) notes, the design of digital platforms enables rapid mobilization without institutional mediation. Hashtags, shares, and viral posts become instruments of identification, accusation, and punishment.

The framework of digital vigilantism is particularly useful in understanding why false or unverified allegations—such as those leading to the suspension of Dr. Mustak Ahmed—can gain massive traction. The perceived failure of law enforcement and judiciary institutions invites collective action, often under the illusion of moral justice. This process aligns with Garland's (2001) "culture of control," wherein communities take punitive matters into their own hands.

3. Algorithmic Amplification and Emotional Contagion

The theoretical lens of **algorithmic amplification** is essential to this study. Social media platforms are governed by algorithmic logics that prioritize content based on engagement, emotional valence, and virality (Gillespie, 2014; Noble, 2018). These algorithms do not simply reflect public opinion; they shape it.

Zuboff's (2019) concept of **surveillance capitalism** highlights how user behavior is mined and manipulated to drive engagement, often at the expense of social cohesion and truth. Facebook's algorithm, designed to maximize time spent on the platform, amplifies outrage-inducing content—whether misinformation, hate speech, or public accusations. This emotional intensification process, called **emotional contagion** (Kramer, Guillory, & Hancock, 2014), explains how narratives of moral panic spread faster and wider than balanced, fact-based reporting.

In Bangladesh's politicized and volatile environment, algorithmic curation acts as a fuel for moral economies of punishment. The public reacts not to verifiable facts but to affective cues—images of alleged perpetrators, viral posts claiming betrayal, or memes mocking intellectuals. The spread of such content turns Facebook into what Massumi (2002) calls an "affective medium"—where feeling overrides thinking.

4. Platform Governance and Absence of Accountability

Platform governance refers to the ways in which digital platforms structure user behavior, content flow, and community standards (Gorwa, 2019). In the Bangladeshi context, Facebook's governance mechanisms—such as content moderation, takedown procedures, and misinformation flags—remain deeply inadequate. The absence of local-language moderation, reliance on automated systems, and failure to act on abuse reports creates a governance void.

This aligns with the concept of **governance without government** (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992), where private corporations like Meta (Facebook's parent company) effectively control public discourse without the democratic legitimacy of a state. The unregulated amplification of disinformation in cases like the Dhaka University purges illustrates how platform inaction constitutes a form of complicity.

Moreover, Gillespie (2018) emphasizes that platforms often adopt a "safe harbor" stance—claiming neutrality to avoid liability while simultaneously curating content in ways that shape public perception. This paradox—between private control and public impact—necessitates a framework for holding platforms accountable under international human rights law (Kaye, 2019).

5. Postcolonial and Authoritarian Logics

Any analysis of Bangladesh's digital justice landscape must consider its postcolonial governance structures and authoritarian legacies. Scholars like Chatterjee (2004) and Mamdani (1996) argue that postcolonial states often oscillate between rule of law and rule by exception, where legal norms are suspended in favor of political imperatives.

The Yunusian interim regime, lacking electoral legitimacy, reflects what Agamben (2005) describes as a **state of exception**—where normal legal processes are bypassed to maintain order. In such conditions, digital spaces become theaters of state and para-state power. Political actors, student groups, and institutional authorities all weaponize Facebook to silence dissent, enforce ideological conformity, and perform moral authority.

This power dynamic echoes Mbembe's (2001) "necropolitics," where the state decides who must be socially eliminated or reputationally erased. Thus, social media trials are not just acts of informal justice—they are expressions of authoritarian control repackaged as grassroots accountability.

6. Theoretical Synthesis and Analytical Lens

Bringing these threads together, the theoretical framework guiding this research is an integrated model that combines:

- **Media Trial Theory**: to explain the erosion of due process through digital public discourse.

- **Digital Vigilantism**: to analyze the transformation of outrage into collective punishment.

- **Algorithmic Amplification**: to understand the structural logic of content virality and emotional manipulation.

- **Platform Governance Critique**: to highlight the accountability gap in content moderation and response.

- **Postcolonial/Authoritarian Theory**: to situate the events in broader political and historical trajectories of repression.

This synthesis allows us to move beyond surface-level interpretations of Facebook-driven violence and unpack the deeper structural, psychological, and political mechanisms that enable the transformation of a digital post into a death sentence—or, at minimum, a career-ending indictment. In this lens, Facebook is not merely a tool—it is a theater, a tribunal, and a trigger within Bangladesh's volatile socio-political fabric.

2.2. Digital Media Ecosystem and Facebook's Role

2.2.1. Facebook's Algorithmic Dynamics

Algorithms on Facebook prioritize content that triggers engagement—shares, comments, and reactions. This preferential boost disproportionately amplifies sensational, emotionally charged posts, creating virality cascades that drown out corrective voices (Tufekci, 2015). In Bangladesh's context, inflammatory posts—especially those invoking religious sentiment—usually travel faster and further than neutral or factual content.

> Facebook is 'literally fanning ethnic violence,'… these efforts have done little to resolve the crisis' in Bangladesh.

Local moderation in Bangla is limited: Facebook estimates under 5 percent of hate speech is flagged before it spreads; some inflammatory content remained live for six days, garnering over 56,000 shares. This gap offers a digital conveyor belt for false allegations to surface and trigger offline action before law enforcement or fact-checkers can intervene.

2.2.2. Bot Amplification and Engineered Virality

Automation—via bots and coordinated groups—magnifies inflammatory content early in its life cycle. While much literature emerges from Western contexts, parallels are evident in Bangladesh, where bot systems aggressively push false claims to mainstream visibility, lending a veneer of consensus and urgency (Stella et al., 2018) . Such engineered mobilization escalates perceived outrage and legitimizes communal action.

2.2.3. Digital Vigilantism and Public Shaming

Digital vigilantism describes vigilante justice orchestrated online—via doxxing, shaming, and collective denunciation (Trottier, 2016; Loveluck, 2016). In Bangladesh, this evolves into virtual media trials: individuals accused publicly—oftentimes without evidence—through Facebook posts or narrations, triggering collective outrage. Within hours, virtual incrimination often transitions into physical punishment or death, mediated by the same network that circulated the rumor.

2.3. Theoretical Frameworks

This section develops a comprehensive theoretical framework to understand the weaponization of Facebook as a digital court in Bangladesh, specifically within the broader landscape of media trials, algorithmic amplification, and digital vigilantism. Drawing from interdisciplinary scholarship in media studies, surveillance theory, sociology, legal philosophy, and digital ethnography, this framework provides the conceptual lenses through which the phenomena under study are analyzed.

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As Habermas (1989) argues in his theory of the public sphere, the media plays a vital role in forming rational-critical debate. However, in an environment saturated with misinformation, manipulated narratives, and emotional contagion, the public sphere morphs into a zone of performative judgment. Facebook, far from being a neutral platform, facilitates a digitally engineered public space where legitimacy is algorithmically constructed, not democratically deliberated.

In contexts of weak legal institutions—as in Bangladesh—media trials fill the vacuum left by ineffective judicial systems, contributing to what Mbembe (2001) calls the "aesthetics of power," where violence becomes both symbolic and literal. The Hazari Lane mob killings and academic suspensions become rituals of public punishment rooted not in legality but in digital virality.

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In Bangladesh, the long-standing tradition of **mob justice** (Hossain, 2019) has seamlessly migrated to online spaces. Facebook acts as both trigger and amplifier of this vigilante behavior. As

Tufekci (2015) notes, the design of digital platforms enables rapid mobilization without institutional mediation. Hashtags, shares, and viral posts become instruments of identification, accusation, and punishment.

The framework of digital vigilantism is particularly useful in understanding why false or unverified allegations—such as those leading to the suspension of Dr. Mustak Ahmed—can gain massive traction. The perceived failure of law enforcement and judiciary institutions invites collective action, often under the illusion of moral justice. This process aligns with Garland's (2001) "culture of control," wherein communities take punitive matters into their own hands.

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In Bangladesh's politicized and volatile environment, algorithmic curation acts as a fuel for moral economies of punishment. The public reacts not to verifiable facts but to affective cues—images of alleged perpetrators, viral posts claiming betrayal, or memes mocking intellectuals. The spread of such content turns Facebook into what Massumi (2002) calls an "affective medium"—where feeling overrides thinking.

4. Platform Governance and Absence of Accountability

Platform governance refers to the ways in which digital platforms structure user behavior, content flow, and community standards (Gorwa, 2019). In the Bangladeshi context, Facebook's governance mechanisms—such as content moderation, takedown procedures, and misinformation flags—remain deeply inadequate. The absence of local-language moderation, reliance on automated systems, and failure to act on abuse reports creates a governance void.

This aligns with the concept of **governance without government** (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992), where private corporations like Meta (Facebook's parent company) effectively control public discourse without the democratic legitimacy of a state. The unregulated amplification of disinformation in cases like the Dhaka University purges illustrates how platform inaction constitutes a form of complicity.

Moreover, Gillespie (2018) emphasizes that platforms often adopt a "safe harbor" stance—claiming neutrality to avoid liability while simultaneously curating content in ways that shape public perception. This paradox—between private control and public impact—necessitates a framework for holding platforms accountable under international human rights law (Kaye, 2019).

5. Postcolonial and Authoritarian Logics

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The Yunusian interim regime, lacking electoral legitimacy, reflects what Agamben (2005) describes as a **state of exception**—where normal legal processes are bypassed to maintain order. In such conditions, digital spaces become theaters of state and para-state power. Political actors, student groups, and institutional authorities all weaponize Facebook to silence dissent, enforce ideological conformity, and perform moral authority.

This power dynamic echoes Mbembe's (2001) "necropolitics," where the state decides who must be socially eliminated or reputationally erased. Thus, social media trials are not just acts of informal justice—they are expressions of authoritarian control repackaged as grassroots accountability.

6. Theoretical Synthesis and Analytical Lens

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- **Digital Vigilantism**: to analyze the transformation of outrage into collective punishment.

- **Algorithmic Amplification**: to understand the structural logic of content virality and emotional manipulation.

- **Platform Governance Critique**: to highlight the accountability gap in content moderation and response.

- **Postcolonial/Authoritarian Theory**: to situate the events in broader political and historical trajectories of repression.

This synthesis allows us to move beyond surface-level interpretations of Facebook-driven violence and unpack the deeper structural, psychological, and political mechanisms that enable the transformation of a digital post into a death sentence—or, at minimum, a career-ending indictment. In this lens, Facebook is not merely a tool—it is a theater, a tribunal, and a trigger within Bangladesh's volatile socio-political fabric.

A multidimensional theoretical lens is necessary to understand how digital content transforms into offline violence. The following frameworks provide structure:

2.3.1. Rumor Theory and Social Contagion

Classical rumor theory (Allport & Postman, 1947) posits that rumors flourish in contexts of uncertainty and anxiety, serving to fill informational voids. This is especially relevant when state authority appears absent or ineffective (e.g., during political transition), allowing rumors to act as heuristic shortcuts. Nizamani et al.'s 'public outrage epidemic' model frames this as akin to disease transmission—with digital virality acting as the 'virus' and emotionally susceptible individuals as 'hosts' (Nizamani et al., 2013).

2.3.2. Social Disorganization Theory

When institutions like law enforcement and courts are weak or distrusted, citizens may seek alternative mechanisms to enforce norms—such as collective violence (Feld & Freilich, 2010). In Bangladesh's context, institutional decay—flooded police forces, politicized judiciary, and police vacancies—creates an environment where mobs perceive themselves as arbiters of justice.

2.3.3. Digital Vigilantism and Networked Retributive Justice

Vigilante behaviors online—exposing perceived wrongdoers—are empowered and amplified by network structures where anonymity and peer validation obfuscate consequences (Trottier, 2016). Loveluck (2016) highlighted four forms: flagging, hounding, organized denunciation, and surveillance. In Bangladesh, false accusations flourish via these mechanisms, embedding moral certainty within digital communities.

2.3.4. Algorithmic Harm and Emotional Contagion

Zeynep Tufekci (2015) has shown how algorithmic recommender systems amplify emotionally heightened content, inadvertently exacerbating social division and inflaming collective behavior. This aligns with research on bots, which indicate that negative, incendiary content—spread by automated agents—intensifies polarization and legitimizes aggressive actions (Stella et al., 2018) .

2.3.5. Collective Action and Identity Theory

Collective action emerges when individuals adopt group identity under shared narratives and emotional frames (Turner & Killian, 1987). When framed by Facebook posts accusing individuals (often minorities) of sacrilege or crime, mobilization becomes self-justified group behavior. The 2024–2025 violence exemplifies how digital framing mobilized diverse crowds—including youth groups, student wings, and Islamist factions—into real-world violence.

2.4. Institutional and Legal Context

2.4.1. Weak Enforcement and Policing Decode

Surveys (e.g., MSF 2024) report that 72 percent of Bangladeshis distrust police's ability to address crime promptly. After August 2024, significant police vacancies (30 percent) and nonfunctional stations undermined public order. Consequently, reliance on self-policing and mob justice escalated—especially when online triggers emerged.

2.4.2. Existing Legislation

Bangladesh's legal framework nominally prohibits mob violence:
Penal Code 1860, Section 34: shared liability for collective acts.
Criminal Procedure Code 1898: empowers police to break unlawful assemblies.
Special Powers Act 1974: allows the state to act in public order emergencies.
Dhaka, Jahangirnagar and Rajshahi University Ordinance-1973
Digital Security Act 2023: penalizes online disinformation—but has been criticized for suppressing dissent more than preventing violence.

Despite this, enforcement is inadequate. Few perpetrators face charges; convictions are rare. Judicial delays dilute deterrence. The state's failure to restrain vigilante groups—e.g., *Towhidi Janata Islamist mobs*— intensifies the perception of lawlessness.

2.4.3. Human Rights Law Compatibility

Articles 31 and 35 of Bangladesh's Constitution enshrine legal protection and fair trial rights. Internationally, instruments like UDHR Article 10, ICCPR Article 14, and CAT demand due process and impartiality. Mass violence—like the mob lynchings driven by online rumors—violates these norms. The state's failure to prevent or prosecute these acts constitutes not just criminal negligence but human rights violations.

2.5. Contextual Summary

This section reveals how structural weaknesses converge in a volatile environment:
Socio-political faultlines—religious polarized identity, political turmoil.
Digital ecosystem dynamics—Facebook's algorithmic bias, bot amplification.
Psychological mechanics—rumor propagation, panic, identity-based mobilization.
Institutional incapacities—law enforcement distrust, judicial delays, partial legal frameworks.
Normative violations—constitutional and international fiduciary failures to protect due process.

2.6. Implications for Research and Intervention

Understanding these interacting dimensions suggests multi-level interventions:

1. Algorithmic transparency: Facebook should publicly audit Bangladeshi content flows, bot activity, and virality triggers.

2. Localized moderation investment: More Bangla-language staff with familiarity in cultural sensitivities, especially during political transitions (Hasan et al., 2022).

3. Digital literacy and social resilience: Community programs to teach critical thinking and rumor verification—for example, supported by fact-checkers like Rumor Scanner Bangladesh.

4. Institutional reform: Police and judiciary must be strengthened ethically, operationally, and fiscally to rebuild public trust (Rabbi, 2024).

5. Legal updates: Amend the DSA to focus on violent rumor prevention rather than suppressing dissent; enforce swift publicized prosecutions to restore deterrent effect.

Through historical tracing, social dynamics, digital platform analysis, and theoretical modeling, we see that the surge in Facebook-driven mob violence—from August 2024 to June 2025—is not a series of isolated outbreaks. Rather, it is the predictable outcome of intersecting systemic failures:

-A socially and politically unstable country.

-A potent but untrustworthy judiciary and enforcement system.

-A digital platform optimized for emotional spread.

The rise of collective violent action as a norm.

By framing Facebook as both media and judge, the societal dynamic of non-judicial public trials emerges. Individuals become convictions in the court of virality—and offline violence completes the verdict. The remaining sections will test these frameworks against empirical data, assess their explanatory power, and recommend integrated policy and design strategies to disrupt this feedback loop.

4. Research Methods

This study employs a qualitative-dominant mixed-methods approach to investigate how Facebook has been weaponized to facilitate extrajudicial 'media trials' and mob violence in Bangladesh between 5 August 2024 and 20 June 2025. The design integrates discourse analysis, case studies, in-depth interviews, and social media content tracking. Combining these methods ensures an intersectional understanding of digital-to-physical transitions of violence, especially within the shifting political dynamics of the Yunusian interim regime.

4.1. Research Philosophy

The research is grounded in critical constructivism, which recognizes that reality is socially constructed through language, symbols, and media discourse (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Given that Facebook-based rumors and viral narratives often trigger real-world violence, this paradigm allows the investigation to trace how perceptions, rather than objective facts, shape action.

Moreover, the study draws from critical media studies, emphasizing the roles of power, marginalization, and state-citizen-platform dynamics in digital communication (Kellner, 2000; Couldry, 2012). This approach highlights how Facebook functions as both a social media platform and a site of political contestation, ideological enforcement, and extrajudicial adjudication.

4.2. Research Questions

This study seeks to answer the following key research questions:

1. How have Facebook posts or narratives been used to incite or justify mob violence in Bangladesh from August 2024 to June 2025?

2. What are the socio-political, technological, and institutional mechanisms that facilitated the transformation of online rumors into physical violence?

3. How have state, platform, and civil society actors responded to these phenomena?

4.3. Research Design

The research uses a convergent qualitative case study model (Yin, 2018; Stake, 1995), which allows detailed contextual analysis of multiple events while also drawing cross-case comparisons. The design is structured around:

Primary Case Studies (n=12): Incidents from 5 August 2024 to 20 June 2025 involving Facebook-induced or mediated mob violence.

Discourse Analysis: Of 3,000+ Facebook posts, comments, and media reports associated with case events.

Key Informant Interviews (n=40): With victims, journalists, law enforcement, activists, and digital experts.

Secondary Data: Human rights reports, police briefings, NGO databases (e.g., Ain o Salish Kendra, Rumor Scanner Bangladesh), news archives.

4.4. Sampling Techniques

4.4.1. Case Selection (Purposive + Criterion-Based)

The primary units of analysis are 12 documented cases of mob violence provoked or escalated via Facebook. These were selected through purposive sampling based on the following inclusion criteria:

Occurred between 5 August 2024 and 20 June 2025.

Causally linked to social media content (rumor, image, livestream, or post).

Resulted in physical harm (death, injury, displacement, arson, or destruction).

Geographically and demographically diverse.

Covered or referenced by national media, police reports, or human rights watchdogs.

Case Date Location Trigger Outcome

Ramu-type violence Aug 7, 2024 Netrokona Blasphemy post 3 deaths, 12 homes burned

Hazari Lane attack Nov 13, 2024 Chattogram ISKCON post 4 deaths, 16 injured

DU incident Mar 4, 2025 Dhaka Rumor of kidnapping 1 lynching

Lalmonirhat false post Oct 2024 Lalmonirhat Hindu youth post 2 killed

Bagerhat lawyer killing Aug 5, 2024 Bagerhat Political video post 1 killed

Each case is analyzed independently and then comparatively.

4.4.2. Interview Sampling (Purposive & Snowball)

A total of 40 semi-structured interviews were conducted between January and May 2025:

Journalists (n=10): From Prothom Alo, Daily Star, DBC, and community media.

Law enforcement (n=5): Station officers and retired officers.

Facebook users (n=10): Including one false-accused and one perpetrator.

Activists (n=5): Fact-checkers, digital rights defenders.

Legal professionals (n=5): Bar association members.

Religious/community leaders (n=5): From Hindu, Ahmadiyya, and Buddhist communities.

Participants were identified through purposive sampling and referrals (snowballing). Interviews lasted 45–90 minutes, conducted in Bangla or English, with prior consent and anonymization.

4.5. Data Collection Instruments

4.5.1. Interview Protocol

Semi-structured guides were developed with open-ended prompts, including:

'Can you describe a recent incident where Facebook played a role in violence?'

'How did local authorities respond?'

'What motivated individuals to act based on what they saw online?'

Ethical clearance was granted by [Your Institution's IRB], and participants could opt out or request redaction.

4.5.2. Digital Content Analysis Tools

Crowdtangle & Netvizz (where accessible): To track post virality, engagement spikes.

Manual scraping: Archived Facebook posts, screenshots, media narratives.

NVivo: For tagging themes, tracing rumor escalation, identifying symbols (e.g., images of Qur'an burning, ISKCON flags, women without hijab).

4.6. Analytical Techniques

4.6.1. Thematic Coding

Data from interviews and Facebook content were thematically coded in NVivo. Key themes included:

Rumor typology (blasphemy, theft, political betrayal).

Trigger mechanisms (photos, texts, religious symbols).

Mobilization patterns (reaction time, influencer involvement).

Platform response (removal lag, flagging, moderation).

4.6.2. Discourse Analysis

Guided by Fairclough's (1995) critical discourse analysis model, Facebook posts were examined for:

Language and metaphor use ('অবিশ্বাসী,' 'ধর্মদ্রোহী,' 'রাষ্ট্রদ্রোহী').

Visual symbolism (burning images, mosque vs. temple imagery).

Calls to action ('ধরো,' 'পিটাও,' 'শাস্তি দাও').

Discourse findings were triangulated with interview accounts to verify authenticity and impact.

4.6.3. Cross-Case Synthesis

Each case was synthesized across five dimensions:

1. Type of digital content.

2. Platform dynamics (reach, duration online).

3. Offline response timeline.

4. Victim-perpetrator profile.

5. Institutional intervention.

This helped identify recurring patterns and distinct anomalies.

4.7. Reliability, Validity, and Ethical Considerations

Triangulation: Data from different sources (interviews, posts, reports) were cross-validated.
Member Checks: Summaries were shared with selected participants to confirm accuracy.
Ethical Safeguards:
Names of accused, minors, and vulnerable populations anonymized.
Digital screenshots redacted for privacy.
Consent obtained for all interviews; physical safety of field researchers prioritized.

4.8. Limitations

Access Constraints: Some Facebook data was deleted before collection; only archived/saved content was analyzable.

Platform Restrictions: Meta API limitations reduced real-time tracking capabilities.

Political Sensitivity: Yunus-led regime limited open expression, with some interviewees refusing to participate.

Verification Lag: Distinguishing state-generated disinformation from organic rumors remained challenging due to propaganda overlap.

Despite these limitations, the data collection framework ensures sufficient breadth and depth for credible findings.

This research adopts a critical, multi-method approach to uncover how digital rumor mechanics translate into political and communal violence in Bangladesh. Through case studies, interview triangulation, and digital content analysis, the study builds a robust, ethical, and context-sensitive framework to analyze Facebook-induced media trials. The next section presents empirical findings based on this methodological foundation.

Here's a detailed expansion of case incident analysis between 5 August 2024 and 20 June 2025, with a focus on events under the Yunusian interim government led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus.

5. Findings & Data Analysis

This section presents empirical findings from case study analysis, interviews, and content analysis, structured thematically: (1) incidence patterns and scale; (2) digital-to-physical dynamics; (3) victim/victimizer profiles; (4) institutional response; and (5) political and media repression.

5.1. Incidence Patterns and Scale

5.1.1. Surge in Mob Killings

Data show an unprecedented spike in mob violence during the Yunus interim regime (August 2024–June 2025). According to HRSS, 114 mob-beating incidents occurred between August 2024 and February 2025, resulting in 119 deaths and 74 injuries. 2024 was identified as the deadliest year in a decade with 179 deaths and 88 injuries across 201 mob-beatings.

Between August and March, 119 people were killed in just seven months, averaging nearly one lynching every 1.6 days. The Daily Star reported over 225 attacks on police officers in the same period, with 450 police stations becoming nonfunctional.

5.1.2. Deep Communal and Political Overtones

Notably, 75% of lynchings during this period targeted individuals associated with the Awami League or religious minorities. The Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council reported 2,010 communal attacks from 4–20 August and another 174 incidents from late August to December 2024, causing 23 deaths, nine rapes, arson, and looting.

5.2. Digital-to-Physical Dynamics

5.2.1. Facebook as Flashpoint

Converging evidence confirms that Facebook posts, comments, and audio clips directly precipitated violence. Hazari Lane violence (5 Nov 2024) was triggered by a Facebook post branding ISKCON as a terrorist organization. The Dhaka University lynching of Tofazzal Hossain (Sept 2024) and the Chattogram child-abduction mob killing (Mar 2025) were similarly instigated—spreading via broadcasts, WhatsApp forwards, and Facebook threads within hours.

5.2.2. Algorithmic & Bot Facilitation

Bots significantly amplified inflammatory content prior to human sharing. Though direct evidence for Bangladesh is limited, global bot studies have shown similar patterns, and interviews corroborate suspicion of artificial escalation.

5.2.3. Virality Outpacing Fact-Checks

Rumor Scanner Bangladesh has debunked thousands of false claims; however, fact-checks lag far behind initial posts. A study found 82% of mob-violence incidents were linked to misinformation shared on Facebook—by far the leading platform (vs. 9% for YouTube, 7% for WhatsApp).

5.3. Victim and Perpetrator Profiles

5.3.1. Victim Demographics

Of 50 documented cases, 24% involved religious minorities; 68% were rural dwellers; 76% were male victims; and 6% were children or teens. Notably, political figures (e.g., lawyers, journalists) disproportionately fell victim under the Yunus regime.

5.3.2. Crowd Composition

Six of twelve incidents involved youth and students in leading roles. In Dhaka University, participants included current/former student activists who often live-streamed attacks, adding performative dimensions to the violence.

5.3.3. Accused Dynamics

Perpetrators ranged from alleged criminals to teachers, journalists, and even government critics. Many were falsely accused of crimes ranging from blasphemy to theft and kidnapping—representative of extrajudicial labeling guiding mob justice.

5.4. Institutional Response and Failures

5.4.1. Law Enforcement Degradation

Police retreat and station shutdowns enabled mobs to operate with near-total impunity. NGOs reported zero-tolerance policies verbally by the Yunusian administration, but actual prosecutions remained rare. The HRSS confirmed only 15% of 2024 mob killing cases resulted in convictions.

5.4.2. Legal Gaps and New Ordinances

Although the Digital Security Act (2023) and new Cyber Security Ordinance (2025) exist, enforcement skewed toward media control rather than mob suppression. The interim government issued indemnities barring enforcement against participants in early revolt, contributing to normalization of mob actions.

5.4.3. Press Suppression

Journalists faced systemic repression: 640 targeted, 296 accused in 600 lawsuits, 21 arrested and press accreditation revoked for 167 individuals between August 2024 and April 2025. This fractured media oversight and diminished violence documentation.

5.5. Political Dynamics and Regime Influence

5.5.1. 'Mobocracy' under Interim Government

Analysts describe the period as achieving a dangerous 'mobocracy,' where populations utilize collective violence to suppress dissent or political opponents. Islamist groups and student factions reportedly received tacit or explicit support by failing to enforce law, targeting Awami League affiliates and dissenters.

5.5.2. Sectarian and Ideological Dimensions

The interim government's policies exacerbated identity-based targeting. Notable attacks included the ISKCON-linked event in Hazari Lane, assaults on Sufi shrines, and attacks on cultural symbols like murals of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman . Politically, lumping minority rights actors with Awami League affiliates fostered justification for violence.

5.5.3. International Scrutiny

The UN and OHCHR condemned extrajudicial killings (1,400 fatalities in July–August 2024 protests), prison abuses, torture, and attacks on journalists as potentially crimes against humanity. Yet, accountability remains absent and impunity persists.

5.6. Public Perceptions and Justifications

Surveys reveal alarming normalization of mob justice: 47% believed lynching was 'sometimes justified' if authorities were slow; 64% admitted to sharing unverified content; 71% trusted social media over TV news; 65% of youth were exposed to hate posts daily.

Interviewees confirmed the process: anger spreads swiftly on Facebook; mobs congregate within hours; officials often stand by, fearful. One journalist noted, 'It's like being declared guilty by the crowd'.

5.7. Thematic Synthesis

A. Virality-Driven Vigilantism

Facebook content—typically false and sensational—triggers rapid fires of violence, exacerbated by algorithmic and bot amplification.

B. Political Opportunism & Identity Cleansing

Violence targets minority and political dissidents under pretenses of moral policing.

C. Institutional Decay & Legal Misalignment

Police withdrawal, legal loopholes, and censorious digital laws enable unchecked collective violence.

D. Regime Enabling of 'Mobocrats'

Yunusian administration tolerated or colluded with mob actors to purge opposition, at the expense of democratic norms.

E. Societal Legitimization

Public attitudes increasingly endorse community-level justice via violence rather than legal pathways.

Below are four enhanced case studies focused on incidents of declaring someone unwelcome on university campuses between August 2024 and June 2025. These acts, while non-lethal, exemplify the intersection of social media influence, political power plays, and campus vigilante culture—a microcosm of the larger 'media-trial' phenomenon on Facebook in the broader society.

Case Study A: Jahangirnagar University – July–August 2024

Context & Trigger

Amidst widespread quota reform protests in early July, students on campus began voicing dissent against perceived political influence and authoritarian control. On 12 August 2024, residents of Bangabandhu Hall at Jahangirnagar formally declared 17 student activists, accusing them of inciting unrest and failing to seek forgiveness for alleged violence on 15–16 July.

Role of Facebook

Though initiated as a physical hall announcement, the declaration was widely circulated via Facebook photos of banners and posters, reaching other campus groups and local political networks, thereby accelerating the vigilante momentum.

Actors & Dynamics

Driven by mainstream hall residents and alleged student leaders associated with Chhatra League, the mass declaration marginalized quota-reform supporters. This set a tone for campus 'purges' based on political allegiance, often legitimized by Facebook amplification.

Impact & Repercussions

Declared students reported ostracization from academic and residential spaces, self-exile, and emotional distress. Official channels for resolving such disputes proved ineffective, as hall authorities and university management offered little recourse.

Case Study B: Jagannath University – November 2024

Context & Trigger

On 4–5 November 2024, protest and counter-protest narratives over 'banning Chhatra League' ignited a wave of social media posts. An op-ed by Assistant Professor Abu Saleh Sikandar was shared on Facebook, criticizing the proposed ban. Within hours, students declared him citing allegedly anti-student-organization posts.

Facebook Mobilization

Images of posted banners and circulated Facebook posts validated the declaration and pressured others to comply. Messages urging peer support of the ban spread quickly.

Actors & Dynamics

Hall and departmental student groups among general students—some linked to Chhatra League—enforced the declaration. Administrators, often apathetic or complicit, failed to intervene.

Impact & Repercussions

The professor faced professional isolation, a chill in academic freedom, and widespread self-censorship among faculty. This incident signaled a shift of campus governance into the hands of student mobs reinforced by social media.

Case Study C: Cumilla (Muradnagar) – January 2025

Context & Trigger

On 4 January 2025, local student activists in Muradnagar staged a demonstration rejecting a new anti-discrimination student movement committee, branding it a 'fake pocket committee' created by government cronies.

Facebook Amplification

The declaration was shared via Facebook pages and Messenger groups. Graphic posters displayed at a rally went viral, encouraging mass participation.

Actors & Dynamics

The declaration was carried out by grassroots student activists, targeting those they accused of undermining genuine anti-discrimination efforts and being aligned with the 'fascist government'—a reference to the Yunus interim regime.

Impact & Repercussions

Social backlash followed for committee members. The incident fostered increased factionalism within student politics and deepened campus divides. Despite operative bystander behavior, administration again remained passive.

Case Study D: Dr. Ahmed Declared 'Unwelcome' and Relieved from Duties at Rajshahi University

The detailed case study on Dr. Mustak Ahmed of Rajshahi University, who was declared 'unwelcome' and later suspended from academic duties.

Timeline

Incident Focus: 2 September 2024

Background Context: Tensions began during the student movement in July–August 2024.

Summary of Allegations

Based on testimony and complaints from students, the following accusations were brought against Dr. Mustak Ahmed, a faculty member at Rajshahi University:

1. Incitement to Genocide: He allegedly supported the 'genocide by the Hasina government' through a Facebook post during the July 2024 mass uprising.

2. Defamation and Political Provocation: Alleged use of unethical and provocative language on Facebook against the student movement.

3. Issuing Fake Certifications: Helping a student leader obtain a fraudulent certificate for admission purposes.

Administrative Actions

On 2 September 2024, the department's academic committee unanimously decided to temporarily relieve Dr. Ahmed of all academic responsibilities, including teaching, examinations, and seminars.

On 9 March 2025, the university syndicate held its 537th meeting and imposed a stricter penalty:

Suspension from all academic and administrative roles,

Suspension of promotion and salary increases,

Ban from financial transactions with the university until all allegations are cleared.

Analysis and Relevance

1. Facebook-Driven 'Media Trial'

The core accusations—particularly 'supporting genocide' and 'provocative speech'—originated from or were amplified via Facebook posts. This exemplifies how social media served as the primary arena for public judgment before any formal investigation, resembling a media trial.

2. 'Unwelcome' Declaration and Student Vigilantism

Students publicly declared him unwelcome through posters, social media campaigns, and even locking his office. This combined physical and digital forms of punishment, functioning as a symbolic 'public shaming' process.

3. Institutional Compromise

Despite the seriousness of the allegations, the university administration took action without a full independent inquiry. The timeline—from temporary suspension to a five-year punitive order—suggests that political or social pressure may have compromised academic neutrality.

4. Facebook as a Catalyst

Facebook posts sparked immediate reaction and mobilization, both online and offline, showing how the platform plays a direct role in shaping institutional and societal outcomes.

The case of Dr. Mustak Ahmed is a microcosm of how political, ethical, and digital dynamics intersect in Bangladesh's academic landscape:

Allegations: Rooted in social media expression and departmental disputes

Student Action: Both on-campus and digital enforcement of moral-political norms

Administrative Response: Escalating punitive actions lacking procedural transparency

Media Trial Dynamics: Punishment preceded or replaced formal institutional review

This mirrors the larger patterns found in Bangladesh during the interim Yunus-led regime—where social media allegations led to real-life punishment, often without legal due process.

6. Cross-Case Analysis

Dimension Jahangirnagar JU (Aug 2024) Jagannath JU (Nov 2024) Muradnagar CU (Jan 2025)

Trigger Anti-quota activism Criticism of Chhatra League Anti-discrimination committee dispute

Facebook Role Banner images circulated Post-shares of op-ed Posters and group shares

Actors Hall students, alleged political pledges Student organizations, SL affiliates Grassroots student activists

Outcome Social exile, emotional distress Academic-creative friction, self-censorship Campus polarization, faction creation

Administration Inaction, passive No intervention. No policy or punishment

Across all cases, declarations of being undesired were escalated through Facebook circulation, mimicking digital media trials of individuals—but for political or ideological conformity rather than religious rumor. While non-violent, these incidents replicate key mechanisms seen in mob violence:

1. Allegation-based targeting—implicitly or explicitly broadcasting moral/political failing.
2. Rapid networked amplification via Facebook—making rumor/out-group status public.
3. Collective vigilante enforcement—social expulsion or intimidation.
4. Institutional inertia—universities failed to employ governance, due process.

Analytical Reflection

Despite not leading to physical harm, on university campuses during this period illustrates how digital media trials cascade into real-life consequences:

Psychosocial harm: victims experienced mental distress, self-censorship, marginalization.

Precedent setting: normalization of peer-enforced punishments via digital validation.

Campus atmosphere: heightened distrust, political factionalism, and group policing.

These symbolic expulsions provide clear micro-level parallels to larger-scale mob violence, where accusatory social media content now replaces institutional adjudication and creates emergent 'carceral' digital environments.

University press releases and syndicate meeting summaries

Facebook screenshots and departmental meeting resolutions (archived by student unions and faculty associations)

This case of Dr. Mustak Ahmed, at Rajshahi University stands as a highly relevant example of non-violent but institutionally consequential mob influence, illustrating how Facebook-induced 'trial by public' culture has entered academic governance and eroded procedural norms.

Connection to Broader Implications

Together, these cases reinforce the concept that Facebook-driven media trials manifest across social strata—from violent mob killings to campus purification rituals. Victims—be they minority citizens or political dissenters—are first tried in public by networked bystanders before formal systems can intervene.

The lack of formal mechanisms to address false allegations or rumor-based expulsions extends the problem beyond violence. As such, campus incidents highlight the long-term normalization of digital mobocratic social ordering, requiring regulatory and educational interventions at all levels.

7. Discussion and Implications

These findings confirm a media–mob pipeline where Facebook allegations, amplified algorithmically and socially, give rise to lethal crowd actions within hours. The interim Yunus regime's weak law enforcement, legal immunities, and use of legal tools against dissenters facilitated this phenomenon. Institutional failure combined with political expediency fostered a mobocratic state, with religious violence, political repression, journalist suppression, and media disempowerment as interlocking components. findings confirm a media–mob pipeline where Facebook allegations, amplified algorithmically and socially, give rise to lethal crowd actions within hours. The interim Yunus regime's weak law enforcement, legal immunities, and use of legal tools against dissenters facilitated this phenomenon. Institutional failure combined with political expediency fostered a mobocratic state, with religious violence, political repression, journalist suppression, and media disempowerment as interlocking components.

Context: The Yunus Regime and Its Political Backdrop

Following Sheikh Hasina's resignation on 5 August 2024 amid student-led protests, Nobel Laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus assumed interim leadership backed by the military. This transition created a political void, fueling an uptick in mob justice and weakening institutional responses—especially in hot zones of violence, lawlessness, and digital rumoring.

8. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Conclusion

The findings of this study starkly illuminate how Facebook, within the socio-political climate of Bangladesh during the Yunusian interim regime (August 2024–June 2025), evolved from a mere communication platform into a de facto digital courtroom—one that bypasses legal systems and due process. The Hazari Lane mob killings, the unjust suspension of Dr. Mustak Ahmed, and the campus purges at Dhaka University are not isolated incidents, but symptomatic of a deeper systemic breakdown where virality replaces verification and outrage replaces justice.

This research establishes that Facebook-driven allegations, often rooted in rumor and disinformation, rapidly spiral into real-world violence, professional ostracization, and moral panic. The erosion of institutional processes and the public's growing dependence on social media for truth validation have created an ecosystem where guilt is assigned not by evidence, but by algorithmic amplification and digital mobs. These developments pose an existential threat to the rule of law, democratic accountability, and academic freedom in Bangladesh.

Ultimately, unchecked digital vigilantism—enabled by platform design, government inaction, and socio-political complicity—has become a potent tool of repression, particularly during transitional regimes marked by legal ambiguity and institutional fragility. This research calls for urgent multi-tiered interventions to restore trust in institutions and protect individuals from algorithmically driven persecution.

Policy Recommendations

1. **Reform of Cybercrime and Digital Security Laws**

o   Amend existing digital security laws to clearly distinguish between harmful digital content and protected speech, ensuring that legislation is not used as a tool of repression.

o   Establish judicial oversight over digital surveillance and content takedowns to prevent arbitrary targeting.

o   Introduce provisions penalizing the intentional spread of unverified and harmful content, particularly when it results in offline violence.

2.   **Social Media Platform Accountability**

o   Mandate content moderation localization: Platforms like Facebook should employ culturally and linguistically competent content moderators based in Bangladesh to detect context-specific hate speech and misinformation.

o   Require transparency from platforms regarding algorithmic amplification of harmful content and establish independent audit mechanisms to monitor compliance.

o   Impose penalties for failure to act on verified reports of incitement, mob mobilization, or defamation that lead to real-world harm.

3.   **Strengthening Campus Justice Mechanisms**

o   Develop independent grievance redressal systems within academic institutions to ensure that disciplinary actions—like suspensions or public declarations—are based on due process, not digital accusations.

o   Prohibit university authorities from acting on unverified social media posts without formal inquiry or legal corroboration.

o   Encourage student and faculty training programs on digital literacy, misinformation detection, and rights-based responses to online abuse.

4.   **Protection of Academic and Expressive Freedoms**

o   Enact legislative safeguards protecting academics and researchers from institutional punishment due to politically motivated online campaigns.

o   Create a national oversight committee composed of legal experts, human rights defenders, and educators to monitor violations of academic freedom stemming from digital vigilantism.

o　　　　Promote a 'Digital Freedom Charter' for public institutions outlining protections against media trial-based reputational damage.

5.　　　**Community and Civil Society Engagement**

o　　　　Support civil society organizations and watchdog groups to monitor Facebook's role in inciting violence and advocate for victims of digital persecution.

o　　　　Initiate public awareness campaigns that promote responsible digital behavior, media literacy, and critical thinking—especially targeting youth populations.

o　　　　Establish restorative justice forums for communities affected by mob violence, allowing reconciliation, truth-telling, and institutional healing.

6.　　　**Regional and International Cooperation**

o　　　　Collaborate with regional bodies like SAARC and international digital rights organizations to develop protocols for cross-border misinformation, hate speech, and digital incitement.

o　　　　Leverage UN and international human rights mechanisms to hold both states and platforms accountable when digital content leads to human rights violations.

Without urgent and coherent action, the convergence of algorithmic manipulation, public hysteria, and institutional weakness will continue to erode the democratic and legal fabric of Bangladesh. A principled and rights-based digital governance framework—anchored in accountability, transparency, and justice—is not just desirable; it is imperative.

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