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Rationality of Irrational Choice: The Logic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Version 1
: Received: 19 March 2024 / Approved: 21 March 2024 / Online: 21 March 2024 (11:55:46 CET)
How to cite: Kagan, E.; Rybalov, A.; Yager, R. Rationality of Irrational Choice: The Logic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma . Preprints 2024, 2024031273. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202403.1273.v1 Kagan, E.; Rybalov, A.; Yager, R. Rationality of Irrational Choice: The Logic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma . Preprints 2024, 2024031273. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202403.1273.v1
Abstract
The goal of the paper is to clarify the observed irrationality of decision making in conflict situations considered as one-step games of two players. To solve such situations, we consider the asymmetry in the relation of the players to their own rewards and the rewards of the opponents. Formalization of the decision-making process is based on recently developed non-commutative operators of multivalued logic algebra. The suggested method is applied to solve the well-known Prisoners’ dilemma game and the other situations of conflict, where it results in the expected strategies.
Keywords
multivalued logic; non-commutative algebra; decision-making; uncertainty; irrational decisions
Subject
Computer Science and Mathematics, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
Copyright: This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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