

Article

# Economic sustainability of small-scale hydroelectric plants on national scale – The Italian case study

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**Abstract:** The feasibility of hydroelectric plants depends on a variety of factors: water resource regime, geographical, geological and environmental context, available technology, construction cost and economic value of produced energy. Choices about the building or renewal of hydroelectric plants should be based on the forecast of the future trend of these factors at least during the project life of the system. Focusing on the economic value of the produced energy this paper examines its influence on the feasibility of hydroelectric plants. Analysis, referred to Italian case, were based on three different phases: i) the economic sustainability of small-scale hydroelectric plants under a minimum price guaranteed to the hydroelectric operator; ii) the estimate of the incentives to reach the thresholds of "acceptability" and "bankability" of the investment; iii) the analysis of results obtained in the previous phases using a model of the evolution of the electricity price in the period 2014-2100.

**Keywords:** economic sustainability; mini hydroelectric plants; tariff; incentive; climate change

## 1. Introduction

Hydropower accounts for about 20% of the worldwide electrical power production, with higher percentage in mountain regions [1]. It is a clean source of energy well as an economic resource for regions rich in usable water. Hydroelectric production is managed mainly according to water availability and electricity sale price [2].

Electricity demand and price generally depend on societal and economic development, but they are also subject to changes related to weather variability, both of seasonal and long-term type (e.g., variation under climate change [3-4]).

Water availability depends largely on climatic and hydrological conditions and, therefore, can have significant variations both in space and time [5]. While seasonal and from year to year variability of river runoff has always been taken into account in the past, recent concern is on the effect of climate change on productivity of hydroelectric plants.

This effect is related to precipitation volumes and time patterns, but also on evapotranspiration and consequently on average temperatures. While productivity of reservoir hydroelectric plant is mainly affected by variations of available water volume, that is by the annual rainfall volumes, in the case of run-of-the-river hydroelectric plants it is affected also by the time distribution among seasons of precipitation, that is mainly by the river discharge-duration curve [6].

Often, hydropower comes largely from cold water, originating from ice/snow melt in the mountain areas subject, to rapid cryosphere wasting due to global warming [7]. This could be a concern, especially for the Alps, with a large share of hydropower depending upon cryosphere water. In the Alpine region, the rising temperatures have resulted in the loss of more than half of the glaciers volume since 1900. With a global temperature increased by 2–4 degrees, 50%–90% of the ice mass of the mountain glaciers could disappear by the end of this century [8]. With earlier snow melting and rainfall variation, inter-annual run-off is changing towards less water during summer and more during the winter-season. Depending on the watershed, the water quantity may increase initially due to the

loss of ice stock [9]. Changes in temperatures and precipitation patterns can involve profound effects on water systems and cause important changes on uses highly dependent on hydrological regime, such as hydropower production modifying total annual inflow volumes and their seasonal distribution [10].

Several studies analyzed climate change impacts on hydropower production. Finger et al. (2012) described as they affected water resources and subsequently hydropower production in hydropower plants in a glacierized alpine valley (Vispa valley, Switzerland). The trends observed in all the projections indicated significant changes to the current situation: the future melt- and rainfall-runoff will increase during spring but decline during summer [1]. Stucchi et al. (2019) studied climate change impact on the Sabbione (Hosandorn) glacier, in the Piemonte region of Italy, and the homonymous reservoir, which collects water from ice melt, projecting forward hydrological cycle under properly downscaled climate change scenarios until 2100. They concluded that the decrease of cold water in this area, paradigmatic of the present state of hydropower in the Alps, and subsequent considerable hydropower losses under climate change, claims for adaptation measures [7]. Ravazzani et al. (2016), assessed the impacts of climate change on hydropower production of the Toce Alpine river basin in Italy; they showed an increase of production in autumn, winter and spring, and a reduction in June and July [11]. Gaudard et al. (2014) provided a synthesis and comparison of methodologies and results obtained in several studies devoted to the impact of climate change on hydropower on Swiss and Italian Alps [12]. Duratorre et al. (2020) studied the effects of potential climate change scenarios at 2100 upon hydropower production from the Chavonne plant, in Valle d'Aosta region of Italy, using Poli-Hydro, a state-of-the-art hydrological model to mimic the hydrological budget of the area, including ice and snow melt share [13]. Patro et al. (2018) assessed the impacts of nine climate-change scenarios on the hydrological regime and on hydropower production of forty-two glacierized basins across the Italian Alps, for the period 2016–2065. Results predict a decline in average summer runoff across all basins compared to present due to the glacier shrinkage, whereas different temperature or precipitation trends plays a marginal role [14].

In areas where a large share of hydropower production depends upon ice melt, the expected future lack of water due to glaciers reduction may affect energy production and requires adaptation strategies [15]. Sensibility of hydropower plants productivity to climate change, together with the fact that they are still the major source of renewable energy, makes strategic to support and increase this type of energy production and to strengthen the efforts to reduce the human induced climatic changes [16].

The focus of this paper is the economic sustainability of small-scale hydroelectric plants on the national scale. Energy and climate policy, as well as electricity market design and dynamics play a pivotal role for the future of the sector [17, 18]. Among the Italian renewable sources, according to the GSE (Energy Services Operator) statistical report hydroelectricity is the largest, both in power and in annual production. It results the most efficient source because with the same installed power and incentive paid, produces more energy than other sources, since its useful life is much longer. Hydroelectric plants have a much higher investment cost than other energy production technologies, but operating costs are extremely lower since no type of fuel is required, which is often the most important cost component. The relationship between the energy produced in useful life and the one consumed to build, install and to dispose of it at the end of its life is of an order of magnitude higher than that other types of renewable sources. Moreover, it ensures the security of energy supply since it is the only programmable renewable source; reservoir plants produce only when necessary, stabilize the National Transport Network and allow the Italian electricity system to adapt to our consumption hour by hour. Even run-of-the-river plants have a predictable production in the short term and therefore they have a qualitatively better role in the energy system of wind power or photovoltaic plants. Anyway, there are two main critical issues that undermine the economy of an investment in hydroelectric plants: the cost of water and the lack of economies of scale since they are tailor-made for their respective sites. The design of small-scale hydroelectric plants is a

challenge involving more factors: hydrological, technological, environmental and social. Moreover, each plant must undergo to a strict and selective authorization process, facing the regulatory uncertainties regarding possible incentives.

The objective of the following study is to analyze the economic sustainability of small-scale river hydroelectric plants with a concession power of up to 1 MW in the current regulatory context, to provide planners, legislators and stakeholders with reflections useful for the transition to a new configuration of incentive mechanisms. The choice of focusing on small-scale hydroelectric plants is due to the peculiarity of the territory. The Alps and the Apennines are completely saturated and it results impossible to build large systems.

The study was divided into three phases. i) The first is an analysis of the economic sustainability of hydroelectric plants with concession power up to 1,000 kW in the absence of incentives for the first 1,500,000 kWh produced. Particular attention was paid to the incidence of water concession fees on the economic evaluation of the investment. ii) The second phase is the estimate of the value of the incentive needed to achieve the economic sustainability for hydroelectric plants, compared to the investment "acceptability" and "bankability" thresholds typical for these types of plants. iii) The last consists in an evaluation of the sustainability of the plants in the complicated context of climate change, with reference to the most influential factors that govern the phenomenon in such a way as to offer the most reliable and truthful forecast possible. The aim is to understand if the incentives can be considered the shock absorber capable of effectively meeting the economic needs of the hydroelectric sector to ensure that the latter remain strategic in the Italian production system.

## 2. Feasibility criteria

To evaluate the economic suitability of small-scale hydroelectric plants, two levels of feasibility were adopted:

a) economic feasibility: the profitability rate, that is the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), between 7% and 9%. It represents a profitability range typically considered acceptable by the entity that promotes the investment.

b) banking feasibility: rates higher than 9%, on average considered acceptable by credit institutions to guarantee the bankability of a hydroelectric project.

Economic analysis of the suitability of small hydroelectric plants can be conducted with different methods. The simplest is to compare the relationship between the total investment and the installed power or the ratio between total investment and energy annual yield. These criteria do not identify the convenience of the systems, since the revenues are not considered; they can be used only to have general indications on the investment. In this study the Net Present Value methodology (NPV) was used. It allows to obtain a faithful estimate of the profitability of the project through the estimate of the IRR. The NPV is nothing more than the difference between cash inflows and outflows, throughout the duration of the investment, both discounted at a rate, called discount rate [19, 20, 21]. The formula to calculate the NPV, if the cash flows occur at regular time intervals results:

$$NPV = \sum_{i=0}^n \frac{R_i - (I_i + O_i + M_i)}{(1+r)^i} + V_r \quad (1)$$

$I_i$ : capital expenditures in period  $i$ ,

$R_i$ : cash inflow into period  $i$ ,

$O_i$ : operating cash costs in period  $i$ ,

$M_i$ : maintenance and repair cash costs in period  $i$ ,

$V_r$ : present value of residual value of the investment at the end of its lifetime

$r$ : discount rate or opportunity cost of capital,


$n$ : number of considered periods.

Only projects with positive NPV can be considered acceptable. The IRR indicates the rate of return expected from an investment: the higher the IRR is, the more convenient the investment. The limit condition results:

$$NPV = f(r = IRR) = 0$$

### 3. Case study


In Italy there are 3,700 hydroelectric plants, that achieve a total production of 42.4 TWh, about 14% of the country's production [19]. Most such plants are small and have marginal influence. In 2015, 77% of Italian hydropower was produced by plants with power >10 MW, covering merely 17% of the total energy electric production. The distribution of hydroelectric plants is quite heterogeneous as well the density of national installed power. Figure 1 shows a map of Italian maximum annual hydroelectric production. The largest number of plants in Italy is in the northern regions with very high percentages in Piedmont, Lombardy and Trentino Alto-Adige. According to data provided by the GSE (year 2016), over 55% of the total plants are installed in these three regions alone, with a considerable density in Piedmont and Lombardy where there are 36% of all plants installed, which generate a total of 42% of the national installed hydroelectric power [19]. Lombardy was chosen as case study, given the high presence of hydroelectric plants and because it is a virtuous example regarding the canons of concession for small plants. As consequent, if the results were not advantageous for this type of plants and in this context where the ferment and private initiative are the masters, they would not be advantageous even in other regions, where the overall rents are higher. In the calculation, the following standard sizes were used: 100 kW, 250 kW, 500 kW and 1000 kW, that is in the category of micro-hydroelectric plants.



**Figure 1.** Map of Italian maximum annual hydroelectric production (Source ERSE SpA).

#### 3.1. The Italian fare system

One of main concern with economic sustainability of hydroelectric plants in Italy is that while the average energy price is constantly decreasing, about 20% less from 2012, the sum of the water concession fees/surcharges continue to rise (in some regions there was an increase in taxes related to the use of water resources by local authorities by almost +160%) [22]. Figure 2 shows the growing trend of water concession fees in recent years for the two regions "at the extreme" as regards the values for small plants in comparison to the National Single Price (PUN). After the peak of 2012, the PUN went down (-17% overall from 2009 to 2018), while the water concession fees, especially the Piedmont, have increased significantly (+159% from 2009 to 2018). The increase in Lombardy is less marked and more gradual (+12% in the period 2009-2019). The trend is rather disconcerting, considering that the fees are fixed costs for the hydroelectric operator not related to either the economic value of the production or the actual water availability [22].



**Figure 2.** Water concession fees in the period 2009-2019.

The water concession fee varies according to the Region, while above a predefined threshold (220 kW), it is necessary to pay "Surcharges", defined by a national standard. Table 1 shows an example of annual water fees for Lombardy.

**Table 1.** Annual water fees for Lombardy.

Annual water fees in Lombardy	
Water concession fee	16.19 €/kW
Extra charge for mountain watershed	30.67 €/kW
Extra charge for local authorities	5.78 €/kW
Ichthyogenic fee	0.85 €/kW
Royalties	3% on revenues

The investment in a small hydroelectric plant involves several payments distributed over the life of the project and provides incomes, also distributed over time. Outputs include a fixed component such as the cost of capital, insurance, taxes other than income taxes, etc. and a variable component represented by operating expense and maintenance, costs which absolutely cannot be ignored for a correct assessment of economic profitability and above all with a view to efficient operation throughout its useful life. At the end of the project, generally coinciding with the duration of the concession, the residual value should be positive. The sale price of the energy produced is defined through the so-called PMG (Minimum Guaranteed Prices), or according to a simplified tariff mechanism that allows producers to sell the electricity fed into the grid, transferring it directly to the GSE who remunerate it based on precise and variable rates every year, paying a price for each kilowatt hour withdrawn. In this economic model it is assumed that the PMG are constant for the entire duration of the plant concession. Choice dictated in the first place by the

awareness that in the last ten years these rates have remained virtually unchanged and secondly by the desire to recognize them more and more strategic importance for the support of the sector, so that the study can constitute an alternative founded for a possible future proposal of legislation devoted to environmental protection. Tables 2 and 3 show respectively PMGs until 2013 and PMGs in force (2019).

**Table 2.** PMGs, 2013.

Guaranteed minimum prices (€/MWh)	2013
0-250,000 [kWh]	158.7
250,000-500,000 [kWh]	100.5
500,000-1,000,000 [kWh]	86.7
1,000,000-1,500,000 [kWh]	80.6

**Table 3.** PMGs, 2019.

Guaranteed minimum prices (€/MWh)	2019
0-250,000 [kWh]	156.1
250,000-500,000 [kWh]	107.2
500,000-1,000,000 [kWh]	67.7
1,000,000-1,500,000 [kWh]	58.5

Table 4 shows the incentive plans proposed in recent years for flowing water systems; in the last decade incentive dropped by about 30%.

**Table 4.** Tariff associated to different power for different DM (Ministerial Decree), [23], [24], [25].


Flowing water	Power (kW)	Rate (€/MWh)
	1<P≤20	257
DM July 6 <sup>th</sup> 2012	20<P≤500	219
	500<P≤1000	155
	1<P≤250	210
DM June 23 <sup>rd</sup> 2016	250<P≤500	195
	500<P≤1000	150
	1<P≤400	155
DM July 4 <sup>th</sup> 2019	400<P<1000	110
	P≥1000	80

The incentive tariffs provided for medium-large size of plants undergone a percentage decrease in the incentive tariffs higher than all the other sizes.

### 3.2. The economic value of produced energy

Several models aimed at estimating the electricity prices were recently introduced in Europe in the wake of the liberalization of the energy market at the end of the 1990s. Such liberalization brought to the country-wise definition of the free market [26]. In Italy, the Legislative Decree 79/1999, allowed such liberalization. Energy prices after energy liberalization are continuously made available by the Energy Markets Operator (GME), an Italian authority with the mission of promoting the development of a national competitive electricity system, according to the criteria of neutrality, transparency, and objectivity. Competition in the electricity market is guaranteed by the Borsa Elettrica, an electricity stock market. It promotes the application of efficient equilibrium prices, allowing the sale and purchase of electricity according to the greater economic convenience. It is organized as a real physical market, with the definition of sales and purchases through hourly charts, according to the criterion of economic merit. This consists of considering, for sales, the prices in increasing order and, for purchases, the prices in decreasing order. Price definition takes place as in a physical market, according to matching of supply and demand. Electricity offers are accepted in order of economic merit, i.e., in order of increasing price, until their sum in terms of kWh completely meets the demand. The kWh price of the last

accepted bidder, i.e., the one with the highest price, is attributed to all offers, and according to European Directive 2009/28, renewable energies, like hydropower, have priority in terms of access to the market. In so doing, in each zone of the Italian territory with given technical constraints, the equilibrium prices are defined, i.e., those that are found at the intersection of the supply and demand curves. Subsequently, the PUN is established by GME. The economic value of electricity is difficult to express with a relationship between the independent variables, already only at a national level. These can be physical, economic, social, political variables and are therefore all specific to a socio-political context, generally referable to a national scale. In literature, there have been proposed some models of the economic value of electricity linked to more general quantities useful if future projections are to be made [27, 28]; among them there are multi-agent models [29], parametric models [30], stochastic models [31, 32, 33] and computational models [34]. Also, hybrid, or mixed, models were developed [3, 4, 35, 36, 37, 38]. The availability of water resources for the next years, strongly influenced by climatic changes [27] strictly will influence hydroelectric production and consequently, the economic value of produced energy. Moreover, hydroelectric energy is greatly affected by weather conditions; its productivity can be subject to significant seasonal and annual variations. The climatic conditions affect both the hydrological cycle, energy demand and the price of electricity. Bombelli et al., [3, 4] investigated how hydroelectric production is influenced by climate, fluctuations in demand and price constraints, extrapolating a hypothetical trend of electricity price up to the end of the 21st century, from three global climate models of the IPCC AR5, RCP2.6, RCP4.5, and RCP8.5 (Figure 3). The method was applied to the case study of the Italian electricity market, showing acceptable capacity of modelling recently observed price fluctuations.




**Figure 3.** Trend of average annual prices of electricity over the period 2014-2100.

The average annual price of energy will undergo a significant increase over the analyzed 87 years, going from about 64 €/MWh to about 169 €/MWh. The immediate outcome of a similar projection is the increase in expectations of the entire hydroelectric sector. If currently the economic sustainability of a hydroelectric project cannot be separated from incentive policies, a similar scenario may instead reserve the possibility of investing in the sector without the need to rely on subsidized tariffs.

### 3.3. Phase 1


In phase 1 the economic sustainability of hydroelectric plants with concession power up to 1,000 kW in the absence of incentives and access to the PMG for the first 1,500,000 kWh produced was analyzed. The energy exceeding the threshold of PMG is sold at the market price, that is the average value of the last 5 years of the PUN on the day before market, was assumed. Moreover, particular attention was paid to the incidence of water concession fees on the economic evaluation of the investment. In calculation energy was weighted by a reduction coefficient equal to 0.85 to consider that a plant is not always at its maximum potential due to periods of inactivity or other external factors that the operator cannot exclude. These could be periods of drought (in which the plant runs at reduced power), periods of full extremes (in which it runs at maximum power or is stopped). From this point of view, the economic simulation of the profitability of a plant that results from it is certainly more reliable and representative of reality because it considers the unpredictability. Furthermore, according to this logic, the average hours of operation considered are effective (non-operating hours for maintenance excluded). The calculation is usually carried out over 30 years, because, due to the discounting, both expenses and income weigh shortly after many years. This aspect, which could be considered a "limit" of this economic model, is not however influential in this analysis since it is customary to consider a duration equal to the period of concession of the plants, which in the greatest number of cases is around 20-30 years.

Figure 4 shows the trend of the IRR varying the average annual hours of operation between 3,000 and 8,000 hours and the CAPEX (capital expenditures) between 4,000 and 7,000 €/kW for sizes of 100 kW, 250 kW and 500 kW, and between 3,000 and 6,000 €/kW for size 1,000 kW. An average OPEX (operating expenses) of 125 €/kW for the size of 100 kW and of 115 €/kW for the others and an annual inflation rate of 1% were assumed. In each graph, two areas were highlighted to mark the investment acceptability threshold in orange (for profitability rates between 7% and 9%) and the investment convenience threshold in green (for rates higher than 9%). Although the average operation of the entire national hydroelectric park, including the reservoir plants, is equal to 3,370 h/year, the analyzed plants are generally characterized by greater hours of operation; this because little run-of-river systems which guarantee a more persistent functioning throughout the year that easily reaches 6,000-7,000 h/year, were considered.




**Figure 4.** IIR trend-Hours of operation for different CAPEX for system of 100 kW (a), 250 kW (b), 500 (c) kW and 1,000 Kw (d).

The IRR of the investment is less than 7% for almost all cases, except the first. The worsening as the size increases, is substantially due to the lesser relevant of the PMG provided for plants with a concession power less than 1,000 kW, within the first 1,500,000 kWh produced. Only the smaller plants can take advantage of these subsidized prices for all the produced energy, while the larger ones must operate mainly on the market price. As shown in Figure 4, a 100 kW system is the only interesting one: it achieves the threshold of acceptability for CAPEX of 4,000 €/kW, 5,000 €/kW and 6,000 €/kW respectively after 4,500, 5,500 and 6,500 hours. For plants with an installed power of 250 kW, the area of acceptability is only slightly crossed with CAPEX of 4,000 €/kW. Systems with the most expensive installation costs (CAPEX equal to 6,000 €/kW and 7,000 €/kW) achieve very low IRR. When a plant exceeds 5,000,000 kWh of energy production, according to PMG 2019, the price of energy undergoes a sharp decrease of approximately 37%, from 107,2 to 67,6 €/MWh. The cash flow is therefore gradually reduced as the production and consequently also the IRR. As shown in Figure 4c and 4d, the situation worsens for plants of 500 and 1,000 kW, as these can reach very high productions, respectively of about 3,000,000 and 7,000,000 kWh. In such cases, the effort to use substantial resources for development is not rewarded at all by the high productions, because the subsidized tariff plan does not reward them. The simulation concerning the 1,000 kW system has the lowest CAPEX, between 3,000 and 6,000 €/kW, to consider the scale factor; unit installation costs too high would lead to a huge unreliable investment. The rents (in which royalties are also considered) have a strong impact on the profitability of the plant: these represent an average annual cost equal to approximately 6% of the revenues for a 100 kW plant, also exempt from the payment of mountain watershed and local authorities, between 9% and 12% for a 250 kW plant, between 15% and 17% for the 500 kW one and between 19% and 22% for a 1,000 kW system. If incentive tariffs on the same cases were applied, any implant size would become economically sustainable, even hitting profitability peaks of over 25%. Figure 5 reports results for the following incentives: 0.219 €/kWh for 250 kW plant (a), 0.179 €/kWh for 500 kW plant (b), 0.1561 €/kWh for 1,000 kW plant (c). To consider the scale factor, the rate is discounted as the size increases. Despite this, all lines intersect the areas of acceptability and convenience.



**Figure 5.** IIR trend-Hours of operation for plants of 250 kW with an incentive of 0.219 €/kWh (a), 500 kW with an incentive of 0.179 €/kWh (b), 1,000 kW with incentives of 0.156€/kWh (c).

In Figure 5 only the minimum and maximum CAPEX were represented. The IRR achieves the profitability threshold for all combinations even for the highest CAPEXs. This proves that, in a regulatory context that supports the sector with advantageous tariffs, there could be significant sustainable development rates for all plant sizes without no longer concerns about investment attractiveness. Newly built plants to which the PMGs are applied, according to the current thresholds, do not appear economically sustainable. They were extended to up to 2,000,000 kWh to highlight the positive influence produced by GMPs, especially for high hours of operation. Given the low price guaranteed for the last bracket, between 1,000,000 kWh and 1,500,000 kWh, instead of increasing the latter, it was decided to add the 500,000 additional kWh that are missing to reach 2,000,000 kWh in equal measure (i.e., 250,000 kWh each) in the two central brackets. For all plant sizes, the curves at CAPEX 4,000 €/kW were compared with two alternative tariff plans: the tariff plans PMGs 2013, that shows more favorable prices and PMGs 2019, extended G to 2,000,000 kWh (Figure 6).



**Figure 6.** IIR trend-Hours of operation comparing PMG 2019 with PMG 2013 extended to 2,000,000 kWh for CAPEX 4,000 €/kW for different plant sizes: 100 kW (a), 250 kW (b), 500 kW (c) and 1000 kW (d).

For all plant sizes both alternatives involve advantages, except for the minimum size of 100 kW, characterized by low energy production that does not benefit from the extension of the PMGs or from the increase in prices. With reference to the PMG 2013, there is an increase of profitability of approximately 21%, 40% and 46% in plants with installed power equal to 250, 500 and 1,000 kW, respectively, while with the PMG 2019 slightly lower percentages were recorded: about 17%, 18%, and 23% for same plant sizes.

Concluding, the PMGs in force ensure the complete profitability only for smallest plants size, with an installed power less than or equal to 100 kW, whose OPEX are not compensated by the energy sale revenue at market price. For the other sizes, there is a deterioration in the profitability of investments as the installed power increases, due to the lower impact of the PMG. To make the development of new medium-large plants more attractive, the extension of the PMGs is needed.



### 3.4. Phase 2 – Remodulation of the tariff plan

The aim of this phase is to identify a so-called Feed in Tariff (FIT) to economically support the micro-hydroelectric sector guaranteeing the maintenance of the minimum plants profitability. Feed-in tariffs (FIT) are fixed electricity prices that are paid to renewable energy producers for each unit of energy produced and injected into the electricity grid. Several countries introduced this kind of energy policy [39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45]. FIT provided by the DM July 4<sup>th</sup> 2019 was 0.080 €/kWh, FIT provided by DM July 6<sup>th</sup> 2012 and DM June 23<sup>rd</sup> 2016 were respectively equal to 0.155 €/kWh and 0.150 €/kWh. The same thresholds of investment acceptability and bankability of phase 1 were adopted. Also, in this case, the cash flows were discounted assuming that the time life of the hydroelectric project is 30 years and produced energy was sold to the PUN. Figures 7-8-9-10 show, varying the hours of operation and the CAPEX, the value of FIT to reach a IIR equal to the two pre-established thresholds (7% and 9%) for plant size of 100 kW, 250 kW, 500 kW and 1,000 kW.




Figure 7. FIT-Hours of operation for different CAPEX to reach IRR of 7% (a) and 9% (b), plant size 100 kW.

The current FIT (DM July 4<sup>th</sup> 2019) is suitable to guarantee a net economic return of 7% but not to reach 9%, while FIT of DM July 6<sup>th</sup> 2012 and DM June 23<sup>rd</sup> 2016 would be sufficient for both the profitability thresholds. The FIT to reach an IRR of 7% and 9%, averaging the values associated with the various CAPEX and assuming 6,000 hours of operation, would be 0.129 €/kWh and 0.208 €/kWh respectively.






Figure 8. FIT-Hours of operation for different CAPEX to reach IRR of 7% (a) and 9% (b), plant size 250 kW.

Figure 8 shows some improvement for the bankability threshold: the FIT of DM July 4<sup>th</sup> 2019 (0.155 €/kWh) allows to reach the profitability for all systems of this size whose installation cost is between 4,000 €/kW and 5,000 €/kW. Higher CAPEXs are unsustainable for this incentive rate. The FIT that would be necessary to reach an IRR of 7% and 9%, averaging values of different CAPEX and assuming 6,000 hours of operation, would be respectively 0.125 €/kWh and 0.168 €/kWh.



**Figure 9.** FIT-Hours of operation for different CAPEX to reach IRR of 7% (a) and 9% (b), plant size 500 kW.

With the increase in installed power, the remuneration conferred by the DM July 4<sup>th</sup> 2019 fell to 0.110 €/kWh with significant repercussions on the economic sustainability of a hydroelectric project (Figure 9). The minimum profitability limit is not guaranteed neither for IRR of 7% (for CAPEX of 6,000 and 7,000 €/kW) nor for IRR of 9%. The FIT to reach these profitability thresholds, averaging values of different CAPEX and assuming 6,000 hours of operation, would be respectively 0.124 €/kWh and 0.155 €/kWh.



**Figure 10.** FIT-Hours of operation for different CAPEX to reach IRR equal to 7% (a) and 9% (b), plant size 1,000 kW.

For 1,000 kW systems, the FIT provided by the DM July 4<sup>th</sup> 2019 is insufficient to guarantee the economic sustainability of 7% and 9% (Figure 10). On the contrary, the FIT established by the previous Ministerial Decrees DM July 6<sup>th</sup> 2012 and DM June 23<sup>rd</sup> 2016 would be sufficient for both profitability thresholds. The FIT to reach these profitability thresholds, averaging of the values of different CAPEX and assuming 6,000 hours of operation, would be respectively 0.107 €/kWh and 0.127 €/kWh. The FIT guaranteed by the DM June 23<sup>rd</sup> 2016, almost all plants reach acceptable yields around 6,000 hours of operation differently that with the last tariff plan (DM July 4<sup>th</sup> 2019). Only systems with installed power less than or equal to 250 kW (for any CAPEX) and those of 500 kW for small CAPEX (about 4,000 €/kW) guarantee the minimum profitability of 7%, for the same number of operating hours. All other combinations do not guarantee the achievement of the minimum economic sustainability. Table 5 summarizes the values of the FIT resulting from analysis.

**Table 5.** Remodeling of the tariff plan.

Power (kW)	FIT -7% (€/MWh)	FIT -9% (€/MWh)
1<P≤100	129	208
100<P≤250	125	168
250<P≤500	124	155
500<P≤1000	107	127

The current FIT (DM July 4<sup>th</sup> 2019) is insufficient for the development of plants larger than 250 kW. If in the past the incentive policies allowed a transversal development of the

micro-hydroelectric, affecting all sizes, today they are excessively restrictive and risk paralyzing not only the increase in total installed power but also any technological development.

### 3.5. Phase 3 – Economic sustainability of micro-hydroelectric plants in the period 2014-2100


The evaluation of the effect of the price of energy on production is important when studying the profitability and benefits associated with energy systems. As previously discussed, the demand and the price of electricity depend not only on economic and social developments but may also be subject to seasonal variability and other medium-long term variations due to climate change. With reference to the model of Figure 3, the benefit that an increase of the electricity price would bring to the economic profitability of small-scale hydroelectric plants was explored. Simulations were performed by applying the NPV methodology; the cash flows to discount over 30 years of the investment life were updated from year to year according to the kilowatt hours of energy produced and the average annual price. Two different analysis were carried out: the first compares the performance of hydroelectric projects undertaken in two opposing scenarios, the second investigates the evolution of the IRR from 2020 to 2070.

#### ANALISYS 1: comparison of performances for two opposite scenarios


For each plant size, the trend of the IRR for two opposite scenarios, characterized by regimes of electricity prices at the extremes of the pre-established temporal projection (periods 2020-2049 and 2070-2099 respectively) were compared. Consistently with previous phases CAPEX was varied from 4,000 €/kW to 7,000 €/kW for plants with installed power of 100 kW, 250 kW, 500 kW, and from 3,000 €/kW to 6,000 €/kW for 1,000 kW systems. To consider the uncertainty linked to future changes in water concession fees from now up to 2100 in calculations two distinct criteria were adopted:

Approach 1: relying on the trend in the average annual energy price according to the projection of Figure 3, the NPV was estimated calculating the updated cash flows from year to year according to the electricity price of the current year.

Approach 2: the calculation of the NPV was developed by assuming the price of electricity constant over time, so that all cash flows calculated for the entire useful life of the investment are equal. Figure 11 and 12 compare results of the two approaches.



**Figure 11.** IRR-Hours of operation, comparing scenarios 2020-2049 for Approach 1 and Approach 2: 100 kW (a), 250 kW (b), 500 kW (c), 1,000 kW (d).





**Figure 12.** IRR-Hours of operation, comparing scenarios 2070-2099, for Approach 1 and Approach 2: 100 kW (a), 250 kW (b), 500 kW (c), 1,000 kW (d).

With reference to Approach 1, The IRR at 6,000 hours of operation for the period 2020-2049 never reaches profitability values equal to or greater than 7% for any CAPEX. Considering the scenario 2070-2099 the IRR always exceed the 7% threshold, up to reaching values that exceed the minimum investment convenience limit (9%) for CAPEX below 6,000 €/kW. The different profitability between the two stages is underlined if the situation is analyzed at 7,000 average hours of operation: if in the first scenario the IRR reaches acceptable values only for installation costs equal to 4,000 €/kW, in the second scenario the IRR exceed the 9% for all types of investments (CAPEX of 4,000, 5,000, 6,000 and 7,000 €/kW). Considering a system characterized by an installed power of 1,000 kW, both scenarios benefit of more favorable IRR. The average annual production for 6,000 hours, in the 2020-2049 scenario exceeds the minimum limit of 7% only with the minimum CAPEX, while in the 2070-2099 scenario all the IRR record a profitability of over 9%, with values even close to 18%. The same trend occurs for 7,000 average hours of production: while in scenario 1 acceptable investment are achieved only for CAPEX of 3,000 €/kW and 4,000 €/kW, in scenario 2 all the CAPEXs exceed the convenience threshold of 9%. The positive effect on IRR of the increase in electricity prices over the course of the century is significant and reflects the expectations of the sector. On average, the increase recorded between scenario 1 and scenario 2, at the threshold of 6,000 average hours of operation, even exceeds 100%; that is, profitability doubles. Comparing results from Approach 1 and Approach 2, in all simulations the difference of IIR is appreciable. Over the useful life of a hydroelectric plant operating in the free market, the factor with the most relevant specific weight for its profitability is the price of energy. To consider the future evolution of the price of electricity is important for the evaluation of the suitability and reliability of an investment.

#### ANALISYS 2: IRR evolution in the period 2020-2070

The aim is to trace the trend of the investment profitability over the years, calculating the IRR by discounting the cash flows envisaged by the NPV methodology over the entire useful life of the system and associating the IRR to the year in which the investment is undertaken. Resulting curve indicates, for each year, the percentage of the IRR of the investment, calculated by discounting the cash flows over the next 30 years (i.e., the value of profitability associated with the year 2032 is the result of the economic analysis carried out using the NPV method considering the cash flows in the years 2032-2061 and the corresponding energy prices. The simulations were carried out sequentially from 2020 to 2070. For each case study (100 kW, 250 kW, 500 kW, 1,000 kW) the trends of the IRR corresponding to the minimum and maximum CAPEX were calculated, to highlight the range within which the investment profitability of similar projects can fluctuate (Figure 13).





**Figure 13.** IRR-Period 2020-2070 for CAPEX of 4,000 €/kW and 7,000 €/kW, assuming an average operation of 6,000 hours: 100 kW (a), 250 kW (b), 500 kW (c), 1,000 kW (d).

Between one-unit installation cost and the other there is a difference ranging from 3 to 5 percentage points at the beginning of the projection (2020) and from 8 to 10 percentage points at the end of the projection (2070). The IRR grows with an almost linear trend, as expected from the trend in the price of electricity. Considering the maximum CAPEX of 7,000 €/kW, starting from an IRR of approximately 1%, within 50 years an IRR of almost 8% is reached; considering the minimum CAPEX of 4,000 €/kW, the initial IRR settles around 5% and the final one around 12.5%. The influence of the CAPEX on the marginal growth of the IRR was confirmed. Even in the case of a 1,000 kW system, the IIR trend remains increasing. However, the marginal growth of this parameter is different for the two considered CAPEX. For the minimum CAPEX (3,000 €/kW), the IRR recorded in 2020 is about 7.5%, while in 2070 it settles around 18%. For the maximum CAPEX (€ 6,000/kW) the IRR starts from a value of 1% and grows up to just over 8%. In the period 2020-2070, the increase of the IRR for the maximum CAPEX is approximately 7%, for the minimum CAPEX is greater (about 11%). This trend can be traced back to the economic investment costs associated with the size of the plant: for the same installed power and for the maximum sizes of the micro-hydroelectric, the CAPEX assumes a greater specific weight in the projection of the IRR. For smaller CAPEX there is a marginal increase in the IRR, higher than the value for the same unit installation cost, for the smaller sizes. Rely the feasibility analysis of a hydroelectric project to an accurate model of future projections of the value of electricity is certainly a more truthful approach, despite the uncertainties connected to this kind of models.

#### 4. Conclusions

In the study the evolution of the profitability of an investment, according to the plant sizes and the economic context, was analyzed for Italian scenario, as function of the tariffs recognized by the hydroelectric energy market, the unit cost of installing the plants and their average hours of operation. Three phases were distinguished: the first, was characterized by the analysis of the economic sustainability of the micro-hydroelectric plants under the PMG; in the second, the value of the incentive to reach the thresholds of "acceptability" and "bankability" of the investment, for the same hydroelectric plants of the phase 1, was estimated; in the third, an analysis of the results obtained in the previous phases was conducted using a model of the evolution of the price of electricity in the period 2014-2100. Obtained results suggest that, to maintain the attractiveness of the sector, it is necessary to safeguard access to the PMG. With PMG 2019, complete sustainability is only achieved for plants with  $P \leq 100$  kW. For the remaining sizes, investments under current conditions would not be profitable. The extension of PMGs could make new medium-large plants (500-1000 kW) more attractive. The current incentive policy (DM July 4<sup>th</sup> 2019) is not effective for the development of plants larger than 250 kW; systems with lower CAPEX should be preferred. Uncertainty about the evolution of the price of energy over

time is a concern for the sector; the use of evolutionary models of technical economic analysis tries to reduce these criticalities and shows that they can be transformed into opportunities. Profitability due to the growing trend expected for the price of energy cannot be highlighted by a traditional analysis.

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### Abbreviations

The following symbols are used in this paper:

<i>GSE</i>	Energy Services Operator
<i>IRR</i>	Internal Rate of Return
<i>NPV</i>	Net Present Value
<i>PUN</i>	National Single Price
<i>PMG</i>	Minimum Guaranteed Prices
<i>DM</i>	Ministerial Decree
<i>GME</i>	Energy Markets Operator
<i>OPEX</i>	OPERating EXPenses
<i>FIT</i>	Feed in Tarif

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