

1 Article

2 Shadow Pricing of Electric Power Interruptions for 3 Distribution System Operators in Finland

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13 **Abstract:** Increasing distributed generation and intermittency, along with the increasing frequency
14 of extreme weather events, impose a serious challenge for the electric power supply security.
15 Understanding the costs of interruption is vital in terms of enhancing the power system
16 infrastructure and planning the distribution grid. On the other hand, customer rights and demand
17 response techniques are further reasons to study the worth of power reliability. In this paper, the
18 authors make use of directional distance function and shadow pricing method for a case study from
19 Finland. The aim is to calculate the cost of one minute of power interruption from the distribution
20 network operator perspective. The sample consists of 78 distribution network operators from
21 Finland with cost and network information between 2013 and 2015.

22 **Keywords:** power interruption; distribution system operator; interruption cost; shadow price

23

24 1. Introduction

25 Continuity of electric power supply is a key concern for authorities, Distribution System
26 Operators (DSOs) and for the consumers. As each sector, such as finance, telecommunications, health,
27 entertainment, transportation etc. become more and more dependent on electricity, the results of
28 power interruptions become more devastating. There is no surprise that the United States Homeland
29 Security defines energy sector as “uniquely critical because it provides an “enabling function” across
30 all critical infrastructure sectors” [1], while [2] emphasize the significance of the electric power grid
31 as “the most critical of critical infrastructure”. As rapidly increasing intermittent renewable energy
32 sources create a challenge for the power system planners, the increasing frequency and the duration
33 of the extreme weather events have become a major threat for the electric power security [3].
34 Consequently, estimation of the costs of power interruptions or the value of lost load has become an
35 attractive field for the researchers. Customer surveys, indirect analytical methods and case studies
36 are the three major methodologies which are commonly used by the research society to assess the
37 customer interruption costs (CIC). Each method has certain advantageous and disadvantageous.
38 Customer Surveys are the most preferred and extensively used approach. In the customer surveys, a
39 customer survey is prepared and distributed to the electricity customers through various means such
40 as one-to-one interviews, telephone calls, e-mails or by mail. The questionnaire includes questions
41 about various interruption scenarios. For reaching customer specific results, this method is the most
42 popular one in the literature [4]. However, doing extensive surveys means too much time, effort and
43 money to be spent. Furthermore, dealing with the raw responses and censoring outliers from the data
44 sets are other challenges of this methodology. The second approach is Indirect Analytical Methods.
45 The main advantage of this method is that it is relatively a straightforward and easy to apply when
46 compared to customer surveys. Electricity prices or tariffs, value added or turnover of a customer,

47 gross domestic product of a country, annual energy consumption or the peak power reached during
48 a year of a customer group, region or a country are some of the input data for this approach. These
49 data are publicly available, objective and easy to reach. The major shortcoming of this methodology
50 is that since it uses general and average data, naturally it provides broad and average results. Finally,
51 Case Studies approach is another method for the CIC analysis purposes. The case studies are done
52 after major and significant blackouts. It is the best way of evaluating both direct and indirect
53 economic costs incurred by the power outages. Even though this method provides the most accurate
54 and reliable results, since they are done after actual events, they are not commonly used. Case studies
55 from New York City blackout of 1977 [5] and Storm Gudrun of 2005 in Sweden [6] are good examples
56 for this. The comprehensive review paper [7] compiles the academic studies in the field of worth of
57 electric power reliability until the year 2015. More recent studies can be found based on country
58 specific data. Studies [8] - [10] adopt customer surveys, whereas [11] - [15] follow indirect analytical
59 methods. The report [8] summarizes the value of service reliability for the electricity customers in the
60 United States. Another detailed report [9] investigates the value of lost load (VoLL) for electricity
61 customers in Great Britain. Study [10] uses a customer survey in Germany. The paper [11] presents
62 the worth of energy not supplied (ENS) in Scotland. The studies [12] and [13] target the costs of power
63 interruptions at residential sector in the European Union and Italy respectively. Another paper
64 introduces outage cost estimations for industry sector customers from South Korea [14]. One generic
65 power interruption assessment paper has been published for customers from South Africa [15]. Most
66 of the sources follow indirect analytical methods, customer surveys or case studies methodologies
67 [7]. However, in this paper, rather than conventional methods, we would like to adopt the directional
68 distance function approach to calculate the shadow pricing of electricity outages. The shadow pricing
69 of a production technology through distance function is presented at [16]. The directional distance
70 function is introduced in detail at [17]. Shadow pricing of a product has been calculated for many
71 areas such as; pollution costs in agriculture production in US [18] and China [19], costs of water cuts
72 in Chile [20], price licenses in salmon farming in Norway [21], banking inefficiency in Japan [22] and
73 price of CO₂, SO₂ and NO_x in the United States coal power industry [23]. On the other hand, [24]
74 adopts parametric distance function approach to calculate the value of power outages for French
75 DSOs. The purpose of this paper is to use shadow pricing technique assess customer interruption
76 costs from the DSO perspective. We should note that VoLL or worth of ENS are not in the scope of
77 this paper. The following of the paper is organized as follows: Section III introduces the methodology
78 of the directional distance function and shadow pricing of a production technology. Section IV
79 presents the empirical study and the results of the shadow pricing of power interruption analysis for
80 78 DSOs from Finland. Section V includes conclusion and discussion remarks.

81 2. Directional Distance Function and the Shadow Pricing of Electric Power Interruptions

82 We may assume that the electricity supply has two main states: the continuity of supply
83 (supplied energy), and the interruptions (energy not supplied). To estimate the worth of the energy
84 not supplied, one can establish an analogy with the directional distance function. The directional
85 distance function has desirable (or good) and undesirable (or bad) outputs [18]. In this study, the
86 desirable output will be energy supplied to the customers, while the undesirable output will be the
87 total minutes lost in a year, or customer minutes lost (CML). By the aid of the directional distance
88 function, we will utilize the shadow price technique to evaluate the costs of power interruptions. The
89 shadow price of bad outputs is presented at [18]. The methodology assumes that the production of
90 good outputs brings along the production of bad outputs. It should be noted that, to talk about power
91 interruptions in a region, naturally there must be electricity service provided in that region in the first
92 place. On the other hand, the shadow price can be obtained via the distance function as well [16],
93 [25]. However, the main advantage of the directional distance function over the distance function is
94 that it enables the expansion of the good outputs and the contraction of the bad outputs
95 simultaneously. For the electricity service, both the DSOs and the authorities wish to reduce the
96 frequency and the durations of interruptions and increase the total amount of energy supplied to the
97 consumers. As a result, it is more convenient to adopt the directional distance function to estimate

98 the shadow prices of the value of lost load, or as it will be presented in this paper, the value of one
 99 minute of interruption. So, the result of the shadow pricing will yield the cost of contraction of one
 100 unit of bad output (customer minutes lost) and the expansion of one unit of good output (energy
 101 supplied) simultaneously in terms of operational expenses. The main features of the directional
 102 distance function can be briefed as follows:

103 Let us assume that there are N inputs, M good outputs and J bad outputs, then inputs (x), good
 104 outputs (y) and bad outputs (b) are denoted respectively by:

$$105 \quad x = (x_1, \dots, x_N) \in R_+^N \quad (1)$$

$$y = (y_1, \dots, y_M) \in R_+^M \quad (2)$$

$$b = (b_1, \dots, b_J) \in R_+^J \quad (3)$$

106 Let $P(x)$ denote the production technology [26], where:

$$108 \quad P(x) = \{(y, b): x \text{ can produce } (y, b)\} \quad (4)$$

109 The directional output distance function serves as the functional representation of the
 110 technology. The production technology $P(x)$ is represented by the directional distance function D_0
 111 [27]. Let $g = (g_y, g_b)$ be a directional vector and β be the maximum expansion of good outputs in the
 112 direction of g_y and the minimum contraction of the bad outputs in the direction of g_b , then D_0 is
 113 defined as:

$$114 \quad \overline{D}_0(x, y, b; g_y, g_b) = \max\{\beta: (y + \beta g_y, b - \beta g_b) \in P(x)\} \quad (5)$$

$$115 \quad \overline{D}_0(x, y + \alpha g_y, b - \alpha g_b; g) = \overline{D}_0(x, y, b; g) - \alpha \quad (6)$$

116 Our aim is to increase the amount of energy supplied to the customers, while decreasing the
 117 amount of energy not supplied via reducing the CML. The directional vectors of $g_y > 0$ mean the
 118 expansion of desirable output, while $g_b > 0$ mean the contraction of the undesirable output. The
 119 relationship between the directional distance function and the revenue function reveals the shadow
 120 price for the undesirable outputs [18]. Let p indicate the good output prices and q indicate the bad
 121 output prices. These are represented as:

$$122 \quad p = (p_1, \dots, p_M) \in R_+^M \quad (7)$$

$$123 \quad q = (q_1, \dots, q_J) \in R_+^J \quad (8)$$

124 The revenue function is then introduced to account for the negative revenue generated by the
 125 bad outputs. The negative revenue due to the undesirable output (CML) is defined by the revenue
 126 function as follows:

$$127 \quad R(x, p, q) = \max_{y,b}\{py - qb : (y, b) \in P(x)\} \quad (9)$$

129 The revenue function, $R(x, p, q)$, gives the largest feasible revenue that can be obtained from
 130 inputs, x , when the production technology, electricity in our case, has good output prices, p , and bad
 131

132 output prices, q . The desirable output prices (p) and the undesirable output prices (q) can be used to
 133 calculate the largest feasible revenue in terms of the directional distance function D_0 as:
 134

$$R(x, p, q) \geq (py - qb) + p \cdot \overrightarrow{D}_0(x, y, b; g) \cdot g_y + q \cdot \overrightarrow{D}_0(x, y, b; g) \cdot g_b \quad (10)$$

135
 136 The left-hand side of the equation stands for the maximum revenue, while the right-hand side
 137 is equal to the actual revenue ($py - qb$) plus the revenue gain from the elimination of technical
 138 inefficiency. The gain in revenue from the elimination of technical inefficiency has two components:
 139 the gain due to an increase in good outputs ($p \cdot \overrightarrow{D}_0(x, y, b; g) \cdot g_y$) and the gain due to a decrease in
 140 bad outputs ($q \cdot \overrightarrow{D}_0(x, y, b; g) \cdot g_b$), since the cost of bad outputs is subtracted from good revenues.
 141 Rearranging (10), the directional output distance function and the maximal revenue function are
 142 related as:
 143

$$\overrightarrow{D}_0(x, y, b; g) \leq \frac{R(x, p, q) - ((py - qb))}{pg_y + qg_b} \quad (11)$$

144
 145 The directional output distance function given in (5) can also be recovered from the revenue
 146 function as:

$$\overrightarrow{D}_0(x, y, b; g) = \min_{p, q} \left\{ \frac{R(x, p, q) - ((py - qb))}{pg_y + qg_b} \right\} \quad (12)$$

147
 148 Applying the envelope theorem twice to (12) yields our shadow price model:

$$\nabla_y \overrightarrow{D}_0(x, y, b; g) = \frac{-p}{pg_y + qg_b} \quad (13)$$

$$\nabla_b \overrightarrow{D}_0(x, y, b; g) = \frac{q}{pg_y + qg_b} \quad (14)$$

149
 150 The details of the physical meaning of the shadow pricing technique is explained in [18] in detail.
 151 By assuming that we know the m -th price of the good output (in our case the operational expenses of
 152 the DSOs), then the j -th nominal bad output price (the price of one minute of interruption) can be
 153 calculated as [28]:

$$q_j = -p_m \left(\frac{\frac{\partial \overrightarrow{D}_0(x, y, b; g)}{\partial b_j}}{\frac{\partial \overrightarrow{D}_0(x, y, b; g)}{\partial y_m}} \right), j = 1, \dots, J. \quad (15)$$

154
 155 The references [17] and [29] parameterize the directional distance function through a quadratic
 156 function. At this point we are supposed to choose our directional vector g , so that we can increase the
 157 amount of energy provided to the customers and decrease the customer interruptions in a year. 1, 0
 158 and -1 within the vector g means increase, no change and decrease in the outputs respectively. For
 159 example, $g = (1, 0)$ means expanding the desirable outputs, while keeping the undesirable outputs
 160 the same. Since our aim is to increase the good outputs and decrease the bad outputs simultaneously,
 161 the directional vector $g = (1, 1)$ is set. We assume that there are $k = 1, \dots, K$ DSOs, then the quadratic
 162 distance function for the k -th DSO is shown in equation (16):

163 Where,
 164 l : the constant of the quadratic directional distance function,
 165 α_n : the input coefficients,
 166 β_m : the desirable output coefficients,
 167 γ_j : the undesirable output coefficients,

168 α_{mn} : the quadratic of input coefficients,
 169 β_{mm} : the quadratic of desirable output coefficients,
 170 γ_{jj} : the quadratic of undesirable output coefficients,
 171 δ_{nm} : the product of the inputs and desirable outputs coefficients,
 172 η_{nj} : the product of the inputs and undesirable outputs coefficients,
 173 μ_{mj} : the coefficients of the product of the desirable and undesirable outputs.

174 The parameters of (16), l , α_n , α_{mn} , β_m , β_{mm} , γ_j , γ_{jj} , δ_{nm} , η_{nj} , μ_{mj} , are chosen to minimize the sum of
 175 the deviations of the directional distance function value from the frontier technology (in our case the
 176 electric power supply). The coefficients of (16) are calculated via solving (17) with Python by adopting
 177 the directional vector as $g = (1, 1)$. Equation (18) requires the output–input vector to be feasible.
 178 Equation (19) and (20) impose the monotonicity conditions of (13) and (14). Equation (21) imposes
 179 positive monotonicity on the inputs for the mean level of input usage. That is, at the mean level of
 180 inputs, \bar{x} , an increase in input usage holding good and bad outputs constant, causes the directional
 181 output distance function to increase, implying greater inefficiency. Equation (22) is due to the
 182 translation property of (6).
 183

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{D}_0 = (x_k, y_k, b_k; 1, 1) = & l + \sum_{n=1}^N \alpha_n x_{nk} + \sum_{m=1}^M \beta_m y_{mk} + \sum_{j=1}^J \gamma_j b_{jk} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{n'=1}^N \alpha_{mn'} x_{nk} x_{n'k} \\ & + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{m=1}^M \sum_{m'=1}^M \beta_{mm'} y_{mk} y_{m'k} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{j'=1}^J \gamma_{jj'} b_{jk} b_{j'k} + \sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{m=1}^M \delta_{nm} x_{nk} y_{mk} \\ & + \sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^J \eta_{nj} x_{nk} b_{jk} + \sum_{m=1}^M \sum_{j=1}^J \mu_{mj} y_{mk} b_{jk} \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

184
 185 Then, an optimization model is established which minimize the sum of the deviations of the
 186 directional distance function value from the frontier technology (in our case the electric power
 187 supply), see from (17) to (23). Moreover, the decision variables in the optimization model are l , α_n ,
 188 α_{mn} , β_m , β_{mm} , γ_j , γ_{jj} , δ_{nm} , η_{nj} , μ_{mj} and they are solved with Python.

$$\text{Minimize } \sum_{k=1}^K [\bar{D}_0(x_k, y_k, b_k; 1, 1) - 0] \quad (17)$$

189
 190 Subject to,

$$\bar{D}_0(x_k, y_k, b_k; 1, 1) \geq 0, \quad k = 1, \dots, K \quad (18)$$

$$\frac{\partial \bar{D}_0(x_k, y_k, b_k; 1, 1)}{\partial b_j} \geq 0, \quad j = 1, \dots, J; k = 1, \dots, K \quad (19)$$

$$\frac{\partial \bar{D}_0(x_k, y_k, b_k; 1, 1)}{\partial y_m} \leq 0, \quad m = 1, \dots, M; k = 1, \dots, K \quad (20)$$

$$\frac{\partial \bar{D}_0(\bar{x}, y_k, b_k; 1, 1)}{\partial x_n} \geq 0, \quad n = 1, \dots, N \quad (21)$$

$$\sum_{m=1}^M \beta_m - \sum_{j=1}^J \gamma_j = -1; \quad \sum_{m'=1}^M \beta_{mm'} - \sum_{j=1}^J \mu_{mj} = 0, \quad m = 1, \dots, M; \quad (22)$$

$$\sum_{j'=1}^J \gamma_{jj'} - \sum_{m=1}^M \mu_{mj} = 0, \quad j = 1, \dots, J; \quad \sum_{m=1}^M \delta_{nm} - \sum_{j=1}^J \eta_{nj} = 0, \quad n = 1, \dots, N$$

$$\alpha_{nn'} = \alpha_{n'n}, n \neq n'; \beta_{mm'} = \beta_{m'm}, m \neq m'; \gamma_{jj'} = \gamma_{j'j}, j \neq j' \quad (23)$$

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192 3. Empirical Study and Results

193 2.1. Empirical Study

194 This paper targets Finland for the empirical study. Even though the country has a robust electric
 195 power infrastructure, the security of supply is being threatened by the extreme weather events [3].
 196 These events might cause long lasting outages which eventually drive Finnish DSOs to invest and
 197 spend more money on operational and maintenance expenses. In our study, we made use of 78
 198 Finnish DSOs and their data for the years 2013, 2014 and 2015. Since some of the DSOs have not
 199 announced their interruption statistics yet [30], the year 2016 is not included in this paper. As useful
 200 data for the directional distance function, from the Finnish Energy Market Authority
 201 (Energiavirasto), we selected energy supplied, number of customers, share of underground cabling,
 202 operational expenses and System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) for each DSO. SAIDI
 203 is calculated as:

$$SAIDI = \frac{\text{sum of all customer interruptions in a year}}{\text{total number of customers served}} \quad (h) \quad (24)$$

204 Sum of all customer interruptions in a year can also be defined in terms of customer minutes
 205 lost (CML) in a year. Therefore, CML is calculated as:

$$CML = SAIDI \times 60 \times \text{number of customers} \quad (min) \quad (25)$$

206 Share of underground cabling in distribution lines (SC in %) and the operational expenses (OPEX
 207 in euros) have been chosen as inputs, while energy supplied to the low voltage customers (ES in
 208 GWh) and the customer minutes lost (CML in minutes) have been designated as desirable and
 209 undesirable outputs respectively. The descriptive statistics of the input and output variables are
 210 shown in Table I by specifying the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of each
 211 data set for the years 2013, 2014 and 2015 for the 78 Finnish DSOs. A total of 936 sample observations
 212 have been used in the analysis process. OPEX and CML are represented in thousand euros and
 213 thousand minutes respectively. In addition, energy supplied is tabulated in GWh.

214 2.2. Results

215 Within this optimization model, the objective function (17) has been solved using constraints
 216 (18-23) by Python programming language in order to optimize the problem, and the following
 217 coefficients have been calculated and presented in Table II. When Linear Programming variables are
 218 assigned, free "Continuous" form has been selected to get relaxed solution. 1176 constraints equations
 219 have been created with the script using (18-23) and they were added to problem to find the optimal
 220 solution. Even though this depends on the computer's hardware, it takes around 1-2 minutes with a
 221 laptop which has 8gb Ram, and 4 core processor. Thus, it is quite fast for solving the problem. We
 222 used "pandas" and "PuLP" packages for Python script. Basically, the algorithm is as follows: script
 223 reads the stored data from excel, creates the optimization problem, and constraints then solves it
 224 using "CBC" solver. After calculating the coefficients, (15) is solved where p is taken as 5.5 € cents as
 225 the average electricity distribution price in Finland [30] and the results are summarized in Table A in
 226 Appendix.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Pooled Sample Observations, 2013–2015

	Inputs		Desirable output	Undesirable output
	SC (%)	OPEX (k €)	ES (GWh)	CML (k mins)
2013				
Mean	47.27	3,015.51	619.92	14,299.67
Stdev.	25.60	5,674.63	1,200.07	45,908.75
Minimum	3.04	35.35	16.67	0.81
Maximum	100.00	32,156.33	7,492.00	300,711.21
2014				
Mean	48.65	2,891.61	616.07	5,367.14
Stdev.	25.46	5,021.57	1,189.88	14,184.51
Minimum	3.23	55.30	16.38	1.90
Maximum	100.00	25,616.35	7,425.00	85,712.50
2015				
Mean	50.34	3,134.97	613.64	14,575.97
Stdev.	25.27	5,857.64	1,177.45	56,013.63
Minimum	3.30	71.00	15.84	6.18
Maximum	100.00	29,906.08	7,283.00	448,823.76

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Table 2. Coefficients Of (16) Per Each Year

	2013	2014	2015
l	16.3252	0.007764978	0.017882857
α_1	0	0	0
α_2	-7E-10	0.24284221	0.27902876
β_1	-1	-0.99987881	-1
γ_1	0	0.000121188	0
α_{11}	0	0	0
α_{22}	-1E-10	0.050119522	0.020527845
β_{11}	0	-1.977E-07	0
γ_{11}	0	-1.977E-07	0
α_{12}	0	0	0
δ_{11}	0	0	0
δ_{21}	0	0.000204027	0
η_{11}	0	0	0
η_{21}	0	0.000204027	0
μ_{11}	0	-1.977E-07	0

232

233 The shadow price for each DSO stands for the price of one minute of interruption in terms of
 234 operational expenses. At this point, the main idea is to increase the desirable output by one unit while
 235 decreasing the undesirable output by one unit at the same time. The shadow price of electricity
 236 outages in 2015 is shown in Fig. 1. As it can be seen from Fig.1, in 2015, Muonion Sähkösuuskunta
 237 (0.035 € cents), PKS Sähkösiirto Oy (0.066 € cents), Valkeakosken Energia Oy (0.108 € cents), and
 238 Vetelin Sähkölaitos Oy (0,135 € cents) have least shadow prices, while Forssan Verkkopalvelut Oy,
 239 LE-Sähköverkko Oy, Helen Sähköverkko Oy and JE-Siirto Oy have the highest shadow prices with a
 240 figure of 0.482 € cents/minute each. As a result of the analysis, we see that shadow prices of one
 241 minute of outage for the majority of the DSOs change between 0.4 – 0.5 € cents for the years 2013 –
 242 2015. It should be noted that as CML decreases incrementally, the shadow price will increase.
 243 Therefore, the findings of this analysis give the lowest costs incurred due to the interruptions. This is
 244 valuable information since it provides the lowest boundary for the cost estimations for the network
 245 operators. In addition, as we mentioned in the methodology, the shadow prices are determined
 246 according to the directional vector g . The vector shows the incremental expansion or contraction of
 247 the outputs. Shadow prices will be affected by changing directional vectors. In this analysis, we only
 248 used $g(1,1)$. However, the directional vectors $g(1,0)$ and $g(0,-1)$ could also be used depending on the
 249 purpose whether the outputs will expand, contract or remain the same.

250 In Finland, by law, DSOs are obligated to pay certain customer compensations varying by annual
 251 customer interruption times [31]. According to this legislation, in case of a single outage event exceeds
 252 the allowable limit, the operator is supposed to pay the corresponding percentage of the annual
 253 electric power delivery fee back to the customer. The maximum amount of compensation to be paid
 254 to a single customer is limited to 1,200 €/year. Table 4 summarizes the standard customer
 255 compensation scheme applied in Finland. In theory, the amount of compensation should not be lower
 256 than the bad revenue (in our case the cost of power outage) which is calculated by shadow price of
 257 undesirable output times the undesirable output (CML) as in (26).

$$R = qb \quad (26)$$

258 To suggest a simpler comparison between the shadow pricing of power interruptions and
 259 standard compensations, let us define compensation price as follows:
 260

$$comp = \frac{\text{Standard compensation paid by the DSO}}{CML} \quad (27)$$

261 The compensation cost is calculated in euros per each minutes lost as an interruption. The result
 262 of the year 2015 is summarized in Figure 2. We can see that majority of the Finnish DSOs did not pay
 263 any compensations at all during 2015 in accordance with the legislation in Table IV. Most of the
 264 compensation prices range from 0.1€ cent/outage minutes to 1 € cent/outage minutes, while for
 265 Rantakairan Sähkö Oy compensation price exceeds 5 € cents. Finally, to see that results better, the
 266 comparison between the shadow prices and the compensation prices for Finnish DSOs in year 2015
 267 is presented in Figure 3. Figure 2 shows us that among 78 Finnish DSOs, only 35 of those paid
 268 compensations during 2015. This observation is directly related to the fairness concerns of the
 269 customer compensation scheme in Finland.
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



Figure 1. Shadow Price (€ in cents) of One Minute of Interruption for 2015

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Table 4. The Standard Customer Compensations According to the Legislation Accepted In 2013

Standard Customer Compensation	
Outage duration (h)	Compensation (%)
12-24	10
24-72	25
72-120	50
120-192	100
192-288	150
>288	200


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Figure 2. Compensation Price of One Minute of Interruption for 2015 (€ cents)



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Figure 3. Comparison of Compensation price vs. Shadow price

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4. Discussion & Conclusions

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The continuity of electric power supply is a necessity to run critical infrastructures such as transportation, telecommunications, health, finance as well as to keep industry production, public services and daily activities running. As electrification of energy systems continue and more intermittent sources are connected to the power grid, the significance of supply security increases in many folds. At this point, understanding the economic impacts of power interruptions from a macro perspective becomes crucial. Estimating value of lost load (VoLL) and the worth of energy not supplied (ENS) is a must both for the authorities and for the network operators. Customer surveys are the most commonly used approach to assess these phenomena. However, being time consuming, requiring extensive labour to prepare and carry out questionnaires and high costs are the main disadvantages of the customer surveys. Moreover, the problem of zero responses and strategic responses is a critical challenge for the ones carrying out these studies. Human behaviour becomes a major issue for the researchers to consider when they adopt customer survey methodology [4]. Shadow pricing technique could be assessed as one of the indirect analytical methods. To introduce a different perspective to the phenomenon from a DSO point of view, in this paper, the authors present the method of shadow pricing of power outages which solely relies on publicly available analytical data rather than survey questionnaires. By this way, cost estimation can be done by only using publicly available and objective analytical data such as number of customers, share of cabling in the distribution system, energy supplied to the low voltage customers and SAIDI. Nevertheless, the major advantage of reaching customer specific results via the customer survey methodology is not applicable here. The shadow pricing technique yields average results, which omits sectoral differences in power consumption and customer interruption costs. One should remember that the cost of one minute of interruption for a residential customer and the same cost for an industry customer will be different. In addition, this cost will vary considerably among sub-sectors of the same sector such as textile, construction, chemical, pharmaceuticals etc. within the industry sector. In order

307 to reach customer specific outage cost estimations, the network operators should share sector and
308 customer specific energy consumption data.

309 This study makes use of analytical data shared by 78 Finnish DSOs which provide 99% of the
310 energy to the low voltage customers in Finland. There are numerous studies in the literature that
311 evaluate the interruption costs phenomenon from the customer point of view. However, this paper
312 is not assessing the customer's VoLL, rather this paper evaluates the problem from the DSO
313 perspective, so that each DSO will be able to have an idea about their interruption losses in a fast and
314 straightforward manner. This information is needed for future planning of power system, enhancing
315 the existing infrastructure and paying the standard compensations purposes. In some countries such
316 as United Kingdom, and Finland, to protect the customers, the DSOs are obliged to pay certain
317 compensations in case of interruptions. In Finland, the electricity law states that if a single time
318 interruption event is between 12 – 24 hours, then the DSO pays 10% of the annual electricity delivery
319 fee back to the customer. Let's assume that a typical Finnish household's annual delivery fee be
320 around 94 euros per year [32]. In case of a 20-hour interruption, the value of one minute of
321 interruption will be 0.78 € cents / minute. We should note that the customers experiencing single time
322 interruption events less than 12 hours receive no compensation at all. When we have a look at the
323 actual compensations paid from Fig. 2, we see that only 11 DSOs pay more than 1 cent / minute. In
324 this paper, we propose that to reduce one minute of interruption, in terms of OPEX, the cost will be
325 around 0.5 € cents.

326 Another shadow pricing of power reliability study targeting 92 DSOs in France [24] follows a
327 similar approach; a distance function but not a directional distance function. The paper uses number
328 of interruption events rather than customer minutes lost as the bad output and suggests that one
329 customer interruption (>3 minutes) has a shadow price of 4.9 € of OPEX costs for rural regions, while
330 it costs 7.5 € for urban areas. We should remind that one interruption event might last days or weeks
331 depending on the fault type and repair efforts. Therefore, we believe targeting the cost of CML is
332 much more useful than targeting the cost of number of interruption events. From the results we can
333 see that even though the outage minutes correspond to certain amount of losses, some DSOs did not
334 pay any compensation at all because of the standard compensation calculation method summarized
335 in Table IV. If a single-time outage event does not exceed 12 hours, the operator is not forced to pay
336 a fine to the consumers. On the other hand, when we look at the Fig. 4, the DSOs which exceed the
337 allowed outage durations pay much more amount of compensation than the calculated amount
338 through shadow pricing method. Based on these observations, we can conclude that in Finland while
339 some of the DSOs did not offer enough compensation for the power interruptions, some DSOs over-
340 compensated the electricity outages. The main principle of the Finnish authorities is to protect
341 consumer rights and introduce them higher quality of services. However, it should be noted that
342 another major principle is fairness and Finnish DSOs should be treated fairly by designing a better
343 standard compensation scheme which will be more cost reflective. Price signals are crucial in terms
344 of providing continuous service quality and affecting future investments. The authors will continue
345 doing further analysis in relation to the customer interruption costs and standard customer
346 compensations.

347 **Author Contributions:** S. Kufeoglu carried out the reliability and customer interruption costs analysis. N.
348 Gunduz was responsible of data analysis and programming. H. Chen contributed theoretical knowledge in
349 directional distance function and shadow pricing. Finally, M. Lehtonen provided general guidance on the
350 methodology and results of the paper.

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355 **Appendix A**

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Table A. Shadow Prices of One Minute Of Interruption (€ Cents), 2013-2015

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DSO	2013	2014	2015	DSO	2013	2014	2015
Äänekosken Energia Oy	0.454	0.449	0.457	Lehtimäen Sähkö Oy	0.457	0.461	0.443
Alajärven Sähkö Oy	0.447	0.466	0.278	Leppäkosken Sähkö Oy	0.457	0.470	0.468
Caruna Espoo Oy	0.462	0.472	0.474	LE-Sähköverkko Oy	0.477	0.481	0.482
Caruna Oy	0.348	0.447	0.439	Mäntsälän Sähkö Oy	0.458	0.474	0.467
Ekenäs Energi Ab	0.477	0.470	0.471	Muonion Sähköosuuskunta	0.426	0.343	0.035
Elenia Oy	0.295	0.445	0.209	Naantalin Energia Oy	0.479	0.479	0.481
Enontekiön Sähkö Oy	0.000	0.357	0.337	Nurmijärven Sähköverkko Oy	0.463	0.474	0.469
ESE-Verkko Oy	0.480	0.482	0.479	Nykarleby Kraftverk Ab	0.429	0.422	0.426
Esse Elektro-Kraft Ab	0.416	0.452	0.286	Oulun Energia Siirto ja Jakelu Oy	0.468	0.470	0.472
Etelä-Suomen Energia Oy	0.364	0.399	0.433	Oulun Seudun S. Verkkopalvelut Oy	0.452	0.467	0.443
Forssan Verkkopalvelut Oy	0.481	0.482	0.482	Outokummun Energia Oy	0.457	0.432	0.462
Haminan Energia Oy	0.478	0.480	0.476	Paneliankosken Voima Oy	0.414	0.472	0.466
Haukiputaan Sähköosuuskunta	0.471	0.474	0.478	Parikkalan Valo Oy	0.179	0.444	0.349
Helen Sähköverkko Oy	0.483	0.483	0.482	Pellon Sähkö Oy	0.465	0.449	0.440
Herrfors Nät-Verkko Oy Ab	0.347	0.433	0.384	PKS Sähkönsiirto Oy	0.376	0.376	0.066
Iin Energia Oy	0.477	0.478	0.459	Pori Energia Sähköverkot Oy	0.386	0.440	0.449
Imatran Seudun Sähkönsiirto Oy	0.268	0.448	0.394	Porvoon Sähköverkko Oy	0.399	0.439	0.449
Järvi-Suomen Energia Oy	0.242	0.438	0.319	Raahen Energia Oy	0.482	0.480	0.481
Jeppo Kraft Andelslag	0.454	0.453	0.445	Rantakairan Sähkö Oy	0.465	0.466	0.456
JE-Siirto Oy	0.481	0.480	0.482	Rauman Energia Oy	0.445	0.475	0.463
Jylhän Sähköosuuskunta	0.457	0.474	0.435	Rovakaira Oy	0.413	0.452	0.431

Karhu Voima Oy	0.481	0.477	0.464	Rovaniemen Verkko Oy	0.480	0.480	0.474
Kemin Energia Oy	0.478	0.479	0.467	Sallila Sähkönsiirto Oy	0.434	0.466	0.465
Keminmaan Energia Oy	0.446	0.478	0.371	Savon Voima Verkko Oy	0.175	0.287	0.146
KENET Oy	0.469	0.473	0.476	Seiverkot Oy	0.470	0.475	0.476
Keravan Energia Oy	0.472	0.468	0.479	Tampereen Sähköverkko Oy	0.449	0.478	0.450
Keuruun Sähkö Oy	0.355	0.414	0.378	Tenergia Oy	0.405	0.427	0.391
Koillis-Lapin Sähkö Oy	0.371	0.445	0.447	Tornion Energia Oy	0.469	0.473	0.447
Koillis-Satakunnan Sähkö Oy	0.441	0.443	0.415	Tornionlaakson Sähkö Oy	0.418	0.463	0.436
Kokemäen Sähkö Oy	0.425	0.466	0.468	Tunturiverkko Oy	0.443	0.451	0.412
Köyliön-Säkylän Sähkö Oy	0.452	0.469	0.473	Turku Energia Sähköverkot Oy	0.469	0.481	0.481
Kronoby Elverk Ab	0.440	0.410	0.459	Vaasan Sähköverkko Oy	0.417	0.430	0.434
KSS Verkko Oy	0.454	0.455	0.470	Vakka-Suomen Voima Oy	0.352	0.458	0.430
Kuopion Sähköverkko Oy	0.481	0.481	0.478	Valkeakosken Energia Oy	0.476	0.476	0.108
Kuoreveden Sähkö Oy	0.445	0.468	0.418	Vantaan Energia Sähköverkot Oy	0.479	0.480	0.481
Kymenlaakson Sähköverkko Oy	0.375	0.426	0.391	Vatajankosken Sähkö Oy	0.419	0.455	0.451
Lammaisten Energia Oy	0.457	0.473	0.475	Verkko Korpela Oy	0.323	0.253	0.378
Lankosken Sähkö Oy	0.274	0.410	0.384	Vetelin Sähkölaitos Oy	0.431	0.474	0.135
Lappeenrannan Energiaverkot Oy	0.401	0.455	0.437	Vimpelin Voima Oy	0.359	0.446	0.360

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