Article
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Game Analysis of Low Carbonization for Urban Logistics Service Systems
Version 1
: Received: 6 January 2017 / Approved: 9 January 2017 / Online: 9 January 2017 (03:29:14 CET)
A peer-reviewed article of this Preprint also exists.
Guo, J.; Ma, S. Game Analysis of Low Carbonization for Urban Logistics Service Systems. Math. Comput. Appl. 2017, 22, 12. Guo, J.; Ma, S. Game Analysis of Low Carbonization for Urban Logistics Service Systems. Math. Comput. Appl. 2017, 22, 12.
Abstract
To improve carbon efficiency for urban logistics service system composed of a third-party logistics service provider (3PLs) and an e-business enterprise, low-carbon operation game between them was studied. Considering low carbon technology investment cost and sales expansion effect of low carbon level, profit functions for both players were constituted. Based on their different bargaining capabilities, totally 5 types of game scenarios were designed. Through analytical solution, Nash Equilibria under varied scenarios were obtained. By analyzing these equilibria, 4 major propositions were given, in which, some key variables and system performance index were compared. Results show that the best system yields could only be achieved under the fully cooperative situation; limited cooperation only for carbon emission reduction would not benefit the system performance improvement; E-business enterprise-leading game’s performance overtook 3PLs-leading ones.
Keywords
3PLs; E-business enterprise; low carbonization; game theory; Nash Equilibria
Subject
Business, Economics and Management, Business and Management
Copyright: This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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